1.

Quasi-Legislative Powers v Quasi-Judicial Power

Quasi-Legislative Power is the authority delegated by the law-making body to the

administrative agency to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions
of a law and implement legislative policy. On the other hand, Quasi-Judicial Power refers
to the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself.

2. 7 Cardinal Principles (based on Ang Tibay ruling)

Ang Tibay v. CIR lays down the seven (7) cardinal rights, to wit:
1. Right to hearing (include the right of a party to present his won case and subit
evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. Decision must be supported by evidence;
4. Evidence must be substantial. Substantial Evidence are those relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable would opine otherwise;
5. Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. Independent consideration of judge(must not simply accept the views of a
subordinate); and
7. Decision rendered in such a manner as to let the parties know the various issues
involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.
Digests:
1. Ang Tibay v CIR , G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

FACTS:

Representative of Ang Tibay, Toribio Teodoro, claimed that there was a shortage of
leather soles in Ang Tibay resulting to temporarily lay off of the members of the National
Labor Union Inc.
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer

union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable
in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration
of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the
motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest
of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of
this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court
of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be
observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of
the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident
that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated
in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than
a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to
it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take
cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions
of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that
the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of
labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties
and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4,
ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity
and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share
of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation
for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and
compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of
this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In
the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law.
ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct.
906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598,
"the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This
principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81
Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products,
6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33
S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct.
220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83
Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter
be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of
the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such
delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the
by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all
the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books
of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union
of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the
exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay
and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we
have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be
and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

2. Ynot v IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades
"Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626
and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to
strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which
upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on
certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of
the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not
by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing
of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated
otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential

decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was
issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No.
6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was
unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that
were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the
grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase
that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve
resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in
precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule
was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a
proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of
1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may
require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of
due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of
the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were,
to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing
sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting
Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise
that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any
of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they
thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is
now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at
Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to
all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of
the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair
play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those
who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half
must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of
the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights
of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal
or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there
are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the
admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may
be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect
the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of
the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the
power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and
is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the
three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him
even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond
the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is
a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the
property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power
is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call
for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No.
626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason,
as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos
and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for
energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional
beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken
steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law

regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a
deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted
thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he
appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a
valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then
badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in
turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals
and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or
draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the
community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao,
as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so
is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt
that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years
old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing
their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the
live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself,
as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken
in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only.
20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of
the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se
as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only
but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized
that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see
fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the
said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply
the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who
confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive
order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and
it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the
trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence,
for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he
saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the
challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We
commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended
in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in
the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on
the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the
role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by
those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except

as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas
bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

3. Lim v Gamosa, G.R. No. 193964, December 2, 2015

While we recognize the rights of our Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) as determined in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), we
delineate, in this case, the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) as provided in Section 661 of the IPRA.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 which denied the
petition for certiorari of petitioners Engr. Ben Y. Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation,
Palawan Aquaculture Corporation, and Peninsula Shipyard Corporation. Affirmed, then,
is the Resolution3 of the NCIP in NCIP Case No. RHO 4-01-2006.

Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista, Coron,

Palawan, represented by individual respondents Fernando P. Aguido, Ernesto Cinco,
Bobencio Mosquera, Jurry Carpiano, Victor Balbutan, Nordito Alberto, Edeng Pesro,
Claudina Baquid, Nonita Salva, and Nanchita Alberto, filed a petition before the NCIP
against petitioners for "Violation of Rights to Free and Prior and Informed Consent
(FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for the Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order."4

Thereafter, the NCIP issued an Order dated 20 October 2006 and directing the issuance
and service of summons, and setting the preliminary conference and initial hearing on the
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order on 22 November 2006 and the
conduct of an ocular inspection of the subject area on the following day, 23 November
2006.

Despite a motion to dismiss being a prohibited pleading under the NCIP Administrative
Circular No. 1-03, petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds:

1)
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because [petitioners] are not
members of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples;
� �
2)
Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners], because summons were served by
mail rather than by personal service;
� �
3)
Lack of cause of action, because there is no allegation in the petition or document
attached thereto showing that [respondents] were indeed authorized by the purported
Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community, and no Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
has as yet been issued over the claim; [and]
� �
4)
Violation of the rule against forum shopping because [respondents] have already filed
criminal cases also based on the same alleged acts before the Municipal Trial Court of
Coron-Busuanga.5
Not contented with their filing of a Motion to Dismiss, petitioners, by way of special
appearance, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, arguing that "considering the nature
of the issues raised [in the Motion to Dismiss], particularly, the issue on jurisdiction, it is
imperative that the [Motion to Dismiss] be resolved first before other proceedings could
be conducted in the instant case."6

On 30 November 2006, the NCIP issued a Resolution7 denying the motion to dismiss.
While affirming that a Motion to Dismiss is prohibited under Section 29 of the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP, the NCIP squarely ruled that: (1) it
had jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents; (2) it acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of petitioners; (3) it was premature to rule on the issue of lack of cause of action;
and (4) respondents did not violate the rule on forum shopping.8

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari before the appellate court, seeking to reverse, annul and set aside the NCIP's
twin resolutions for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

As previously stated, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed
the resolutions of the NCIP. The appellate court echoed the NCIP's stance that from the
wording of Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP was bestowed with an all-encompassing
grant of jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and that the
requirement in the proviso contained in the section, i.e., obtaining a certification from the
Council of Elders/Leaders that the parties had exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary law prior to the filing of an action, applied only to instances where both
parties were members of an ICC/IP.

The NCIP also cited Section 14 of its own Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
Before the NCIP which provides exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies under customary laws, such as where one of the parties is: (1)
either a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a
public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his
official functions; and (2) a non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/ICC. In all, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the NCIP's resolution that when a claim or dispute involves
rights of the IPs/ICCs, the NCIP has jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the
opposing party is a non-IP/ICC.

Adamant, petitioners appeal to us by a petition for review on certiorari, echoing the same
issues raised before the appellate court:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT x x x THE [NCIP HAS] JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION x x x;

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

SERIOUS ERRORS IN HOLDING THAT x x x THE [NCIP] ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PETITIONERS; and

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

IN HOLDING THAT x x x RESPONDENTS HAVE CAUSE/S OF ACTION AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS.9
Notably, petitioners have dropped their issue that respondents are guilty of forum
shopping.

At the outset, we note that none of the petitioners, the NCIP, and the appellate court have
proffered an argument, and opined, on the specific nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP,
whether such is primary and concurrent with courts of general jurisdiction, and/or
original and exclusive, to the exclusion of regular courts.
In the main, petitioners argue that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the petition
filed by respondents because they (petitioners) are non-IPs/ICCs. Essentially, they
interpret the jurisdiction of the NCIP as limited to claims and disputes involving rights of
IPs/ICCs where both opposing parties are IPs/ICCs.

On the other hand, the NCIP and the appellate court rely mainly on the wording of
Section 66 of the IPRA and the averred purpose for the law's enactment, "to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral land and to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people."10
According to the two tribunals, "[a]ny interpretation that would restrict the applicability
of the IPRA law exclusively to its members would certainly leave them open to
oppression and exploitation by outsiders."11 The NCIP and the appellate court maintain
that Section 66 does not distinguish between a dispute among members of ICCs/IPs and a
dispute involving ICC/IP members and non-members. Thus, there is no reason to draw a
distinction and limit the NCIP's jurisdiction over "all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs."12 Effectively, even without asseverating it, the two tribunals interpret the
statutory grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP as primary, original and exclusive, in all cases
and instances where the claim or dispute involves rights of IPs/ICCs, without regard to
whether one of the parties is non-IP/ICC.

In addition, the NCIP promulgated its rules and regulations such as NCIP Administrative
Circular No. 1-03 dated 9 April 2003, known as the "Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedure Before the NCIP," and Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, known
as "The 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples." Sections 5 and 1, respectively of both the 2003 and 2014 Administrative
Circular, Rule III, provide for the jurisdiction of the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer
(RHO), thus:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases
pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including
but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of
ICCs/IPs;

Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws

or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
We first dispose of the primordial question on the nature and scope of the NCIP's
jurisdiction as provided in the IPRA. Specifically, the definitive issue herein boils down
to whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs or
primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive, to the
exclusion of the regular courts, on all matters involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

We are thus impelled to discuss jurisdiction and the different classes thereof.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the Constitution and by statute, to
hear and decide a case.13 The authority to decide a cause at all is what makes up
jurisdiction.

Section 66 of the IPRA, the law conferring jurisdiction on the NCIP, reads:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however,
That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied).
The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with state policy averred in the IPRA
which recognizes and promotes all the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of the
constitution. Such is likewise reflected in the mandate of the NCIP to "protect and
promote the interest and wellbeing of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and[,] institutions".14
In connection thereto, from Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank,15 we
learned that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court
would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may
exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.

Plainly, the NCIP is the "primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and
well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their
rights thereto."16 Nonetheless, the creation of such government agency does not per se
grant it primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding the regular courts
from taking cognizance and exercising jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights
of ICCs/IPs.

Recently, in Unduran et al. v. Aberasturi et al.,17 we ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA
does not endow the NCIP with primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the qualifying proviso, we
held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes occur only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Since two of the
defendants therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts had jurisdiction over the
complaint in that case.

In his concurring opinion in Unduran, Justice Jose P. Perez submits that the jurisdiction
of the NCIP ought to be definitively drawn to settle doubts that still linger due to the
implicit affirmation done in The City Government ofBaguio City, et al. v. Atty.
Masweng, et al.18 of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are not
ICCs/IPs.

In Unduran and as in this case, we are hard pressed to declare a primary and/or exclusive
and original grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs where there is no clear intendment by the legislature.

Significantly, the language of Section 66 is only clear on the nature of the claim and
dispute as involving rights of ICCs/IPs, but ambiguous and indefinite in other respects.
While using the word "all" to quantify the number of the "claims and disputes" as
covering each and every claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs, Section 66
unmistakably contains a proviso, which on its face restrains or limits the initial generality
of the grant of jurisdiction.

Unduran lists the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP: (1) the claim and
dispute involve the right of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. Both elements must be present prior to the
invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.

Thus, despite the language that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, we cannot be confined to that first alone and
therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and disputes to
the exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the intention of the legislative that: (1) the
NCIP exercise primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the regular courts be excluded from
taking cognizance of, claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature
could have easily done so as in other instances conferring primary, and original and
exclusive jurisdiction to a specific administrative body. We will revert to this point
shortly but find it pertinent to first discuss the classes of jurisdiction.

Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and
authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon
a matter by virtue of its specific competence.19 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy which
falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence.20 In one
occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or should not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before
the question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory
statute administered.21 The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after
an administrative agency has determined some question arising in the proceeding before
the court.22
Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction.23 It
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in
such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.24 In some instances, the Constitution and statutes grant
the administrative body primary jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized
government agencies or the regular courts, such as the distinct kinds of jurisdiction
bestowed by the Constitution and statutes on the Ombudsman.

The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of

Justice25 delineated primary and concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to original and
exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the Constitution and statutes26 on the Ombudsman
concurrent, albeit primary, with the Department of Justice.

Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz.:

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute
cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power
to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution
provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770,
otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.

Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the
Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990, entitled,
Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging

any public officer or employee including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or
administrative proceedings, or both.

For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal

offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed,
is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute, such
cases.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case

may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by
any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or
as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct
exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable
by the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is
only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence
of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of
the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the
authority to investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that
the Court will first dwell on the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1),
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of
the government, the investigation of such cases.

That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in
several decisions of the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the

Court expressly declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of
investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.

Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the
Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any
stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of
the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.

In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation
in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.

A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the
Ombudsman, under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has
jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and
duty to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials"
(Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 1[3]).
The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the
Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to
recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 1[3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of
the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with
or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither
should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant
to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in
the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special
office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether
or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of
the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section
13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a
special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were
confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to,
the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring
from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter
where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the
Ombudsman, is greatest.

At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the
Cojuangco, Jr. case and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than
real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of the powers of the
Ombudsman to investigate.

In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, that while it may be true that the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of
any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary
and not an exclusive authority, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as
we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority "is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged."

Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and
amended information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do
not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo; 191 SCRA
545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of
illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e.; any crime imputed to a
public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged, i.e.; the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information.

In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice
in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.

In Natividad v. Felix, a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it
is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation over his case for alleged Murder, the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo v.
Domagas and Sanchez v. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need
for tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since
the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the
former.

In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject
matter, has been in a state of flux.

These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, - the
first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres.
Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860;
and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.

The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
'SEC. A. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

...

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000:
PROVIDED,

HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years
or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4(a)
(2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense
committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office and than penalty
prescribed be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000.00.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has
been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or
employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been
retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire
primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.

It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pah materia to Article XI, Sections
12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier
mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or
thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or
particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be

consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as
to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
"interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretand," or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and
13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861
must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution
was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter.
In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres.
Decree No. 1861.

R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D.
1861) likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under
paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they
must have been committed by public officers or employees in relation to their office.

In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4
of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial,
city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage,
from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation
of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may,
in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction[,] take over at any stage.
xxxx

To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation

on charges against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator
or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as
the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes
under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which
had been held in the Natividad case as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there
is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency
which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may
assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.27 (Emphasis supplied)
In contrast to our holding in Honasan II, the NCIP cannot be said to have even primary
jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP cases comparable to what the Ombudsman has in cases
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We do not find such
specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66 of the IPRA.

Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

Thus, we revert to the point on the investiture of primary and/or original and exclusive
jurisdiction to an administrative body which in all instances of such grant was explicitly
provided in the Constitution and/or the enabling statute, to wit:
1. Commission on Elections' exclusive original jurisdiction over all elections contests;28

2. Securities and Exchange Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,29 prior to its
transfer to courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court by virtue
of Section 4 of the Securities Regulation Code;
3. Energy Regulatory Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by it in the exercise of its powers,
functions and responsibilities;30

4. Department of Agrarian Reform's31 primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate

agrarian reform matters, and its exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR);32

5. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction

over disputes involving contracts of construction, whether government or private, as long
as the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration;33

6. Voluntary arbitrator's or panel of voluntary arbitrator's original and exclusive

jurisdiction over all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies;34

7. The National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC's) original and exclusive

jurisdiction over cases listed in Article 217 of the Labor Code involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural; and

8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration's primary and exclusive

jurisdiction over all deportation cases.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected
in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to govern in the lives of the
ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that customs and customary law cannot
be applied to non-IPs/ICCs since ICCs/IPs are recognized as a distinct sector of
Philippine society. This recognition contemplates their difference from the Filipino
majority, their way of life, how they have continuously lived as an organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory. The ICCs/IPs share common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, which by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority. ICCs/IPs also
include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories, or who
may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.36

In all, the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special cause
involving rights of IPs/ICCs, can only be exercised under the limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute.

To effect the IPRA and its thrust to recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within
the framework of the Constitution goes hand in hand with the IPRA's running theme of
the primary distinctiveness of customary laws, and its application to almost all aspects of
the lives of members of the IPs/ICCs, including the resolution of disputes among
ICCs/IPs. The NCIP was created under the IPRA exactly to act on and resolve claims and
disputes involving the tights of ICCs/IPs.37

Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz, the first challenge to
the IPRA, emphasizes the primacy of customs and customary law in the lives of the
members of ICCs/IPs:
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as
a source of law. Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be
applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. In other words, in the absence of
any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights
and liabilities.

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely
applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific
provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is
specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and
the laws on land titling and land registration38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once again, the primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for the
NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction and its consequent application in dispute
resolution.39 Demonstrably, the proviso in Section 66 of the IPRA limits the jurisdiction
of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs where both
parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and customary law cannot be made to apply to non-
ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction.

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction of the
NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and
authority to decide on a controversy involving, as well, rights of non-ICCs/IPs which
may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights
and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be
excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-duty
correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-
ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only
customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with
jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a
given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every
kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.

In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,40 we delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor

Arbiter and the NLRC, specifically paragraph 3 thereof, as all money claims of workers,
limited to "cases arising from employer-employee relations." The same clause was not
expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today but the Court ruled
that such was a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is
outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code x x x:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) The Labor Arbiters
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30)
working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
Unfair labor practice cases;

Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security,
medicare and maternity benefits;

Cases involving household services; and

Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Labor Arbiters."
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to
suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers
against their employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3 should not [be] read not in isolation from
but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor practices),
paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment),
paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-
employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to
employees or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs
through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of
or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other words, a
situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be [used] in clarifying the scope of
paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We
reach the above conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217,
as last amended by B.P. Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the
Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee relations," which clause was not expressly
carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed
that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their
employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to
be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an
exclusive basis. The court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of
workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise
out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or
incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which
now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money
claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee
relationship.
Clearly, the phraseology of "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" does
not necessarily grant the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves
rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the status of the parties, i.e, whether the opposing
parties are both ICCs/IPs.

In Union Glass & Container Corp., et al. v. SEC, et al.,41 we learned to view the
bestowal of jurisdiction in the light of the nature and the function of the adjudicative
body that was granted jurisdiction, thus:
This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the nature and function of the
SEC under the law. Section 4 of PD No. 902-A confers upon the latter "absolute
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations,
who are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit issued by the government
to operate in the Philippines x x x." The principal function of the SEC is the supervision
and control over corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that
investrnent in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued
for the promotion of economic development.

It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC must be exercised. Thus
the law explicitly specified and delimited its jurisdiction to matters intrinsically
connected with the regulation of corporations, partnerships and associations and those
dealing with the internal affairs of such corporations, partnerships or
associations.42ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Drawing a parallel to Union Glass,43 the expertise and competence of the NCIP cover
only the implementation and the enforcement of the IPRA and customs and customary
law of specific ICCs/IPs; the NCIP does not have competence to determine rights, duties
and obligations of non-ICCs/IPs under other laws although such may also involve rights
of ICCs/IPs. Consistently, the wording of Section 66 that "the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" plus the proviso
necessarily contemplate a limited jurisdiction over cases and disputes between IPs/ICCs.

That NCIP Administrative Circulars44 expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original
and exclusive in Sections 5 and 1, respectively of Rule III:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases
pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including
but not limited to the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(A.) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
1.) Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

xxx

5.) Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent
of ICCs/IPs;

xxx

6.) Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary

laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

xxx

8.) Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

9.) Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

is of no moment. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment.45

It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into
effect. The administrative regulation must be within the scope and purview of the law.46
The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. Indeed,
administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they
seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to
modify, the law.47

However, administrative bodies are allowed, under their power of subordinate legislation,
to implement the broad policies laid down in the statute by 'filling in' the details. All that
is required is that the regulation does not contradict, but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.48

Perforce, in this case, the NCIP's Administrative Circulars' classification of its RHO's
jurisdiction as original and exclusive, supplants the general jurisdiction granted by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 to the trial courts and ultimately, modifies and broadens the scope
of the jurisdiction conferred by the IPRA on the NCIP. We cannot sustain such a
classification.

As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City,
et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.49 and similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation
of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such
holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie
our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction, where
there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the
NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's
general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal
bounds of rights and remedies.50

Jurisprudence has held on more than one occasion that in determining which body has
jurisdiction over a case, we consider the nature of the question that is the subject of
controversy as well as the status or relationship of the parties.51

Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in respondents' petition:

4. That [respondents] are members of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities in
the Calamianes group of islands [in] Coron, Palawan;
5. That Barangay Buenavista, Coron is part of the ancestral domains of the Tagbanuas
within Cluster 1 of the Calamianes group of islands;

6. That prior to the enactment of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), they
have already filed their claim for the recognition of their ancestral domains with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources under DAO-2-93 and DAO No. 61-
91;

7. That because of the enactment of the IPRA, the Provincial Special Task Force on
Ancestral Domains (PSTFAD) recommended instead the validation of their proofs and
claims with the newly created National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) for
the corresponding issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domains Title (CADT).

8. That Sections 3.1 and 11 of the IPRA provided that the State recognizes the rights of
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) to our ancestral domains by virtue of their
Native Title and that, it was even optional on their part to request for the issuance of a
title or CADT;

9. That as such, it was not even required that they have to obtain first a CADT before
their rights to their ancestral domains be recognized;

10. That furthermore, their free and prior informed consent (FPIC) are required before
any person or entity, whether private or government can enter or undertake any activity
within their ancestral domains;

11. That in order to ensure that their rights to FPIC are not violated, Section 59 of the
IPRA provides that the NCIP had to issue first a Certification Precondition (CP) that their
consent had been elicited first;

12. That their Free and Prior Informed Consent was not elicited by [petitioners] Engr.
Ben Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation, Palawan Aquaculture Corporation and Peninsula
Shipyard Corporation when they unlawfully entered and occupied portions of their
ancestral domains [in] Sitio Makwaw and Sitio Minukbay Buenavista, Coron, Palawan at
a time when the IPRA was already operative;

13. That the workers of the abovenamed persons had destroyed the houses of [their] tribal
members, coerced some to stop from cultivating their lands and had set up houses within
the said portions of their ancestral domains;

14. That the unlawful intrusion and occupation of [petitioners] within the aforesaid
portions of their ancestral domains and their violation of the rights of [respondents] to
Free and Prior and Informed Consent and the criminal acts committed by [petitioners']
workers had cause (sic) incalculable sufferings among [respondents] x x
x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In their petition before the NCIP, respondents alleged: (1) their status as Tagbanuas,
claiming representation of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities in the
Calamianes Group of Islands in Coron, Palawan; (2) the provision in the law which
recognizes native title of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous persons; (3)
that they have already filed their claim for the recognition of their ancestral domains with
the DENR; (4) that they have yet to obtain a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT) from the NICP which, under the IPRA, is the agency tasked to validate their
claim; (5) the purported violation of petitioners of their rights to free and prior and
informed consent; and (6) that petitioners unlawfully intruded and occupied respondents'
ancestral domains.

From their allegations in the petition, such call to the fore: (1) respondents' lack of
CADT; and (2) the status of petitioners as non-ICCs/IPs and petitioners' apparent
ignorance that respondents are IPs, and their claim of ancestral domain over the subject
property.

It should be noted that a bare allegation that one is entitled to something is not an
allegation but a conclusion.53 Such allegation adds nothing to the pleading, it being
necessary to plead specifically the facts upon which such conclusion is founded.54 Rule 8
of the Rules of Court, entitled "Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings" requires in
Section 1, as a general rule, for "[e]very pleading [to] contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts."

Respondents' status as Tagbanuas, as indigenous persons or members of an indigenous

cultural community, is not an ultimate fact from which respondents can anchor the rights
they claim to have been violated by petitioners.

In this case, respondents' petition, as written, does not mention ultimate facts that lead to
the conclusion that (1) they are Tagbanuas, and (2) they are the representatives of the
Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts
showing acts or omissions on the part of petitioners which constitute a violation of
respondents' rights.

We elucidate.

In this case, respondents allege that prior to the enactment of the IPRA, they have
previously applied for recognition of their ancestral domain with the DENR under DENR
Administrative Order No. 2-93 and No. 61-91; and with the advent of the IPRA, it was no
longer required that they first obtain a CADT. However, una voce, they aver that it has
been recommended that they validate "their proofs and claims" with the NCIP for the
issuance of a CADT. The allegation itself goes against respondents' conclusions that they
are Tagbanuas.

Such a pronouncement does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership even
without a paper title and that the CADT is merely a formal recognition of native title.55
This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
SEC. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned
ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
And along those lines, we have subsequently held in Lamsis, et al. v. Dong-e56 that:
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the
NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's
claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the
purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral land. Just like a registration
proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but
only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his
predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time
immemorial.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, the allegation that respondents are Tagbanuas and that they are
representatives of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities are conclusions of
their status not derived from facts that should have been alleged. Indeed, respondents did
not even attempt to factually demonstrate their authority to represent the Tagbanua
Indigenous Cultural Community. This is crucial since intra IPs' conflicts and contest for
representation are not impossible.

In that regard, Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines "customary laws" as "a body of written
and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually
recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs" Section 3(i), on the other
hand, refers to "indigenous political structures" consisting of "organizational and cultural
leadership systems, institutions, relationships, patterns and processes for decision making
and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders,
Council of Timuays, Bodong Holders, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature." To
establish their status as Tagbanuas or their representation as representatives of Tagbanua
Indigenous Cultural Community, respondents, as "plaintiffs" claiming relief under the
IPRA, should have alleged the ultimate facts constitutive of their customs, political
structures, institutions, decision making processes, and such other indicators of
indigenous persons nature distinct and native to them.

Truly, respondents should have asserted their identification through a reduction into facts
of the defmition and description of an ICC/IP in the IPRA:
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogenous societies identified by self ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political,
social and cultural inroads of colonization, non indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may
have resettled outside their ancestral domains[.]58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, the right of ancestral property requires historical proof which, of course, must
proceed from allegations in the petition. As noted in the separate opinion of former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Sec of Environment & Natural Resources,59 the
IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs rights over ancestral domains and ancestral lands where land is
the central element of the IPs' existence, viz.:
x x x There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among
the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or
to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land
reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the
concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present
generation but the future ones as well.

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the
gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. Customary law
has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a
group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by
residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system
of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence
and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who
are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden
farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial
grounds should be communally-owned. For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right
to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared
in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions
individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a
limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner
has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an
exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. Under Kalinga customary law,
the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family,
or loss of crops. Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member
before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-
member of the ili.

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The
concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if
not inexistent.60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the IPRA, ancestral domains and ancestral lands are two concepts, distinct and
different from one another:
a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents made no allegation outlining and tracing the history of their indigenous
ownership of domain and land.

To further highlight the necessity of respondents' allegation of their status as Tagbanuas

is the stewardship concept of property which is most applicable to land among the
Philippine IP:62
Land is not an individual item which a man owns for himself and by himself. For he
secures the rights to land in two ways: Firstly, as a citizen of the tribe he is entitled to
some arable land and building land, and to the use of public pasturage, fishing waters,
and wild products. Secondly, in all tribes except those who shift their gardens widely and
have an abundance of land, he gets rights from membership of a village and a group of
kinsfolk. That is, a man's right to land in the tribal home depends upon his accepting
membership of a tribe, with all its obligations. The right of every subject, while he is a
subject, is jealously safeguarded.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is also significant to note that respondents do not identify themselves with other
Tagbanuas who have been awarded a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim as of
1998.64

Palpably, in the factual milieu obtaining herein, the NCIP does not have ipso facto
jurisdiction over the petition of respondents just by the mere expedient that their petition
involves rights of ICCs/IPs.

One other thing jumps out from all the discussions herein: the IPRA does not contain a
repeal of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 limiting the general jurisdiction of the trial, courts
even as the IPRA purportedly grants the NCIP jurisdiction over "all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs."

Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No. 410,
Executive Order Nos. 122B and 122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does
state that "all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly," such an implied
repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict
must be found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws refer to different subject matters,
albeit the IPRA includes the jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts
between parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may still fall within the general jurisdiction of
the regular courts dependent on the allegations in the complaint or petition and the status
of the parties.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in
instances where, among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute
involves their rights, and the specific wording of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 129,
Sections 19-2165 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts,
and Sections 33-3566 on the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and
unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest from the language
of Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the words "primary" and/or
"original and exclusive" to describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" and (2) contained a proviso requiring certification
that the parties have exhausted their remedies provided under customary laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular
courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the
governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the
law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

All told, we rule that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants jurisdiction to the NCIP
over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, requires that the opposing
parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their customs and
customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. The validity of
respondents' claim is another matter and a question that we need not answer for the
moment. Too, we do not resolve herein the other issues raised by petitioners given that
we already declared that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the case of respondents
against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98268 dated 26 April 2010 and the Resolution of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples in RHO 4-01-2006 dated 30 November 2006 are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.

The petition in RHO 4-01-2006 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Section 1 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1,
Series of 2014, promulgated on 9 October 2014 declaring the jurisdiction of the Regional
Hearing Officer as original and exclusive is declared VOID for expanding the law.
Respondents may refile their complaint against petitioners in a court of general
jurisdiction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

4, Perez v LPG, G.R. No. 159149, June 26, 2006

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision1 and
Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318,
which nullified Circular No. 2000-06-010 of the Department of Energy (DOE).

The facts are undisputed.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession
for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) cylinders.3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of
P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4
On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P.
Blg. 33, thus:

SECTION 4. NO PRICE DISPLAY BOARD –

LPG Marketer/LPG Dealer/LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Reprimand/warning letter

2nd Offense - Recommend suspension of business operation to the proper local

government unit

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit and
initiate criminal proceedings

SECTION 5. NO WEIGHING SCALE –

A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

1st Offense - Fine of P5,000

2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000

2nd Offense - Fine of P7,000

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Reprimand

2nd Offense - Fine of P500.00

3rd Offense - Fine of P1,000.00

SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS.

(REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO
(2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)

A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 7. NO APPROPRIATE OR AUTHORIZED LPG SEAL

A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 8. NO TRADE NAME, UNBRANDED LPG CYLINDERS, NO SERIAL

NUMBER, NO DISTINGUISHING COLOR, NO EMBOSSED IDENTIFYING
MARKINGS ON CYLINDER OR DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN
(REQUIREMENT ON SERIAL NUMBER AND DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR
DESIGN SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS
CIRCULAR)

A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 9. UNDERFILLED LPG CYLINDERS

A. LPG REFILLER/MARKETER

1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P6,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. DEALER

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

C. LPG RETAIL OUTLET

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 10. TAMPERING, ALTERING, OR MODIFYING OF LPG CYLINDER

THRU ANY MEANS SUCH AS BUT NOT LIMITED TO CHANGING THE VALVE,
REPAINTING, AND RELABELLING BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER
THAN THE LEGITIMATE AND REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SAME. FOR THIS
PURPOSE, LPG REFILLER, MARKETER, DEALER, OR RETAIL OUTLET, AS THE
CASE MAY BE, WHO HAS POSSESSION OF SUCH ILLEGALLY TAMPERED,
ALTERED, OR OTHERWISE MODIFIED LPG CYLINDER SHALL BE HELD
LIABLE FOR THIS OFFENSE

A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

B. Dealer

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,500 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 11. UNAUTHORIZED DECANTING OR REFILLING OF LPG

CYLINDERS

1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 12. HOARDING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS INCLUDING LIQUEFIED

PETROLEUM GAS

1st Offense - Fine of P10,000 per cylinder

2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit plus the
filing of appropriate criminal action

SECTION 13. REFUSAL TO ALLOW OR COOPERATE WITH DULY

AUTHORIZED INSPECTORS OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION
BUREAU (EIAB) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN THE CONDUCT OF
THEIR INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION, WHETHER REGULAR AND ROUTINARY
OR COMPLAINT-INITIATED

1st Offense - Fine of P10,000

2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

SECTION 14. REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PAY FINE – The Department of Energy

shall recommend to the proper local government unit the closure of business of a
respondent who refuses or fails to pay any administrative fine without prejudice to the
filing of an appropriate criminal action if warranted.5

Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside
the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of
merit.

Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it
introduced new offenses not included in the law.6 The court intimated that the Circular,
in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the
maximum penalty under the law. The decretal part of its Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular
No. 2000-06-010 null and void and prohibits the respondent from implementing the
same.

SO ORDERED.7

The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

"A CLOSE SCRUTINY OF BP 33, PD 1865 AND R.A. NO. 8479 SHOWS THAT
OFFENSES LIKE NO PRICE DISPLAY [BOARD], NO WEIGHING SCALE, ETC.
SET FORTH IN THE CIRCULAR ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR IN ANY OF THE
THREE (3) LAWS".

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

"A SCRUTINY OF THE NEW SET OF PENALTIES PROVIDED BY THE
CIRCULAR SHOWS THAT THE PENALTIES THIS TIME ARE BASED ON PER
CYLINDER BASIS"; THAT "BEING SUCH, NO CEILING WAS PROVIDED FOR
AS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES"; THAT "AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE
PETITIONER, FOR JUST ONE LPG CYLINDER FOUND VIOLATING AT LEAST
SEC[TIONS] 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE [CIRCULAR], A FINE OF P24,000.00 IS
IMPOSED;" AND THAT "THIS WILL CLEARLY BE BEYOND THE P10,000.00
PROVIDED BY THE LAWS."

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

SECTION 16 OF PETITIONER’S CIRCULAR WHICH AUTHORIZES THE
IMPOSITION OF PECUNIARY PENALTIES WITH THE TOTAL FINE NOT
EXCEEDING P20,000.00 FOR RETAIL OUTLETS VIOLATES THE PENALTY
CEILING OF P10,000.00 SET UNDER BP BLG. 33, AS AMENDED.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

SINCE SECTION 5(g) OF R.A. 7638 FINDS NO REFERENCE IN DOE CIRCULAR
NO. 2000-06-010, THE SAME SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

"ON THE NEW OFFENSES INTRODUCED IN THE CIRCULAR SUCH AS
SECTIONS 4, 5, 10, 13 AND 14 AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE GRADUATED
PENALTIES ON ‘A PER CYLINDER BASIS’, THIS COURT FINDS [NO] REASON
TO DISTURB ITS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT-MOVANT EXCEEDED ITS
AUTHORITY. X X X IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT BP BLG. 33 AS
AMENDED AND P.D. 1865 ARE CRIMINAL STATUTES AND MUST BE
CONSTRUED WITH SUCH STRICTNESS AS TO CAREFULLY SAFEGUARD THE
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT."

VI
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE
ASSAILED CIRCULAR SETS NO MAXIMUM LIMIT AS TO THE FINE THAT
MAY BE IMPOSED ON AN ERRING PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHICH FACT
MOVANT CONCEDES. FOR ONE (1) CYLINDER ALONE, NOT ONLY DOES THE
CIRCULAR MAKE THE FINE EXCESSIVE TO THE EXTENT OF BEING
CONFISCATORY, BUT IT EVEN IMPOSES A PENALTY WHICH MAY EVEN GO
BEYOND THAT MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE FINE OF P50,000.00 SET BY P.D. 1865
IN ITS SEC. 4 AFTER A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING."8

To our mind, the issue raised by petitioner may be reduced to the sole issue of whether
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular null
and void, and prohibiting the Circular’s implementation.

Petitioner argues that the penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular
are sanctioned by Sections 19 and 3-A10 of B.P. Blg. 33 and Section 2311 of Republic
Act No. 8479.12 Petitioner adds that Sections 5(g)13 and 2114 of Republic Act No.
763815 also authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular.

Respondent counters that the enabling laws, B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479, do not
expressly penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the
Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638, respondent claims, since the said law does not
pertain to LPG traders. Respondent maintains that the Circular is not in conformity with
the law it seeks to implement.

We resolve to grant the petition.

For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself.16

The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal
trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products.
Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum
products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may
be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or
incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG
cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings
on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized
decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the
contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum
merchants.

As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under
B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the
acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under
the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000,17 an amount
within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the
Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless,
does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere
fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run
counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the
maximum limits of penalties.

Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts
involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the
corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent
on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the
Circular contravenes the law.

Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended
to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to
effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving
petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this
case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming
public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of

DOE is declared valid. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and prohibiting its
implementation are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.