Torres, Jeany Ann D.

231 SCRA 463 (G.R. No. 92285) March 28, 1994

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, respondents.

**Doctrine of primary jurisdiction**

FACTS: PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI) is a Philippine corporation

engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations which
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance
with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree
plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a
set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and
"wood-derivated" products.

On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported

four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia and two (2) more containers of matches
from Singapore on 19 April 1989. On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment
issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines
for the match industry at reasonable price."

On 5 May 1989, PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction
and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents
Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and
"wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing
the importations.

On 14 June 1989, AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:

(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and
not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an
importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by law for an importation
have been complied with . . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention or release of
property affected . . . . ;"

PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied. However, on
8 February 1990, on motion for reconsideration by AJIC and despite the opposition of
PTFI, the Court reconsidered its 28 July 1989 order and dismissed the case on the
ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal
importations." Thus, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the
case.

HELD: The Regional Court of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case.

PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency
of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, we held that —

. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of
the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers
v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters
or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave
abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by
PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of
AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of
Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse
to the courts by way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin
such act which is within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it
gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occasion to
rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before
us.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor,
and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.

FACTS: The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial

Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration. The
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage
of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off
the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported
by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was
but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the
breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29,
1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to
 systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or

employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining,

majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal
source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be
made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been
the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration
of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR.

HELD: NO.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court. It is more an administrative than a

part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice, which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations,
as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It
not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It shall
take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions
of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided
that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds
thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the
Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and
proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It
shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile
the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2,
section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate
and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or
locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In
fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may
employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system
of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality
here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., we had occasion to point
out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules
of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted
to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling
the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.)
And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially
regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights, which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights, which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle
emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be "substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
 confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can
the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,

render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the
by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are
of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the
reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after
considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the
main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.