Aberin, Azell Alexis F.

1st Yr.-Special Section

Writing)

July 2, 2012
Exercise No. 2 (Legal

G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioner
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;POWER.The nature of the Court of Industrial

Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
2. TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.The Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.

3. CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.There are cardinal primary rights which must be

respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
4. CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record
is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a
rational way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be

relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and
the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the decision.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of First
Instance
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Union
Claro M. Recto for petitioner Ang Tibay
Jose M. Casal for National Workers Brotherhood
DECISION on motion for reconsideration on motion for new trial.
LAUREL, J.:
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoros claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles
in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoros letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Workers Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S.,
548, petitioners printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American
origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the
motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is
not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall
proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the
nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles
which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is
more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of
views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes
of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farmlaborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the
Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by
the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper
to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by
the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting
for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum
canon or rental to be paid by the inquilinos or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In
fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor

and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
THE OPINION:
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
(Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for
the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
1129, the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain.
Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented
can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached. (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates
from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be substantial. (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; BallstonStillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct.
563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and
Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable

flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use
the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may
refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public
official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is
such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In
the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority
authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal
to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of leather material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the
National Labor Union, Inc., from work" and this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner
with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather";
that "the National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial averments "are
so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and
that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The
failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
Motion for new trial granted and cause remanded with instructions.