Distributive Justice

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Fossil Fuel, Environmental Justice, Social Justice, Procedural Justice, Inequality,

Technocracy

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Distributive Justice, Theories of

A. Kaufman, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012

Abstract
Distributive justice is concerned with the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits
of social cooperation among diverse persons with competing needs and claims.
A theory of distributive justice must set out an account of political justification
specifying the weight to be assigned to various kinds of relevant considerations
and providing an acceptable description of the standpoint from which judgments
are formed. The theory must employ these resources to justify an account of a just
distribution of social goods, determining, in the process, the priority to be assigned
to considerations such as claims of right, entitlement, efficiency, equality, fairness,
and community.

> Read full chapter

Reproductive Ethics: Perspectives on

Contraception and Abortion
E. Mulligan, M. Ripper, in International Encyclopedia of Public Health, 2008

Justice
Distributive justice is a key ethical principle that applies to the provision of social
goods including public health services. Health services are an instrumental, rather
than an absolute, good in that they are not good in and of themselves, but only
insofar as they facilitate survival, human dignity, and full citizenship. The principle of
distributive justice requires that health services be accessible to individuals according
to need and within the context of resource availability. When there are barriers pre-
venting access to contraception and abortion, distributive justice is compromised.
Access to health care is often stratified by race, class, and region. This is also true for
access to abortion and contraception. Many factors compromise access to fertility
control, including material considerations, cost, availability, and religious or national
policies.

Access to safe contraceptive and abortion services requires sufficient regulation of

providers and manufacturers to ensure safe services. However, a highly regulated
environment can compromise services. In some jurisdictions, regulatory mech-
anisms retard or restrict the distribution of contraceptives and medications and
devices used for postcoital contraception and abortion. Currently this restriction
exists in some countries in relation to RU486 despite this drug being included on
the World Health Organization's list of essential medicines for developing countries
(2005).

Access to contraception and abortion is also compromised when services are under
attack, and when service providers and/or patients are intimidated and stigmatized.
The marginalization of abortion services from mainstream health provision pro-
duces further barriers to access. These include difficulties in recruiting, training,
and sustaining a skilled workforce, which compromise the quality of services.

Stigma associated with abortion and contraception creates an environment in which

normal requirements for duty of care by medical practitioners can be compromised.
For example, where law or practice allows health workers conscientious exemption,
those practitioners who decline to provide services still have an ethical obligation to
refer the patient for these services elsewhere.

> Read full chapter

Meritocracy and Tokenism

Stephen C. Wright, Gregory D. Boese, in International Encyclopedia of the Social &
Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Meritocracy as Equity
Distributive justice involves people's evaluations of the fairness of the allocation of
desirable outcomes across people. Deutsch (1975), in his influential summary of
distributive justice, distinguished three basic principles that people endorse as fair
depending on the particular social goals that are relevant to a particular relationship
or social context (see Tyler and Smith, 1998). The principle of equality calls for the
equal distribution of resources and is widely endorsed as the default principle in so-
cial settings were cooperation and harmony are primary goals. Need calls for unequal
distribution of resources such that those who are most in need receive the larger
portions. This principle is seen as appropriate where the goals are social welfare
and responsibility. The principle of equity also calls for an unequal distribution of
resources but holds that the ratio of any individual's inputs to outcomes should be
equivalent to the same ratio of the person or persons with whom the individual
is being compared. In other words, each individual should receive resources in
proportion to their relative contributions. Some theorists have held that equity
can be understood to be the general principle of distributive justice (see Adams,
1965; Walster et al., 1973). In fact, among some economists equity and justice are
entirely conflated such that ‘equitable’ is synonymous with ‘fair.’ Although most social
psychologists would see these as overstatements, equity is widely accepted as the
preferred distributive justice principle in economic and competitive contexts (see
Tyler, 2014). Thus, in capitalistic cultures such as North American (and perhaps other
‘Western’ nations), which focus heavily on competitive and economic relationships,
the principle of equity (merit) is applied across a wide range of domains including
educational, economic, political, organizational, and interpersonal.

While equality and need are inconsistent with meritocracy, the principle of equity
serves as the primary justification for meritocracy. That is, a meritocracy is a system in
which the principle of equity is upheld and it is generally believed that if individuals
are talented enough or invest enough effort, they will receive a greater share of
system resources and will advance up the social ladder. Given the relative ubiquity
of equity as the preferred justice principle in individualistic/capitalistic cultures, it is
perhaps not surprising that meritocracy has been described as America's ‘dominant
ideology’ (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; McNamee and Miller, 2009). However, the
recognition that equity is only one of at least three possible justice principles pro-
vides a basis for understanding why meritocracy, even when it is actually realized, can
be rejected as unfair. For example, although we might find very few North American
students who would reject meritocracy at the approach for distributing grades (a
valued resource), we might find more variance in the endorsement of meritocracy
as the primary strategy for distributing a professor's time. While the best students
might garner some additional attention, most would likely agree that a teacher's
time should also be distributed more equally or perhaps on the basis of need. Thus,
despite the strong support for meritocracy as a guiding cultural worldview, there
remain contexts where meritocracy can be rejected in favor of another form for
distributive justice.

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Justice: Social Psychological Perspec-

tives
Ali Kazemi, ... Gerold Mikula, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Interactional Justice
Distributive and procedural justice has received the most attention in the literature.
But since the mid-1980s, theory and research have also emphasized the importance
of the social and informal aspects of justice in daily encounters (Bies and Moag,
1986; Greenberg, 1993; Mikula et al., 1990). Greenberg (1993) pointed out the im-
portance of considering interactional justice in justice theorizing and distinguished
between interpersonal and informational justice as two forms of interactional justice.
This has subsequently been supported by Colquitt et al. (2001; see also Colquitt,
2001). There is however some controversy concerning whether or not interactional
justice should be subsumed under the broader concept of procedural justice (Bies,
2005; Bobocel and Holmvall, 2001). Procedural and interactional justice may con-
stitute aspects of ‘fairness of treatment’ (Van den Bos, 2005).

While procedural justice is related to the formal and structural aspects (i.e., rules
and policies), interpersonal justice concerns the quality of the relationship or the
exchange and social processes taking place between people. Just as distributive
and procedural justice is defined in terms of a number of criteria or principles,
interpersonal justice is defined in terms of four main criteria: respect, truthfulness,
justification, and propriety (Bies and Moag, 1986). Information justice refers to
how allocation decisions or enacted procedures are explained to those concerned
– the type of information given or how it is given to the individuals. This gives the
impression of neutrality and increases people's trust in the authorities. Research on
information justice and its effects are very scarce (see Kazemi and Törnblom, 2009).

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Organizational Justice
Russell Cropanzano, Agustin Molina, in International Encyclopedia of the Social &
Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Distributive Justice
Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of an allocation or, more broadly,
to how people judge what they receive. It was probably the first type of justice to
gain the attention of organizational justice scholars and continues to receive wide
attention. In general, there are three rules that people can use to decide whether or
not their outcomes are fair – equity, equality, and need (Deutsch, 1985).

Equity allocations treat a fair allocation as one that pays individuals in accordance
with their contributions. There are different models of equity – Aristotle even had one
– but by far the most influential is Adams' (1965) equity theory. According to Adams,
individuals calculate equity comparing two outcome/input ratios. The first ratio is
their own outcomes divided by their own inputs, while the second is a referent's
outcomes divided by the referent's inputs. In order for equity to exist, these two
ratios should match. A counterintuitive prediction of equity theory is that people
care about overreward, as well as underreward. If an individual's ratio is larger than
that of a referent person, this means that the individual has greater outcomes given
his or her inputs. In such a circumstance, Adams found that the individual will
attempt to restore equity by either raising performance (if pay is fixed) or lowering
performance (if pay is piece rate). In general, equity theory has received support,
including predictions for overreward. But it is not the whole story.

An equality allocation provides everyone with the same amount, without regard
to contributions. Equality allocations are most likely to be used when the goal is
to maximize group harmony; equity allocations are most common when the goal
is to maximize productivity. As such, equality is relatively common among close,
communal groups. There is some evidence that equality, as opposed to equity, is also
preferred when decision making is allocating something negative, such as budget
cuts. If we must share suffering, it seems that individuals often prefer to suffer by the
same amount or percentage. Interestingly, equality may also have an information
processing advantage, as it is a very simple allocation rule that requires less effortful
thought than others. In this regard, researchers have documented the existence of
an equality heuristic, whereby people simply divide things evenly unless they have the
cognitive resources to consider a more complex norm (such as equity).

A third allocation rule is need, which provides outcomes on the basis of a perceived
deficit. Perhaps surprisingly, need allocations have been less widely studied in the
organizational sciences, although even profit-making firms make at least some use
of them. For instance, family leave policies are allocated to those who need them –
only people with particular needs (e.g., child care or elder care) receive time off.
In practice, when people are asked to make allocation decision, they often mix the
rules together, such that they are not always used in a pure form (Cugueró-Escofet
and Rosanas, 2013). For example, one strategy might be to provide ‘necessities’ or
a minimum income to all. This would be an equality allocation. However, above
this equal minimum the equity rule could be employed. In this regard, one might
use merit to allocate additional payments. Another mixed approach might be to
allocate different goods in different ways. Among American employers, for example,
socioemotional goods indicative of group standing are often allocated equally,
whereas economic goods are often allocated through equity (Chen, 1995). These and
other sorts of mixed approaches seek to balance the strengths and weaknesses of the
different allocation rules.

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Property: Legal Aspects

Peter S. Menell, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
(Second Edition), 2015

Distributive Justice
Theories of distributive justice seek to allocate society's resources on the basis of just
principles. The process of determining such principles is the focus of considerable
debate. Many theories incorporate utilitarian and Lockean principles. In perhaps,
the most influential work on distributive justice of the past century, Rawls (1971)
offers an ‘ideal contractarian’ theory of distributive shares in which a just allocation
of benefits and burdens of social life is determined by what rational persons would
choose from behind a ‘veil of ignorance,’ which prevents them from knowing what
abilities, desires, parentage, or social stratum they would occupy. Rawls concludes
that people behind such a veil would adopt what he calls the ‘difference principle’:
‘primary goods’ – not only wealth, income, and opportunity, but also bases of
self-respect – would be distributed to the maximal advantage of a representative
member of the least advantaged social class. Rawls (1993) emphasizes that the
difference principle does not call for simple egalitarianism but rather measures to
assure that “the basic needs of all citizens can be met so that they can take part in
political and social life.”

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Property Rights
M.H. Werner, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012

Property Rights and Distributive Justice

As for arguments from distributive justice, these arguments are mainly used to
assess alternative distributions of these rights if a system of property rights is already
in place. They do not primarily aim to solve the general problem of justifying the
institution of property rights as such. However, theories of just distribution can
incorporate considerations about efficiency (as is the case in Rawls’s difference
principle), and these considerations may, given empirical knowledge about the
expectable effects of alternative systems of property rights, render some of these
systems superior to others. Independent from such empirical knowledge, accounts
of distributive justice seem compatible with a wide spectrum of different definitions
of property rights; but insofar as the realization of just distributions will probably
require recurrent interferences with the outcome of unrestricted market exchange,
it will not be compatible with a libertarian notion of property rights that excludes
any such interferences.

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Intergenerational Justice
Paul Kelly, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second
Edition), 2015

Contractualism and Asymmetry

Contemporary discussions of distributive justice are synonymous with the resur-
gence of contractarian thinking under the influence of philosophers such as Rawls
(1971) and Gauthier (1986). The contract device is used for thinking about distrib-
utive questions in circumstances where the parties disagree about ultimate moral
principles. If we cannot base our obligations to one another by appeal to a common
standard such as utility maximization, we can use the idea of a rational bargain or
reasonable agreement as the basis for distributive norms and obligations. The idea
of a contract is a thought experiment that can be used to legitimize principles rather
than an actual agreement process that groups of people have to collectively engage
in. However, even as a hypothetical device the idea of a contract (in both versions
of the theory) poses a major problem because of the asymmetrical relation between
the participants in intergenerational cases.
The ‘mutual advantage’ theory argues that distributive principles can be derived from
a rational bargain between participants in a cooperative venture, such as market
society or political community. The issue of justice only arises when certain circum-
stances of justice obtain. If each individual could get everything they wanted without
cooperation there would be no need for principles of justice. The circumstances of
justice are threefold. First, (roughly) equal power among the parties. What one lacks
in strength they can make up in guile so no one is guaranteed always getting their
own way. Second, moderate scarcity of goods and motivations obtains, so that social
cooperation is necessary or at least in the interest of all. Finally, while all benefit from
the existence of social cooperation, the participants are interested in the distribution
of its benefits and burdens. As rational agents each has an interest to maximize their
share of the benefits but minimize their share of the burdens of cooperation.

The problem for the ‘mutual advantage’ theorist is that the circumstances of justice
do not unequivocally obtain between noncontinuous generations. If we use the
idea of the contract within one generation we can make sense of the idea of
rough equality of power and reciprocity as the key motivations for accepting the
distribution of the benefits and burden of social cooperation (although we might still
argue that this is a morally inappropriate way to think about justice). Yet when we
extend this idea to noncontinuous generations the weakness of the method becomes
apparent. In what way can we both speak of ourselves and future generations as part
of the same ‘cooperative’ venture? If we just concentrate on the rough equality of
power we can see how there is an asymmetrical relation between the generations.
Take an issue such as energy policy. A present generation can unilaterally impose
significant costs on future generations such as the management of toxic or nuclear
wastes. I leave aside a further case where the consequences of a present decision
are so egregious as to prevent there being a future generation. Does stopping
potential people coming into existence constitute a harm or injustice? It is clearly
possible for a present generation to take such choices without any possible negative
consequences from the future generation except perhaps disapproval and poor
historical reputation. The present generation is able unilaterally to affect the interests
of a future generation, whereas a future generation cannot unilaterally affect the
interests of the present generation, hence the asymmetry. Without rough equality
of bargaining power any contractual agreement will simply reflect the advantage
of the stronger party, in this case the present generation. If this is so, the contract
does nothing more than allow the present generation to pursue its own interests
taking account of the future only when its own reputation is at stake and when
this is of higher value than any other present interest such as standard of living.
Because of the asymmetrical relationship underlying an agreement it is unclear how
the present generation could be motivated to assume obligations to the future given
the motivational assumptions of ‘mutual advantage’ contractarianism. The contract
not only does not generate obligations to the future, but would appear to generate
reasons for ignoring such claims.

The ‘impartialist’ theory departs from many of the key features of the ‘mutual ad-
vantage’ bargain just considered. Rawls' theory introduces the idea of a hypothetical
original position in which the participants deciding which principles of justice should
shape the basic structure of their society as a fair system of social cooperation, are
shrouded by a ‘veil of ignorance.’ The point of the veil of ignorance is to filter out the
possibility of exploiting ‘positional’ advantage or inequalities of bargaining power.
By denying agents behind the veil of ignorance, information about their particular
circumstances and goals, and allowing them only general knowledge about society,
Rawls constructs an impartial choice situation. Rational self-interest plus ignorance
delivers impartiality and fairness.

Rawls' theory is a thought experiment designed to test the fairness of candidate

principles of justice. The contract with the veil of ignorance is designed to model
a fair choice situation. However, once again the asymmetry problem arises. The
agents behind the ‘veil or ignorance’ are denied information that will prevent them
from pursuing their own interests at the expense of each other. The agreement is
effectively between members of a single generation. What is to stop the participants
choosing principles in order to maximize the condition of the worst off currently
in existence that will at the same time worsen the situation of those not yet born?
In order to bring future generations into the agreement Rawls posits an additional
motive for the participants. They are expected to reason as representatives of families
who are assumed to have a concern for their descendants. Heads of families provide
the intergenerational link that overcomes the asymmetrical relations between future
generations. The problem with this strategy is that it merely concedes the problem of
asymmetry and the inability of the contract device to generate adequate obligations
to the future. At best the additional motivational assumption gives those in the
present generation a reason to take account of future generations. It does not
establish an obligation to future generations in the way that the contract does
establish obligations within one generation. The addition of the extra motivational
assumption provides a noncontractarian reason for taking account of future gener-
ations. In effect it assumes precisely what it is supposed to provide, namely a reason
for taking account of the interests of future generations.

While contractarian arguments have been central to the development of current

theories of distributive justice, they seem singularly ill-equipped to deal with issues
of justice between generations because of the asymmetrical relationship between
even hypothetical bargainers. This is a point acknowledged by Barry, one of the
most significant defenders of a neo-Rawlsian contractarianism (in Dobson, 1998b).
The key relationship of reciprocity and the equal ability of the partners to affect
the interests of each other do not apply in the case of temporally noncontinuous
generations. To overcome this, the contractarian has to appeal to noncontractarian
reasons.

> Read full chapter

Ethical Experiments
J. Johnson, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012

Justice
A basic principle of distributive justice that appears to be violated in much biomedical
experimentation is that burdens and benefits ought to be fairly shared. Significant
empirical evidence can be compiled which indicates that such equitable sharing has
not been a feature of experimentation so that the vulnerable have historically carried
significant burdens without receiving proportionate compensating benefits in
return, and those who reaped the benefits have not always contributed proportion-
ately to research. For instance, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
impoverished ward patients were involved in much human experimentation, yet the
benefits that followed from this research in terms of improved health care generally
flowed to relatively well-off private patients. In more recent times, similar issues have
arisen with respect to research undertaken in developing countries. Such research
is often intended to benefit those in the developed world rather than the developing
one, and for reasons of expense or inadequate healthcare infrastructure, there may
be no realistic prospect for any benefits obtained through research to be extended
after a trial to those communities from which the participants were drawn.

The Belmont Report, written in the wake of Tuskegee, introduced the notion of
vulnerability into discussions of research ethics by connecting it to justice. The Report
complained that it was unjust to select and recruit participants for research simply
based on administrative ease, convenience, and “their ready availability in settings
where research is conducted” rather than according to good scientific criteria – that
is, their suitability in terms of the study and its research goals. Participants in the
Tuskegee study seem to have fallen victim to this particular form of injustice because
they provided an ‘unusual opportunity’ for researchers. They were a relatively large
group of impoverished and diseased men living in close proximity, who could be
manipulated to suit the administrative requirements of the researchers. The Belmont
Report argues that such subjects should be protected from this kind of exploitation.
As noted previously, for justice in research to hold, however, it may be important
to actually include vulnerable individuals and groups such as children and pregnant
women, provided appropriate protections are in place, because if they are always
excluded, this means that although they are not burdened by research, neither do
they benefit.

> Read full chapter

Social Movements: Psychological Per-

spectives
T. Tyler, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001

2 When do People Act Collectively?

Early research on both distributive and procedural justice focused primarily upon
the feelings of the individuals who experienced justice or injustice. On this level,
there was widespread evidence that justice played a central role in shaping people's
feelings and behaviors. Further, people both reacted to their own experiences of
justice or injustice and acted to provide justice to other people when they observed
injustice. However, most of this research did not acknowledge that justice can also
be conceptualized and responded to on the level of groups, not individuals. People
can think about injustice in terms of unfairness to groups and they can respond to
injustice on a group level. The perception of group level injustice is the key to the
development of social movements.

The first crucial insight is that people can think about injustice in terms of unfairness
to groups. This insight is contained in the early distinction between egoistical and
fraternal deprivation (Runciman 1966). Instead of being concerned with personally
receiving fairness, people can judge the fairness received by groups. Psychologists
have increasingly recognized that group memberships are an important element in
people's self-definitions (Hogg and Abrams 1988) and this has heightened attention
to people's reactions to the experiences of the groups to which they belong, as well
as to their own personal experiences.

The key issue is how people interpret experiences, that is, their view about the
reason for the injustices they experience or observe. If people feel that the injustice is
occurring to someone as an individual person, either themselves or someone else,
and is due to their personal actions, they will respond personally. If they feel that
the injustice is occurring to someone due to their membership in particular groups,
or to all the people who share a common group membership, they will respond
collectively.

Social identity theory argues that the way people interpret their experience is deter-
mined by how they think about people. In particular, people are influenced by the
degree to which they construct their sense of self in terms of the groups to which
they belong (Hogg and Abrams 1988). To the degree that people think of themselves
or others in personal terms, they interpret experiences as reflecting unique personal
characteristics and behaviors, and they think about fairness in personal terms. To
the degree that they think of people in terms of the group(s) to which they belong
(their ‘social’ self ), they interpret experiences as reflecting treatment as a member of
groups and think about justice in group terms.

Studies confirm that those with strong social-selves are more likely to interpret
experiences as being shaped by others attitudes toward the groups to which they and
others belong, and to respond to injustice by engaging in collective behavior (Grant
and Brown 1995, Kelly and Kelly 1994). So, thinking about injustice in collective
terms leads to acting collectively in response to injustice, for example, by joining
social movements.

Decisions about whether to respond to injustice individually or collectively are not

only shaped by judgments about why injustice is occurring. Choices among possible
behavioral responses are also influenced by people's judgments about the intergroup
situation (Ellemers 1993). For example, people are influenced by their assessments
of the permeability of group boundaries. If people believe that it is possible for
individuals to move from low status groups to higher status groups, they are more
likely to act as individuals. If people believe that the group's boundaries are not
permeable, they are more likely to act collectively to raise the status of their group.
Interestingly, studies suggest that very few low status group members need to be
successful for people to view the group's boundaries as sufficiently permeable to
justify individual, as opposed to collective, action (Wright et al. 1990).

People are also influenced by the perceived stability of group status. When they
believe that group status can change, people are more likely to act collectively on
behalf of the group. People are similarly affected by their views about the legitimacy
of the status of existing groups. If people view current social arrangements as
illegitimate, they are more likely to engage in collective action to change them (Major
1994).

Finally, people are influenced by pragmatic concerns. They respond to their sense of
the probable gains and losses associated with various types of actions (Klandermans
and Oegema 1987). When people decide that injustice has occurred, their general
behavioral reaction is to do nothing. This inaction reflects the real risks associated
with confronting powerful others, and an objective recognition of the low likelihood
of success. On the other hand, risk is not enough of an explanation for people's
behavior. For example, although the willingness to engage in collective action is
influenced by the likelihood of success (Klandermans 1997), studies of collective
 action suggest that people often engage in collective actions against injustice even
when the likelihood of success is small.

Similar factors shape people's motivation to engage in groups for positive, identity
based, reasons. If people feel that their identity is firmly rooted in their group
membership (stability), they will act to try to build the stature of their group through
collective action. An example is ethnicity, which is often linked to physical appear-
ance. If people feel that their status is not changeable, they are more likely to identify
with that group, and to work to improve its status. Of course, such identification can
also be strong when physical appearance is not involved. For example, many people
identify strongly with being gay, even though they could ‘pass for straight.’ However,
when people are members of a low status group they are more strongly tempted to
leave the group as an individual and join a higher status group, instead of defining
themselves in terms of group membership.

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