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29 views23 pagesEquality
Perspective on equality
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/ 23
Equality!
PAULA CASAL AND ANDREW WILLIAMS.
©} coupter contents
‘¢ Invoduction
‘© Justice as faiiness
© Equality of resources
Equality, priority, and sufficiency
Equality and interpersonal comparison
Equality, epportunity, and responsibilty
'# Conclusion
© tester seice
This chapter begins by outlining the place of equality in the two leading contemporary
theories of economic justice John Rawls’ conception of justice as fainess and Ronald
Dworkin’s account of equality of resources. It then examines three debates that these
authors have helped to shape The fist debate arises between egalitarian and various
influential critics, who appeal to the importance of achieving efficiency and avoiding
certain forms of absolute deprivation, The other two debates take place among egalitarians
and relate to the respects in which individual’ lives should be equal, and the degree to
which choice and personal responsibility must figure in any plausible account of equality.
‘The case study draws on the latter wo debates to consider how to allocate responsibility
for the decision to became a parent.
Google 150 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
Introduction
Political theorists address questions about the distribution and the exercise of legitimate
political authority. Thus, they ask ‘who has the right to rule?’ and propose various answers
relating to whose commands members of a state have enforceable moral duties to obey.
Asking ‘what is it to rule rightly?’, they make further claims about how those who possess
the right to rule should exercise that right. Within Western societies, a consensus has See chapter 1
‘emerged favouring egalitarian accounts of the distribution of political authority. Thus,
widespread agreement exists that ultimate political authority should be shared equally
through a set of democratic institutions.
See chapter 4
Domestic inequality
Between 1979 and 2005, the top 5 per cent of US families saw their real incomes increase
by 81 per cent. Over the same period, the 20 per cent on the lowest incomes saw their real
incomes decline by 1 per cent
(US Census Bureau, 2005)
In 1962, the wealth of the richest 1 per cent of US households was roughly 125 times greater
than that ofthe typical household. By 2008, it was 190 times greater.
{Economic Policy institute, 2007, Figure 5B, available online at
http stateofworkingamerica.oretabfig/05/SWAOS_FigSB jpg)
From 1960 to 1998, the US average national incorne in real tems doubled Thelevel ofa production
nnotker’s pay, and of the minimum nage, hardly changed at al, while the salaries of chief executive
officers of companies expanded by a multiple of 11
(Sutcliffe, 2002, p.16)
‘The richest 1 per cent of US houschoids now owns 34.3 per cent of the nation’s private
‘wealth, more than the combined wealth of the bottom 90 per cent. The top 1 per cent also.
‘owns 36:9 per cent of all corporate stock.
(Economic Policy Institute, 2007, Table 5.1, available online at
https//wwrw.stateofworkingamerica.org/tabfig/0S/SWAO6 TabS.1.ipg, and Figure SF, available
online at http:!/www stateofworkingamerica.org/tabfig/05/SWAOG FigSF-jpg)
The top 1 per cent of US families in 2005 received 21.8 per cent of all pre-tax income, more
than double what that figure was in the 1970s, This is the greatest concentration of income
since 1929.
(Piketty and Saez, 2003, Figure 1, updated to 2005, available online at
httplemlab.berkeley.edu/users/saex/TabFig2005.xls)
Inequality in the United Kingdom is greater than it has been for the pas Forty years and more
people have moved below the poverty line in the last fifteen years. “Average” households (that
is, those that are neither poor nor wealthy) have been diminishing in number, and gradually
disappearing from London and the south-east
(Dorling et al., 2007, available online at
hetpziwww jrforg ublknowledse/findings/housi
«Google JNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Equality 151
‘Turning to the exercise of political authority, a second consensus exists that ruling
rightly requires attaching equal importance to each citizen's life. Such a requirement of
impartiality among citizens rejects certain considerations as grounds for political action.
For example, it denies that a citizen’s race or gender is itself a good reason to attach less
importance to benefiting him or her rather than someone else, and so opposes extreme
forms of racism or sexism, So construed, however, an insistence on impartiality still
leaves unanswered many questions about how political authority should be exercised. For
example, it is silent about whether governments are required to protect individuals from
suffering worse prospects in life because of their race or gender, or because of some other
unavoidable characteristic. We now turn to these more controversial questions about the
demands of equality, and their implications for the exercise of political authority and the
design of economic institutions. Our starting point is the outstanding work of twentieth
century political theory, John Rawis’ A Theory of Justice (1971).
Justice as fairness
The aim of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971; 1999) is to identify a set of plausible
principles of social justice (pp. 3-10). As Rawls explains the terms, principles of justice
provide uncompromising, or especially weighty, moral standards for resolving individuals?
competing claims. Principles of social justice resolve claims on the design of the basic
structure—that is, a set of major social institutions that distribute rights and duties,
and exert profound influence on individuals’ life prospects. Because the basic structure
encompasses, among other things, legislation and government policies, the principles are
guides to the exercise of political authority.
According to utilitarianism, whether the exercise of authority is justifiable depends
ultimately on what maximizes the sunt of benefits and burdens. In contrast, Rawls rejects
purely aggregative principles. He argues that, even if utilitarians are right that those
principles may guide distributive decisions across different stages in one life, extending
them across different lives is a mistake, because it fails to ‘take seriously the distinction
between persons’ (1971; 1999, p. 24).
In Rawls’ account, because society is comprised of separate persons, distribution is of
fundamental importance. For example, itis deeply unfair that some individuals should
have far worse career prospects than those of others merely because of their class origins
or family background, rather than their different ambitions and natural talents. To
correct such inequalities, Rawls advocates a principle of fair equality of opportunity,
which requires that similarly motivated and naturally talented individuals enjoy the same
prospects in the competition for jobs (1971; 1999, Pt 12).
Rawis also recognizes that individuals can have less income and wealth than others
due to their class origins or their being endowed by nature with fewer marketable talents.
He argues that it would be arbitrary to be concerned only with inequalities arising from
the social lottery and not the natural lottery, and then proposes a novel solution to the
problem of how to distribute income and wealth.
The solution assumes that it would be implausibly wasteful to oppose all economic
inequalities. Doing so would, for example, impede firms using unequal wage rates
+s» Google UN 182 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
as incentives for especially talented individuals to pursue more productive occupa-
tions that benefit everyone, Thus, Rawls rejects a strict egalitarian principle, which
opposes economic inequality regardless of its harming anyone, instead proposing the
difference principle, which permits inequalities—that is, ‘differences’ —in income and
wealth, but requires that they be arranged to benefit the least advantaged to the
greatest extent possible. Although not as strict as some alternatives, the difference prin-
ciple remains genuinely egalitarian, because it treats equality as a baseline and then
permits expansions in inequality only if they are not harmful to those who benefit
least. Because the difference principle does not require such expansions, it also dif-
fers from a maximizing principle that favours continually increasing the income and
wealth of the least advantaged, regardless of its environmental impact (Rawis, 2001, pp.
63-4).
Rawls also recognizes that economic inequalities that enhance the income and wealth
of the least advantaged, and are licensed by the difference principle, might be harmful
in other respects. For example, they might still be large enough to jeopardize fairness
in the labour market and democratic process, or equality before the law. These harmful
inequalities are governed by additional principles that deepen even further the egalitarian
character of justice as fairness.
Asmentioned, the principle of fair equality of opportunity already requires governments
to address labour market inequalities arising from discrimination and other differences
in social luck. Note, too, that Rawls defends another principle of social justice: the basic
erty principle, which restricts inequality still further by insisting on upholding the fair
value of rights to participate in the political system and not merely more familiar civil
liberties. Thus, justice as fairness condemns inequality when it corrupts the democratic
process by allowing the rich to buy political power.
For a fuller understanding of how justice as fairness regulates inequality, then, we need
to bear in mind how Rawls orders his various principles:
FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
ties compatible with a similar liberty for all
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit ofthe least advantaged... and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
‘opportunity
(Rawls, 1999, p. 266)
Rawls’ first principle grants individuals basic civil liberties, such as equality before the
law and freedom of speech, as well as rights to participate in the democratic process on a
fair basis. The second principle, known as democratic equality, comprises the difference
principle, and the principle of fair equality of opportunity. In sufficiently developed
societies, Rawls treats these principles as in lexical order. Thus, the first principle may
. » Google UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN not be compromised to any degree to better realize democratic equality and equality of
‘opportunity enjoys similar priority over the difference principle.
Because Rawls’ principles function as a set of filters on unjust inequalities, even if
an inequality survives the difference principle, it may still be ruled out by other more
weighty principles. One might, however, oppose large economic inequalities, because
of deleterious consequences that Rawls’ principles leave unmentioned. For example,
‘expansions in economic inequality arguably diminish health and longevity, regardless
of their effects on absolute income levels. This may explain why wealthy, but unequal,
countries—such as the USA—perform so poorly in terms of health and why less
wealthy, but more equal, countries—such as Cuba—perform so well (Daniels, 2001).
Economic inequality also correlates positively with crime and violence, both within
and across countries, and even afier controlling for other determinants (Fajnzylber
etal. 2002).
Justice as fairness leaves questions concerning illness, mortality, death, crime, and
violence largely unanswered. As Rawls notes, justice as fairness is an incomplete theory,
which deals with only a limited number of issues. It is also an ideal theory, proposed for
situations of full compliance rather than pertial compliance. Thus, it states what justice
requires if individuals generally conform to its demands and so says little about how to
respond when individuals act unjustly. We should not assume, then, that Rawls clit
that his principles exhaust the reasons to restrict economic inequality or that his theory
cannot be developed to provide additional considerations. For example, Rawls’ concern
with maintaining the social basis for self-respect might also justify limits on stigmatizing
differences in living standards (Scanlon, 2000, Pt Il).
Having been the subject of such intense scrutiny, it is unsurprising that democratic
equality has provoked objections. These three objections are especially important, and
bear on our later remarks. The first objection comes from the right of the political spec-
trum and claims that, like other egalitarians, Rawls gives too little scope for individuals to
exercise certain economic liberties (Nozick, 1974, ch. 7). Those who press this objection
assume that individuals have rights to use and transfer their holdings as they see fit, even
if doing so, for example, creates the type of class-based inequalities that jeopardize fair
‘equality of opportunity,
‘The second objection comes from the opposite end of the spectrum and claims that
Rawls exaggerates the degree to which justice permits inequality. There are two distinct
versions of this charge. The first claims that Rawls fails to recognize that fairness and
efficiency can be conflicting values, and that inequalities are unfair even when eliminating
them would make nobody any better off (Temkin, 2000). The second does not assume
the fairness and efficiency conflict, but instead claims that Rawls fails to recognize that his
difference principle should apply not only to public policies, but also to individual wage
negotiation and career choices. As. result, he mistakenly regards as just many inequality-
generating incentives that are necessary to motivate individuals simply because they fail
to comply with the demands of justice (Cohen, 1991; 1997).
‘The third objection arises naturally from a utilitarian perspective and claims that
rejecting all economic inequalities that are harmful to the least advantaged is too
extreme—for example, because it rules out distributions that impose very small losses
on the least advantaged, but yield enormous gains to everybody else.
«iy Google UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 14 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001)
‘After publishing his masterpiece, A Theory of Justice, in 1971, Rawls continued to refine
his conception of justice as fairness and to develop 2 more general conception of political
liberalism. He also regularly taught at Harvard and the extensive lecture notes he provided
for his students eventually developed into the Restatement. This later volume explains
| arguments for, Raw’ principles of justice. As well as discussing how those principles might
| be inssrionatized by 2 propery-owning democracy and become stable, the volume a0
l
contains replies to criticisms of vatious aspects of justice as fairness, including its treatment
of the family and of variations in capability.
|
i emu eae that alerts Juss flrs and anes oe carta ot anc vai’ |
‘© Rawis opposes utilitarian principles, because they overlook the moral importance of how
benefits and burdens are distributed
‘© Rawis’ conception of democratic equality applies to a society's major institutions or basic
structure,
© Different critics have objected that democratic equality affords too small a role to economic
liberties, exaggerates the degree to which justice permits inequality, and sometimes makes,
excessive demands on the more fortunate |
Equality of resources
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources finds its fullest expression in his book, Sovereign
Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (1981b; 2000). The theory begins with the
assumption that displaying equal concern for all of those obliged to obey their commands
is the price that those possessing political authority must pay for their right to rule.
‘As Dworkin emphasizes, the requirement of equal concern need not extend to all of
humanity or apply to decisions that do not involve the exercise of authority. Dworkin
then argues that the best interpretation of equal concern demands that the economy is,
arranged to produce results that might have emerged from an imaginary procedure in
which markets play a defining role.
To illustrate the procedure, Dworkin imagines some shipwreck survivors, who must
divide a desert island's resources equally among themselves. Any division, he suggests,
should satisfy an appropriate version of what economists term the envy test and so will
ensure that nobody prefers anyone else's initial share of resources. Dworkin then argues
that the most appealing way to eliminate envy is through an auction, in which everyone
Google wie ' Equality 155
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000)
‘fier Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1871), this isthe most influential contemporary statement
of liberal egalitarianism. Rejecting equality of welfare, Dworkin defends his own conception
of equality of resources and explains the role that it affords to civil liberties, democracy, and
community. Dworkin aso applies his theory to various debates about public policy regarding
health care, campaign finance legisiation, affirmative action, and genetic intervention. Others
have developed Dworkin'sideas in more radical ways—most notably Philippe Van Parijs, who
employs resource egalitarian arguments to defend the provision ofa universal basic income
in Real Freedom for All (1956)
has the same bidding power, and in which the auctioneer continuously divides lots until
the market clears and no bidder wishes to repeat the process.
‘The procedure then becomes more complex, because Dworkin assumes that individuals
should be free to make different choices about production, investment, and trade. Where
individuals vary only in their preferences, he argues that those who succeed in more
productive endeavours are entitled to a higher income. Dworkin recognizes, however,
that the outcome of the social and natural lottery will also exert a profound influence
on individuals’ relative prospects. Like Rawls, he assumes that economic institutions
should enable individuals to share fairly in each other's fortunes. Nevertheless, Dworkin
rejects democratic equality as insufficiently sensitive to individuals’ ambitions. Instead,
he favours a form of luck sharing, in which individuals’ personal values play a much
larger role in determining how much protection against misfortune equality requires.
Dworkin defendshis alternative proposal by distinguishing luck in the choices individu-
‘als make—that is, their option luck—and luck in the conditions that they face regardless
of their choices—that is, their brute luck. He argues that inequalities arising from
variations in option luck against a fair background should be treated very differently from
inequalities arising from variations in brute luck. For example, suppose some islanders,
choose to gamble with their justly held initial holdings, have bad option luck, and lose.
If this is the case, there need be no reason to object to their having fewer resources than
those who declined to gamble, or who chose the same gamble, but had better option luck.
Ifsome islanders are born blind while others are sighted, however, or if some have higher
incomes because they are more naturally gifted rather than more industrious, then there is
‘a weighty reason to redress such misfortiunes—but how much redress does justice require?
Relying on his assumption that individuals should be free to expose themselves to
different degrees of luck, Dworkin's answer appeals to the idea ofa fair insurance market.
To describe such a hypothetical market, he assumes that decisions will reflect individuals’
actual preferences and attitudes to risk. Unlike in actual insurance markets, however,
individuals are situated equally. Thus, they can afford the same insurance packages, and
are aware only of the overall distribution of misfortune and not their own place in the
distribution. Given limited information about the level of protection and premium that
each individual would prefer, Dworkin argues that individuals should receive the average
Google 156 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
Ronald Dworkin (1931-)
(One of the world's leading legal, moral, and political philosophers. As a legal philosopher,
Dworkin is best known for Taking Rights Seriously (197) and Law's Empire (1986), which
provide an alternative to legal positivism. As a moral philosopher, he is known for his
discussion of abortion and euthanasia in Life's orninion (1993) and as politcal philosopher
for his defence of liberal egalitarianism in Sovereign Virtue (2000). He has also made many
influential contributions to public debates about US Supreme Court decisions, often via The
‘New York Review of Books
level of protection that would be purchased in such a market. He recommends funding
such protection by a system of general taxation, which includes a progressive income tax.
Tosummarize, then, from Dworkin’s perspective, an actual distribution of income and
wealth is equal only if the individuals involved might have produced such a distribution
through a specific market process. The process involves those individuals exercising
certain rights to produce and trade, using resources that they have acquired in an equal
auction, and pooling risks through a fair insurance market. If information is available
about each individual's behaviour in such a market, then each should be compensated
for misfortune to a degree that depends on the level of insurance that they would have
purchased. In the absence of such individualized information and to minimize the risk of
‘overcompensation or under-compensating, the level of compensation should depend on
that which the average insurer would have purchased.
There are important theoretical differences between equality of resources and demo-
cratic equality. In defining an equal distribution, Dworkin attaches more importance than
Rawis to market freedoms and, in particular, to the freedom to choose which level of pro-
tection against misfortune to assume. Thus, although both theoristsappeal to hypothetical
agreement from behind a veil of ignorance—that is, in a situation of limited informa-
tion—Dworkin employs a thinner veil, which allows decision makers to be guided by
personal preferences. Asa result, Dworkin recommends a more ‘ambition-sensitive’ form
of luck sharing in which what qualifics as relative misfortune, as well the appropriate form
and level of redress, varies depending on the preferences of the individuals concerned.
‘© Darorkin claims that those in authority should display equal concern for the lives of all of
‘their subjects by meeting the demands of equality of resources.
1 Equality of resources evaluates different distributions by appealing to a hypothetical market
procedure, which includes a fair insurance market
@ Democratic equality and equality of resources both requite individuals to share in each
‘other's fortunes, but Dworkin’s view does so in a manner that is more sensitive 10
Individuals’ values and attitudes to risk
Google , Equality 157
Equality, priority, and sufficiency
We now turn to some distinctions that cast light on the variety of egalitarian principles
available, as well as two influential objections to egalitarianism.
One distinction depends on whether a principle attaches any importance to an
individual's level of advantage relative to others’ when determining the reasons to benefit
that individual. Comparative egalitarian principles imply relative position does matter. AS
an example, consider the strict egalitarian principle mentioned earlier, according to which
it is bad, or unfair, if some individuals are worse off than others. This principle faces an
influential criticism, which Derek Parfit illuminating essay ‘Equality or priority?” (2000)
dubs the levelling down objection. The objection points out that the strict principle
implies that it would be better, in one way, if everyone were to be blind rather than if
some were to be blind and others sighted. It assumes that such a conclusion is highly
implausible and infers that we should reject strict egalitarian principles.
‘There are various ways in which to argue that the levelling down objection fails to
show that we should reject all egalitarian principles. The first reply—that of pluralist
cgalitarianism—reiterates that the strict principle implies only that levelling down is
better in some respect rather than all things considered. Pluralist egalitarians argue that
our reluctance to waste benefits therefore shows only that the pursuit of equality, like
‘many other values, must sometimes be tempered to respect other values; it does not, they
insist, show that equality lacks any value whatsoever. The second conditional egalitarian
reply (Temkin, 2000, p.157) suggests that we should apply comparative principles to
choose only among non-wasteful distributions. As suggested earlier, democratic equality
provides one example of this type of reply. Under certain conditions, as Rawls notes,
the difference principle recommends choosing the most egalitarian member of the set of
non- wasteful distributions (Rawls, 2000, p. 61).
‘The most radical reply abandons the concern with relative position that is characteristic
of comparative principles. The reply appeals to what Parfit terms the priority view, or
prioritarianism (2000, p. 101). According to this non-comparative egalitarian principle,
the moral value of benefiting each individual dinsnishes asthe individual’ absolute level
of advantage increases (Raz, 1986, ch. 9). The priority view implies that itis, in one way,
better to provide some benefit to a less well-off individual than a better-off individual.
As a result, it tends to favour the less advantaged when their interests conflict with the
‘more advantaged and so qualifies as ‘egalitarian’ in a broad sense of the term. To justify
favouring the less advantaged, however, the priority view appeals only to the absolute
condition of each individual. For this reason, prioritarians need not assume that reducing
the gap between the better and worse off has any non- instrumental value, or that we have
any reason to waste benefits when doing so diminishes inequality. Thus, prioritarians can
escape the levelling down objection more easily than can comparative egalitarians?
The priority view has a second attraction, because it can take more moderate, as well
as more extreme, forms. Extreme prioritarianism gives absolute priority to the interests
of the less advantaged over those of the more fortunate. This form of prioritarianism
resembles the difference principle in that both positions prohibit benefiting better-off
individuals if doing so deprives the least advantaged of any benefits; morcover, they do
so even when those benefits are very large and can be produced at very small cost to the
=» Google ve eS ican 158 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
less advantaged. As mentioned, some critics object to the difference principle, because it
displays such rigidity. Rawls has replied by insisting that his principles should be assessed as
a package and suggesting that the type of situation just mentioned is very unlikely to occur,
especially when his prior principles are satisfied (2001, p. 67). A different reply is available
to prioritarians. They can adopt the moderate priority view, which requires attaching non-
absolute priority to the interests of the less advantaged. From this perspective, whether
there is decisive reason to benefit the less fortunate rather than more fortunate can depend
‘on, for example, the size of the benefits at stake and the number of individuals involved.
For illustration, suppose that a government must choose between funding a medical
programme that provides a modest benefit to a small group of very badly off individuals
or one that provides a bigger benefit to a larger group of less badly off individuals. The
policy implications of moderate prioritarianism, like those of the pluralist comparative
view, are indeterminate until weights are attached to the various factors that the two views
deem relevant. This suggests that prioritarians must pay a price for escaping the rigidity of
the extreme view—namely, increased reliance on appeals to intuitive judgements likely
to resist systematic formulation (Williams, 2004).
We shall conclude this section by drawing a further distinction between the types of
egalitarian principle canvassed so far and sufficiency principles. These principles claim
that, when evaluating distributions, what ultimately matters is whether individuals have
‘enough to escape absolute deprivation or to live above some critical threshold. Thus, the
moral importance of individuals having enough is not explained by the further beneficial
‘consequences of them doing so. If reaching a particular threshold—for example, being
well nourished or literate—had such consequences, then prioritarians would already
attach great importance to securing these crucial benefits, given their commitment to
taking the size of benefits into account.
Arguments based on sufficiency principles play a valuable role in public affairs by
stating that the eradication of poverty, at home and abroad, is an urgent responsibility
‘of government. Such principles also play a more negative role in a second influential
objection to egalitarianism. The objection is pressed by anti-cgalitarian sufficientarians
‘who argue that, once everyone has enough, there is no reason to reduce inequality
or to attach priority to the less advantaged (Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003). There are
various forms that such a position might take, depending on whether it requires simply
minimizing the number of individuals who suffer absolute deprivation or attaches
importance to distribution below the threshold.
‘There are also various ways in which egalitarians can reply to the sufficientarian critique
(Casal, 2007). The most obvious reply claims that thresholds are usually points on a
continuous scale and that locating them at any particular point is likely to be arbitrary.
For example, even the idea of a subsistence income is more complex and contestable than
it at first appears, because it is defined by reference to some standard life expectancy.
Further distinct replies arise depending on where the threshold is located. Thus, lower
thresholds make it less plausible for the sufficientarian to claim that, when everyone has
enough, even large inequalities are unimportant; higher thresholds make it less plausible
to insist on maximizing the number of individuals who have enough, because, then, far
too many individuals may be sacrificed in order to ensure that a small number attain
some ambitious threshold. Triage may be plausible on the battlefield when survival is at
stake, but appears much less plausible as the relevant threshold is raised
=» Google VERSES HCHIGIN Equality 159
Principles of distributive justice: equality, priority, and sufficiency
Egalitarians believe that itis non-instrumentally bad, or unfair, if some individuals are worse
off than others. Prioritarians believe that the moral value of a benefit, or disvalue of a burden,
diminishes as its recipient becomes better off on an absolute, rather than relative, scale.
‘They need not believe that inequality, which is a comparative notion, is nor-instrumentally
bad, Sufficientarians also reject egalitarian comparisons of the relative position of individuals
and focus instead on whether individuals have enough not to fall below some critical level of
advantage.
Perhaps the most effective reply to the sufficientarian critique points out that there are
more or less egalitarian ways of ensuring that everyone has enough. Suppose, for example,
that a government can fund its welfare state through two different tax systems: one system
secures adequate revenue through imposing the same flat tax rate on each citizen who has
enough; the other imposes a progressive tax rate that takes larger proportion of citizens’
resources as they become wealthier. The reply insists that the latter system is preferable,
even if both are equally likely to ensure that everyone has enough. Such a conviction
is powerful counter-evidence to the sufficientarian critique. In contrast, it fits well both
with the egalitarian impulse to reduce the gap between the more and the less wealthy, and
the priority view’s key assumption that reasons to benefit individuals diminish as they
become more advantaged. As this reply suggests, equality, priority, and sufficiency may
be friends rather than foes
egalitarian principles favour levelling down
¢ Prioitarians claim that the moral value of benefiting an individual diminishes as individuals
enjoy more benefits.
‘© Suffcientarian anti-egalitarians argue that, when everyone has enough, inequality is unab-
jectionable. Egaitarians can reply that more egalitarian ways of eliminating insufficiency
There ate pluralist and conditional egalitarian relies to the cbjction that comparative |
are preferable to less egalitarian ones. |
Equality and interpersonal
comparison
‘Any conception of equality requires some standard of interpersonal comparison to identify
an individual's level of advantage in different distributions. Much of the debate about
interpersonal comparison turns on what role judgements about an individual's resources
Google f 160 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
‘The currency of distributive justice”
The currency of distributive justice’ isa phrase coined by G. A Cohen to refer to the standard
‘of interpersonal comparison that is employed to identify each individual's level of advantage
and thereby decide on how individuals fare relative to one another indifferent outcomes, or
Under different institutions. Contemporary egalitarians have debated whether interpersonal
comparisons should focus on welfare, primary goods, resources, or some combination
Of these, or other, benefits Although most favour focusing on individuals’ opportunities
to enjoy the relevant types of benefits, more disagreement exists about the extent to
which individuals can forfeit their entitlements through voluntary choices. One extremely
permissive view, associated with luck egalitarian currencies, assumes that individuals have
extensive choice- making powers and that avoidable inequalities are not unjust
(Dworkin, 1981; 2000, p. 65), welfare (Arneson, 1989), and capabilities (Sen, 1992; Nuss-
baum, 2000), or all three considerations (Cohen, 1989) should play in such comparisons.
To sample the debate, begin with the most simple resource-based standard, which
makes comparisons purely on the basis of each individual's level of income and wealth.
Consensus exists that this proposal is too crude and that there can be morally relevant
differences between individuals in other dimensions. For example, all else being equal,
‘one individual is worse off than another in a morally relevant sense if he or she suffers
from a severe disability, such as blindness or paraplegia. There are, however, various ways
in which to attempt to accommodate this conviction.
‘Some attempt to do so by arguing that comparisons should focus in addition, or even
exclusively, on personal welfare, or well-being, understood as what makes a person's
life worth living for the individual concerned (Parfit, 1984, Appendix 1). One influential
account of welfare is preference-based and assumes that how well an individual's life
gocs depends upon the extent to which his or her self-regarding preferences are satisfied.
A preference-based welfare egalitarian might, then, attempt to justify redistribution to
the disabled by appealing to the assumption that disabled individuals are likely to be
less satisfied with their lives than are others. But those who oppose welfare standards
might question whether being disabled necessarily reduces the level of welfare available
to an individual or deny that an individual's claim not to be disadvantaged by disability
depends upon the truth of such an assumption. Surely Charles Dickens's Tiny Tim, they
might insist, is entitled to a wheelchair, even if his quality of life is higher than that of
many of the individuals who are required to fund its provision?
Opponents of preference-based welfare standards can also press a more general
objection, designed to show that subjective satisfaction should play no role whatsoever in
interpersonal comparison. The objection takes the form of a dilemma, which Dworkin
illustrates with the following two scenarios (1981a, Pt VIII):
1. The case of Louis. Suppose that satisfaction is initially distributed equally, wealth is
also distributed equally, and preferences are equally expensive to satisfy, An indi-
vidual, called Louis, then deliberately acquires some new and relatively expensive
Google ener i
See chapter 8 Equality 161
preferences, and can attain the same level of satisfaction as others only if he receives
more wealth than them.
2. Thecase of Jude. Suppose that satisfaction is initially distributed equally, although an
individual called Jude has less wealth than others, but correspondingly inexpensive
preferences. Jude then deliberately acquires preferences that are more expensive
than his previous ones, but no more expensive than others’ preferences. As a result,
Jude can attain the same level of satisfaction as others only if he receives as much
wealth as them,
The dilemma arises because welfare egalitarians must respond to the first scenario by
either accepting or denying that Louis is entitled to more wealth than others with
more modest ambitions. If welfare egalitarians take the former option, they then face
the first horn of the dilemma, because Dworkin then insists—and many egalitarians
agree—that Louis is surely not entitled to more wealth than others. Welfare egalitarians
might take the latter option of denying that Louis is entitled to more wealth than others
and justify doing so by appealing to the fact that Louis might have avoided acquiring
more expensive preferences. If welfare egalitarians make this response, which invokes
the principle of equality of opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989), then they face the
second horn of the dilemma because Dworkin then points out that, in his second scenario,
Jude might also have avoided deliberately acquiring more expensive preferences than he
previously possessed and so, like Louis, enjoys the same opportunity for welfare as others.
Welfare egalitarians should, he suggests, treat the scenarios similarly. Thus, if equality of
opportunity for welfare justifies denying that Louis is entitled to more wealth than others,
then it also justifies denying Jude as much wealth as others.
Some egalitarians endorse such a denial. For example, in his paper ‘On the currency of
distributive justice’ (1989), Cohen rejects equality of opportunity for welfare, but affirms
equality of access to advantage, and so affords some role in interpersonal comparison to
an individual's opportunity for welfare as well as his or her resources and capabilities.
Cohen's hybrid view implies that, if other things are equal, then Jude should receive
fewer resources, because of his alleged good fortune in having relatively inexpensive
tastes.
In sharp contrast, Dworkin insists that any such denial of Jude’s claim to equal
resources is implausible and remains unmoved by Cohen's later arguments (Cohen,
2004; Dworkin, 2004, pp. 339-49). In Dworkin's account, then, pandering to people with
expensive tastes by giving them more resources than others and penalizing people with
inexpensive tastes are both objectionable. So, having refused cither to side with Louis or
against Jude, Dworkin instead recommends refusing to allow interpersonal comparisons
of preference satisfaction any role in defining an equal distribution,
How might egalitarians avoid the implausibility of 2 crude resource-based standard
and the various problems associated with welfare-based standards? One response is to
embrace the capability approach to interpersonal comparison that is recommended by
‘Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. According to this approach, an individual's level
of advantage depends on his or her capacity to function or to act in certain listed ways:
for example, to be well nourished, mobile, and literate, Assuming blindness or paraplegia
impact upon the morally relevant capabilites, the view can easily explain why individuals
with such disabilities are worse off than others, even if they possess the same income and
wy Google UN 162 Paula Casal and Andrew Williams
G. A. Cohen (1941-)
‘A leading contributor to many important debates in political philosophy, Cohen first became
well known through Kar! Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (1978), the founding text in
the development of Analytical Marxism, He later made major interventions in debates on
libertarianism and the currency of justice. Most recently, through if You're an Egalitarian,
How Come You're So Rich? (2000) and his forthcoming Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cohen
has focused on the role of individual conduct in achieving social justice and has provided the |
leading leftist critique of liberal egalitarian political philosophy
wealth. Ifthe view excludes preference satisfaction from the list of capabilities, it can also
avoid pandering to, or penalizing, people on the basis of their tastes.
‘Considered asa framework for developing some standard of interpersonal comparison,
the capability approach fits well with familiar judgements of the relevance of individuals’
needs to distributive decision making. The most obvious challenge facing its advocates
is to develop a more concrete version of the approach that focuses on specific capabil-
ities and explains their relative importance in determining an individual's overall level
of advantage. It is debatable, however, whether such a challenge can be met without
reliance on divisive perfectionist assumptions about different capabilities’ contribution
to personal well-being. It is also debatable whether the capability view is superior to
a sophisticated resource-based standard such as Dworkin’s, which justifies redressing
inequalities in capability when doing so mimics the operation of a fair insurance market
(Dworkin, 2000, ch. 8).
© Egalitarians disagree about the role of resources, welfare, and capabilities within interper-
sonal comparison,
© Critics claim welfare standards unfairly pander to expensive tastes o unfairly penalize
inexpensive tastes, or rely on divisive perfectionist ideals
‘© The claim that capabilities are relevant within interpersonal comparison has considerable
appeal, but disagreement exists about how to identify the relevant capabilites.
Equality, opportunity,
and responsibility
‘The problem of egalitarian interpersonal comparison is multifaceted. When comparing
each individual's level of advantage, egalitarians have to ask more than whether they
Google Equality 163
should focus on resources, welfare, capability, or some other type of benefit. They also
have to ask what range of choices about the relevant benefits egalitarian institutions
should empower individuals to make and how to distribute responsibility for those
choices between the decision maker and other individuels.
‘Suppose that egalitarians accept Dworkin's recommendation to focus on resourcesand,
when distributing goods among a group of similarly talented individuals who differ only
in their preferences, treat everyone as entitled to an equally valuable share of resources.
In addition, they need to decide whether those individuals are entitled to make different
decisions about the productive use of their resources and about their use in other types of
gamble. They also need to decide how the costs and benefits of any such decisions should
be distributed. For example, in a desert island scenario, egalitarians have to decide whether
individuals are entitled to work on their land more or less intensively, or to assume higher
orlower risks with theirassets. They must, moreover, decide how much more of theirlarger
product industrious individuals who work more productively than other similarly talented
individuals are entitled to retain and how much, if any, should be shared with others.
‘There is a spectrum of opinion about how egalitarians should answer these questions
about the relationship between liberty, liability, and equality. Some views of the rela-
tionship place relatively few limits on how individuals are entitled to use their assets,
Provided they do not threaten others’ fair shares. They also place few limits on the costs
that individuals may be left to bear asa result of making choices that are rightfully theirs.
According to these relatively permissive views, whether one individual is worse off than
another in a morally relevant respect depends, to a large degree, upon the history of the
