Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 2225973, Nov.

2016
Topic: Bill of Rights.
Facts:
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum
to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order
of President Duterte. Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to
the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former
President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate
the Constitution, domestic and international laws.
Ruling:
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not
be allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act
of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the
Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-
dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the
Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their
case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII,
Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history
as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing. Thus: By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and
state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic
political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and
by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not
“self executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.” xxx The petitions must be dismissed.

DISSENTING OPINION SERENO, C.J.:

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this
Court must zealously protect. Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the
1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos’ enduring values. The protection of those values has
consequently become the duty of the Court. That this is the legal standard by which to
measure whether it has properly comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared
in various fashions by the Court itself. See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to
protect the environment, women, children, labor, the indigenous people, and consistently,
those who have been or are in danger of being deprived of their human rights. Note the power
that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection of
human rights, and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated the writs of
kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.
Discussion/Analysis:
It is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings and damages inflicted upon
persons whose properties or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or
those whose professions were damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of
movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.
It is true that the present Constitution was crafted to prevent the occurrence of abuse
prevalent during the Marcos Regime. This is evident in numerous provisions of the
Constitution such as the Bill of Rights and the provisions under the Executive Department
limiting the power to declare Martial Law. Nevertheless, the Constitution neither expressly nor
impliedly prohibits the interment of President Marcos in the LNMB.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided
a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness.
Title: Aquino Jr. v. Enrile 59 SCRA 182
Topic: Bill of rights.
Facts:
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile answered
that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the
SC ruled that the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a
clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
President’s order.
Discussion/Analysis:
The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either
have been permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject
to certain restrictions. In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal
possession of firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11,
1973.
Bill of Rights provision reads:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of 'which
events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
such suspension shall exist.
TOPIC/DOCTRINE Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the
public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that
the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13,
Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution
CASE TITLE
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015

FACTS On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3,
2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age
and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution.
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
ISSUE / S Whether or not the Motion to fix bail may be granted as a matter of right of
the petitioner.
RULING / 1. YES.
RATIONALE
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and
so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or
 an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion

perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then

enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly,
will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before
a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat
the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail –
whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the
subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus
balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.

TOPIC/DOCTRINE
CASE TITLE Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)

FACTS This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations
of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
ordered by General Fabian Ver «to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports
about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,»

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of
the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
 employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted
and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then

Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs
may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in
the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the
present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties.
ISSUE / S
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution?

2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under
the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and
severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and
liberties have been violated?

RULING /
RATIONALE 1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or
any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights
and liberties of another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondeat
superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or
to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in
our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or
employee or person ‘directly’ or «indirectly» responsible for the violation of
the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article
32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the

Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer
may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected
rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people
power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government
was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant
violations of human rights. While it would certainly be so naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing
damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no one's terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors
Substantive Due Process

Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 US 578

Facts:

Relying on an open policy with the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company in New York, E.
Allgeyer & Company sent mail from New Orleans to Atlantic Mutual regarding insurance of
an international shipment of Louisiana cotton. A Louisiana statute prohibited foreign
(out-of-state) insurance corporations from conducting business in Louisiana without
maintaining at least one place of business and an authorized agent in the State. Louisiana
implemented the statute as an exercise of its police powers, intending to protect its
citizens from deceitful insurance companies. This allegedly violated a state law that
prevented citizens of Louisiana from engaging in business with marine insurance
companies outside the state unless those companies had appointed agents in Louisiana.
(This was designed to reduce the risk of insurance fraud.)

Allgeyer was charged with violating this law on three occasions, and it faced a fine of
$3,000, since the statute imposed a fine of $1,000 per violation. The state trial court ruled
in its favor, finding that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Louisiana statute prohibiting out-of-state insurance corporations

from conducting business in the state without maintaining at least one place of
business and an authorized agent in the state violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, which protects companies’ liberty to enter into contracts with
businesses of their choice?

Rulings:

1. YES. The Louisiana statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.

Discussion:

1. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the Louisiana statute deprived
Allgeyer & Company of its liberty without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Agreeing with the trial court, the Court found that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends broadly to protect individuals from restrictions on their
freedom to contract in pursuit of one’s livelihood or vocation. The Court noted that
each potential deprivation of liberty by the state needed to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.

Later cases allowed states greater authority to place restrictions on the freedom to
contract.

Doctrine:

Substantive due process is based on the premise that the constitution protects the public
from unwarranted government intrusion infringing upon their fundamental rights. If the
government passes a law that infringes on life, liberty, or property rights, a substantive due
process analysis must be performed.
To quote from the case, “to deprive the citizen of such a right as herein described without
due process of law is illegal. Such a statute as this in question is not due process of law,
because it prohibits an act which under the federal Constitution the defendants had a right
to perform. This does not interfere in any way with the acknowledged right of the state to
enact such legislation in the legitimate exercise of its police or other powers as to it may
seem proper. In the exercise of such right, however, care must be taken not to infringe
upon those other rights of the citizen which are protected by the federal Constitution.”
Lochner v. NY, 198 US 45

Facts:

The owner of a bakery in the New York city of Utica, Joseph Lochner, was charged with
violating a state law known as the Bakeshop Act. This law set maximum hour
requirements for bakery employees at 10 hours per day and 60 hours per week, in
addition to regulating sanitary conditions. While its provisions appeared benign, they may
have resulted from anti-immigrant sentiment in the industry, since foreign-born bakers who
were willing to work longer hours were seen as a threat to American bakers. Lochner was
accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week.

The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in
a fine of $50. Although Lochner did not challenge the first conviction, he appealed the
second but was denied in state courts by narrow decisions. He argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment should be interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights
encompassed by substantive due process.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Bakeshop Act violate the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Rulings:

1. YES. The New York’s Bakeshop Act violate the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Discussion:

1. The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority maintained that the statute
interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right
to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court further held that the New
York law failed the rational basis test for determining whether government action is
constitutional. The majority reasoned that the Bakeshop Act had no rational basis
because long working hours did not dramatically undermine the health of
employees, and baking is not particularly dangerous.

Doctrine:

Broadly interpreting state authority to regulate under its police powers, Justice Harlan in
his dissent articulated reasoning that would inform later decisions in the post-Lochner era.
Rather than requiring the government to prove that a law had a rational basis, he would
require the party challenging the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is the current
rule.)
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379

Facts:

Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women
in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. At the
Cascadian Hotel in Wenatchee, which was owned by the West Coast Hotel Company, a
chambermaid named Elsie Parrish was paid an amount less than this wage. Together with
her husband, she sued the hotel for damages amounting to the difference. The lower court
relied on the 1923 Supreme Court decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital in ruling for the
hotel.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a minimum wage law for women violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Rulings:

1. NO. The minimum wage law for women did not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Discussion:

1. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that
the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller
v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to
restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and
marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract.
The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in
American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation
aimed at regulating business.

While Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from
Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According
to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive
achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the
Court's conservative justices. His decision to disregard his personal political views
has been called the "switch in time that saved nine," considering that Roosevelt
had proposed a plan to pack the Court with favorable justices. (However, Hughes
and others denied that this proposal influenced them.) Roberts also set a
precedent for justices to base their decisions on public opinion rather than personal
views.

In dissent, Justice George Sutherland implicitly criticized Roberts for changing

sides and argued that politics and public opinion should not impact the Court’s
understanding of the Constitution.

Doctrine:

Deprivation of liberty to contract is forbidden by the Constitution if without due process of

law, but restraint or regulation of this liberty, if reasonable in relation to its subject and if
adopted for the protection of the community against evils menacing the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people, is due process.
A statute of the State of Washington (Laws, 1913, c. 174; Remington's Rev.Stats., 1932, §
7623 et seq.) providing for the establishment of minimum wages for women, held valid.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, is overruled; Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, distinguished. P. 300 U. S. 400.

185 Wash. 581; 55 P.2d 1083, affirmed.

 PEOPLE vs POMAR 46 Phil. 440
FACTS:

On October 26, 1923, a complaint is presented, accusing Julio Pomar, a manager, and person in
charge of Las Flor de la Isabela a Tabacco factory, of a violation of section 13 in connection with
section 15 of Act. No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint alleged that on or about
August 27, 1923, the defendant granted the pregnant Macaria Fajardo a vacation leave which
began on July 16, 1923.

The defendant appealed contending that the court erred in convicting him and that not declaring
section 13 of Act No. 3071, unconstitutional. Section 13 of Act No. 3071 states that “Every person,
firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be
obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty-day vacation
with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not
discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages
equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of her discharge.”

Section 15 states that “Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act
shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred and fifty, or by
imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 Act. No. 3071 is a reasonable and lawful exercise
of the police power of the state.
RULING:

Sec. 13 of Act No. 3071 was enacted in the exercise of police power, protecting pregnant laborers
by insuring them reasonable support for one month before and after their delivery. Such provision
compels the employer to pay for no service of equivalent value from the employee. It deprives the
right to liberty, the right to enter a contract and to terminate contracts, therefore unconstitutional.

The legislature cannot prevent persons from making contracts nor prevent any person from refusing
to employ another or to terminate contracts. The right to contract is protected by due process of
law.
 ICHONG vs HERNANDEZ 101 Phil. 1155
FACTS:

Petitioner, for and on his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations, and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending
that:

(1) it denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and
property without due process of law;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it
to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist;
(2) Whether the law was enacted in the interest of national economic survival and security;
(3) Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws and the due process of law?;
(4) Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?;
(5) Whether there was a defect in the title of the law;
(6) Whether there was a violation of international treaties and obligations.
RULING:

1. The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger
to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and
free citizens and the country from dominance and control.
2. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and
by which it protects its own personality and ensures its security and future.
3. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes.
4. The privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege.

5. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to be plainly evident
— as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in
any case, such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The provisions of
the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled
the legislators or the segment of the population affected.

6. Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Hence, the
petition was denied, with costs against the petitioner.
 RUBI vs PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO 39 Phil. 660 1919
FACTS:

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145.

Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by the provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Petitioners, however, challenge the
validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:

Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?
RULING:

No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. In determining whether the
delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by
the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate officials thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case. In enacting the said
provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor,
with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to
the execution of the law.

This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites that have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward
state. Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar
Inc., petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the
city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate
because hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of
due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels. Moreover, there was also the requirement that
the guests should fill in a form specifying their personal information. There was also a provision
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection from city authorities. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being
vague.

The law also classified motels into two classes and requires the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as telephone in each room, dining room or
restaurant, and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours. There was also a prohibition for persons under 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels
that violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Hence,
this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Ruling:
NO. The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the injunction issued lifted.
Discussion/Analysis:
There is a presumption that the laws enacted by the Congress (in this case, the Municipal
Board) are valid. Without a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays.
As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts, and such cannot prevail over the
presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question
that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages
hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU
concerned. Taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is
likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this
case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb prostitution in the city
which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the
said ordinance alleged to be vague.
Doctrines:
POLICE POWER
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification
for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,
movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal
system, its use has rarely been denied.

In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection, and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect
the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust, or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.

TWO TYPES OF DUE PROCESS

Procedural Due Process: this refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
Substantive Due Process: this refers to the procedure that completes the protection envisioned
by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Nebbia v. State of NY, 291 US 500
Facts:
The New York legislature established a Milk Control Board that was vested with the power to
“fix minimum and maximum retail prices” for milk sold within the state. Appellant, Mr. Nebbia,
an owner of a New York grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for process in excess of the
price set by the Board.
Issue:
Whether or not the Constitution prohibits a state from fixing the selling price of milk
Ruling:
NO. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a storekeeper for selling milk at
a price below that allowed by an order promulgated by a state board pursuant to statutory
authority.
Discussion/Analysis:
The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state and largely affects
the health and prosperity of its people. Property rights and contract rights are not absolute in
nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price controls were not “arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant” to the policy adopted by the legislature to promote
the general welfare, it was consistent with the Constitution.

Doctrines:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conditions the exertion of regulatory
power by requiring that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process,
that the regulation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction, a State is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio.
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 US 500
Facts:
On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the account
books should not be in any other language except English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a
penalty of fine of not more than P10,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than two years will
be imposed. On March 1923, the BIR inspected the books of account of Yu Cong Eng where it
was found out that it is not in accordance with Act No. 2972. A criminal case was then filed
against Yu Cong Eng before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in Chinese.

Yu Cong Eng et. al. are Chinese merchants, claiming that they represent the other 12,000 filed
a petition for prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning the constitutionality of Act
No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2972 is constitutional
Ruling:
YES. The judgment is reversed.
Discussion/Analysis:
Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants
of whatever nationality from making entries in the books of account or forms subject to
inspection for taxation purposes in any other language than either the English or Spanish
language or a local dialect. The law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were
necessary to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes. The Chinese will not be
singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since there are other
aliens doing business in the Philippines. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or
arbitrary spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal discrimination between
persons in similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws
are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of confiscation.

Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in
commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands,
shall keep its account books, consisting of sales books and other records and returns required
for taxation purposes by regulations of the BIR, in effect when this action was begun, in English,
Spanish, or a local dialect, thus valid and constitutional.

Doctrines:
The Power of Taxation is the strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute
and unlimited. It is a legislative power, and all of its incidents are within the control of the
legislature. It is the Legislature which must questions of state necessarily involved in ordering
a tax, which must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be observed in
order to produce the desired results, and which must decide upon the agencies by means of
which collections shall be made.
The power to tax is not judicial power and a strong case is required for the judiciary to declare
a law relating to taxation invalid. If so great an abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and
fundamental rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act unconstitutional.
Republic of the Philippines vs Fajardo GR 12172 29 August 1958

People vs. Fajardo

Facts: Mayor Fajardo of Camarines Sur passed Ordinance No 7 requiring permit for building/repairing
buildings and penalizes if building destroys the view of the public plaza.

Four years after his term ended and requested permit to build on their property located /separated from
the plaza by a creek.

The request was denied on the ground of destroying the view of public plaza. Second request was denied
too.

They continued to build their residence since their former house was destroyed by a typhoon.

They were then charged and convicted by the justice of peace. Fajardo appealed to CFI. CFI affirmed the
decision and fined them.

Issue: Whether or not Fajardo was deprived to use his property?

Decision: The mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit.

The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action.

It permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds
of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property without just compensation.

Every structure that may be erected on appellants’ land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the
highway.

The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character.

To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

In 1980, Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A which forbade the transportation and slaughtering
of carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught by the
police.

His carabaos were immediately confiscated. He filed a case for replevin before the RTC.

The carabaos were returned to him upon filing of a superseades bond of P12,000.00.

After hearing, the court sustained the confiscation.

Since Ynot could no longer produced the carabaos, the superseades bond was ordered confiscated.

Ynot appealed to the IAC which upheld the decision of the RTC. Ynot appealed to the SC with the following
contentions:

1. EO 626-A is unconstitutional as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being

transported across provincial boundaries

2. Penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court guaranteed by due process

3. The measure should not have been presumed and so sustained, as constitutional

4. There is an improper exercise of legislative power

Issue:

Was Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional?

Held:

Yes. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.

Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.

The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers.

There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. (G.R. No. 74457, March
20, 1987)
CASE DIGEST : US vs TORIBIO

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-
appellant.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol.

The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of Large Cattle.

The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.

Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of
their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle,
is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

The Court held that that the provision of the statute in question being a
proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a
provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States,
and is found in substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States
of the Union.
 Petitioner
The assailed provision granting the CIR the power to remove billboards objectionable to the sight is unconstitutional for
constituting a deprivation of property without due process
Court
It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not always
require, in respect to the Government, the same process that is required between citizens,
though it generally implies and includes regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a
trial according to some well settled course of judicial proceedings. The case with which we
are dealing is in point. A citizen's property, both real and personal, may be taken, and usually
is taken, by the government in payment of its taxes without any judicial proceedings
Churchill v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580 whatever. In this country, as well as in the United States, the officer charged with the
collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell the property of delinquent taxpayers
without applying to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the law authorizing
this procedure never has been seriously questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl] The
Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and cases cited.)
Facts:
Churchill and Tait owned and operated a billboard situated on a private land in the
province of Rizal. Rafferty, the collector of Internal Revenue, assessed the deficiency
taxes against Churchill which led to ordering the closure of the business. Pursuant to
Section 100, Act No. 2339 also ordered the said billboard to remove for being nuisance.
The lower court ruled in favour of Churchill and Tait upon claiming that Act No. 2339
violated their right to the protection of their property.

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2339 Sec. 100 was a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of
Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly
foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary
enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is
reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or
comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own
views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature.

DOCTRINE:
Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, maybe suppressed by
the State especially those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics may be
regulated by the police power of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest and
safety. Moreover, if police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and
economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are
included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is
amenable to the police power of the State.

Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts:
Agustin was an owner of a Volkswagen beetle car, model 13035 already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could
serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance:
Instructions No 229, as amended,
“The as well adopts
Philippines as the Implementing
the generally rulesof and
accepted principles regulations
international law as part ofin
the law of the
nation.” Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a
Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land
commitment transportation
to which it had pledged itsCommission. Respondent
word. Our country’s word was resembled Land
in our own act of
legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of
Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle
of international morality.
 Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant
to Letter of Instructions No.229, as amended. It required the use of early Warning
Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as
well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction imposes valid measure of police power?

Ruling:
YES. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there
was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As
identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the
particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.” Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City and leased a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. The reaction of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile then enacted
ordinances which both prohibit the issuance of business permit and cancel existing
business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises
or portion thereof for the operation of casino, and impose penalty thereto. Magtajas and
the City of Cagayan de Oro argue that LGUs may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people.
Pryce Properties assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both
violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid
exercise of police power.

Ruling:
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils
exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized
casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
Dans v. People 285 SCRA 504

Facts:
Marcos and Dans were separately charged of Criminal Cases for accepting employment
as Chairman and Director of the PGHFI and LRTA. The accusations against both of
them stemmed from the contracts they signed in representation of the LRTA and of the
PGHFI which were allegedly entered into under terms and conditions manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government. Marcos filed a motion for inhibition on the
ground of pre-judgement of her case however it was denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Marcos was deprived of her constitutional right to be
heard by herself or counsel?

Ruling:
Yes. The questioned Decision is premature and had disregarded the constitutional right
of the Petitioner to present evidence in her behalf. Her right to testify in her own behalf is
a guaranteed right, the exercise of which is her personal choice alone, and which
counsel had no authority to waive in her behalf. Besides, counsel being suspended, he
could not have made a waiver. This constitutional right "to be heard by himself and
counsel" she is invoking now, as part of her right to due process (Sec. 14 (1) and (2), Bill
of Rights).

The questioned Decision is a nullity for it was rendered in derogation of Petitioner's

subsisting right to be heard and to submit evidence in her defense. The finding of waiver
is a prejudicial error. The evidence thereof on the record is tenuous. A waiver by an
accused person of the right to be heard in her defense, including her right to testify in her
own behalf must be indubitable, and is valid only if personally exercised through her own
manifestation in open court.
CASE: Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141

TOPIC: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

FACTS:
Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System” on the
following grounds: 1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a
law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the
congress to make laws, and 2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of
privacy.

ISSUES: Whether the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy

RULING:
YES, because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s right to privacy
in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks proper safeguards
for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and
other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination;
it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

DISCUSSION:
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy
when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of
privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the
well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an inerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that
because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
CASE: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, Nov. 19, 2001

TOPIC: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

FACTS:
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080
also known as “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder because the assailed law
is said to be vague, it dispenses the “reasonable doubt” standards in criminal prosecution and
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code
which he claims to be violative of the due process clause of our Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague and violative of the due
process clause

RULING:
NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.

DISCUSSION:

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards

that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application.

In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects- it violates
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does
not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by
proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

When a constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by

a criminal statute, such law must be struck down for being void.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A
criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.

As earlier intimated, the "vagueness doctrine" is anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined right to

due process of law. Thus, as in this case that the "life, liberty and property" of petitioner is
involved, the Court should not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has sufficiently
complied with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous argument
that the Court cannot apply the vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is tantamount to
saying that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant it is to the constitutional
right to due process.

While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in reasonably general terms to accomplish the
legislature’s objective of protecting the public from socially harmful conduct, this should not
prevent a vagueness challenge in cases where a penal statute is so indeterminate as to cause the
average person to guess at its meaning and application. For if a statute infringing upon freedom of
speech may be challenged for being vague because such right is considered as fundamental,
with more reason should a vagueness challenge with respect to a penal statute be allowed since
the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life which, inarguably, are rights as
important as, if not more than, free speech.

CASE: ABAKADA v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1

TOPIC: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, an act
amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.The
petitioners alleged that the Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the Presidentin Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No.
9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be
credited against the output tax;and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate BillNo. 1950 regarding other kinds of
taxes in addition to theVAT.

Moreover, the petitioners alleged that: there was undue delegation of legislative
powers; R.A. No. 9337 imposed an unfair and unnecessary additional tax burden; there
is an unconstitutional

ISSUES: Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the
NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violates the
due process clause.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.

There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A.
No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon
finality of herein decision.
DISCUSSION:
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof
of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.

Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax
partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without
due process of law.

The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege.

The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for
persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away
rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property,
which was vested by virtue of such rights.
Procedural Due Process
Animas v. Min. of National Defense, 146 SCRA 408

Facts:

This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve accused
persons, only one of whom is in the military, for the offense devoid of any national
security or political complexion and committed long before the proclamation of martial
law, Diosdado Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, candidate for Mayor
of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental in the November 11, 1971 local elections. The
petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the alleged killing of Yanson
on the of the November 11 elections.

The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal,
considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel.
Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but he
modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised
Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential
Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of Firearms with Murder."
Before trial could proceed, the respondent Minister of National Defense ordered on
June 30, 1979, the transfer of the case to the civil courts. Before the order could be
implemented, it was superseded by the respondent Minister's 1st Indorsement dated
August 22, 1979, directing immediate implementation of the hand-written marginal
instructions dated August 14, 1979 of the President enfaced on the letter of Nelly
Yanson, the wife of the deceased-victim, dated July 23, 1979 which reads:

In order to calm the fears of injustice by the aggrieved party, I order the Military
Commission to retain jurisdiction of the case and not to transfer it to the civil
court.

This retention prompted the filing of the instant petition. The petitioners allege that
respondent Military Commission No. 27 has no jurisdiction over the instant case. They
ask that the court declare as null and void the lst Indorsement dated August 22, 1979
of respondent Minister of National Defense and the corresponding order of arrest
dated June 8, 1978 of respondent military commission for having been issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction.

Issues:

Whether or not the motion to transfer the case from military tribunal to civilian courts
is constitutional.
 Rulings:

1. YES. The transferring of this case to civilian court is constitutional.

Discussion:
1. Out of the twelve (12) accused only one, Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a member of the
armed forces. The respondents state that even if the allegations in the charge sheet
are declared insufficient, the fact that one of the twelve accused is a military
personnel, bring the case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the military courts. We
apply the above-cited rule in Rolando A. de Guzman v. Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando,
et al, (G.R. No. 62798, December 22, 1983 and March 13, 1984) where the lone
military personnel was ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before a civil
court. It is also clear from the records that the acts for which Sgt. Animas was
charged had nothing to do with the performance of official duty.

The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10,
1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. There was no question about the
case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time. Now that
it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to
return, there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be
retained, at this time, by a military tribunal. The reason given by the August 14, 1979
marginal notation on the letter of Mrs. Nelly M. Yanson for retention of jurisdiction by
military courts, "In order to calm the fears of injustice by the aggrieved party," even
assuming it to be true, can be overcome through a careful monitoring by an interested
parties to insure that the trial court is indeed responsive to the demands of justice. At
any rate, this Court does not doubt that in the 1970s when this case was supposed to
go to trial, the judges of the Courts of First Instance would have been able to
administer better justice than any military court or tribunal constituted under martial
law. The expectations for independent courts fearlessly dispensing impartial and
humane justice are at their highest now.

The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian accused at
a time when all civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes
one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine judiciary.

Doctrine:

The essence of procedural due process is expressed in the immortal cry of

Themistocles to Eurybiades: “Strike, but hear me first!” In more familiar words, the
justice that procedural due process guarantees, to repeat Daniel Webster, is the one
“which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.”
 Our Supreme Court has held that “the twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the essential elements of due process and neither of these elements can
be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.”

Tanada v Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette is indispensable.

 Rulings:

1. YES. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended.

Discussion:

1. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence,
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One
can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the
law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption
is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section
6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially,
the legislative enactments of the government.

Doctrine:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.

The publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give

effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable
by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
 People v Salas, 143 SCRA 163

Facts:

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the
prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed,
with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but
while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for
homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and
ordering his release; and so he escaped. The respondent judge, learning later of the
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was
gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance
with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended
all proceedings until the return of the accused.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the authorizing trial in absencia of the respondent judge is

constitutional.

Rulings:

1. NO. The authorizing trial in absencia of the respondent judge is unconstitutional.

Discussion:
1. Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza because it was held
notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent
conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are
present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try
the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the
illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape,
including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the
right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not
to mention a possible or even probable conviction.
Doctrine:

Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified.
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

BANCO ESPAÑOL v. PALANCA, 37 PHIL, 921

Facts:
The case at bar discusses the mortgage agreement Engracio Palanca Tanquienyeng y
Limquingco entered with El Banco Español-Filipino foreclosing a mortgage upon various
parcels of real property situated in the City of Manila. After the execution of the agreement,
Engacio left the Philippines for China where he lived and died. Thereafter, the mortgage
defaulted, prompting the Plaintiff-Appellee to institute an action for foreclosure of the
mortgaged property before the Court of First Instance (CFI). Since Engracio was a
non-resident at the time of the action, the Plaintiff-Appellee made the necessary notice by
publication, and deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and complaint to
Engracio’s last known residence. The action proceeded before the CFI with Engracio failing to
appear. As such, a judgment by default was rendered in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, ordering
Engracio to deliver the amount of the mortgage. Failure to comply shall result in the public
sale of the mortgaged property. The payment was never made. Thus, the CFI ordered the
sale of the mortgaged property.

On June 25, 1915, exactly 7 years after the confirmation of the sale, Defendant-Appellant
Vicente Palanca, the administrator of the estate of Engracio, filed a motion to set aside the
order of the CFI for it being void on the ground that CFI never acquired jurisdiction over
Engracio or over the subject of the action. The CFI denied the motion; hence, the present
Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the Court of First Instance are violative of the
due process of law.

Ruling:
No. The proceedings conducted by the Court of First Instance did not infringe the due process
of law when it decided on the case at bar favoring El Banco Español-Filipino.

Discussion/Analysis:
As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1)
There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over
the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

On the third requirement of giving the defendant the opportunity to be heard, it was well noted
that Palanca went back to his hometown in Amoy, China where he also died, and to answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for
the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. But it was contested that
Palanca did not have an idea that his properties, at that time, are being subject to foreclosure
having not received the notice of the said foreclosure. Assuming the clerk of court failed to
send the notice by post as required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider
whether this is a proper assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is that
there is a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the
court, which presumption is not overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause. There is
therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this
notice; and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should
be allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action
has no control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business
of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant
must depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Considering the ordinary course of things, it is presumed that Palanca soo acquired the
information regarding the sale of his property albeit being outside the Philippine Island.

Thus, Palanca’s appeal was denied and the judgment being appealed accordingly affirmed.

Doctrines:
Procedural Due Process: this refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
DAVID v. AQUILIZAN, 94 SCRA 707

Facts:
In this case, Filemon David filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a wit or Preliminary
Injunction filed on November 27, 1978 to set aside the decision dated September 29, 1978 of
the Court of Agrarian Relations reinstating Ricardo and Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar, as
‘deemed owners’ of the lands they are cultivating which are owned by David.

Ricardo and Felomeno claimed that they were tenants of David who were no longer allowed
to continue their cultivation of the subject lots due to prohibition of David for no reason at all.
David denied the fact Ricardo and Felomeno are his tenants. David instead said that they
were his workers who were given incentives, in Ricardo’s case and who worked on a share
basis, on Felomeno’s case. But Ricardo and Felomeno voluntarily surrendered their land
holdings upon resignation. Ricardo, after resigning as a tractor driver, worked with DOLE and
as a farm tenant of his father. Felomeno on the other hand continued his faith healing work
and later worked with his father after selling his working animals.

Ricardo and Felomeno lodged their petition with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform which was
dropped due to lack of merit, finding there was no unlawful ejectment.

On September 29, 1979, Judge Aquilizan, without conducting hearing, rendered judgment for
the private respondents, Ricardo and Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar, were tenants of
Filemon David, hence the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the decision should be set aside due to denial of due process of law.

Ruling:
Yes. The judgment should be set aside due to denial of due process of law and Judge
Aqulizan is directed to conduct appropriate proceedings,

Discussion/Analysis:
The petition was found to be invested with merit. Judge Aqulizan admittedly did not conduct
any hearing in the case prior to the issuance of the challenged decision favoring Ricardo and
Felomeno Jugar rendering them ‘tenants’ of Filemon David. The decision is null and void and
must be set aside for want of due process. It is a must that the procedural due process must
be present before deciding a case. It must be noted that the following requisites are present,
namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must
be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In the case at bar, judgment was pronounced without David having an opportunity to be
heard.

Hence, the decision ordered by Judge Aquilizan was found to be null and void from inception
making the decision sought to be set aside does not exist in the eyes of the law because it is
‘as though it had not been done.
Doctrines:
Procedural Due Process: this refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
DBP v. BAUTISTA, 26 SCRA 366

Facts:
DBP is a creditor of Lourdes Gaspar Bautista for the recovery of a sum of money representing
the unpaid mortgage indebtedness, which previously had been wiped out with the creditor
bank acquiring the title of the mortgaged property in an extrajudicial sale. Thereafter, the title
was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the land in question being adjudged as belonging to
another claimant Rufino Ramos, without, however, such debtor, having been cited to appear
in such court action. Bautista – Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) – DBP – Conrada
(sold via foreclosure)

Issue:
What is the right, if any, of a creditor which previously satisfied its claim by foreclosing
extrajudicially on a mortgage executed by the debtor, whose title was thereafter nullified in a
judicial proceeding where she was not brought in as a party? If no right existed as against
appellee Bautista, could recovery be had from the Assurance Fund?

Ruling:
Yes. The judgment should be set aside due to denial of due process of law and Judge
Aqulizan is directed to conduct appropriate proceedings,

Discussion/Analysis:
The fundamental due process requirement having been disregarded, Bautista could not in any
wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the effects of such decision. After
the DBP had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale, through its own act,
seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the
same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that
she was not made a party on the occasion of such nullification. If it were otherwise, then the
cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without
being given a hearing would be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court whenever such a question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial of due process
success to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the
impress of nullity.

Article 1558 of the Civil Code reads: “The vendor shall not be obliged to make good the
proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee.”
In effect, the DBP would hold Bautista liable for the warranty on her title, its annulment having
the same effect as that of an eviction. In such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil Code
that Bautista, as a vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend
herself. In view of her being denied her day in Court, it would follow, if the intent of the above
codal provision were to be respected, that she is not obliged to
make good the proper warranty.

Doctrines:
Procedural Due Process: this refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
PITC v. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996)

Facts:
The Philippine Trading International Corporation (PITC) issued
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 which commands that
applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of
China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export
Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer
himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for at
one is to one ratio.

The private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic

corporations, applied for authority to import with the petitioner. However,
they failed to comply with the mandates of AO SOCPEC 89-09-01 so that
further import applications were withheld by PITC. Because of this,
Remington filed for a petition for prohibition and madamus with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO against PITC and was joined by Firestone later.

Hon. Zosimo Angeles, the judge handling the case at the trial court,
granted the petitioners’ request and declared as null and void and
unconstitutional the administrative order issued by the PITC. Among his
reasons for the judgment was the fact that the AO was not published. Later
on, President Fidel Ramos directed the Department of Trade and Industry
and the PITC to cease implementing the said AO.

The respondents contend that the case has been moot and moved for its
early resolution. PITC, however, disagreed that the case is moot because
the respondents still have an outstanding liability.

Issues:
1. Does the administrative order have a binding effect even if it had not
been published?
2. Can the respondents be made liable for an unpublished administrative
order?

Ruling:
1. No. As provided by Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws is
an indispensable step in making the law effective. The administrative order
in question should have been implemented because its purpose is to
“enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.”
Therefore, even before the president has directed that the AO cease to be
implemented, it had never been legally effective.

2. No. The unpublished administrative order had no effect in pursuance to

Article 2 of the Civil Code so any liability incurred because of it is invalid.

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees v. Phil. Blooming Mills, Inc. 50 SCRA 189
FACTS:

On March 4, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization

(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to
express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about about PBMEO's plans, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc.
called for a meeting with the leaders of the union. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by PBMEO, which noted that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company. PBMEO stated that
the planned demonstration was an exercise of the laborers' inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances against police indignities.
The company asked PBMEO to cancel the demonstration, noting that the
same would constitute an interruption of the normal course of their
business which may result in loss of revenue. The company also
threatened the workers that they would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the demonstration.

A second meeting took place where the company stressed that those from
the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate in the
demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed.

Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the demonstration took place. The
officers of PBMEO were eventually dismissed by the company for violation
of the "No Strike and No Lockout" clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal of PBMEO officers from their employment

constituted a violation of their constitutional right to freedom of expression,
assembly, and petition. -- YES.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that PBMEO needed even the first and regular
shift workers for the demonstration as their complete presence in the mass
demonstration would generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of
their cause and immediate action on the part of corresponding agencies.

The company’s contention that it would suffer loss by reason of the

absence of the employees from 6 AM – 2 PM is a plea for the preservation
of merely their property rights. The appropriate penalty that could have
been imposed by the company – if it deserves any penalty at all – should
have been simply to charge the one-day absence of the workers against
their vacation or sick leaves.

While the Bill of Rights protects property rights, human rights such as
freedom of expression, assembly, and petition, are supreme over property
rights. Infringement on human right requires a more stringent criterion for
validation, as compared to impairment of property rights.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officer.

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by

the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7, 2010

FACTS:
At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on
July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Petitioner Louis Biraogo, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails
EO No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.
A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition was likewise filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,et al. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
As can be gleaned from the provisions of the EO, the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.
Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely
an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the
President may create a public office he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation
of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the
executive branch of government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive possesses the inherent authority to create
fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally
mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.
RULING:
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the
three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in
them.
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the
faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as
the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed.
Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of the President
to issue A.O. No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of
Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case,
it was ruled:
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law. xxx
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
Issue
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Ruling

The Court took reference to the Sec 1, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which states that “No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.”

The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. It also seems that the
previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the
fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted
that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused
on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. Thus, EO No. 1 should be struck down

Therefore, the court ruled that EO No. 1 is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution
and that the respondents were ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.
Notes:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play.

Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.
CASE: Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

TOPIC: Procedural Due Process

FACTS:On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other
persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St BF Homes, Parañaque,
Metro Manila.

ISSUES: Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them of their due process during preliminary investigation.

RULING:
The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste.
Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Petitioners charge the NBI
with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April
28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report.

DISCUSSION:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the
petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence on their behalf and for the panel to study
the evidence submitted more fully. Likewise, petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.

4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a
judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the
prosecution of crimes belongs to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility
is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been
sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
CASE: People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54

TOPIC: Procedural Due Process

FACTS:Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting Maureen
Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer
to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The amended
information was filed, however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary

investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.

RULING: Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.

DISCUSSION:Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information
for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offence originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was
merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the circumstances thus
obtained, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is
allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved
and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by
the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate
petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an
open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
CASE: People v. Sanchez, GR 121039, Oct. 18, 2001

TOPIC: Procedural Due Process

FACTS:Mayor Sanchez, Mayor of Calauan Laguna was accused of the rape of Eileen Sarmenta and her boyfriend
Allan Gomez. Eileen was said to be with her boyfriend, both Agriculture students of UP Los Banos when she was
abducted to be gifted to the Mayor who has been eyeing her beauty. The trial invited a lot of attention from press
and has been nationwide news, to which the accused invoked to have been violative of his constitutional rights to
due process, it being a trial by publicity.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused Mayor Sanchez was deprived of his constitutional rights and was
subjected to trial by publicity.

RULING: WHEREFORE,premises considered, it was AFFIRM -the conviction of accused-appellants for seven
counts of rape with homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them for each of said counts, with
MODIFICATION that the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims.

DISCUSSION: We cannot sustain the appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials.Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure
possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterised the
investigation and trial of the case.The records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden
1.0 Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

FACTS:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred
that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor
union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually,
NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed
a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which
they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of
the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously
accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

- The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
- Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented.
- While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
- Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
 - The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
- The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
- The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

2.0 De Bisshop vs. Galang 8 SCRA 244 (1963) G.R. No. L-18365 May
31, 1963

FACTS:
George de Bisschop (Bisschop), an American citizen, was allowed to stay in the country until 1
August 1959 as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc. (Bissmag), of which he
is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration,
in a letter dated 10 July 1959. However, this application was denied by the Commissioner of
Immigration – in view of damaging reports of Immigration Officer Benjamin De Mesa to the effect
that Bissmag is a gambling front and that Bisschop is suspected of tax evasion. A letter was sent,
and Bisschop was advised that he should depart within 5 days.

Bisschop’s counsel requested a copy of the decision. The legal officer of the Bureau of
Immigration replied that, where the result of an application for extension is a denial, no formal
decision, order, or resolution is promulgated by the Board for reasons of practicability and
expediency. Bisschop then filed this petition for prohibition. The RTC granted the petition, ordering
the Board to refrain from arresting Bisschop and that it should first conduct formal hearings.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Commissioners of Immigration are required to conduct formal hearings on
all applications for extension of stay of aliens.
2. Whether or not the Commissioners need to promulgate written decisions in such cases.
3. Is prohibition the proper remedy for the appellee?

HELD:

1. NO.

The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive
branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the
immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, SC was
inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely
administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in
certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and
expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if SC take into account that, in the
particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is
a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in
paragraph 7 of appellant’s answer to the complaint, the “requirement to leave before the start of
the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the
State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion”. It is already a settled rule in this
jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.

2. NO.

With respect to the contention that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on matters of
petition for extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing, appellee relies on Section
8 of the Immigration Act, which provides that in “any case coming before the Board of
Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall prevail”. However, SC agreed with the
Solicitor General that the word “decision”, as employed in this section, obviously refers to
the number of “votes” necessary to constitute the decision of the said Board. The
Sampaguita Shoe case (G. R. No. L-10285, 14 Jan. 1958), which was taken into account by
the lower court, is not applicable to the case at bar; it applies to judicial decisions, as
provided in Section 1, Rule 35, of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, as pointed out in
appellant’s brief, where the intention of the lawmaker is otherwise, the immigration laws
specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to
wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of
admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27 (c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the
decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37, paragraphs (a)
and (c). But there is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of
Commissioners must render decisions on petitioners for extension of stay.

3. NO.

Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. The writ should issue with caution, and only in
cases of extreme necessity — which condition does not obtain in this case. Moreover, it will
issue only if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (Section 2, Rule 67,
Rules of Court). This Court has already ruled that “the use of habeas corpus to test the
legality of aliens’ confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a
settled practice” (Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, 683). This is because habeas corpus,
aside from being thorough and complete, affords prompt relief from unlawful
imprisonment of any kind, and under all circumstances. It reaches the facts affecting
jurisdiction, or want of power, by the most direct method, and at once releases the
applicant from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized (cf. People ex rel. Livingston v.
Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383; 79 N.E. 330). And it has already been held by a long line of American
decisions that the existence of this adequate remedy by habeas corpus will bar the
issuance of a writ of prohibition.

DOCTRINE:
As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process
of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government
is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is
as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated,
without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process
of law. (Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal, 41 Phil. 188, 192-194)

3.0 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 1970)

FACTS:
This case was brought by residents of New York City who received financial aid under the
federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York
State’s Home Relief Program. Their complaint alleged that City officials administering these
programs terminated such aid without prior notice and hearing, denying them due process of law.
After the suit was filed, the City adopted procedures for notice and hearing, which the plaintiff-
appellees then challenged as constitutionally inadequate. The procedure allowed the recipient to
challenge the proposed termination of benefits within seven days and submit a written statement
for the reviewing official to make a final determination. Appellees’ challenged the procedures’ lack
of an opportunity to personally appear before the reviewing officer for oral testimony and cross-
examination of adverse witnesses. The procedure did allow for a post-termination “fair hearing,”
however. The District Court held that only a pre-termination hearing would satisfy the
constitutional due process requirement.

ISSUE:
Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without affording
him an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the recipient due process
of law?

HELD:
Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides
the recipient with procedural due process. For qualified recipients, welfare provides the only
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care. The crucial factor is that the
termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy might deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits. Dissent. No provision in the Constitution should
paralyze the government’s efforts to protect itself against making payments to people who are not
entitled to them. There are large numbers of undeserving welfare recipients, and States should
be able to fight back against them. Concurrence. None.

DOCTRINE:
The interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the
State’s interest that payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the State’s
competing interest to prevent administrative and fiscal burdens. The pre-termination hearing need
not take the form of a judicial or quasi- judicial trial, as the “fair hearing” will afford full
administrative review later on. It need only produce an initial determination that the welfare’s
grounds for termination of benefits are valid.
CASE: Board of Regents v Roth 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 1972 U.S.
PETITIONER: Board of Regents of State Colleges
RESPONDENT: David Roth

Statement of facts:

Roth was hired as a first year assistant professor in the political science department at
Wisconsin State University in 1968. Roth’s contract was for a fixed term of one year with the
possibility of extending the contract. At the end of his contract year, Roth was informed by the
president of the University that his contract would not be renewed, citing no reason for the
decision or offering an opportunity to challenge the decision in any forum. Under the Board of
Regents policy, employees were given the opportunity for review if dismissed before the end of
their employment term; however this protection was not given to employees who were not
contractually renewed. Roth sued based on infringement of his First Amendment rights, stating
his contract was terminated based on critical statements he made against the university
administration, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, alleging his right to due process had also
been violated.

Issue: Does the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that a state university provide a one-year
contract employee a hearing and reasons when he is not retained after the termination of his contract?

PETITIONER’S CLAIM: The Board of Regents of State Colleges stated the University president
followed the policy set forth for nontenure track professionals, did not violate Roth’s First or
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and did not owe explanation for nonrenewal or opportunity for a
hearing.

RESPONDENT’S CLAIM: Roth claimed the University violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights when his nontenured contract was not renewed. Though rated as an
“excellent” teacher by the faculty, Roth claims it was his criticism of university administration that
led to his nonrenewal.

REMEDY SOUGHT BY PETITIONER: The Board of Regents did not want to provide formal
reasons for nonrenewal, provide a hearing for Roth, or extend Roth’s contract.

APPEAL PROCESS: The case was originally heard by the Seventh Circuit Court and was ruled
in the Respondent’s favor; the District Court granted summary judgment for the University
officials to provide Roth with reasons for dismissal and a hearing (310 F.Supp. 972). The Court
of Appeals affirmed partial summary (446 F.2d 806). The Supreme Court then only heard the
question of the Fourteenth Amendment and ruled the University did not violate due process.

Rulings:
DECISION OF THE COURT: (5-3 vote) The Supreme Court denied Roth had his Fourteenth
Amendment rights violated, stating their need not be an opportunity for a hearing prior to
nonrenewal of an employee’s nontenured contract. The Court did not address the First
Amendment rights issue. Judgment for the Petitioner. In an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, the court held 5-3 that Roth had no
protected interest in continued employment, as he had completed his contracted
term, and therefore was no Fourteenth Amendment protection.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATORS: The idea of “right to work” is recognized and protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; however the status of government employment is still
undecided and uncertain. Educators must be aware of the tenuous employment relationship
between public school districts and public school teachers. The Roth ruling could have
implications and change the due process rights of public school teachers and/or grant more
flexibility to public school districts in their hiring processes. These changes could dramatically
affect academic freedom for public school teachers.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO
PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Statement of facts:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note companied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as
the Extradition law, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC
of Manila prohibiting the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The Court -- by a vote
of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to
file a comment and supporting evidence. 8

On the Motion for Reconsideration by the SOJ, it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held
that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ,
filed with the an appropriate Petition for Extradition alleging that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for conspiracy to
defraud the United States ,tax evasion, wire fraud, also statements and illegal campaign contributions. In
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate
arrest" pursuant to the extradition law.

Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that
petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez
and set the case for hearing , petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The court below, directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Hence, this Petition. Mark Jimenez maintains that the
constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited.
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charge with offenses with reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.

Issue:

1. Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
2. Whether or not extradites are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending
Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. The present case involve a pure questions of law that are of public interest.
Five Postulates of Extradition
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime. by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused. Second, an extradition treaty
presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal
system and judicial process.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis. Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a
class by itself -- they are not. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court
of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee . An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. The rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards while a
criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction Finally, unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts
may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith. Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered
into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption
that its implementation will serve the national interest.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight. Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest? If the
presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for
the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in
extradition cases. There was also no violation of due process. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness. Not to mention that prior to the extradition he had that opportunity in
the requesting state, instead of taking it he ran away.

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required."
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG vs. HON. OLALIA AND MUÑOZ
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

Statement of Facts:

Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court of 3 counts of the offense of accepting an
advantage as agent, and 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy. Warrants of arrest were later
issued against him.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong DOJ, a request for the
provisional arrest of Muñoz. The DOJ forwarded the request to the NBI, which later filed with the
RTC of Manila, an application for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. The RTC of Manila later
issued the warrant of arrest and the NBI later arrested him. Muñoz subsequently filed an appeal
with the CA questioning the validity of his arrest. The CA later declared his arrest void. Later on
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court sustained the validity of the arrest of Muñoz.

Earlier, the Government of HK, filed a petition for the extradition of Muñoz. In the same case,
Muñoz filed a petition for bail. After hearing, an Order denying the petition for bail was rendered
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk." Muñoz then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail which was later granted. The Government of Hong Kong is now
questioning said grant of bail to Muñoz arguing that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to bail can be granted in the case of Muñoz, an extradition case.

Ruling:

YES
As a rule, the right to bail of an accused is granted only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this
Court cannot ignore trends in international law, with the modern trend in public international law
placing primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. With the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after World War II, human rights
principles were then given recognition and importance whereby the principles therein, are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.

Examining the US vs. Purugnan case, the Court ruled that to limit the right to bail in the criminal
proceeding would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential history. Philippines has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved in this jurisdiction to
persons in detention during the tendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognisance
the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
In extradition, the extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time in the detention should be reasonable.

In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detained for 2 years
without being convicted in Hongkong.

The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process
and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain
standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE”.

However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing
evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination
and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the
Constitution.
 ERNESTINA Z. SOLLOSO
Subject: Constitutional Law II

1. Case Title: LAO G. V. CA 180 SCRA 756

Facts

Petitioner Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children were charge for
deportation by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. From the 1958
rulingof the Supreme Court, Opinion 191 finding Filomeno Chia alias Sia Peng Hui to
be a Filipino Citizen born on November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of
Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua Pampanga.

In 1980,The Minister of Justice rendered another opinion-Opinion 147, cancelling

Opinion 191 setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it
was founded on fraud and representation. This amended opinion charge was filed
at the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the BOC alleging that
petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused by filing a motion for
reconsideration of the said order and opposed the motion for their arrest but this was
denied.

In September 1981, respodents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on

the ground that BOC has no authority to reopen a matter long settled through
Opinion 191 in 1958. This motion to dismiss was opposed by a private prosecutor as
well as the CID special prosecutor by this was denied and again denied in
December of 1981.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari in February 1982 and the Court en ban
resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit. June 1982 filed a motion for
reconsideration but again was denied by the Court in September 1982.

September 1982, also CID set the deportation case against respondents for hearing
and Acting Commissioner Nituda gave the respondents 3 days to move for
reconsideration of the order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the
motion for their arrest. Again respondents filed for motion for reconsideration but
again denied until respondents filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition for
injunctive relief relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila relative to the case of
falsification of public documents. 1985 April, a decision was rendered by the Trial
Court dismissing the petition for lack of legal basis. An appeal was interposed to the
Court of Appeals in 1987 but was dismissed and denied in 1988.

Petitioners filed petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals and to set aside the order of CID dated September 1982 and directing it to
proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the
petitioners.
 Relevant Issue

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the right to due process if they are aliens.

Ruling (Dispositive Portion)

The petition was granted and the order of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation dated 1982 was set aside. The CID was directed to continue hearing the
deportation case against the petitioners, and based on evidence before it, to resolve
the issue of citizenship of petitioners

Discussion Analysis

The power to deport an alien is an act of the state under the authority of its
sovereign power. But before any alien may be deported upon a warrant of the
Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation, there should be a prior procedure by
the CID on the existence of the ground as charged against them.

The deportation proceeding though not a criminal action, the case of deportation is
harsh and highly affecting their freedom and liberty, hence, the constitutional rights
of alien to due process should not be denied.

Section 37 © of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, provides that

“No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commission on Immigration.

2. Case Title: DOMINGO V. SHEER, 421 SCRA 468

Facts

Respondent Sheer, a German nationality who married a Filipina and had 3 children
became a permanent resident in July 1986, Alien Certificate of Registration in
September 1987, and Immigration Certificate of Residence in February 1988. June
of 1995 the Philippine Ambassador in Bonn Germany was informed that Sheer had
police records and financial liabilities in Germany .

The DFA received from the German Embassy in Manila that the respondent, Sheer
was wanted by the German Federal Police and requested the Philippine Authorities
on the Matter. BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation in 1997 with the
following orders:

1. Cancellation of respondent’s permanent residence visa;

 2. Respondent’s summary deportation and permanent exclusion from the
Philippines; and
3. Inclusion of his name on the Bureau’s Blacklist.

The respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged his arrest and detention were premature,
unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. His Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not been
resolved for more than six years.

Relevant Issue

Whether or not the arrest and detention of the respondent and his deportation
under the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC for insurance fraud and illegal
activities in Palawan violated his constitutional and statutory rights to due process.

Ruling (Dispositive Portion)

The arrest and detention of BOC was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary. Sheer
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted by the Court that any order, oral or
written, issued by respondent Commissioner Domingo against petitioner, in relation to
his deportation, is ANNULLED, and respondent Commissioner Domingo is hereby
permanently enjoined/prohibited from deporting petitioner, in so far as this case is
concerned.

Discussion Analysis

The BOC is mandated to implement a legal and valid Summary of Deportation Order
within the reasonable time, but in the case of the respondent the arrest was more
than 6 years and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was also filed more than 6
years. There exist no factual or legal basis for his deportation, hence, the case shall
be reviewed further in the manner prescribed by law. Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Philippine Constitution allowed the Court to look into and resolve questions of
whether or not such judgement of the BOC has been made with grave abuse and
discretion.

3. Case Title: PHILCOMSAT V. ALCUAZ, 180, SCRA 218

Facts

RA 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted “a franchise to establish, construct, maintain

and operate in the Philippines….” PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
companies like GLOBE and PLDT. From then on, the petitioner continued to operate
and maintain same facilities providing the international satellite communication
services since 1967. Executive Order No. 196 placed the petitioner under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing rates.

This Executive Order caused PHILCOMSAT to have provisional authority to

continue operating its existing facilities but it also directed the petitioner to charge
modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates.

With this, PHILCOMSAT sues NTC and Commissioner Alcuaz assailing that said
directive does not provide the necessary standards which were constitionally
required.

Relevant Issue

Whether or not the questioned order violates procedural due process for having
issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing and rate reduction it imposes is
unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory.

Ruling (Dispositive Portion)

The order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under resolution of
September 13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of
respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized
services, is hereby made permanent.

Discussion Analysis

The application of a policy like the fixing rates as exercised by administrative bodies
is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. If the function of the Administrative
agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where the order
applies to a named person, as the case, the function involved is adjudicatory.

NTC has no authority to make such order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. Said hearing is required is
evident in respondent’s order of 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority “to continue operating its existing facilities….”
CASE TITLE:

GLOBE TELECOM, INC., vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, DEPUTY
COMMISSIONERS AURELIO M. UMALI and NESTOR DACANAY, and
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. G.R. No. 143964. July 26, 2004

FACTS:

Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a
Complaint to effect the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner
Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and
malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS. Globe pointed
out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued the Order where it ruled
that both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Order for their
lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for
interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present
impasse and penalized both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added
Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. Globe filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order.
The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without
authority from it, in violation of Section 420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs
intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC
through an administrative process. Yet, in view of what it noted as the "peculiar
circumstances" of the case, NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a
Cease and Desist Order, and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite
authority to provide SMS within thirty (30) days, subject to the payment of fine in the
amount of two hundred pesos (P200.00) "from the date of violation and for every day
during which such violation continues.

ISSUE:

WON NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe

RULING:

No. NTC violated several of the cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the
assailed Order. The assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently
explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial
evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe
despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the
right to present evidence on its behalf.

Thus, the Order effectively discriminatory and arbitrary as it is, was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and it must be set aside. NTC may not legally require Globe to
secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS. This does not imply though
that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS. However, the move
should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all
entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the
assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.

CASE TITLE:

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security

checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. 1 Initially hired
on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular
employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of the Security Checkers Section
of private respondent.2

Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out

its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency.
The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint on December 3,
1991 for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages,
and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that the violation of the respondent’s notice requirement can be
considered as a denial of due process of the petitioner’s dismissal or layoff.

RULING:

No, the respondent’s notice of requirement cannot be considered as a denial of due

process. The first reason is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a
limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power,
such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. State has authority to
take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered
civilized methods.

The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause
before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is
obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee
is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day
written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be
heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him
time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his
employment.

The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 cannot be considered a
requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected
to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination
of employment for a just cause under Art. 282 (i.e., serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and habitual
neglect of duties, fraud or willful breach of trust of the employer, commission of crime
against the employer or the latter's immediate family or duly authorized
representatives, or other analogous cases).

In sum, the court hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it is
shown that the termination of employment was due to an authorized cause, then the
employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to
comply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he must be granted separation pay
in accordance with Art. 283.

On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown
that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes mentioned in said Art. 282,
then, in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be
paid back wages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined
that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him
before he is dismissed renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann
Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay
for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay and,
in addition, full back wages from the time his employment was terminated on October
11, 1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is
REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the separation pay, back wages,
and other monetary awards to petitioner.
CASE TITLE:

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME
IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of

selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners
Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January
2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims
and claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice
and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were
not dismissed but had abandoned their work.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Yes, accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned their
employment and were already working for another employer. To dismiss an employee,
the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to
be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss;
and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the
employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment
written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

In the present case the dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the
petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent,
however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending
notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside
there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse
because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known
address.21 Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, finding that
petitioners' Jenny and Virgilio Agabon abandoned their work, and ordering private
respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from
1996 to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same
period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance of Virgilio Agabon's thirteenth
month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is
further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as
nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.