STANDING OF IBP

IBP v. ZAMORA
Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines
(the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the
"PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI")
which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under
the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila
through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially
those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
whose members include those that are well-trained,
disciplined and well-armed active or former
PNP/Military personnel.
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is
not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves
a political question; that the organization and conduct
of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of
one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier,
does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
In view of standing
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts
no other basis in support of its locus standi The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
National President of the IBP who signed the petition,
is his alone, absent a formal board resolution
authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none
of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents,
has sustained any form of injury as a result of the
operation of the joint visibility patrols.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically
assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for
resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The
reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of
a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover,
the political question being a function of the separation
of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch unless the case
shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold
the law and the Constitution.

STANDING OF THE GOVERNMENT TO QUESTION

ITS OWN LAWS
PEOPLE V VERA
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the
trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all
were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
of United States for review, which was also denied. The
SC denied the petition subsequently filed by CuUnjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution
of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application
for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of
CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed
an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces
and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the
provinces and this is the actual situation now
appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would
be illusory. There can be no probation without a
probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system
The general rule is that constitutionality should be
raised in the earliest possible opportunity, which means
during proceedings in the inferior court. However,
Supreme Court is granted concurrent jurisdiction.
When the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute,
it may be prevented by a writ of prohibition from
enforcing that statute. Since the CFI Manila sitting on
probation proceedings derive its jurisdiction from Act
No. 4221, it cannot determine whether the statute
granting them jurisdiction is constitutionally valid or not.
On the second level of the argument of the defence,
the public prosecutors representing the People of the
Philippines is also allowed to assail the constitutionality
of an act promulgated by the legislative because the

State is always interested in the integrity of its

constitution or statutes involved.
Taxpayers Suits
Bayan v. Zamora
Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the
United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by United States
military personnel. In view of the impending expiration
of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected
the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On
July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US
Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific
Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed
by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr.,
to exchange notes on the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the
Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which
was respectively signed by public respondent
Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President
Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998,
the President, acting through respondent Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the
Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not
petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA;
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they
have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA.
As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the
VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that
a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition

and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing

the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of
the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. The Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created
by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue
of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to
study and recommend proposed amendmentsand/or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds
that it is a public office which only the legislature can
create by way of a law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal
standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 43
HELD: Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It
is readily apparent that there is no exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR
was created by thePresident by virtue of E.O. No. 43,
as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O.
No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for
its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds
of the Office of the President. Being that case,
petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the
suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume
to make such a representation.
Doctrine of Purposeful Hesitation
Drilon v. Lim
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the
LocalGovernment Code
. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of
four oil companies and a t a x p a y e r ) d e c l a r e d
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue
C o d e ) n u l l a n d v o i d f o r n o n - compliance with
the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certainprovisions contrary to law and
public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretarys
resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declaredSec
187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it
vests on the Secretary the power of control over
LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues
that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that
the proceduralrequirements for the enactment of
tax ordinances as specified in the Local
GovernmentCode had indeed not been

observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the

Court due tofailure to submit certified true copy of the
decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Republic Vs. CA
Facts:
Republic of the Philippines has sought the
expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the
private respondents for the widening and concreting of
the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan
Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the
Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents,
however, demand that the just compensation for the
property should be based on fair market value and not
that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended,
which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by
the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner,
whichever is lower. The Regional, Trial Court ruled for
the private respondents. When elevated to it, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it

affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been
passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books
and considered never to have existed at all. Not only
the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration
of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to
apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a
total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under
this view, the court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses
to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties
just as if such statute had no existence. The court may
give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law,
but the decision affects the parties only and there is no
judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of
the court may operate as a precedent for the
determination of other similar cases, but it does not
strike the statute from the statute books; it does not
repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The
parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but
no one else is bound.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, providing that "when the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern. . . .4
The strict view considers a legislative enactment which
is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal
intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed
as if had never existed. Here, of course, we refer to the
law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It
is not always the case, however, that a law is
constitutionally faultyper se. Thus, it may well be valid
in its general import. but invalid in its application to
certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise
valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it
is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in
pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested
rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be
so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of
contracts. 5
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may
not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a
declaration.

Held: There are two views on the effects of a

declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute.

The Baselines Law

Magallona v. Ermita

The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as

announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act

Facts:

Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to

consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the
LGC
Held: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in whichthe subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Moreover, Article X, Section5 ( 2 ) , o f t h e
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r f i n a l judgments
and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation,order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.In the exercise of this jurisdiction,
lower courts are advised to act with the
utmostcircumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionalityupon the stability of laws, no
less than on the doctrine of separation of
powers. It is also emphasized that every court,
including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposefulhesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was
firstcarefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by themto be
in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally approved. To doubt is tosustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the clearest showingthat there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the

maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158,
codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A.
5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be
compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one
baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for
three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under
Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea
lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands
would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or
loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts,
serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the
scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature
can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are
subject to both passages does not place them in lesser
footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover,
RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state
can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover,
the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the
UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100
mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to

include them, well breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Govt of Phil. Islands vs. Monte de Piedad
FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in
the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions
provided $400,000 aid as received by the National
Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The
government used the money as such but $80,000 was
left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de
Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries,
equivalent to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon
the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from
before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with
this order on the ground that the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands and not the Department of
Finance had the right to order the reimbursement
because the Philippine government is not the affected
party. On account of various petitions of the persons,
the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de
Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with
interest, for the benefit of those persons and their
heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is
authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the
people deposited in respondent bank.
HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government
is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against
respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector
of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent
supreme power to enforce laws which promote public
interest. The government has the right to "take back"
the money intended fro people. The government has
the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the
public interests, where no other person is entrusted
with it.
Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was
thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that
respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs
with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.
Cabanas v. Pilapil
Facts: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he
indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the
child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall
be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The

child was only ten years of age when Florentino died

and so Francisco then took charge of Florentinos
insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora
Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the
insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared
as the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of
the insurance policy and that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the
parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by
virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance
policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the
strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and
that whenever any member thereof such as in the case
at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected
then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should
resolve that case according to the best interest of that
person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it
should be the mother as she was the immediate
relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the
mother shall show more care towards the child than
the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here
is in consonance with this countrys tradition of favoring
conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.

LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
YES:
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.
And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in
fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of

the present government. All the eleven members of this

Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
Effects of Change of Soverignty
People v. Perfecto
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the
Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that
the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the
convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto
published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code provision that
punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown.
Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in
the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the
Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives
of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its
representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with
the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from
Spanish to American, it means that the invoked
provision of the SPC had been automatically
abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the
SPC to be political in nature for it is about the relation
of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that it is a general principle of the public
law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.
Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer
in force and cannot be applied to the present case.
Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion
rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.

November, 1963. The said property was no longer the

subject of litigation.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only
by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner
Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his
order dated October 23, 1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184,
which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot
1184 A E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on
July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of
Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the
lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing
Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and
Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has

no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to
the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of
this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the
Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been
abrogated because whenever there is a change in the
sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by
Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Derogation of Philippine Sovereignty; The Visiting
Forces Agreement
Bayan v. Zamora
Facts: (Ibid) Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA
violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Issue: Was the VFA unconstitutional?

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with

"Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code,
Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3
par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D.
Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the
mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned
provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private
and business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly
on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the
plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March
6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the
decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil
Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and

Held: NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless
the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the
first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution
No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII]
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the

phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this
case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words

used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed,
in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the
sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement
is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The records reveal that the United States

Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government
has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America
accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under
the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.
USA VS. REYES
FACTS:
Private respondent, hereinafter referred to as Montoya,
is an American citizen who, at thetime material to this
case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker
at the U.S. NavyExchange (NEX) at the Joint United
States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters inQuezon City. She is married to one
Edgardo H. Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employedby the U.S. Navy and stationed in San
Francisco, California. Petitioner Maxine Bradford,
hereinafterreferred to as Bradford, is likewise an
American citizen who was the activity exchange
manager atthe said JUSMAG Headquarters.As a
consequence of an incident which occurred on 22
January 1987 whereby her body andbelongings were
searched after she had bought some items from the
retail store of the NEXJUSMAG, where she had
purchasing privileges, and while she was already at the
parking area,Montoya filed on7 May 1987 a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of her place of residence
Cavite against Bradford for damages due to the
oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the
latterin excess of her authority as store manager of the
NEX JUSMAG.In support of the motion, the petitioners
claimed that JUSMAG, composed of an Army, Navy
and AirGroup, had been established under the
Philippine-United States Military Assistance
Agreemententered into on 21 March 1947 to
implement the United States' program of rendering
militaryassistance to the Philippines. Its headquarters

in Quezon City is considered a temporary

installationunder the provisions of Article XXI of
the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. Thereunder, "it
ismutually agreed that the United States shall have the
rights, power and authority within the baseswhich are
necessary for the establishment, use and operation
and defense thereof or appropriate forthe control
thereof." The 1979 amendment of the Military Bases
Agreement made it clear that theUnited States shall
have "the use of certain facilities and areas within the
bases and shall haveeffective command and control
over such facilities and over United States personnel,
employees,equipment and material." JUSMAG
maintains, at its Quezon City headquarters, a Navy
Exchangereferred to as the NEX-JUSMAG. Checking
of purchases at the NEX is a routine
procedureobserved at base retail outlets to protect and
safeguard merchandise, cash and equipment
pursuantto paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT
SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7 Thus, Bradford's order tohave
purchases of all employees checked on 22 January
1987 was made in the exercise of herduties as
Manager of the NEX-JUSMAG
ISSUES:
whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion todismiss based on
the following grounds:(a) the complaint in Civil Case
No. 224-87 is in effect a suit against the public
petitioner, a foreignsovereign immune from suit which
has not given consent to such suit and(b) Bradford is
immune from suit for acts done by her in
the performance of her official functions asmanager of
the U.S. Navy Exchange of JUSMAG pursuant to the
Philippines-United States MilitaryAssistance
Agreement of 1947 and the Military Bases Agreement
of 1947, as amended.
HELD:
The petition was DENIED for lack of merit. There can
be no doubt that on the basis of theallegations in the
complaint, Montoya has a sufficient and viable cause
of action. Bradford'spurported non-suability on the
ground of state immunity is then a defense which may
be pleaded inthe answer and proven at the trial.Since
Bradford did not file her Answer within the
reglementary period, the trial court correctlydeclared
her in default upon motion of the private respondent.
The judgment then rendered againsther on 10
September 1987 after the ex parte reception of the
evidence for the private respondentand before this
Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order on 7
December 1987 cannot beimpugned. The filing of the
instant petition and the knowledge thereof by the trial
court did notprevent the latter from proceeding with
Civil Case No.224-87. "It is elementary that the
mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced inrelation to a case pending before a
lower Court, does not interrupt the course of the latter
whenthere is no writ of injunction restraining it."
SALIENT POINTS:

The Doctrine of State Immunity

sometimes called
the royal prerogative of dishonesty
as declaredin the Constitution affirms,
The state may not be sued without its consent".
This provision is merely recognition of the sovereign
character of the state andan express affirmationof the
unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the
courtsof justice.According to JusticeHolmes the
doctrine of non-suability is based not on any
formalconception or obsolete theory but onthe logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right
against the authority, which makesthe law on which the
right depends. Another justification is the practical
consideration that thedemands and inconveniences of
litigation will divert the time and resources of the state
from themore pressing matters demanding its
attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.The
doctrine is also available to foreign states insofar as
they are sought to be sued in the courts ofthe local
state. The added basis in this case is the principle of
the sovereignequality of states, underwhichone state
cannot assert jurisdiction over another inviolation of the
maxim
par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would unduly vex the
peace of nations."
Exemption: Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations admits ofexceptions. It reads:
A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the crimin
al jurisdiction of the receiving State.He shall also enjoy
immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction
except in the case
of:xxx xxx xxx(c) an action relating to any professional
or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving State outside his official
functions
Immunity of Foreign States & Diplomats; Par in
parem non habet imperium; Process of Suggestion
HOLY SEE v. RTC
Facts: This petition arose from a controversy over a
parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name
of petitioner. Said Lot5-A is contiguous to Lots5-B and
5-Dregistered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon
Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to
the sale to private respondent, Starbright Enterprises.
The squatters refused to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties
has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land
of squatters occurred. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).Private respondent filed a complaint for

annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and

specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana.
Held:
Immunity from suit: YES. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in
the regular course of business. If the foreign state is
not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or
an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or
profit.Lot5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign
sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is
granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envo yholds on
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic
envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in
this case is the Holy See.
Notes: There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, according to the Supreme Court: (a)
Classical or absolute theory: a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the
courts of another sovereign; and (b) Restrictive theory
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acof a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis. JURE IMPERII AND JURE GESTIONIS. "There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the Courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. x x
x Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a
foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate
test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry.
The logical question is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly

in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction

must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit
of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is
an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken
for gain or profit." The service contracts referred to by
private respondent have not been intended by the ADB
for profit or gain but are official acts over which a
waiver of immunity would not attach.
Par in parem non habet imperium: An equal has no
power over an equal
Process of Suggestion: In the United States, the
procedure followed is the process of "suggestion,"
where the foreign state or the international organization
sued in an American court requests the Secretary of
State to make a determination as to whether it is
entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that
the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the
Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion"
that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a
similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office
issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting
a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130
[1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign
Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal
1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to
the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the
latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued
because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972),
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a
telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to
make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States
Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
"suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation
and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with
this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of
petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to

file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of

sovereign immunity.
DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LIANG VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC
of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners
bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an office of protocol from the DFA stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter
filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the
case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he
is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with
immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation
was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45
of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in official
capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in

cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case.
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.
The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Immunity of international organizations and
Agencies
SEAFDEC v. NLRC
FACTS
:T w o l a b o r c a s e s w e r e f i l e d b y t h e h e r e i n
private respondents against the
p e t i t i o n e r , Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the
National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases,
theprivate respondents claim having been wrongfully
terminated from their employment by thepetitioner.The
petitioner, who claims to be an international intergovernment organization composedof various
Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss,
challenged the jurisdictionof the public respondent in
taking cognizance of the above cases.The private
respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter,
allege that the petitioner is notimmune from suit and
assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has,however, impliedly, if not
expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly
raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
:Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
RULING
:The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond
question that petitioner SEAFDEC is
aninternational agency enjoying diplomatic
immunity. It has already been held in
SoutheastAsian Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department vs. National Labor
RelationsCommission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA
283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian
FisheriesDevelopment Center-Aquaculture Department
(SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agencybeyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC
including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in
whose territory itsoffice is located. One of the
basic immunities of an international
organization is immunityfrom local jurisdiction, i.e.,
that it is immune from the legal writs and processes
issued by thetribunals of the country where it is found.
The obvious reason for this is that the subjectiono f
such an organization to the authority of
the local courts would afford a
c o n v e n i e n t medium thru which the host government

may interfere in their operations or even influenceor

control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such objection to
local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such
body to discharge its responsibilitiesimpartially on
behalf of its member-states.
CALLADO VS. IRRI
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a
driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the
IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the
findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official
duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to
supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of
a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the
charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and
indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the
Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue
of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that
it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as
an international organization in the instant case filed by
petitioner, not having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor
Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination,
respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and,
accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no
longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal
and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set
aside and the complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of
the IRRI as an international organization granted by
Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be
invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the
same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on
the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D.
1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in

this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?
Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall
enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the
Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted
law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by
the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI
enjoys immunities accorded to international
organizations, which determination has been held to be
a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order
not to embarass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government or other officer acting
under his direction.

the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development

Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and
Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And
The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The
Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on
the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic
immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in
favour Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03
November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the
NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation
of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a
favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts
with different private companies, ADB has descended
to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial
transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from
suit
Held:

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal

and an express waiver by its Director-General is the
only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the

ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form,
except in the specified cases of borrowing and
guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale
and underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on
their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts
performed by them in their official capacity. The
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting
these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants
and commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute

may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.

Being an international organization that has been

extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent
of the municipal law.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance

of unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned.

DFA v. NLRC
Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed
an illegal dismissal case against ADB. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB
and the other through the Department of Foreign
Affairs ("DFA"). ADB and the DFA notified respondent
Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and
Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal
process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale
of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of

"One of the basic immunities of an international

organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that
it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued
by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The
obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an
organization to the authority of the local courts would
afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an

ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which
should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from
suit, by entering into service contracts with different
private companies. There are two conflicting concepts
of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the Courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory,
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a
foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate
test. Such an act can only be the start of the
inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign
state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly
in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent
have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain
but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity
would not attach.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Municipality of San Fernando vs. Judge Firme
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs.
FIRMEG.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
Facts:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney
owned by the Estate of MacarioNieveras, a gravel and
sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and
a dumptruck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
driven by Alfredo Bislig. Dueto the impact, several passengers of
the jeepney including LaureanoBania Sr. died asa result of
the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered
varying degrees of physical injuries.On December 11,
1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for
damagesagainst the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,respectively, of the
passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants
filed a ThirdParty Complaint against the petitioner and the driver
of a dump truck of petitioner.Petitioner filed its answer and
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause
of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action
and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision.Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme ordered
defendants Municipality of San Fernando,La Union and
Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs

for funeralexpenses.Private respondents stress that

petitioner has not considered that every court,including
respondent court, has the inherent power to amend
and control its processand orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion whenit deferred and failed to resolve the defense of
non-suability of the State amounting tolack of jurisdiction in a
motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
Non-suability of the state.
The doctrine of non
suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article
XVI,Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be
sued without itsconsent."Consent takes the form of express or
implied consent.Municipal corporations, for example,
like provinces and cities, are agencies of the Statewhen
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy thesovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless,
they are subject to suit even in theperformance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and besued."Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicablelaw and the established facts.
The circumstance that a state is suable does notnecessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if itdoes not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that thestate has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity,it is
only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable."Anent the issue of whether
or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not thedriver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.
Unincorporated; If principal function is
governmental
Farolan v. CTA
Facts:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived
on January 30, 1972 at the Port ofManila carrying
among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to
Baging BuhayTrading (Baging Buhay). The import was
classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff
and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay
paid the duties and taxesdue in the amount of
P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of Customs
ordered a re-examination of the shipment uponhearing
the information that the shipment consisted of
mosquito net made of nylonunder Tariff Heading No.
62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon reexamination, itturns out that the shipment was
undervalued in quantity and value as
previouslydeclared. Thus the Collector of Customs
forfeited the shipment in favor of
thegovernment.Private respondent filed a petition on

August 20, 1976 for the release of the

questionedgoods which the Court denied. On June
2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales werereleased to
Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen
remaining bales weremissing. The respondent claims
that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950
yardswere in good condition and the rest were in bad
condition. Thus, respondents demandsthat the Bureau
of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the
43,050 yards itactually lost.
Issue:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held
liable for the 43,050 yardsactually lost by the private
respondent.
Held:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual
damages that the privaterespondent sustained with
regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit
privater e s p o n d e n t ' s c l a i m t o
prosper would violate the
d o c t r i n e o f s o v e r e i g n immunity. Since
it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be
ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for
which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it
isobvious that this case has been converted technically
into a suit against the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that state may not
be sued without its consent,
categorically applies. As an unincorporated
government agency without any separate judicial
personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys
immunity from suit. Alongwith the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty,namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau
of Customs performs the governmentalfunction of
collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary
function. Thus privaterespondents claim for damages
against the Commissioner of Customs must fails
City of Angeles vs. CA
FACTS:
In a Deed of Donation , private respondent donated to
the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated inBarrio
Pampang, City of Angeles (50,676 sq m). The
amended deed provides that: The propertiesdonated
shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of
the Angeles City Sports Center. Any changeor
modification in the basic design or concept of said
Sports Center must have the prior written consentof
the DONOR. The properties donated are devoted
and described as open spaces of
the DONORssubdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases
the DONORand/or assumes any and all obligations
and liabilities appertaining to the properties
donated.On 1988, petitioners started the construction
of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the
donatedland. Upon learning thereof,
private respondent protested such action for being

violative of the termsand conditions and also offered

another site for the rehabilitation center. However,
petitionersrejected the alternative because the site was
too isolated and had no electric and water facilities.
Privaterespondent filed a complaint for breach of the
conditions imposed in the amended deed of
donationand seeking the revocation of the
donation.Petitioners admitted the commencement of
the construction but alleged that the conditions
imposed inthe amended deed were contrary to
Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise
known as theSubdivision Ordinance of the Municipality
of Angeles.ISSUE: Whether a subdivision
owner/developer is legally bound under Presidential
Decree No. 1216 todonate to the city or municipality
the open space allocated exclusively for parks,
playground andrecreational use.HELD: PD 1216
(amending PD 957) defines open space as an area
reserved exclusively for parks,playgrounds,
recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship,
hospitals, health centers, barangaycenters and other
similar facilities and amenities
.
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds
andrecreational use shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable. No portion of the parks
andplaygrounds donated thereafter shall be converted
to any other purpose or purposes.Upon their
completion x xx, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and
playgrounds shall be donated by the owneror
developer to the city or municipality and it shall be
mandatory for the local government to accept;provided,
however, that the parks and playgrounds may
be donated to the Homeowners Association of the
project with the consent of the city or municipality
concerned. x xx. (amended sec. 31, PD 957)It is clear
from the aforequoted amendment that it is no
longer optional on the part of the
subdivisionowner/developer to donate the open space
for parks and playgrounds; rather there is now
a legalobligation to donate the same. Although there is
a proviso that the donation of the parks
andplaygrounds may be made to the homeowners
association of the project with the consent of the city
of municipality concerned, nonetheless, the
owner/developer is still obligated under the law to
donate.Such option does not change the mandatory
character of the provision. The donation has to be
maderegardless of which donee is picked by the
owner/developer. The consent requirement before the
samecan be donated to the homeowners association
emphasizes this point.We hold that any condition may
be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not
contrary to law,morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. The contention of petitioners that the
donationshould be unconditional because it is
mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not
provide that
the donation of the open space for parks and
playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that

itshould be so is tantamount to unlawfully expanding

the provisions of the decree. In the case at bar, oneof
the conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of
Donation is that the donee should build a
sportscomplex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216
clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross
areaallotted for parks and playgrounds is nonbuildable, then the obvious question arises whether or
notsuch condition was validly imposed and is binding
on the donee. It is clear that the nonbuildablecharacter applies only to the 3.5% to 9%
area set by law. If there is any excess land over and
above the3.5% to 9% required by the decree, which is
also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds
andrecreational purposes, it is obvious that such
excess area is not covered by the nonbuildabilityrestriction. Inasmuch as the construction
and operation of the drug rehabilitation center
has beenestablished to be contrary to law, the said
center should be removed or demolished. At this
juncture,we hasten to add that this Court is and has
always been four-square behind the governments
efforts toeradicate the drug scourge in this country. But
the end never justifies the means, and however
laudablethe purpose of the construction in question,
this Court cannot and will not countenance an outright
andcontinuing violation of the laws of the land,
especially when committed by public officials.
Suits against Public Officer
Veterans manpower v CA
Facts:
The constitutionality of the following
provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the
Private Security Agency Law), as amended, is
questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:
SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman
Agency. - Any Filipino citizen or a corporation,
partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of
five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is
owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize
a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no
person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than
one such agency except those which are
alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x
x. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine
Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision of existing
laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this
Act.

VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of

R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition
and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to
favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.
(PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an
interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the
validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the
Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to
Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying
Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by
then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col.
Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private security
agencies/company security forces must register as
members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the
Region where their main offices are located.... As such
membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in
nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional
provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade.
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of
Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day
at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00
outside of Metro Manila.
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency
(Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI
of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract
rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging
said customer lower than the standard minimum rates
provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May
12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat
competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from
PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate
a security agency (Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and
likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSIs
license.
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a
clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it
requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988,
requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of
PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal
of its license, even without a certificate of membership
from PADPAO

Issue: whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the

PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent
Held: Yes. The State may not be sued without its
consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PCSUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primarily
governmental function of regulating the organization
and operation of private detective, watchmen, or
security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief)
and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the
Governments consent, especially in this case because
VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public
respondents to act in a certain way, but worse,
because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory
damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary
damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees from said public respondents. Even if its
action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims
may not be enforced because the State did not
consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,
it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded.
A public official may sometimes be held liable
in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in
this case, were performed by them as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad
faith, no recovery may be had against them in their
private capacities.
The correct test for the application of state
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the
State but the legal nature of the act.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a

business contract. It does not apply where the contract

relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In the instant case, the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO
was intended to professionalize the industry and to
standardize the salaries of security guards as well as
the current rates of security services, clearly, a
governmental function. The execution of the said
agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as
amended, which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen or security
guard agencies.
WYLIE VS. RARANG
FACTS:
Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative
officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was theco
mmanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay,
Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora
Rarang wasassigned as merchandise control guard in
the Office of the Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, inhis
capacity as asst. admin. Officer, supervised the
publication of the socalled Plan of the Day (POD) published
daily by the US Naval Base Station. The
POD featured important announcements, necessary
precautions andgeneral matters of interest to military
personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was
the action line inquiry (NAVSTA ACTION
LINEINQUIRY), a telephone answering device in the
Office of the Admin Asst intended to provide personnel
access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel
should be brought to his attention for correction or
investigation. On February 3, 1978, the POD under the
(NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and
mentioned a certain AURING as a disgrace to her
division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. The
same article explicitly implied that Auring
was consuming and appropriating for herself
confiscated items like cigarettes and
foodstuffs. The PR was the only one who was named
Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal. As a
result thereof, she was investigated by her superior.
The PR commenced an ACTION FOR DAMAGES in
the CFI of Zambales against M.H. Wylie, Capt. James
Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the
articleconstituted false, injurious, and malicious defama
tion and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue an
dreputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR and
dismissedthe suit against the US Naval Base. The IAC
(now,CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC with
modifications as to theamount of damages awarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the American naval officers (such as
Wylie and Capt. Williams) who commit a crime or
tortious act while discharging official functions still

covered by the principle of state immunity from suit.

Does the
grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under th
e RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers
from crimes and torts?
HELD:
The general rule is that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad
faith (Chavezv. Sandiganbayan).It may be argued, as a
general rule, that Capt. Williams as commanding
officer of the naval base was far removed in the chain
of command from the offensive publication and it would
be asking too much to hold him responsible for
everything which goes wrong on the base. However, in
this particular case, the records show that the offensive
publication was sent to the commanding officer for
approval and that he approved it. ART. 2176, CC
prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a
persons act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, stating that, Whoever by act or omission,
causes damage to another, there beingfault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence,.. Moreover, ART. 2219(7),
Civil Code provides that moral damages may be
recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form
of defamation.Indeed, the imputation of theft
contained in the POD was a defamation against the
character and
reputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted
that the Office of the Provost Marshal
Explicitly recommended the deletion of the name
Auring if the article will be published. The
petitioners, however, were NEGLIGENT because
under their direction, they issued the publication
without deleting the said name. Such act or
omission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deeme
d part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS act which
ridiculed the PR. As a result of petitioners act, PR
suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, especially so, since the article was
baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their
personal capacities, are liable for the damages they
caused the Private Respondent
Express Consent
Republic v. Feliciano
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980,
which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo
Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of

a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the

State.On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint
with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
against the RP,represented by the Land Authority, for
the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land, consisting of four (4)lots with an aggregate
area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of
Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac,Camarines Sur.
Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in
question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract
of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of
Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had
acquired theproperty by purchase from the heirs of
Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property
was evidenced by an
informacion posesoria
that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual
possession of the same, introduced
variousimprovements therein and caused it to be
surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by
the Director of Lands onOctober 24, 1954.On
November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, underthe administration of the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA), a tract of land situated in theMunicipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the
NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority,
started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the
settlers; that the property in question, while located
withinthe reservation established under Proclamation
No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and
should therefore beexcluded therefrom. Feliciano
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner
of the property in questionconsisting of 1,364.4177
hectares; that his title of ownership based on
informacion posesoria
of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid
and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel
and nullify all awards to thesettlers.
ISSUE:
WON the State can be sued for recovery and
possession of a parcel of land
R U L I N G :
NO
R A T I O N A L E :
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is
not permitted, except upon a showing that the State
hasconsented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too
plain to bemisinterpreted. It may be invoked by the
courts
sua sponte
at any stage of the proceedings.Waiver of immunity,
being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly. but must be construed in
strictissimi juris
(of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued
mustemanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State

immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative

body.
Addtl:
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, that the
informacion posesoria
registered in theOffice of the Register of Deed of
Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a
"reconstituted" possessory information; itwas
"reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this
office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano,"
without thesubmission of proof that the alleged
duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was
lost. Reconstitution can bevalidly made only in case of
loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave
doubts as to the authenticity and validityof the
"informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent
Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document
is thefact that "possessory information calls for an area
of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by
respondentFeliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares,
later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be
wary in accepting"possessory information documents,
as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof
of alleged ownership of lands.
GENERAL LAW

Which requires that all money claims against

the government must first be filed with the
commission on Audit which must act upon it
within 60days. Rejection of the claim will
authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to
the supreme court on certiorari and, in effect,
sue the state thereby.

SPECIAL LAW
MERRIT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.
FACTS:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant
that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an
ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff
in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion,
the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to
Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the
left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in
the back part of his head, while blood issued from his
nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks
revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull
and that the grey matter and brain had suffered
material injury.
Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg
showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a
curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at
the point of the fracture. Examination of his head
revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the

brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got

from the collision disabled him to do this work as a
contractor and forced him to give up contracts he
recently had.
As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the
Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act
No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit
against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General
to appear in said suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is legally-liable
for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
RULING:
No, the Government is not legally-liable for the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate
to extend the Governments liability to any cause not
previously recognized.
That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case,
the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by
a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently,
the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the
said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an
official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only
liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from
must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally
liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This

matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the
courts.
Implied Consent; When State Commences
Litigation
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping
FACTS:
On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed
a complaint against thedefendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the
ShippingCommission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in
installments; that to secure the payment of the balance
of the purchase price, heexecuted a chattel mortgage of said
vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission; that for
variousreasons, among them the non-payment of the
installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of
said vessel and considered the contract of sale
cancelled; that the ShippingCommission chartered and
delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental
ShippingCo. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines; that he appealed the action of theShipping
Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting
on August 25, 1950,the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under
his original contract with the ShippingCommission; that he had
repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the
possessionof the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.
He, therefore, prayed that, upon theapproval of the bond
accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the
seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances,
and that after hearing, he be adjudged to havethe rightful
possession thereof On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued
the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and byvirtue thereof the
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said
vessel.On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its
answer denying the right of Froilan to the possession of the
said vessel; it alleged that the action of the Cabinet on
August 25, 1950, restoringFroilan to his rights under his
original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and
void;that, in any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition
precedent imposed by the Cabinetfor the restoration of his rights
to the vessel under the original contract; that it suffered damages
inthe amount of P22, 764.59 for wrongful replevin in the month of
February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as
damages suffered for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it is
allegedthat it has incurred necessary and useful expenses on the
vessel amounting to P127,057.31 andclaimed the right to retain
said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had been
reimbursed(Rec. on App. pp. 8-53).On November 10, 1951, after
the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenorappellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a
complaint in intervention allegingthat Froilan had failed to pay to
the Shipping Commission (which name was later changed
toShipping Administration) the balance due on the purchase price
of the vessel in question, the interest excluding the dry-docking
expenses incurred on said vessel by the session of the saidvessel
either under the terms of the original contract as supplemented by

Froilan's letter datedJanuary 28, 1949, or in order that it may

cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the ChattelMortgage
Law. It, therefore, prayed that Froilan be declared to be without
any rights on said vesseland the amounts he paid thereon
forfeited or alternately that the said vessel be delivered to
theBoard of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may have its
chattel mortgage extrajudiciallyforeclosed in accordance with the
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law; and that pending
thehearing on the merits, the said vessel be delivered to its
owner On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
filed an answer to the complaint inintervention alleging that the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated
todeliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of
bareboat charter with option to purchase executed on June
16, 1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also
alleged that it hadmade necessary and useful expenses of the
vessel and claimed the right of retention of the vessel.It, therefore,
prayed that, if the Republic vessel, to comply with its obligations of
delivering to it(Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) or causing its delivery by
recovering it from FroilanOn November 29, 1951, Froilan
tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which was liquidating
theaffairs of the Shipping Administration, a check in the amount of
P162,576.96 in payment of hisobligation to the Shipping
Administration for the said vessel as claimed in the complaint
inintervention of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Board of Liquidatorsissued an official report
therefor stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila'On December 7,
1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines brought
the matter of said payment and the circumstances surrounding it
to the attention of the lower court 'in order thatthey may be taken
into account by this Honorable Court in connection with question
that are now pending before it for determination'On
February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan
of the amount of P162,576.96 On November 29, 1951, to the
Board of Liquidators constituted a payment and adischarge of
Froilan's obligation to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and orderedthe dismissal of the latter's complaint in
intervention. In the same order, the lower court made itvery clear
that said order did not pre-judge the question involved between
Froilan and the OrientalShipping Co. which was also pending
determination in said court . This order dismissing thecomplaint in
intervention, but reserving for future adjudication the controversy
between Froilanand the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had already
become final since neither the Government of theRepublic of the
Philippines nor the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had appealed
therefrom.On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the
ground that the purpose of saidcounterclaim was to compel the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver thevessel
to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event that the Government
of the Republic of thePhilippines recovers the vessel in question
from Froilan. In view, however, of the order of theorder of the lower
court dated February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made by
Froilan'sobligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had
already become final, the counterclaimof the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no
longer feasible,said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment

and stated no cause of action. It was also allegedthat movant was

not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in connection with the
counterclaim.This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4,1952 .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit.
HELD:
NO! because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government
in effect waived its right of nonsuability."The immunity of the state
from the suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties
in itsown courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to privatelitigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders
its privileged position and comes down to the level of
the defendant. The latter automaticallyacquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defense he might haveagainst the state. The United States
Supreme Court thus explains: No direct suit can be
maintained against the United States. But when an
action is brought by theUnited States to recover money in the
hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, itwould be a
very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim
in a court of justice, and turn him around to an
application to Congress.'".It is however, contended for the
intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of
the plaintiff against whom the complainant in
intervention was directed. This contention is
untenable.As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in
a sense in derogation of the defendant'sclaim over the possession
of the vessel in question.
WHEN STATE ENTERS INTO A BUSINESS
CONTRACT

*USA VS. RUIZ

At times material to this case, the United

States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair
offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation,
submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the
Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of
America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The
complaint is to order the defendants to allow the

WON the US naval base in bidding for said

contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned
orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil
Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.

Facts:

plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the

event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The
company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the
projects.
The defendants entered their special
appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject
matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the
individual defendants as agents of defendant United
States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not
given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the
causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p.
50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued
the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but
to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to
restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.
Issue/s:

Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts

a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish thembetween sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign &
governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to

the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to

have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably
a function of the government of the highest order; they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
correct test for the application of State
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State
but the legal nature of the act
Suability not outright liability
Meritt v. Govt of the Phil. Islands
Facts: E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent
at his work. One day, while he was riding his
motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped
by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent.
Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and
he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much
so that he could never perform his job the way he used
to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he
used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to
sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands
and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined
the amount of damages and ordered the government
to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the
negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state,
by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible
for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a

special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in

which these words are employed, is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being
bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a
special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the
government. The Government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in
all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest.
FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMAN
Facts: The National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily
proprietary functions but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo
Garcia, who was not its special agent.
Issue: Whether NIA is performing governmental
functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its
special agent
Held: No. The functions of government have been
classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the
exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory;
the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional. The
functions of providing water supply and sewerage
service are regarded as mere optional functions of
government even though the service rendered caters
to the community as a whole and the goal is for the
general interest of society.
The NIA was not created for purposes of
local government. While it may be true that the NIA
was essentially a service agency of the government
aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare,
such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely
a government-function corporation. NIA was created
for the purpose of constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and
pump irrigation projects. Certainly, the state and the
community as a whole are largely benefited by the
services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which
is the irrigation of lands.

The NIA is a government agency with a

juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government
but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent.
Consent to be sued does not include consent to
execution
Republic v. Villasor
Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in
Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan,
and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against
petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount
of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfactionof a
judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June
24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor
issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and
executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of
RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato
execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal
served Notices of Garnishment with several
Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and
PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are
public funds duly appropriated and allocated for
thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances
of military and civilian personneland for maintenance
and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed
prohibition proceedings against respondent
JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of
jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of
Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the
notices and garnishment arenull and void.
Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor
valid?
Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in
conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from
the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well
as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit,not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends. The State may not
be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated
by logic and soundsense from a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged.The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special

law, it may limit claimants action only up to the

completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since the government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy
.Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects ,as appropriated by law
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL VS. FERNANDEZ
Municipality of Makati v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a
portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings,
the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land
which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a
writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was
deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed
by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so
would result in the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the
law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v.
Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed
said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of
Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders
of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which
are public fund and thereby are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required
under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are
not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived
from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the governmental activities and functions of
the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount

from its public funds deposited in their PNB account,

no levy under execution may be validly effected.
However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said
land which has been in their use already. This Court
will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its
legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they
are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent
domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair
play and justice.
IMMUNITY CANNOT BE USED TO PERPETRATE AN
INJUSTICE ON A CITIZEN
MINISTERIO VS. CFI OF CEBU
FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13,
1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a
registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square
meters, alleging that in 1927 the
NationalGovernment through its authorized
representatives took physical and material possession
of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue, a national road,Cebu City, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement, either
written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated
demands for the payment of its price or return of its
possession, but defendants Public Highway
Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to
restore its possession. It was further alleged that on
August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of
Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the
reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00
per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00.
Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30,
1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in
the alternative, either the restoration of possession or
the payment of the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents,
through the then Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied
upon was that the suit in reality was one against
the government and therefore should be dismissed, no
consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969,
the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect:
"That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot
647-B of the Banilad estate described in the
Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more
particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters;
That the National Government in 1927 took possession
of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the
widening of Gorordo Avenue; That
the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved
Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot
No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No.
647-B is still in the possession of the
National Government the same being utilized as part of
the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the

National Government has not as yet paid the value of

the land which is being utilized for public use."
The lower court dismissed the complaint on January
30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against
the National Government and there is now showing
that theGovernment has not consented to be sued in
this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to
review the decision and contended that they are
entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1
(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of
Cebu to dismiss the complaint by
reason Government immunity from suit correct?
HELD: NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely
there was a failure on what the law requires and the
petitioners has the right to demand from
the Government what is due to them. The Supreme
Court decided that the lower courts decision of
dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for proceedings
in accordance with law.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Initiative, referendum and Recall
Defensor-Santiago v Comelec
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the
time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.)
instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18
Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action
for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago
argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples
initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no
such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA
6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and
on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative
were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III

thereof but no provisions were specifically made for

initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates
that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law as pointed
out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to
include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of
Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to
this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it
needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress.
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con
stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art
17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypasses Congressional action in the last
analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold
niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such
right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress
for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227

(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992),
which created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227
likewise created SBMA to implement the
declarednational policy of converting the Subic military
reservation intoalternative productive uses.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on

November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled
that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution which reads in part:

*On February 1, 1995, the President issued

Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of
the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former
naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.

Ten member of the court reiterates their position, as

shown by their previous opinions already given when
the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru peoples initiative.
It is not a stare decisis
INDIRECT INITIATIVE
SMBA VS. COMELEC

*On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned

over the Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly thepreservation
of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and
otherinstallations left by the American navy.
*On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10
,Serye 1993, expressing therein itsabsolute
concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227,
to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted
such to the Office of the President.
*On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition
with theSangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993
*The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join
provided conditions are met.
*The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the
petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg.18, Serye 1993, requestingCongress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
*Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power
initiative under the LGC of 1991.
*On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for
local initiative on theground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

*On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued

Resolution No. 2845and 2848 , adopting a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum and providing for "the
rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum
*On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for
certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848
alleging that public respondent isintent on proceeding
with a local initiative that proposes anamendment of a
national law

ISSUE:
1.WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the
conduct of thereferendum proposing to annul or
repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2.WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject
within the powers of the people of Morong toenact;
HELD:
1.
YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents
was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the
body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote
below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27
times, but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum
returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the
word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No.
2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the
people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislative
assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the
right reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject any act or
measure which has been passed by a legislative body
and which in most cases would without action on the
part of electors become a law. In initiative and
referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over
the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control
or change the substance or thecontent
of legislation.
2.
The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the
municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not
yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It
is not yet anapproved law. Should the people reject it,
then there would be nothing tocontest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it
and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution
that rights and obligationscan be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely
aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon
a mere conjecture orpossibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actualcontroversies,
not hypothetical questions or cases.In the present
case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to

reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the

commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it
does not have the same authority in regard to
theproposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any
"branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that
matter. TheCommission on Elections itself has made
no reviewable pronouncementsabout the issues
brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply
includedverbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision
or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court
whichthis Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in theexercise of its review powers
RECALL
Garcia v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in
the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province constituted themselves
into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall
election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution
No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings.
COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the
gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul
the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC
failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160
(Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the
most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the
PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the
assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and
exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will
remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any
mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall
elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate,
Congress was clearly given the power to choose the
effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment

dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the
mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its
constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall
elections to supplement the former mode of initiation
by direct action of the people. The legislative records
reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an
assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty
of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people;
and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE, A POLITICAL QUESTION
EVARDONE VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been
elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. He
assumedoffice immediately after proclamation. In 1990,
Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a
petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local
Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a
Resolution approving therecommendation of Election Registrar
Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against
Evardone.Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Later, inan en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing
process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this
present petition.
Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by
virtue of its powers under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local
GovernmentCode) was valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to
be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period
material to this case, no local government code enacted by
Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law
for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government
officials, Evardone contends that there isno basis for COMELEC
Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at
bar is premature.The COMELEC avers that the constitutional
provision does not refer only to a local government code which is
in futurum butalso in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines
which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the
present LGC. Pending theenactment of the amendatory law, the
existing Local Government Code remains operative.Article XVIII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987Constitution shall
remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic
Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991,
approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically
repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said
Act.But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only
on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code
(B.P. Blg.337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to
the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the
effectiveness of B.P.Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the

proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We

therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272promulgated by the
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recalland
set the date for the signing of said petition.
Party-list Representatives
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives
from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as
members of the House of Representatives. Upon
petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system
on the ground that under the Constitution, it is
mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to
define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system
to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party
list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list
representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of
first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of
concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the
three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941

constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned
from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with
the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised
by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts
are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners,
the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all
the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party
is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast
for all the parties participating in the system. All parties
with at least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The
party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of
seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the
number of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of
additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW labor party vs. comelec

FACTS:
G.R. No. 147589 (Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party
v.s. Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party, et. al.)
and G.R. No. 147613 (Bayan Muna v.s. COMELEC)
were consolidated. Both petitioned under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court challenging Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785 issued by COMELEC on March 26, 2001,
which approved 154 party list organizations in the 2001
party list elections. Petitioners seek disqualification
because the respondents represented the mainstream
or overrepresented sectors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omnibus Resolution 3785, a
mechanism to provide a proportional representation is
constitutional?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that under Sections 7
and 8, Article IX-C of the Constitution, (political) parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
However, these parties must be consistent with the
provisions laid down in the Constitution and RA 7944.
Proportional Representation refers to the
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors as exemplified in Section 5:
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, woman,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

BA-RA v. COMELEC
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated
petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations and subsequently were accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections.
Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor
for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed
in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent
petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314,
addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs
Law Department requesting a list of that groups
nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc
Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees names confidential and in net
effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure
request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of
the party list nominees away from the public is

deducible from the excerpts of the news report

appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and
UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections
without simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "PartyList System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners
Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional
prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein
be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the partylist elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the
elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by
the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named
in their petition on the ground that these groups and
their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal
the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free
access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it
seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents
named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel
the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations
accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections,
the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of

accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their

petition. The exercise would require the Court to make
a factual determination, a matter which is outside the
office of judicial review by way of special civil action for
certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must
be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and
does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of
the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is
there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the
accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names
of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7
of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names
of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the
people have the right to elect their representatives on
the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast
in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in
any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in
an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to
information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but
like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official
records are not absolute. The peoples right to know is
limited to "matters of public concern" and is further
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.

But no national security or like concerns is involved in

the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
BANAT VS. COMELEC
Facts: Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
a petition to proclaim the full number of
party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal
group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to
declare the petition moot
andacademic was approved by the COMELEC en
banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans
ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC
assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes
prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can major political parties participate in the partylist elections?
Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates
the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of partylist representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress. The
20% allocation of party-listrepresentatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achievethe maximum number of available partylist seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the

members of the House of Representatives shall consist

of party-listrepresentatives.We therefore strike down
the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of thebroadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the partylist elections, directly or indirectly.
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang
Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were
disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but
primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari
against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said
party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court
now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated
cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC
must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize along

sectoral lines and do not need to represent any

marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are
disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since
theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they
do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit

indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the marginalized and underrepresented and to those
who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it
was their intention to include all parties into the partylist elections in order to develop a political system
which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case,
Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people
should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution,
is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the partylist system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized
and underrepresented or for parties who lack welldefined political constituencies. It is also for national or
regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The common denominator however is
that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery
unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor
candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system
like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from
running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,
among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not
per se economically marginalized but are still qualified
as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies as they are
ideologically marginalized.

APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS

BAKER VS. CARR
Facts

Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County,

Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the
Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint
alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn
its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the
Tennessee State Constitution which required
redistricting according to the federal census every 10
years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state,
asserted that the demographics of the state had
changed shifting a greater proportion of the population
to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections,
and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large
elections. The district court denied relief on the
grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political
question and would therefore not be heard by the
court.
Issues
1.
Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a
constitutional challenge to a legislative
apportionment?
2.
What is the test for resolving whether a case
presents a political question?
Holding and Rule (Brennan)
1.
Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a
constitutional challenge to a legislative
apportionment.
2.
The factors to be considered by the court in
determining whether a case presents a political
question are:
1.
Is there a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department (i.e. foreign
affairs or executive war powers)?
2.
Is there a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving the issue?
3.
The impossibility of deciding the issue
without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
4.
The impossibility of a courts
undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government.
5.
Is there an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made?
6.
Would attempting to resolve the matter
create the possibility of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question?
The political question doctrine is based in the
separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable
is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to
foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive
governmental action regarding an issue then a court
can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding
the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there

needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the

court may be able to decide the case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did
not present a political question. The case did not
present an issue to be decided by another branch of
the government. The court noted that judicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause were well
developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts
since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and
reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with
any of the other two branches of the government, it
presents a political question and the Court will not
answer it without further clarification from the other
branches.
Mariano v. COMELEC
Facts:
1.Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No.
7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into
aHighly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.2.GR No.
118577 involves a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief,and assailing the statuteas
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land areaor
territorial jurisdiction of Makati bymetes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10,
Article X of theConstitution, in relation to Sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code.
b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart thethreeconsecutive term limit for local electiveofficials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 7,Article VI of the Constitution.
c. Section 52: i.Increased the legislative district of
Makati only by speciallaw (the Charter) violates the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to bepassed by Congress
withinthree years following the return of every census
ii.The increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the bill title
iii.The addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accordance withSection 5 (3), Article VI
of theConstitution the population of Makati is
450,0003.
GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails
Section 52 asunconstitutional on the samegrounds as
aforestated.
Held:
1. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the
territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot
be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for
they define the limits of territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
the government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.

The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se

present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent
Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati
2. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be
made through special laws, such as in the charter of a
new city. The constitution provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the constitution
did not preclude the Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what the Congress
did in enacting R.A. 7854 and providing for an increase
in Makatis legislative district. The policy of the Court
favors a liberal construction of the one title one
subject rule so as not to impede legislation. The
Constitution does not command that the title of the law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue in all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject.
3. Said provision provides that a city with a population
of atleast 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than 250,000 shall
be entitled to atleast one congressional representative.
Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

MONTEJO VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the
first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain
municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates
the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and
Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is
composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval,
San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its
subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section
1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the
municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria,
Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,

Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised

therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and
the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province.
(The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight
municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new
province of Biliran. A further consequence was to
reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined
above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the
1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of
inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of
Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation
meetings with the incumbent representatives of the
province and other interested parties and on December
29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where,
among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of
Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the
COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.
Held:
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set
aside.
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the
major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after
the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the
Commission who did the reapportionment of the
legislative districts and for the subsequent elections,
the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance
appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as
part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states
that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby
empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.

MARCOS VS. COMELEC

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be
createdThe number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created
or where the city, whose population has so increases,
is geographically located shall be correspondingly
adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and
twenty days before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the
allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a
municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with
the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,
section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another
district. The power granted by section 3 to the
respondent is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities.)
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
Facts: Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district
before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored
a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead.
The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative
districts were created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity
of the said law and he went immediately to the
Supreme Court. He was contending that the 2nd district
was created without a plebiscite which was required by
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the
case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at
bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory,
population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.
Qualifications

FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still
in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he
was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was
elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the
1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for
election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in
the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual

removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile
of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands
domicile because the term residence in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after
her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one
only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she
chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while
living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner
possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Aquino v COMELEC
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner,
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino
amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the

petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the

election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the
May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy
actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established
domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the
sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been
understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle
was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the

legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation
given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point
that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter
of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence
to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.

The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers

unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs
of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in
the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that
Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in
the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in
the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11,
1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace
and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter
of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin
(obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC
was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of
Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
The short length of time he claims to be a resident of
Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate
that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile
from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the
Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining
respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate
garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections of Second district of Makati
City made permanent.

Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional
candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of
representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
ceased in the instant case after the elections and the
remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum
which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a
threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously
reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec
has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of one year against the
petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable
laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal
impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly
created political districts which were only existing for
less than a year at the time of the election and barely
four months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of
canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out
of the remaining qualified candidates after the
erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard
of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a
person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new
districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing conditions in
these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was
executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the
HR, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot,
by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular
lease agreement cannot be better.
Natural Born
BENGZON VS. HRET
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue
in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and

without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,

took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization
as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To,
or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson
who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto
Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the HOR
since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for
quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth
as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

Term of Office; Priveleges; Parliamentary Immunity

Eastland v US Servicemens Fund
Syllabus
The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security,
pursuant to its authority under a Senate resolution to
make a complete study of the administration,
operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act
of 1950, began an inquiry into the various activities of
respondent organization, to determine whether they
were potentially harmful to the morale of United States
Armed Forces. In connection with such inquiry, it
issued a subpoena duces tecum to the bank where the
organization had an account, ordering the bank to
produce all records involving the account. The
organization and two of its members then brought an
action against the Chairman, Senator Members, Chief
Counsel of the Subcommittee, and the bank to enjoin
implementation of the subpoena on First Amendment
grounds. The District Court dismissed the action. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although
courts should hesitate to interfere with congressional

actions even where First Amendment rights are

implicated, such restraint should not preclude judicial
review where no alternative avenue of relief is
available, and that, if the subpoena was obeyed,
respondents' First Amendment rights would be
violated.
Held: The activities of the Senate Subcommittee, the
individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel fall within
the "legitimate legislative sphere," and since it is
determined that such is the case, those activities are
protected by the absolute prohibition of the Speech or
Debate Clause of the Constitution against being
"questioned in any other Place," and hence are
immune from judicial interference..
(a) The applicability of the Clause to private civil
actions is supported by the absoluteness of the term
"shall not be questioned" and the sweep of the term "in
any other Place."
(b) Issuance of subpoenas such as the one in question
is a legitimate use by Congress of its power to
investigate, and the subpoena power may be exercised
by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of one of the
Houses.
(c) Inquiry into the sources of the funds used to carry
on activities suspected by a subcommittee of Congress
to have a potential for undermining the morale of the
Armed Forces is within the legitimate legislative
sphere.
(d) There is no distinction between the Subcommittee's
Members and its Chief Counsel insofar as complete
immunity from the issuance of the subpoena under the
Speech or Debate Clause is concerned, and since the
Members are immune because the issuance of the
subpoena is "essential to legislating," their aides share
that immunity.
(e) The subpoena cannot be held subject to judicial
questioning on the alleged ground that it works an
invasion of respondents' privacy, since it is "essential to
legislating."
(f) Nor can the subpoena be held outside the protection
of speech or debate immunity on the alleged ground
that the motive of the investigation was improper,
since, in determining the legitimacy of a congressional
action, the motives alleged to have prompted it are not
to be considered.
(g) In view of the absolute terms of the speech or
debate protection, a mere allegation that First
Amendment rights may be infringed by the subpoena
does not warrant judicial interference.
159 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 488 F.2d 1252, reversed and
remanded.
HUTCHINSON VS. PROXMIRE

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff research scientist appealed the grant of
summary judgment for defendants, a senator and his
assistant, from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in an action for libel, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, interference with
contractual relations, and infringement of plaintiff's
rights of privacy, peace, and tranquility.
CASEFACTS
Plaintiff was a research behavioral scientist who
studied emotional behavior in monkeys. Most of his
research was funded by government grants.
Respondents were a United States Senator and his
legislative assistant. Respondent senator awarded
plaintiff the Golden Fleece Award for presenting an
egregious example of wasteful governmental spending.
Respondents publicized the award through telephone
calls, radio and television interviews, and newsletters.
Plaintiff filed his action for libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with contractual
relations, and infringement of his rights to privacy,
peace, and tranquility.
DISCUSSION

Reversing the district court and the appeals

court, the United States Supreme Court held
that plaintiff was not a "public figure," and
therefore the "actual malice" standard did not
apply to him.
In addition, the Court held that the Speech and
Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution did not protect respondents for
defamatory statements they made or might AT
That meant that the libelous remarks made by
respondents in followup telephone calls to
executive agencies, and in the television and
radio interview, were not protected.

CONCLUSION
The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment
and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
Jimenez v Cabangbang
Facts: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958,
Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that
there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That
such strategists have had collusions with communists
and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was
planning a coup dtat to place him as the president.

The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,

among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al
may or may not be aware that they are being used as a
tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have
been published in newspapers of general circulation.
Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to
collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered
by the privileged communication rule and that the said
letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by
privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices,
in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time
of the performance of the acts in question. Congress
was not in session when the letter was published and
at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

DISQUALIFICATION AND INHIBITION

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness ispending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of aCongressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos primary argument is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
as their representative in Congress. Having been reelected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made possible by the
intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
frompending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing
Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When a people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this
with the knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions
to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for
official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District
of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard
and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the
House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held:
NO.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in

a restrictive sense.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to
be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. xxx
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, arises from
a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
provision shows that the privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11,
Art. VI of the Constitution. The members
ofCongress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases
The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer foracts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled
by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement,
whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from

imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There is no showing that the above privileges are
peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings will virtually
make him a free man
When the voters of his district elected the accusedappellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so
with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge
that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down
to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being
a Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position

of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. (People vs. Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)
Sessions; Adjournments; Officers
Santiago v. Guingona
Note: Issue re: Sessions and Adjournments are not
discussed extensively. Only Constitutional
provisions were noted.
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen.
Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated
to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to
2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate
President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with
the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming
position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the
majority, while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the minority. However,
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
number 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed
this case for quo warranto.
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term majority has been judicially defined a
number of times. When referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the
number greater than half or more than half of any
total. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate
President must obtain the votes of more than one half
of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the majority, much less the
minority, in the said body. And there is no showing
that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other
than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the

President of the Senate must be elected by a number

constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction
with the larger number of votes, not necessarily more
than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality.
In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a
smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would
be the minority. But where there are more than two
unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the
minority entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities. In a government with a multi-party
system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several minority
parties, one of which has to be identified by the
Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes
of the general elections. In the prevailing composition
of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of
the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers
in Congress other than Senate President and House
Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that
the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary. To our
mind, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. xxx

QUORUM
AVELINO VS. CUENCO

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada

invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to
formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next
session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session
for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by
Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other
Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory
and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering
his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were
being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even
ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out
of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the
session due to the disorder. Sanidad however
countered and they requested the said adjournment to
be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and
he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately
followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then
stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was
so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the
session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to
deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads
Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the
Senate President. This was unanimously approved and
was even recognized by the President of the
Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of
office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warrantoproceeding before the SC to declare him as
the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of
the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they
cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of
the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside,
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the
Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case,

what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et
al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto
was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a
continuation of the morning session (presided by
Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was
there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning
session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the
journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in
session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).
Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean
all the members. Even a majority of all the members
constitute the House. There is a difference between a
majority of all the members of the House and a
majority of the House, the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all
the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of
a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one
had been so arrested, there would be no doubt
Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino
on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the
SC take cognizance of the case and that they are
willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC
whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that
there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was
elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are
absentee senators; one being confined and the other
abroad but this does not change the number of
senators nor does it change the majority which if
mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half
of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12

senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there

was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to
assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The
Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys
pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that
any new session with a quorum would result in
Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the
Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos
persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional
processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the
Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys
ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with
the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco
has been legally elected as Senate President and the
petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided
that the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the
fact that said provision was amended in the
Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business,
shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to base the majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for in the Constitution, but on actual
members or incumbents, and this must be limited
to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
house or for other causes which make attendance
of the member concerned impossible, even
through coercive process which each house is
empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a
quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made
for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for
considering the use of the words of all the members
as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5
(5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required
concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so

as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the

members of each House. Therefore, as Senator
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the
Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
majority.
Rules of Procedings
Arroyo v. De Venecia
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of
RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are
members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives.
The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll
call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The
interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of
both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed
into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly
permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts

ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They

may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved
but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to
the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members

of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to
discipline its ownmembers: the former is not
punitive, the latter is

FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint
for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against then CID Commissioner Miriam DefensorSantiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her
official functions, approved the application for
legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her
suspension effective for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
authority to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension against a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines
RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged withviolation of the provisions of Republic Act

No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.

xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the
court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of thevalidity of the information filed
before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient
in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the
nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the
case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the
official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.
Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive
Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to
Discipline its Members
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the
information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act
No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its ownranks under the Constitution which
provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.
The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the
house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Enrolled Bill Theory

Mabanag v Lopez Vito
Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8
representatives. The three senators were suspended
by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the required
vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which
has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the
same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members
of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition
of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot
take cognizance of the case because the Court is
bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance
of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution
was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is
concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on
the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated
copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy
in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and
rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy,
be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the

explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be

conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced,
finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper
officers of each, approved by the president and filed by
the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act
190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission
or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
CASCO CHEMICAL V GIMENEZ
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
COMPOSITION
BONDOC V PINEDA
FACTS:
Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as
Representatives of the 4th district. Pineda won in the
elections, prompting Bondoc to file a protest with the
HRET, which decided in favor of the latter. However,
before promulgation of the decision, Congressman
Camasuras membership with the HRET was
withdrawn on the ground that he was expelled from the
LDP. As such, the decision could not be promulgated
since without Congressman Camasuras vote, the
deicison lacks the concurrence of 5 members as
required by the Rules of the Tribunal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the House of Representatives
can issue a resolution compelling HRET not to
promulgate its decision
Whether or not the composition of the HRET
may be affected by a change in the political
alliance of its members
HELD:

HRET is a non-political body

xxx xxx xxx

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the

1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of
the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of
its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in
a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said
about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives:

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ

created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole
judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139.)

Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating
the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal
all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to
judge contests relating to the election and qualification
of members of the National Assembly is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in
the legislature.
Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating
to election returns and qualifications of members of the
legislative houses
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House
were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the legislative
houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which
must be permitted to select their own employees, and
to supervise and control them, without any legislative
interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction
to hear and decide congressional election contests is
not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the
Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature and though not a power
in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.

Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET

not to promulgate its decision?
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so
zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution,
would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce
if the House of Representatives, or the majority party
therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the
electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in
power.
Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party
impairs HRET constitutional prerogative
The resolution of the House of Representatives
removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he
cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's
candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of
Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for
the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which
the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone
NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority
party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the tribunal.
Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET?
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence
even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of
party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience
vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of

the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the

recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
HRET members enjoy security of tenure
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion
resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security
of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except
for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party, or removal for other valid cause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that
he has formally affiliated with another political group.
As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from
the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the
SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect
in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the
COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of
three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of
the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed
disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring
the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not
less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may
adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of

that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the

only three Members who would remain, all Justices of
this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be
given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,
creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed
by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those
judicial and legislative components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The legislative component herein cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to
the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be
misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of
the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a
case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
POWERS
AQUINO V COMELEC
FACTS: Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner,

filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino
amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the
May 15 and June 2 orders.
Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional
candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of
representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
ceased in the instant case after the elections and the
remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum
which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

6 and 7 of Republic Act 6646 empower COMELEC

even after election.
SAMPAYAN VS. DAZA

HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over

election contests and qualifications of
members of Congress
Remedies against a disqualified House of
Representative candidate: (1) cancellation
of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC
before election; (2) quo warranto case filed
with HRET after proclamation

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza,
then incumbent congressman of their congressional
district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident
of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza
has not by any act or declaration renounced his status
as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution
(section 18, Article III).
Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying
the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United
States as evidenced by a letter order of the
US Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status
when he returned to the Philippines on August 12,
1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be
disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:

HELD: The Commission on Elections shall have

jurisdiction over the determination of qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives until
they are proclaimed. After the proclamation, the
Electoral Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over
contests relating to elections, returns and
qualifications of their members.
There is no basis in law for the petitioners contention
that determination of qualifications after elections and
before their proclamation is lodged exclusively in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Sections

The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case,

first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident
from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,
1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his
position as Congressman for the duration of his term of
office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30,
1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully
pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section
17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification of its members.
The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been
to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate

ofcandidacy before the election or a quo warranto case

with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days
after Dazasproclamation.
JURISDICTION OVER PROCLAMATION
CONTROVERSY
CARUNCHO V COMELEC
Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate
of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the
lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998
synchronized elections. The other candidates were:
Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP);
Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C.
Bassig (Independent); Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM
Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C.
Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason
(Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal
Party/LAMMP).
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1998,
respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers composed
of Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S.
Belvis as Vice-Chairman, and Dr. Florentina Lizano as
Member, started to canvass the election returns. The
canvass was proceeding smoothly when the Board
received intelligence reports that one of the candidates
for the congressional race, retired General Arnulfo
Acedera, and his supporters, might disrupt and stop
the canvassing.
At exactly 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May
14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters stormed
the Caruncho Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City,
where the canvassing of election returns was being
conducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the
canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process.
As pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning
shots causing those present in the canvassing venue,
including the members of the Board and canvassing
units, to scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel
exited through the backdoors bringing with them the
Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as
well as the Statement of Votes that they were
accomplishing. They entrusted these documents to the
City Treasurer's Office and the Pasig Employment
Service Office (PESO). Election documents and
paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when
the intruders left.
The following day, May 15, 1998, the subcanvassing units recovered the twenty-two (22)
Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the
Treasurer's Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of
each of the 22 election returns, which contained the
names of candidates for congressmen, had been
detached and could not be found. An investigation was
conducted to pinpoint liability for the loss but it yielded
negative result. Hence, the Board secured proper
authority from the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), 1 through Election Director for the
National Capital Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the

reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the

other copies of the election returns, particularly the
provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes placed
therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.
At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board,
satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491
election returns from as many clustered precincts,
proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race for the lone district of Pasig. 2 The
votes obtained by the leading three candidates were:
Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R. "Boy"
Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera 36,139
votes. The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival,
Caruncho, by 17,971 votes.
However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner
Caruncho filed a "Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the
Basis of Incomplete Returns" with the COMELEC. He
alleged that the Board had proceeded with the
proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winning
congressional candidate even though one hundred
forty-seven (147) election returns involving about
30,000 votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that
the COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null
and void and that the Board of Canvassers be directed
to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the
votes of the candidates for the House of
Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner.
On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC issued an Order requiring respondent
Pasig City Board of Canvassers to comment on the
amended motion to nullify Lanot's proclamation. In his
comment filed on June 23, 1998, respondent Atty.
Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the disruption and
stoppage of the canvass of election returns on May 11,
1998 but asserted that there were only twenty-two (22)
election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho, that
were missing but these were eventually recovered. The
Board stated in part:
. . . . Contrary to the insinuation of Atty.
Irene D. Jurado, only 22 Election
Returns were reported missing. On the
following day, May 15, 1998, the subcanvassing units have recovered the
22 missing Election Returns and the
Statement of Votes from the
Treasurer's Office and from the Pasig
Employment Service Office (PESO).
There are no missing election returns.
That to the surprise of the
Board and of the 22 canvassing units,
they found out that Page 2 of the 22
Election Returns they recovered were
detached and missing. We wish to
inform the Commission that Page 2 of
the Local Election Returns contained
the name of candidates for
Congressman. We conducted
investigation on who did the
detachment of Page 2 of the 22
Election Returns. However, nobody

from the Treasurer's Office nor from

the PESO admitted that they
committed such election offense.
Xxxx
The facts as established show that all the legal steps
necessary to carry out the reconstitution of the missing
page 2 of the twenty-two (22) election returns have
been followed. Proper authorization for the
reconstitution of that page was secured from the
COMELEC. The reconstitution was based on the
provincial copy of the election returns that was
retrieved from the sealed ballot boxes The board of
canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the
election returns have been received by it terminated
the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on
the basis of the available election returns. The facts
further show that the 22 alleged misisng election
returns represented only 4,400 votes.
HELD: A crucial issue in this petition is what body has
jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy involving a
member of the House of Representatives. The 1987
Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard.
Article VI thereof states:

concerning the composition of the board of canvassers

and the authenticity of the election returns; and
qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy
of his certificate of candidacy.
The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunals
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the
proclamation of herein respondent Teresa AquinoOreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner. x x x.
In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions
the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his
remedy should have been to file an electoral protest
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
COMPOSITION
GUINGONA VS. GONZALES

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of

Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x.
The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in
Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, to wit:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives.
In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and AquinoOreta, the Court, in interpreting the aforesaid
constitutional provision, stressed the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over its members, thus:
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well
as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provide
that (t)he Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
x x x. In Javier v. Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court
interpreted the phrase election, returns and
qualifications as follows:
The phrase election, returns and qualifications
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestees title.
But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
election referred to the conduct of the polls, including
the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
returns to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was

composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house
must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators
of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce
7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LPPDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,
nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDPLABAN should represent the same party to the CoA.
This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by
Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members
of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
compromise. He alleged that the compromise is
against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in
determining a partys representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that
each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no

other manner of application. The problem is what to do

with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer
in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of
Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senatorsmembers in the CoA. Where there are more than 2
parties in Senate, a party which has only one member
senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to
resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other
in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with
the other party.
POWERS (CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT)
SARMIENTO V MISON
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution.
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then
president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and
Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,
and professors of constitutional law questioned the
appointment of Mison because it appears that Misons
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists
that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo
Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison
due to the unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of
bureaus needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers
removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments,

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers
appointed by the president which require confirmation
by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not
require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison
as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong
to the first group hence he does not need to be
confirmed by the COA.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
GENERAL LEGIS POWER; PROCEDURAL
LIMITATIONS; ONE BILL, ONE SUBJECT
GUZMAN V COMELEC
SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE
PHIL. JUDGES ASSOC. V PRADO
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No.
7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is
unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing
that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace

only one subject which shall be expressed in the title

thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the
body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held
that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph
of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege
from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD
1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original
version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200.
As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke
Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House
and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down
the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading
of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on
the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into
the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form
were not distributed among the members of each
House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances
from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal

Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the purpose
of promoting the public service. While it may have
been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free
carriage of mail for certain offices of the government
that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their
own public functions.

CHONGBIAN VS. ORBOS

If the title of a bill expresses the general

subject, and all provisions are germane to that
subject, then the power given by the bill is
fairly expressed in the title of the statute and
is in sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement of Sec. 26 (1), Art
VI, which states:
Sec 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
The constitutional requirement that every bill
shall be passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof has always been given a practical
rather than a technical construction. The title is
not required to be an index of the content of the
bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to the
subject, such as the reorganization of the
remaining administrative regions.
BILLS THAT MUST ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY
FROM THE HOR
TOLENTINO V SEC OF FINANCE
FACTS: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the
constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino
averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.

Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that

it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means
Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what
Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking
out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630
in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and
co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally
infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected
the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in
the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version
rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of
form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over
what has been done.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
APPROVAL OF BILLS; ITEM VETO
BENGZON V DRILON
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old
laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed
during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos.
These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the
constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to
restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However,
President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill
No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government
officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed
a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797
was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were
subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the

repealing law never existed due to non publication and

in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme
Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in
the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of
retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in
the following manner: Congress made an item entitled:
General Fund Adjustment; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different
brances of the government; among such obligations is
the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the
judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines
which provided for the pensions of the retired justices
in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that
portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when
she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other
retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The
President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on
that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested
rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never
repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less
to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill
does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed
some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot
be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in
its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case,
the president did not veto the entire line item of the
general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the
portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices
but did not veto the other items covering obligations to
the other departments of the government.
LEGISLATIVE VETO
IMMIGRATION SERVICE VS. CHADHA

Brief Fact Summary. Chadha was an East Indian

student who had overstayed his visa and was
deportable. The Attorney General suspended his
deportation. The House passed a resolution that
Chadha should be deported because he did not meet
the hardship requirement.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The one-house veto
violated Article I, Section: 7, the Presentment Clause,
because a bill must be presented to the President to
sign or veto, and it violated Article I, Section:Section: 1
and 7, bicameralism.
Facts. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of a
provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act authorizing one House of Congress, by
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive
Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The Immigration Naturalization Service (INS)
suspended Chadhas deportation. A year and a half
later the House passed a resolution to veto the
suspension. Because the resolution was passed
pursuant to Section 244(c)(2) it was not treated as an
Article I legislative act. As a result, it was not submitted
to the Senate nor was it presented to the President for
action. Chadha appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The INS agreed with
Chadhas position before the court of appeals and
joined him in arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was
unconstitutional. The court of appeals held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order
Chadhas deportation.
Issue. Is it constitutional for Congress to statutorily
authorize a one-house veto of a decision the Attorney
General made, under authority delegated to him by
Congress, to allow a particular deportable alien to
remain in the United States?
Held. Chief Justice Burger opinion. No. The court of
appeals decision is affirmed.
Congress first argued that Section 244(c)(2) was not
severable. Therefore, if that provision was
unconstitutional than the whole statute was, and then
the Attorney General could not suspend Chadhas
deportation order. He would lack standing because he
would receive no relief from an order declaring Section
244(c)(2) invalid. The Court pointed out that Congress
itself had provided for severability in Section 406 of the
Act.
Even if this law or procedure were efficient, convenient
and useful in facilitating functions of government, that
alone would not save it if it is contrary to the United
States Constitution. The very structure of Articles I, II,
and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers.
The Framers ranked other values higher than
efficiency. They sought to define and limit the exercise
of the newly created federal powers affecting the states
and the people.
The one-house veto violated Article I, Section: 7, the

Presentment Clause, because a bill must be presented

to the President to sign or veto. The Presentment
Clause is an effort to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,
improvident or ill-considered measures.
The one-house veto was unconstitutional because it
violated Article I, Section:Section: 1 and 7,
Bicameralism. The Framers were trying to balance the
legislative process. The Presidents participation was to
protect the Executive branch from Congress and to
protect the whole people from improvident laws. The
Attorney General is part of the executive branch. When
Congress is vetoing his decision, they are encroaching
upon territory reserved for the Executive branch. Both
Houses had to vote on the bill because splitting the
legislative power means it will be exercised only after
opportunity for full study and debate in separate
settings.
This action was legislative in character and effect
because it was to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization, it altered the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons, including the Attorney General,
executive Branch officials and Chadha.
Dissent. Justice White and Justice Rehnquist
dissenting.
J. White: Todays decision eliminates over 200
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a
legislative veto which is more efficient. The Courts
decision fails to recognize that the legislative veto is
not the type of action subject to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I.
J. Rehnquist: Congress could not have intended the
one-house veto provision to be severable from the rest
of the statute. They never intended to permit
suspensions of deportation unless they could retain
some so
rt of veto.
Concurrence. Justice Powell concurring. The case
should be decided on a narrower ground. For example,
Congress may not encroach the Judicial branch
because it is a judicial function to determine whether a
particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria
for permanent residence.
Discussion.
J. Burger presents the same argument that J. Black did
in Youngstown, just because something is useful, does
not mean it is constitutional
The Court in Mistretta v. United States held that the
Court would uphold statutory provisions that to some
degree commingle the functions of the branches, but
that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or
encroachment.
The dissent by Justice Scalia in Mistretta stated that
the Commissions guidelines are laws, since any judge
that disregards them will be reversed. Congress cannot
create an agency that has no governmental power
other than to make laws, because only Congress can
make laws under the Constitution. The court upholding
a pure delegation of legislative power has encouraged

Congress to delegate its lawmaking powers frequently

in the future, particularly over no-win political issues.
Congress could have said that they are giving the
Attorney General a discretionary power and because
discretionary powers are really Congresss
responsibility, they are putting strings on that power. If
Congress does not like what the Attorney General does
in a given case then they can override it. So, the case
can either be that Congress is giving the executive
power, creating a power which would have a life of its
own, but the nature of the power is limited. Therefore
they are not really taking anything away from the
Attorney General and it is not aggrandizement. If
Congress could not use a legislative veto, then they
might not pass on the power at all.

PHIL. CONSTITUTION ASSOC V ENRIQUEZ

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to
question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that
Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot
specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the
executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president
of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house
of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead,
Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought
the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al.
Taada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the
GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by
the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that
Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC
dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and
compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction
scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the
scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation
and may be more properly addressed by revising the
debt policy. He, however did not delete the

P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et

al averred that the president cannot validly veto that
provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The
veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed
provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc
found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation
as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise
vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were
already funds allotted for the same in the National
expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for
it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided
double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30%
(contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it
may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The
funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some
existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The
1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of
special provisions, conditions to items in an
expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately
from the items to which they relate so long as they are
appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein
is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for
purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the
said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional
mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations,
and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent
of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP.
The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment
AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and
separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose

pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the

Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to
use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC
retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs
including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the
implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided
by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the
it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme
Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent
with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which
states that no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I
am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere to the well-established principle on
compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that
the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The
SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional
mandate that additional or indirect compensation can
only be given pursuant to law. In the second place,
such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse,
be treated as superfluities.
POWER OF THE PURSE

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is

authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds
For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV
of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided
only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is
not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education,
the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE

PROHIBITION AGAINST TRANSFER OF

APPROPRIATIONS

FACTS:

PHILCONSA V ENRIQUEZ

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic

appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

FACTS: IBID
PINANG-HAWAKAN: Petitioners assail the special
provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other
expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this

practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the

Constitution. Said section provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations: however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives the power to augment items
in an appropriation act for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their appropriations,
whenever there is a law authorizing such
augmentation.
POWER OF TAXATION
MCCULLOCH VS. MARYLAND
Facts
Maryland (P) enacted a statute imposing a tax on all
banks operating in Maryland not chartered by the state.
The statute provided that all such banks were
prohibited from issuing bank notes except upon
stamped paper issued by the state. The statute set
forth the fees to be paid for the paper and established
penalties for violations.
The Second Bank of the United States was established
pursuant to an 1816 act of Congress. McCulloch (D),
the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the
United States, issued bank notes without complying
with the Maryland law. Maryland sued McCulloch for
failing to pay the taxes due under the Maryland statute
and McCulloch contested the constitutionality of that
act. The state court found for Maryland and McCulloch
appealed.
Issues
1.
Does Congress have the power under the
Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though
that power is not specifically enumerated within
the Constitution?
2.
Does the State of Maryland have the power to
tax an institution created by Congress pursuant
to its powers under the Constitution?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
1.
Yes. Congress has power under the
Constitution to incorporate a bank pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper clause (Article I, section
8).
2.
No. The State of Maryland does not have the
power to tax an institution created by Congress
pursuant to its powers under the Constitution.
The Government of the Union, though limited in its
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its

laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution,

form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in
the Constitution which excludes incidental or implied
powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope
of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate
and plainly adapted to that end, and which are not
prohibited, may be employed to carry it into effect
pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause.
The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct
sovereign power or end of Government, but only the
means of carrying into effect other powers which are
sovereign. It may be exercised whenever it becomes
an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers
granted to the federal government under the U.S.
Constitution. If a certain means to carry into effect of
any of the powers expressly given by the Constitution
to the Government of the Union be an appropriate
measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree
of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion,
not of judicial cognizance.
The Bank of the United States has a right to establish
its branches within any state. The States have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to impede or in any
manner control any of the constitutional means
employed by the U.S. government to execute its
powers under the Constitution. This principle does not
extend to property taxes on the property of the Bank of
the United States, nor to taxes on the proprietary
interest which the citizens of that State may hold in this
institution, in common with other property of the same
description throughout the State.

POWER OF LEGIS INVESTIGATION

SENATE V ERMITA
This case is regarding the railway project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer
scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005.
Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a
letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
afford said officials ample time and opportunity to
study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation. Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464,

effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive
and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her
consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited,
attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal
for such attendance.

ISSUES:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the
power of inquiry vested in Congress
HELD:
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized
in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as early as 1950 (the 1935
Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in
Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court already recognized that
the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to
legislate. xxx
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch may be deduced from
the same case. The power of inquiry...is co-extensive
with the power to legislate. The matters which may be
a proper subject of legislation and those which may be
a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that
the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
xxx the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is
grounded on the necessity of the information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by
executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity
of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information
and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review
xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse
than executive or judicial power. It may thus be
subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts
certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII.

For one...the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid

of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power
of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for
Congress to avoid such a result...is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any
person for that matter, the possible needed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its investigations, along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be
less room for speculation on the part of the person
invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards
that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The
provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published
rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without
duly published rules of procedure. Sec. 21 also
mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition
that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in
the Bill of Rights.
Exemption to power of inquiry
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are
still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions falls under the rubric of executive
privilege.
Executive privilege, defined
Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of
the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell
defines it as the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.
Kinds of executive privilege
One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets
privilege...on the ground that the information is of such
nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military
or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the
informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government
not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with
the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege

for internal deliberations has been said to attach to

intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.

autonomy and the constitutional independence of the

judiciary.

That a type of information is recognized as privileged

does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only whether the
requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be
honored in a given procedural setting.

xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress

on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking
the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls
for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is
no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to
appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of
the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

The principle of executive privilege

Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition
that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character
of the exemptions indicates that the presumption
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure.
xxx
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court
are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis
not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal

How executive privilege should be applied in the

case of an official

Right to Information
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between
the right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum
issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives
elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its
power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
generally conducted in public, however, any executive
assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations necessarily deprives
the people of information which, being presumed to be
in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of
public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access
to information which they can use in formulating their
own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other governmental officials
through various legal means allowed by their freedom

of expression xxx
The impairment of the right of the people to information
as a consequence of EO 464 is, therefore, in the sense
explained above, just as direct as its violation of the
legislatures power of inquiry.

BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case
filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the
alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of
several government corporations to the group of Lopa,
a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen.
Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions,
an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and
testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirtysix (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."
3.
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the
defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
4.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief
claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case
before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the
Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of
legislation
NO.
1.
There appears to be no intended legislation
involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa
had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2.
The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of

persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall

be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.
3.
The civil case was already filed in the
Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be
an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue
sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted
by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue
would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.
4.
Finally, a congressional committees right to
inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by
the Constitution on governmental action including the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these
rights is the right of an individual to against selfincrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if
it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the
petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and if pursued would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial departments of the
government as ordained by the Constitution.

NERI V SENATE

Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vs.

Legislative Inquiry during Question Hour
Elements of Presidential Communications
Privilege
Exception to Executive Privilege

FACTS:
This is regarding the contract entered into by DOTC
with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for
the NBN Project. In connection with this NBN Project,
Senate passed various Resolutions and pending bills,
which it then used as basis for initiating an
investigation.
One of the cabinet officials invited to appear before the
Senate during the investigation was Petitioner, who
was Director General of NEDA at the time. During the
11-hour questioning, Petitioner invoked executive

privilege and refused to answer the questions on (a)

whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
In view of his refusal, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee issued a subpoena ad testificandum, to
which Petitioner replied that he was willing to testify to
other matters besides those three questions covered
by executive privilege and that he wanted to be
furnished beforehand matters to be taken up during the
inquiry so that he may adequately prepare therefor.
Executive Secretary Ermita also sent a letter to the
Blue Ribbon, affirming that indeed those three
questions mentioned were covered by executive
privilege because such information if disclosed might
impair diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the Peoples Republic of China. As such, the Office of
the President has ordered Petitioner not to answer
those questions.
Nevertheless, the Blue Ribbon issued a show cause
Letter and a contempt Order against Petitioner. Thus,
this case.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the
subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
RULING:
IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations -The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition
that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory
process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has
limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published
rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the
only way for them to be exempted is through a valid
claim of executive privilege.
Is there recognized claim of executive privilege despite
revocation of E.O. 464? At this juncture, it must be
stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in
any way diminish our concept of executive privilege.
This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE:

1) The protected communication must relate to a

quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited
and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that,

indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor
of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there
is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or
critical need: xxx presidential communications are
presumptively privileged and that the presumption can
be overcome only by mere showing of public need by
the branch seeking access to conversations xxxx Here,
the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from
respondent Committees to show a compelling or
critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions
in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer
more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight
function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than
Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled
that the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is
conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an
inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the
exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this
regard, much will depend on the content of the

questions and the manner of inquiry is conducted.

EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
Demonstrated, specific need for evidence in
pending criminal trial (US v. Nixon) does not apply
-In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where
the information is requested and it is the demands of
due process of law and the fair administration of
criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This
is the reason why the US Court was quick to limit the
scope of its decision. It stressed that it is not
concerned here with the balance between the
Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality xxx
and congressional demands for information. Unlike in
Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard,
Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim
of executive privilege depends not only on the ground
invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the
context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in
Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of
need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national
security secrets. In the present case, Executive
Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive
privilege on the grounds of presidential
communications privilege in relation to her executive
and policy decision-making process and diplomatic
secrets.
Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People to
Information on Matters of Public Concern
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. The provision (Section 7, Article
III) itself provides the limitations, i.e. as may be
provided by law. Some of these laws are Sec. 7, RA
6713, Art. 229, RPC, Sec. 3(k), RA 3019, and Sec.
24(e), Rule 130, ROC. These are in addition to what
our body of jurisprudence clarifies as confidential and
what our Constitution considers as belonging to the
larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
certain information. We find the information subject of
this case belonging to such kind.
Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis Right
of the People to Information on Matters of Public
Concern: More than anything else, though, the right of
Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with
the peoples right to public information. The former

cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an

exercise of the peoples right to information. xxx
The members of respondent Committees should not
invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right
properly belonging to the people in general. This is
because when they discharge their power, they do so
as public officials and members of Congress. Be that
as it may, the right to information must be balanced
with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to
constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to
delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by
numerous decided cases.

POWER TO PUNISH CONTEMPT

ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the

Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of
P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000
was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second
sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates
respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the
original owner of the estate. He bought the first from
San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the
Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was
not able to pay the necessary amount of money to
complete his payments. As such, his contract with said
owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company
sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate
to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute
deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000.
The Philippine Government then, through the
Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,
accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the
latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its
Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to
investigate the transactions surrounding the estates.
The special committee created by the resolution called
and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing

question which the committee sought to resolve was

the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the
Governments paying to Burt the total sum of
P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in
the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before October, 1949. The committee
sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt
aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date
he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H.
Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he
deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and
that on the same occasion he drew on said account
two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to
the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000
payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the
ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave
rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name
the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a
resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this
resolution which brought him to jail and is being
contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects
the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to
be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it
vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to
expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to
answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the
question must be determined by its direct relation to
the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation
to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,

that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative

action and the form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum total of the information to
be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by
a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not
cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is
no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond
its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the
witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court is always open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the
witness to the important question, which is the name of
that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were
obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the
Senate that if he should reveal the name he would
incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew
the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony
which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a
refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so
punishable. Since according to the witness himself the
transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000
to a representative of Burt in compliance with the
latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon
which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of
that person might incriminate him.
ARNAULT V BALAGTAS (MISSING)

POWER TO DECLARE EXISTENCE OF STATE OF

WAR
THE PRIZE CASES
Brief Fact Summary. Union ships pursuant to
President Lincolns April 1861 Order declared a
blockade of southern ports seized ships carrying goods
to the Confederate States.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. It is the Congressional
prerogative to declare war under Article , Section: 8,
Clause 11. However, the President has the ability to
take action when attacked.
Facts. In April 1861 President Lincoln declared a
blockade of southern ports. Pursuant to this blockade
in May and July 1861, Union ships seized Confederate

merchant vessels and cargoes of foreign neutrals and

residents of the southern states. The ships were
condemned by federal court order. The owners of the
ships and cargo appealed.
Issue. Did President Lincoln have the authority to
institute a blockade of southern ports?
Held. Justice Grier. Yes.
By the Acts of Congress of 1795 and 1807, the
President is authorized to call out the militia and use
the military and naval forces of the United States in
case of invasion by foreign nations and to suppress
insurrection against the government of a state or of the
United States.
Even if it was necessary to get Congressional sanction
for the existence of war Congress did approve of the
Presidents actions by the Acts they passed in 1861,
which allowed the government to prosecute the war
with vigor and efficiency. In 1861, Congress approved,
legalized and made valid all acts, proclamations and
orders of the President as if they had been done under
the previous express authority and direction of the
Congress. Therefore even if he needed Congress to
ratify his actions, they did so and therefore cured any
defect.
Discussion. The majority opinion held that the
President could resist an attack by a foreign nation.
The fact that the attack in this case came from an
internal part of the Union rather than from a foreign
power does not eliminate the Presidents power to take
action.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
TECSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification
in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate
of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino
citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was
a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of
the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court
may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
*Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondents birth, provided

that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those

whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather
Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was
also drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born
in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son
to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino
citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the
respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent
was born only before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

MORA V MCNAMARA
Brief Fact Summary. Three people were drafted into
the United States Army in late 1965. They brought suit
to prevent the Army from requiring them to serve in
Vietnam.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the
United States will give great deference to Congress
and the President when dealing with war issues.
Facts. The petitioners were drafted into the United
States Army in late 1965 and were to be shipped to
Vietnam six months later. They brought suit to prevent
the Army from carrying out those orders and requested
a declaratory judgment that the present United States
military activity in Vietnam is illegal. The district court
dismissed the suit and the court of appeals affirmed.

The write of certiorari to the Supreme Court was

denied.
Issue. Should the writ of certiorari be denied?
Held. Yes.
Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Douglas
dissenting.
There are several questions, which are large and
deeply troubling. Among them were whether the
present United States military activity in Vietnam was a
war within the meaning of Article I, Section: 8, Clause
11 of the Constitution and what relevance are treaty
obligations of the United States? These questions and
problems will solve themselves when the Court refuses
to hear this case. The Court should squarely face them
by granting certiorari and setting this case in for oral
argument.
The United States Constitution inserted the phrase to

declare war as a check on the Executive when the

President might have to take emergency action to
protect the security of the United States. It should be a
decision that Congress should support. The check was
to transfer the power to declare war from the person
who was to spend to those who were to pay.
Discussion. In the Prize cases, Justice Grier
emphasized the arguments for strong presidential
powers in the majority opinion. Justice Nelson writing
for the minority interpreted the Constitution more
strictly, emphasizing that what is war in actuality may
not constitute war in the constitutional sense. This has
been a recurrent theme throughout history with the
Spanish-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, Two
World Wars, Korea and then Vietnam. Whether or not
Vietnam was an unconstitutional war was never
decided. The lower courts generally ruled that the
issue was nonjusticiable.