CONSOLIDATED TIPS

(2017 Bar Examinations)

Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

❖ RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES vs. RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

Speedy trial in Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution covers only
the trial phase of criminal cases, whereas Section 16 covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative proceedings. (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A
Comprehensive Reviewer)

The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. While the concept
of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 188165 & G.R.
No. 189063, 11 December 2013, J. Bersamin)


INOCENTES V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 205963-64, 7 July 2016
J. Peralta

FACTS: Inocentes, a GSIS Branch Manager, together with four others

were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Inocentes
filed an omnibus motion (1) for judicial determination of probable cause; (2) to
quash the informations filed against him; and (3) to dismiss the case for
violating his right to the speedy disposition of this case.

ISSUE: Whether Inocentes’ right to speedy disposition of cases was

violated.

HELD: YES. The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve
the criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7) years, violated Inocentes'
constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him, as well as its own constitutional duty to act promptly on
complaints filed before it.

A person's right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under

Section 16, Article III of the Constitution. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or
quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action of all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
 The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is justifiable
because the informations were initially filed before the RTC in Tarlac City.
However, after going over the records of the case, the court observed that the
period of time in between the incidents that could have contributed to the delay
were unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious.

❖ RIGHT TO BAIL


ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015
J. Bersamin

FACTS: Juan Ponce Enrile (“Enrile”) is a 90-year old member of the

Senate who was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan. On the same
day the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered and
was confined at the PNP General Hospital.

Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and a
Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile argues that (a) the mitigating circumstances of age
and voluntary surrender should grant him bail since the penalty imposable
would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; (b) the prosecution’s
failure to show that evidence of his guilt is strong; and (c) he is not a flight
risk. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution against his Motions and denied his
Motion for Reconsideration on the abovementioned motions.

ISSUE: Can bail be granted to a 90-year old Senator (or public servant)
who is already in his advanced age and has voluntarily surrendered to a charge
which prescibes a non-bailable penalty of reclusion perpetua?

HELD: The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the

accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. Thus, bail acts
as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not

evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within
the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma, "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether
or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that
bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a

capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
 to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the

application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and
8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the

summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused

upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.

It must be noted that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his
favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. However, the
determination of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court

is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in
the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as

well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of
bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees
upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately

surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the
risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the
trial. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly,
will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
 PEOPLE v. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos 216007-09, 8 December 2015
J. Peralta

FACTS: Accused Valdez was charged with a complex crime of

Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valdez is entitled to bail.

HELD: YES. The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right

to an accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00.

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that “[a]ll
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties x x x.” The term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not
imposable, penalty.

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the
felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is
what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249
of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which
ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code
provides for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the
commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed
on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable
penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable
penalty under the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period.
From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also
called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a convict,
i.e., the prison term he has to serve.

For the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru

Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such crime
be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable
penalty" is reclusion perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed
penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied
in its maximum. The falsification, which is the means used to commit the
crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating circumstance
that effectively directs the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. The phrases "shall be applied" and "shall impose," found in Articles 63
and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be
imposed" found in Article 48. Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be
imposed after considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s.
Finally, the "penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering
that the ISL finds no application as the penalty is indivisible.

Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the
complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses
were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged
and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component
offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.

At this point, there is no certainty that accused Valdez would be found

guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For
purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed
crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has
terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing
malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the
constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none
of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and
grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex
crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust to give a stamp of approval in
depriving the accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly
committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex
crimes does not change the nature of the constituent offenses; it only requires
the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law. When
committed through falsification of official/public documents, the RPC does not
intend to classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been
expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659. If truly a non-bailable offense,
the law should have already considered it as a special complex crime like
robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, and kidnapping
with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an

accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
palpable when compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a
heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080,34 as amended by R.A. No.
765935 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or
total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at
least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is
alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of
official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled
to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as
P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been
contemplated by the law.
❖ DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM and PRIORITY
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND

ARAULLO, ET AL. v. AQUINO III

G.R. Nos. 209287, -135, -136, -155, -164, -260, - 442, -517 and -569, 1 July 2014
J. Bersamin

The interpretation of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) and its

definition of savings is a judicial function. Furthermore, the question of the
constitutionality of the acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection, is still entirely within the Court’s competence, and its determination
does not pertain to Congress to the exclusion of the Court. This is because the
power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive.

The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by

virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of
programs, activities and projects (PAPs) shall be limited to the amount fixed
by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the
power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the
Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their
prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly
transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the
perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP
is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts
and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 541 should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long
as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from
savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the
limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must
come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law.
Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions

in the GAA. Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item
that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President,
the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to
"the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation
or of the bill.” Thus, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his
power of item veto, an appropriation bill must contain “specific appropriations
of money” and not only “general provisions” which provide for parameters of
appropriation. An item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a “line-item.”
This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a
“specific appropriation of money” but also ensures that the President may
discernibly veto the same. Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5)
of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the
appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment
class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the
relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category
or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto
power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that
expense category belongs to. Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not
take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs
may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether
or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly
augmented require factual determination that is not within the scope of the
present consolidated petitions under Rule 65.

The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact
doctrine. As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act
carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification
of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine
may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for
the nullification of the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects,
social and economic services funded through the DAP. Thus, the Court upheld
the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact
doctrine.

Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,

being public officers, further enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary because they
are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the State, and because they act
in the interest of the public as required by law. However, the presumption may
be disputed. At any rate, the Supreme Court agreed during its deliberations to
extend to the proponents and implementors of the DAP the benefit of the
doctrine of operative fact. This is because they had nothing to do at all with
the adoption of the invalid acts and practices.

BELGICA, ET AL. v. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.

OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566/G.R. No. 208493/G.R. No. 209251
11 November 2013

The congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is

unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers - As a rule, the budgeting power lies in

Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the
pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted
– a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power - As a rule, the Constitution

vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the
Constitution.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of
the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances - One feature in the principle of

checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator
can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under
such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again,
“Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy - As a rule, the local governments have the power to

manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs),
the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This
is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy.
It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse,
the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

However, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by
Belgica, et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as P.D. No. 1869 (as amended by P.D. No. 1993), which amended
PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
 (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part
of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes
which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a

part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29,
Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not
have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in
the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

❖ PROBABLE CAUSE

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.

The determination of probable cause to charge a person in court for a criminal offense
is exclusively lodged in the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Department of
Justice. Initially, the determination is done by the investigating public prosecutor, and on
review by the Secretary of Justice or his duly authorized subordinate. The courts will respect
the determination, unless the same shall be shown to have been made in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Manolo P.
Samson, G.R. No. 205972 & G.R. NO. 164352, 9 November 2016, J. Bersamin)

Moreover, the courts could intervene in the determination of probable cause only
through the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by
appeal through the petition for review under Rule 43. Thus, the Court of Appeals could not
reverse or undo the findings and conclusions on probable cause by the Secretary of Justice
except upon clear demonstration of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the Secretary of Justice. (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Manolo P. Samson,
supra.)

The discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in the determination of probable cause
to charge a respondent public official or employee cannot be interfered with in the absence of
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Hilario P. Soriano v. Deputy Ombudsman For Luzon Victor C. Fernandez, GR No.
168157, 19 August 2015, J. Bersamin)

❖ CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rules
of Court, Rule 111, Section 1)

Exceptions to the above rule:

 1. the offended party waives the civil action;
2. the offended party reserves the right to institute it separately; or
3. the offended party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. (Rules
of Court, Rule 111, Section 1)

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. (Rules of Court, Rule 111, Section 1)

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment
of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. (People and AAA v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015, J. Peralta)

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a
denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy. (People and AAA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, 25
February 2015, J. Peralta)

If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal

therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.
The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
(People and AAA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015, J. Peralta)

❖ PENALTIES

Penalties with divisible duration, the periods of which are not expressly mentioned in
Article 76 are called “penalties not composed of three periods” since Article 76 has not fixed
the duration of their periods, they must be computed in accordance with Article 65. Under this
provision, the time included in the duration of penalty shall be divided into three equal
portions and periods shall be formed from each portion.

The penalty for malversation under paragraph 2 of Article 217 of the RPC is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium period. The range of this penalty is not found in Article
76. Considering that this penalty is not composed of three periods, the time included in the
penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming
one period, pursuant to Article 65 (Zafra v. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, J.
Bersamin).

The duration of “prision mayor in its minimum and medium period” is 6 years and 1
day to 10 years. To determine “the time included in the duration,” deduct “one day” and the
lower limit of the prescribed penalty from its upper limit.
 10 years -------------------upper limit
- 6 years and 1 day ------- lower limit
- 1 day
--------------------------
4 years ------- time included in the duration of penalty

Four years, which is “the time included in the duration,” shall be divided into three
equal portions.

4 years
÷3
-------------------------
1 year and 4 months --------- one third portion of the penalty

The minimum, medium and maximum periods shall be formed out the 3 equal
portions of the penalty. The time included in the duration of each period is 1 year and 4
months.

6 years
+1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
7 years and 4 months
+ 1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
8 years and 8 months
+1 year and 4 months
-----------------------------
10 years

Thus, the minimum period of the prescribed penalty of “prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods” ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months; its medium
period ranges from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months; its maximum period
rages from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10 years (Zafra v. People, G.R. No. 176317, July
23, 2014, J. Bersamin).

❖ 17 YEAR OLD MINOR OFFENDER; R.A. NO. 9165

PEOPLE V. MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011
J. Peralta

Appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the offense was
committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
RTC's Decision. R.A. No. 9344 took effect on 20 May 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on 14 September 2005, when the appellant was no
longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with
Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws
that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the
imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment
to death.
 It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a
suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which
provide for its retroactive application. However, the Supreme Court already
ruled in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with
the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344
as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic.
It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case
was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records
show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence,
when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the
case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of
Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of
minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of
Article 192 of P.D. 603.

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition

under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of
convicted children.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused-appellant

for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 of the same law. A violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the
penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the
same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the
penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature
of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in
fixing the penalty that should be imposed.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the
rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than
reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating
circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty
which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death),
where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal)
by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
❖ IMPOSSIBLE CRIME FOR UNFUNDED CHECK

If the check is unfunded, stealing the check and presenting it for payment with the
bank constitute impossible crime. It is factually impossible to accomplish the crime of
qualified theft since the check is unfunded (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, 13 July
2009, J. Bersamin)

JACINTO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162540, 13 July 2009
J. Bersamin

FACTS: Baby Aquino handed a postdated check to Mega Foam’s

collector Gemma Jacinto in payment of merchandise. The check was deposited
in the Land Bank account of Jacinto’s brother-in-law. Land Bank called Mega
Foam looking for the brother-in-law informing that the check bounced.
Company records showed that Jacinto never remitted the subject check to
Mega Foam. The customer paid cash to Mega Foam in replacement of the
bounced check. With the help of the NBI, entrapment operations were
conducted against Jacinto and her group. Aquino gave marked money to
Jacinto in replacement of the check that bounced and the latter was
apprehended. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against Jacinto
and her group of which they were convicted by the trial court. On appeal, only
Jacinto was found guilty by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Jacinto is liable for the crime of qualified theft for
taking a check without value.

HELD: NO. Jacinto is not liable for the crime of qualified theft for
taking a check without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Jacinto is
found liable for committing an impossible crime. In Intod v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved
factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket
is empty. Jacinto’s case is closely akin to the example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Jacinto’s evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for
Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.

❖ ESTAFA

CORPUZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
J. Peralta

FACTS: Corpuz received from Tangcoy pieces of jewelry which the

former would sell on a commission basis. Corpuz provided that Tangcoy must
remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold after thirty (30)
 days. When the period to return or remit had lapsed, Tangcoy met with Corpuz
but did not hand over the jewelry and instead promised to pay. However, no
payment was ever made to Corpuz. Hence, the Information for estafa with
abuse of confidence was filed against Tangcoy.

ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient demand from Corpuz in order to

prove estafa.

HELD: YES. No specific type of proof is required to show that there

was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific
word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made
upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. As
expounded in Asejo v. People:
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that
demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate
court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in
estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a
written demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include
both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present
a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired

about the money entrusted to the accused, the Supreme Court held that the
query was tantamount to a demand.

*NOVATION. Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability but it can

extinguish the old contract, which may be the basis of criminal liability. In estafa through
misappropriation, “receiving the property in trust” is an element thereof. In sum, contract is
an ingredient of this crime. Novation may convert the contract of trust into creditor-debtor
situation, or put doubt on the true nature of the original transaction (People vs. Nery, G.R. No.
L-19567, 5 February 1964). In these situations, the accused will be acquitted for failure to
prove the element of “receipt of property in trust.” Thus, novation is a defense in estafa
through misappropriation where the contract of agency is converted into sale (Degaños v.
People, GR No. 162826, 14 October 14, 2013, J. Bersamin). However, partial payment and
promise to pay the balance of obligation under contract of agency will not convert it into sale.
There is no novation since the obligation of the accused in making a partial payment is not
incompatible to the obligation to give the proceeds of sale of the property under the contract
of agency (Degaños vs. People, supra).

Novation cannot be used as a defense in case where the existence of contract is not an
element. In theft case, there was no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement which can
be modified or altered by the parties (People vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, 29 April 1968,
En Banc).In estafa through falsification of public documents, the liability of the offender
cannot be extinguished by mere novation (Milla vs. People, G.R. No. 188726, 25 January
2012).

*ESTAFA and FALSFICATION. In De Castro vs. People (G.R. No. 171672,

February 02, 2015 [J. Bersamin]), the bank teller took advantage of the bank depositors who
had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their
knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to
her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her
misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the
withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding the bank,
her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of depositors; and
falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of depositor in the
withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the respective slips
in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because
the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal
slips.

*ESTAFA and FALSFICATION. Distinction should be made as to when the crimes

of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered
as two separate offenses. The complex crime of estafa through falsification of documents is
committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods
from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing
estafa. If the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses
of estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused collected
payments from the customers, said collection which was in her possession was at her disposal.
The falsified or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were
contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the company.
Hence, the accused is liable for separate crimes of estafa and falsification of document
(Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 164457, 11 April 2012, J. Bersamin).

Other view: If falsification is committed for the purpose of enabling the accused to
commit malversation (People vs. Silvanna, G.R. No. L-43120, July 27, 1935; Zafra vs.
People, G.R. No. 176317, 23 July 2014, J. Bersamin) or estafa (People vs. Go, G.R. No.
191015, 6 August 2014) with less risk of being detected, the accused is liable for complex
crime proper.

❖ MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL/

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

In Zafra vs. People (G.R. No. 176317, 23 July 2014, J. Bersamin), there is a big
disparity between the amount covered by receipts issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for
the same receipts in the tax collection reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the
accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from
taxpayers concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the
auditors. Thus, the accused is liable for complex crime of malversation through falsification
of documents.

In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public funds

through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver
felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus fine in
the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled. In addition,
the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds malversed, or the
value of the property embezzled. (Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, 23 July 2014, J.
Bersamin)

❖ MURDER
 PEOPLE vs. JUGUETA
G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016
J. Peralta

FACTS: Accused-Appellant Jugueta, with two others, stripped off the

sack walling of Divina’s hut, which he considers his residence. In the hut were
his wife and their four children. Jugueta ordered Divina to step out of his
house. When Divina refused, Jugueta and his companions shot at them and hit
his two children. The two children died. Accused-Appellant and his
companions were charged with two counts of murder and multiple attempted
murders on two separate Informations.

However, the two Informations filed against accused failed to comply

with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
that an information must charge only one offense. Accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the
Informations, Furthermore, in convicting accused-appellant, the trial court used
the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in its Judgment.

ISSUE #1 : Did accused-appellant and his two companions conspire to

kill Divina and his family?

HELD: YES. They are equally responsible for the death of Divina's
children because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill
Divina’s family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof
of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the
crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design
and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all. Here, the
three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto
together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to
identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm
that killed the children.

ISSUE #2: Whether accused-appellant waived his right to object to the

defective informations?

HELD: YES. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge

only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. However, since accused-
appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move
for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to
question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a

single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial,
the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Accused-Appellant can
 therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts
of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Parenthetically, The Supreme Court clarified the nomenclature used by

the trial court to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There
is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder"
and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting accused, and yet imposing
penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize
appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder. The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that accused-appellant is guilty
of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the
victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of accused. In the
same vein, accused-appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of
Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
7702-G.

❖ CARNAPPING; THE VICTIM IS THE OWNER, DRIVER OR OCCUPANT OF

THE CARNAPPED MOTOR VEHICLE

If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in the aggravated
form under Section 3 of RA No. 10883. If the victim accidentally killed is not the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are simple
carnapping and homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft and robbery
(People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, 21 Novenber 2001). Although not punishable under RPC, it
can be treated as a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs. People,
G.R. No. 181184, 25 January 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for homicide, which is the
direct and natural consequence of simple carnapping.

❖ PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENTS UNDER SEC. 23 OF R.A. NO. 9165

ESTIPONA v. LOBRIGO
G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017
J. Peralta

FACTS: Estipona, Jr was charge with violation of Section 11 of R.A.

9165 for possession of dangerous drugs. He later on filed a Motion to Allow
the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement. He argued that Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the intent of the law and the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court. The RTC judge denied the Motion of the
accused.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to enter into plea bargaining

agreements under Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is unconstitutional.

HELD: YES. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional

for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
 In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. 50 The essence of the agreement is
that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the
chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. Considering the
presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

❖ EFFECT OF DENIAL OF DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. PEOPLE

G. R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016
J. Bersamin

FACTS: After the Prosecution rested its case, accused former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager
Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to
show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions
for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the
Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the special civil action of certiorari is the proper

remedy to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.

HELD: YES. The special civil action for certiorari is generally not
proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of
the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.”

It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial

of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that
did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction, they may then
appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of
certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so “x x x would be
to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. In the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s superintending control over other courts, it is to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case “as the ends of justice may
 require.” So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to
the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the
Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence,
the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

❖ PRINCIPAL ACTION IS REQUIRED IN THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN A
PARTY FROM INSTITUTING CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS

As an ancillary and preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be

resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights during the pendency of the principal
action, and for no other purpose. Such relief will accordingly protect the ability of the court to
render a meaningful decision; it will further serve to guard against a change of circumstances
that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper relief after a trial on the merits. Verily, its
essential function is to preserve the status quo between the parties until the merits of the case
can be heard. (BPI v. Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163, 25 June 2014, J. Bersamin, citing
Saulog v. Court of Appeals [262 SCRA 51, 1996])

BPI v. HONTANOSAS
G.R. No. 157163, 25 June 2014
J. Bersamin

FACTS: Spouses Silverio et al filed a complaint against Bank of the

Philippine Islands (BPI) for the declaration of nullity of the promissory notes,
real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement the parties
had executed. They further sought damages and applied for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties. The RTC
granted the application for preliminary injunction in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for

preliminary injunction is GRANTED. x x x let a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued directing the defendant and its agents or
representatives, to cease and desist from commencing foreclosure
and sale proceedings of the mortgaged properties; from taking
possession of the Mitsubishi Pajero subject of the chattel mortgage;
and from using the questioned post-dated checks as evidence for the
filing of complaint against plaintiffs Facultad for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, while the present case is pending litigation.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was

proper.
 HELD: NO. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the
application of the respondents was improper. They had admittedly constituted
the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their loan
obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the
consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the
loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy
provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment.

Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the
applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of such right. A preliminary injunction should not
determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a
preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury,
and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.

As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or

injunction – whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any
criminal prosecution. But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the
general rule have been recognized, including: (1) when the injunction is
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial
question that is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) when it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution; (9) when the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima faciecase
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No.
CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the
issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22
against the respondents was unwarranted.

Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted

lightly or precipitately because it is a limitation upon the freedom of the
defendant's action. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied
that the law permits it and the emergency demands it, for no power exists
whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and
deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an
injunction.

❖ WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing

any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series
of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully
satisfied. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as “Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,” Rule 1, Section 4[c])
Requisites:
1. An agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof:
(a) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
(b) unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right;
2. there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
(A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8)

The petition for the issuance of a Writ of Continuing Mandamus shall:

1. be verified;
2. contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping;
3. allege the facts with certainty and specify that the petition concerns an environmental
law, rule or regulation;
4. attaching thereto supporting evidence;
5. pray that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of
acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations; and
6. be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where
the actionable neglect or omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8)

If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing
mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the
wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to
submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the
court may evaluate and monitor compliance. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Section 7)

❖ RULES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION

Special Commercial Courts in Quezon City, Manila, Makati, and Pasig shall have
authority to act on applications for the issuance of writs of search and seizure in civil actions
for violations of the Intellectual Property Code, which writs shall be enforceable nationwide.
(A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC, otherwise known as “Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property
Rights Cases,” Rule 2, Section 2)

Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, the Special Commercial Courts in the
judicial regions where the violation of intellectual property rights occurred shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of search and seizure. (Id.)