Case 13:

JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Senator Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated
July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-
14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists
that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan regarding the misuse of the Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF). On
June 10 and 16, 2014, Enrile filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying,
among others, to be allowed to post bail, which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on July 3,
2014 due to its prematurity as Enrile had not yet voluntarily surrendered or placed into custody.
On the same day his warrant was issued, Enrile voluntary surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of CIDG in Camp Crame and was later confined in PNP General Hospital after his
medical examination.

Enrile thereafter filed his Motion for Detention at PNP General Hospital and his Motion to Fix
Bail on July 4, 2014 and argued to be allowed to post bail on the ground that (1) the Prosecution
had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (2) although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua;
and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.

July 14, 2014, Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail due to prematurity as there has
yet to be a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against the accused. The accused
second argument holds no merit as the presence of mitigating circumstance(s) is not yet taken
into consideration. Lastly, although his age, physical condition and flight risk are considered, as
mentioned prior, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without showing that the
evidence of guilt is not strong.

August 8, 2014. Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner raised the following grounds to support his petition for certiorari:
a) Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile
may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
b) The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever convicted,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
 c) The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of guilt is
strong.
d) Enrile is not a flight risk.

ISSUE: WON Enrile is entitled to bail?

RULING:
Yes. The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

Bail protects the rights of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion.

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution and the Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Both state that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Thus, the moment one is detained or restrained by officers of the law, he can claim the
guarantee of his provisional liberty and retains his right unless he is charged with capital offense
or with an offense punishable with life imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
Thus, all criminal cases in MTC or MCT are bailable because these courts have no jurisdiction to
try capital offenses of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
Enrile averred two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor: (1)
that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and (2)
that he voluntarily surrendered. However, the determination of these two mitigating
circumstances entitling him to bail is ideally made by the trial court. Nonetheless, in now
granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
Thus, Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. It also cannot be ignored that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency
of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.

Furthermore, the currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. Dr. Jose
C. Gozales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric
patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be
suffering from multiple ailments including, but not limited to, chronic hypertension, diffuse
atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, atrial and ventricular arrhythmia (irregular heartbeat),
Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome, etc. Dr. Gonzales
attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks
to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or
non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications
associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by
certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could
cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his
own instance, was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor
of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital.
 Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court: x x x This court, in disposing of the first
petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of
the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the
law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; x x x x x

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to
entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive
of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the
subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for
bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by
protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at
the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.

Accordingly, the SC conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of
bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, there is a grave abuse of
discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for
the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8,
2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan;
and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause.