Received: 12 June 2019 Revised: 18 November 2019 Accepted: 25 November 2019

DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12646

ARTICLE

Categories

Javier Cumpa

Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Abstract
Correspondence Categories play a major role in contemporary metaphysics.
Javier Cumpa, Departamento de Lógica y
They have not only been invoked in a number of philosophi-
Filosofía Teórica, Facultad de Filosofía,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid cal theories but are themselves objects of epistemological
28040, España. and metaphysical scrutiny. In this article, we will discuss the
Email: jcarteseros@ucm.es
following questions: How do we know when something
Funding information belongs to a certain category? Is there a fundamental cate-
Consejería de Educación e Investigación de la
Comunidad de Madrid, Grant/Award Number:
gory of the world? Can we give a satisfactory account of the
2016-T1/HUMD-1263 number of categories and the completeness of systems of
categories? Are categories the genuine subjects of ontology?

1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N

Categories are invoked in support of a number of projects in contemporary metaphysics: Substantialism (Lowe,
2005; Heil, 2012), Structuralism (French, 2014, 2018; Ladyman & Ross, 2007), and Factualism (Buonomo, 2017;
Cumpa, 2014, 2018a, 2018b), among others. But the nature of the categories has become an object of episte-
mological and ontological scrutiny. The most important epistemological issue regarding the nature of categories
concerns how we can be acquainted with categories: Is our knowledge of categories based on logical, linguistic,
perceptual, or ideological considerations? There are also three central ontological issues regarding the nature of
categories. The first ontological question is about the fundamental character of categories: What (if any) is the
most fundamental category of the world? The second ontological question is about the overall number of cate-
gories and the completeness of systems of categories: How can we justify the number of categories and the
completeness of our proposed systems of categories? Finally, there is the metaontological question about
whether categories are the genuine subject of ontology, namely: Is the question about categories a substantive
question of ontology?
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I provide a historical survey of theories of categories from the
Presocratics to our days, via Plato, Aristotle, Ryle, and Sellars. Section 3 explores the epistemological problem of how
we can have epistemic access to categories. In Section 4, I address the ontological debate about the fundamentality
of categories. Section 5 discusses ontological issues concerning the number of categories and the completeness of
systems of categories. Lastly, in Section 6, I critically examine whether categories are the genuine subject of
ontology.

© 2020 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Philosophy Compass. 2020;15:e12646. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phc3 1 of 11

https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12646
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2 | T H E TH E O R Y OF CA T E G O R I E S A N D I T S HI ST O R Y

The English word “category” comes from the word “κατηγορία” from Ancient Greek. In Modern English, it is often
used as a synonym of “attribute,” “class,” or “set,” But in Ancient Greek, this word had other meanings like accusation
in a court of law, which provides some clues as to its philosophical meaning. In this sense, “category” means what we
today understand by “predicate”: being said of something.
Both historians of Ancient and Medieval philosophy as well as almost all of Aristotle's Greek and Latin commenta-
tors have been content with crediting Aristotle with the foundation of the so-called “theory of categories.” But it would
be a mistake to think that the relevant meaning of “category” has only to do with attributing some predicate to some-
thing. The significance of the word “category” is also to be found in the context of Plato's theory of higher-order genera
and his theory of division of genera into species in the Sophist (Plato, 1997: 250a–260b). Two of the main features that
Aristotle ascribed to categories in his Categories are precisely those of being higher-order genera and being divisible
into lower-order species of individuals or substances (Aristotle, 1952: 1b 25–2a 11). And while it is true that the theory
of higher-order genera and the theory of division of genera into species are genuinely Platonic, the theory of division
can be arguably tracked back to Presocratic philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaximander. According to Plato
(1997: 243c–260b), these Presocratic philosophers offered a theory of the first two kinds of division, namely, by con-
tradiction and by contraries. The most important catalogue of traditional divisions is due to Porphyry's Commentary on
Plato's Sophist (Porphyry, 1993: 164–195). However, it is Aristotle's Categories that has traditionally been the source of
most of the controversies over categories. From Antiquity, Aristotle's followers have disputed various aspects of the
Categories: its authorship, its title, its place within Aristotle's works, the goal of the book, and the nature of its content,
among others. Unfortunately, there has been no agreement on any of these topics.
Is the theory of categories undermined by its history? Are there any non-Aristotelian theories of categories? The
20th century analytic tradition does not explicitly clash with the Aristotelian tradition in regard to categories, but it
does go beyond it by providing two new interpretations of categories. These two non-Aristotelian interpretations
analyze categories from two different points of view, namely, the perspectives of mathematical logic and of funda-
mental physical science.
The first non-Aristotelian interpretation of categories consists in an understanding of the notion of category from
mathematical logic. It analyzes categories from the logical rules which govern the combination of types for the formation
of meaningful propositions. According to this interpretation, the Aristotelian tradition has mistakenly analyzed categories
from the grammar of language by being focused on grammatical aspects of propositions such as name, verb, and the
subject-predicate distinction of ordinary language. Ryle (1938: section VI) was the first philosopher to pioneer this inter-
pretation of the categories from mathematical logic by claiming that the theory of categories is a theory of logical types.
The second non-Aristotelian interpretation of categories consists in an understanding of the notion of category
from the categorial frameworks of current fundamental physical science. It analyzes the notion of category, not from
the categorial framework of common sense, but rather from the categorially different frameworks of physical sciences.
Whereas the Aristotelian tradition has studied the categories in connection with Aristotelian physics (Aquinas's Com-
mentary on Aristotle's Physics (Aquinas (1952a) is a case in point), as Sellars emphasizes (in Sellars, 1963: section IV), the
Aristotelian tradition has mistakenly tried to understand the categories of fundamental physical science from the cate-
gories of the categorial framework of common sense. Sellars's defense of the primacy of the categories of the scientific
image gives rise to a true scientific interpretation of categories, where the Aristotelian categories are to be updated in
accordance with the categorial frameworks of fundamental physical science.

3 | C A TE GO RI A L K N O W LE D G E

Since the times of Aristotle, there has been an epistemological problem regarding how we are to establish reliable
methods, tests, or criteria for determining when a certain item belongs to a certain category. There are two related
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problems here. The first is what I call the problem of categorial sameness: How do we know when two items belong to
the same category? The second is what I call the problem of categorial difference: How do we know when two items
belong to different categories? In the chapter entitled “Antepradicamenta” which opens his Categories (Aristotle
1952: 1a1–1a13), Aristotle appealed to synonymy as a criterion for establishing when two items belong to the same
species, genus, or, by extension, summum genum (higher-order genus or category): having the same name and the
same definition (Aristotle 1952: 1a6). Since the 20th century, there are four main philosophical approaches to criteria
of sameness (and difference) of category, which appeal to logic, ordinary language, perception, and ideology,
respectively.
This first test, the logical test of categorial sameness, consists in the analysis of the so-called “propositional
functions.”1 The test was proposed by Russell (1964) in the Principles of Mathematics. Specifically, in the Doctrine
of Types (Russell, 1964: appendix B), Russell frames sameness of type in terms of variables of propositional func-
tions indicating the range of significance of its values. According to Russell, two items belong to the same category
or type (Russell's own word for the traditional term “category”) if they are in the range of significance of the same
propositional function. Consider a propositional function following Aristotle's example of synonymy: “x is an ani-
mal.” Russell's criterion establishes that Nora (a certain human being) and Cozio (Nora's dog) belong to the cate-
gory or type animal because both of them are values in the range of significance of the same propositional
function “x is an animal.” Nora and Cozio are values of the propositional function because both of them are ani-
mals. Conversely, a formulation of Russell's criterion of categorial difference would establish that two items are of
different type or category if they are values of different propositional functions. For example, Nora and Angelina
(Nora's favorite tea room in Paris) are of different type or category because Nora is a value in the range of the
propositional function “x is an animal,” and Angelina is a value in the range of the propositional function “x is a tea
room.” Nora is a value of the first propositional function because Nora is an animal, and Angelina is a value of the
second propositional function due to the fact that Angelina is a tea room.
The second test, the ordinary language test of categorial sameness, arose as a consequence of a criticism of
Russell's logical test of sameness of type or category. It was proposed by Gilbert Ryle (1938) in Categories. The test
consists also in the analysis of propositional functions.2 According to Ryle (1938: 194), Russell's test of categorial
sameness is grammatical, not logical, so it works with grammatical but not with logical categories. In essence, Ryle
takes Russell's doctrine of types to be the grammar of language, and Wittgenstein's doctrine of meaning as use by
which the meaning of words is constituted by its use to be the logic of language. Ryle's argument against Russell's
test runs as follows. According to Ryle, the propositional function “x is an animal” has as its range of significance
values of the grammatical categories name, descriptive phrase, and substantive, such as “Nora” and “Angelina.” But for
Ryle, not every possible value of these grammatical categories could complete the propositional function “x is an ani-
mal.” For example, even though “Nora” and “Angelina” are both of the category name, only “Nora” would be a suit-
able value for completing the propositional function “x is an animal.” “Nora” could complete the propositional
function because its use in certain sets of propositions determines that animal can be its logical type. However,
“Angelina” as possible value of the propositional function would give rise to an absurd proposition because its use
determines that animal cannot be its logical type. To assert that “Angelina” (the name of Nora's favorite Parisian tea
room) is an animal is an absurdity. (This was the origin of Ryle's Ryle (2000)famous theory of “category-mistakes”
later developed in the Concept of the Mind.) Absurdities, according to Ryle, entail that there are differences of cate-
gory or type. Ryle updated Russell's test by restricting the ranges of significance of propositional functions to logical
ones, that is, those determined by the use of expressions not by its grammatical type. According to Ryle's ordinary
language test, we can only know if “Nora” and “Angelina” are of the category animal by considering whether these
words are similarly used in certain sets of propositions.3 Conversely, two expressions are of different type or cate-
gory if they are used differently in certain sets of propositions.
The third test, the perceptual test for categorial sameness, relies on the perception of exemplified categorial
properties. Grossmann (1992: 46) has argued for the existence of categorial properties that ontologically ground
the memberships of items in categories. On Grossman's view, we need only to have a look at the familiar items of
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our surroundings in order to discover what categories they belong to. According to Grossmann, sensory intuition
directly acquaints us with all existing types and categorial properties. For example, I can see with my own eyes that
Nora and her dog (but not Angelina) are of the lower-order type animal but also that Nora, her dog, and Angelina
are of the higher-order type or category particular. They are particular things located in space and time. Nora and
her dog Cozio are now, at 4:20 p.m., in front of Angelina, but Angelina also has a spatial location, namely, Rivoli
street. Nora, Cozio, and Angelina, on Grossmann's conception, exemplify one and the same category of being a
particular.
The fourth test, the ideological test for categorial sameness, consists in the satisfaction of an indispensability cri-
terion. Sider (2011) has questioned the significance of perceptual similarity but has stressed the significance of simi-
larity in connection with ideology for determining whether or not notions of one's ideology represent categories of
genuinely similar items in the world.4 For example, let's consider the property of being an animal shared by Nora and
her dog Cozio. The thought behind Sider's criterion is that if the property of being an animal satisfies the similarity
criterion by which the sharing of this property makes for genuine similarity, then the notion of being an animal
should be regarded as an indispensable part of one's ideology. This means that the notion in question is capable of
representing a category of genuinely similar items in the world. In other words, we have epistemic access to a cate-
gory when we have an indispensable notion of it. Recently, Thomasson (2015) has argued against this view.
According to her, it does not matter if Nora and Cozio have the property of being an animal, and if the sharing of the
property makes for similarity. For the property of being an animal, Thomasson argues, does not play any role in
explaining whether or not Nora and Cozio are similar. This means that such a notion cannot be an indispensable part
of one's ideology.
The controversy over tests of sameness of category has raged for 26 centuries because the notion of sameness
has traditionally played a fundamental classificatory role according to metaphysicians. As we shall see in the next
section, one of the most important categorial issues concerns the classification of the world in terms of the most fun-
damental category.

4 | C A T E G O RI A L F U N D A M E N T A L I T Y

What is the most fundamental category of our world, the actual world? The traditional answer is the category
of substance. A substance is an individual or particular such as Nora and Cozio, which are entities capable of
being represented by proper names like “Nora” and “Cozio” or demonstratives like “this” and “that.” However, a
recent proposal is that the fundamental category of the world is that of fact or state of affairs. A fact is a par-
ticular like Nora having a certain property, say, the property of being white, forming the factual combination of
Nora's being white. Facts are represented by whole sentences such as “Nora is white.” An even more recent
proposal is that the fundamental category of the world is that of structure. A structure is, for instance, the col-
lection of particles which composes Nora. Structures are represented by wholes whose central constituent
parts are relations.
Traditionally, Aristotelians have defended Substantialism, the thesis that the fundamental category of the
world is that of substance because of three closely related characteristics that substances appear to possess: prior-
ity, simplicity, and independence. First, a category is prior to other categories when it can be the subject or bearer
of the other categories, but not vice versa. Second, simplicity is the feature that a category has when it cannot be
divided into other categories. Third, a category is independent of other categories when it does not depend on the
others for its existence. In his Categories, Aristotle (1952: 3a8–3b10) argues that substances are prior, simple, and
independent due to the fact that substances “are not in other subjects” (and “are not said of other subjects”). The
main idea behind this view is that subjects have properties, but subjects cannot be had by other subjects.
Returning to Nora, the substance protagonist of our example, Nora is a subject that has a certain accident, the
property of being white. White is in Nora. Now, and this is the crucial point, Nora cannot be in another subject,
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say, Cozio. Only accidents such as the property of being white can be in a subject, for example, Nora and Cozio.
Nora and Cozio have the trait of priority because they are ultimate subjects of properties. They are simple as they
are single subjects. And they are independent due to the fact that neither of the two substances depends on the
other for its existence.
In a revolutionary way, Wittgenstein defended Factualism, the thesis that the fundamental category of the
world is that of fact or state of affairs. In regard to priority, Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein,
1951: 2.011) that substances are constituents “in” facts. So substances are after all in other subjects: facts.
Nora, for instance, is a constituent “in” the fact of Nora's being white. As to simplicity, Wittgenstein (1961: 56)
argued in the Notebooks: 1914–1916 that the spatial analysis of objects such as substances reveals infinite
divisibility, such that no spatial object could be considered simple.5 This is intended to mean that Nora cannot
be simple. Nora, as a spatial object, has spatial parts. For instance, she has a body, arms, and legs. But Nora's
body also has organs, and these organs have even much smaller parts like molecules, atoms, and elementary
physical particles. Concerning independence, Wittgenstein (1951: 2.0121) argued in the Tractatus that sub-
stances, as constituents of facts, cannot be independent entities. Nora, for instance, is not independent because
she is a constituent “in” the fact of Nora's being white. Substances depend on the existence of facts. According
to Wittgenstein (1951: 2.061), only facts can be independent entities. For example, the fact of Nora's being
white is independent because it is not a constituent “in” any other fact. Facts do not depend upon other facts
for their existence.
Heil (2012) has modernized Substantialism by updating Aristotle's criteria of priority, simplicity, and indepen-
dence in order to argue for the fundamentality of the category of substance. His general thesis is that Aristotle
was wrong about the candidates for substances. According to Heil, instead of treating ordinary objects as sub-
stances, we should only treat elementary physical particles as substances, since these are the only objects which
meet the criteria for priority, simplicity, and independence. First, Heil (2012: 21) argues that the priority of ele-
mentary physical particles is obvious since there are no more fundamental bearers of properties other than ele-
mentary particles. This means that elementary particles such as electrons are the truly ultimate subjects of
properties. Second, Heil (2012: 51) argues that only elementary physical particles are simple, for they cannot be
further divided into more elementary particles. Third, Heil (2012: 34) argues that elementary physical particles do
not depend upon any other elementary particles for their existence, as ordinary substances such as Nora and
Cozio depend upon their elementary particles for their existences. This last characteristic of true substances has
led him to a sort of eliminativism about ordinary substances.6 In this context, Nora and Cozio are nothing but
two collections of elementary particles.
Ladyman and Ross (2007) and French (2014) have defended Structuralism, the thesis that the fundamental cate-
gory of the world is that of structure. Ladyman and Ross (2007) have criticized substantialism on the basis of what
Paul (2013: 110) has called “categorial collapse” by reference to the elimination of substances in quantum mechanics.
They have questioned whether particles have the characteristics that Heil attributes to them. More recently, French
(2014) has proposed a form of eliminativism like Heil's about the substantiality of ordinary and scientific substances
based on the scientifically more fundamental category of structure. According to French (2014), elementary particles
are constituent features of underlying structures. Thus, for French (2014: 172–178), particles (in his non-
individualistic interpretation) are not prior as subjects as Heil assumes, and for this reason, elementary particles can-
not be independent either.
Cumpa (2014, 2018b) has proposed a naturalistic criterion of categorial fundamentality according to which we
should answer the question of whether our world is a world of substances, structures, or facts by considering the
explanatory power of those categories in accounting for the relationships between what Sellars (1963) called “the
manifest image” and “the scientific image” of the world. The so-called “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world
are the frameworks of common sense and science, respectively. Persons, tables, and chairs are the sorts of thing
which populate the manifest image, while electrons, fields, and nuclear forces are the kinds of thing that inhabit the
scientific image. According to Cumpa (2014: 322), when we apply the criterion to the debate about categorial
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fundamentality, we realize that the category of fact is in a much better position than that of substance in Aristotle's
or Heil's senses. For while Aristotelian, ordinary substances such as Nora and Cozio only belong to the manifest
image, and Heil's scientific substances like electrons only belong to the scientific image, facts can have constituents
both in the manifest image and the scientific image. For example, on this view, in the fact of Nora's being white, the
particles composing Nora belong to the scientific image, and the property of being white which Nora has belongs to
the manifest image.
French (2018) has raised several questions for the factualist: Are structures prior subjects in the Aristotelian
sense with respect to facts? Are structures more fundamental than facts in Cumpa's sense of the criterion of
fundamentality? And which category does the explanatory work in explanations? He has argued for the compatibility
of the metaphysics of structuralism with that of factualism, but he has argued in favor of the category of structure in
response to the above questions. First, French (2018: 211) argues that structures are prior to facts in the sense that
structures are constituents of facts, but particles and other physical entities are features of structures, the ultimate
constituents of the world. Second, French (2018: 212) argues that there are both facts and structures, but the cate-
gory of structure is more fundamental than the category of fact because facts about structure are facts about what
is physically fundamental. Third, French (2018: 218) argues that it is structure, not facts, that does the explanatory
job in scientific explanations.
Then, is the categorial structure of the actual world substantial, factual, or structural? Metaphysicians have tradi-
tionally thought that in order to provide a final answer to the question, it is necessary to address another question
about whether or not the categories of a system of categories are finite in number and thus form a complete system
of categories. What is a system of categories? A system of categories is a set of related or unrelated categories pro-
posed by a categorial ontology or theory of categories. Different ontologies of categories typically propose different
lists of categories. Systems of categories have two defining features. Systems of categories are determined by a fun-
damental category in the sense discussed in this section and are also determined by its number of categories. Thus,
we find first the familiar substantialist, factualist, and structuralist ontologies and, second, ontologies of one or more
categories, for example, one-category (Paul, 2017), two-category (Armstrong, 1997), and four-category (Lowe, 2005)
ontologies, among others.

5 | N U M B E R A N D CO M P L ET E N ES S

The problem of the number of categories and the completeness of systems of categories dates back to Ancient
Greece through the Middle Ages and was first raised by the Neo-Platonist philosopher Plotinus (1968–1988) in his
On the Genera of Being. Plotinus raised two questions in response to Aristotle's Categories. (a) What kind of division
(criterion, test, and method) was used by Aristotle to divide his categories? This led to the first criticism of Aristotle's
division of categories, which was that it was not a proper Platonic division in genus-species form, but a mere enumer-
ation or list of them. (b) Is Aristotle's enumeration of categories complete? This led to the second criticism of
Aristotle's division of categories, which was that no mere enumeration could guarantee the completeness of a sys-
tem of categories. This controversy became central for Plotinus's contemporaries such as Porphyry as well as for the
followers of the Neo-Platonic schools like Jamblicus, Dexxipus, Ammonius, and Simplicius, who devoted extensive
Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories to the discussion of Plotinus's two objections to Aristotle. It was Simplicius
(1907: 67.1, 25–68.1, 34) who first replied to Plotinus's two objections. According to Simplicius, Aristotle's enumera-
tion of categories forms a class, whose completeness can be justified by induction by examining how all ordinary
objects fall under the ten Aristotelian categories.
Aristotle's medieval followers such as Rodolphus Britus (1981: VIII) and his contemporary Thomas Aquinas
(1952b) inherited the Neo-Platonic controversy over Aristotle's categories, and they called it “De Numero et
Sufficientia Praedicamentorum” (On the Number and Completeness of Categories). Plotinus's two objections to
Aristotle lived on after the Middle Ages. In the Enlightenment, Kant (1965) in his Critique of the Pure Reason
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(Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, Second Part, First Division, Book I, Chapter 1, section 3, 10) raised them
once again. And we can also find the two objections in the analytical and phenomenological traditions.
Currently, there are two main views on systems of categories in connection with the problem of the number of
categories and the completeness of systems of categories. Following Thomasson (2019), we can distinguish
between “mono-dimensional systems of categories” and “multi-dimensional systems of categories.” Both types
share criteria of adequacy, namely: (i) comprehensiveness: all there is must belong to one category; (ii) exhaustivity:
all there is must belong to only one category; and (iii) hierarchical organization: no category can be in more than one
level in the hierarchy of categories. The main difference between both kinds of systems of categories is that
while the former uses only one dimension of categorization to enlist a fundamental enumeration of categories, the
latter uses more than one dimension of categorization to enlist a fundamental enumeration of categories.
For instance, we may classify Nora and Cozio in terms of several categorial dichotomies: “spatial/nonspatial,”
“temporal/atemporal,” “concrete/abstract,” “independent/dependent,” “necessary/contingent,” and “simple/
complex,” among others. For this reason, Thomasson (2019) has considered that no mono-dimensional system of
categories can provide an account of the ultimate number of categories and the completeness of a system of cate-
gories. Also, Westerhoff (2005: 218) has stressed that no system of categories may be said to be absolute or the
only true system of categories but rather that what system of categories is correct will depend upon our interests.
For example, in quantum mechanics, we may need a structuralist system of categories with such and such catego-
ries, while in biology we may need a substantialist system of categories with such and such categories. Tambassi
(2019: 32) has emphasized that the number of categories and the completeness of systems of categories in geo-
ontologies, that is, computational ontologies about the geographical world, is always variant. Cumpa (2019: 152)
has argued that non-Aristotelian ontologies can dispense with the Aristotelian problem of the number of categories
and the completeness of systems of categories.
Lowe (2013: 39) seems to have been aware of the problems related to multidimensional systems of categories.
He has suggested that the problem of the number of categories and the completeness of systems of categories
can be answered in connection with another problem, the so-called “problem of categorial uniqueness”: How can
we determine that there is one and only one system of categories? For Lowe, it is possible to determine the abso-
luteness of a dimension of categorization of a system of categories by way of two fundamental formal relations
such as instantiation and characterization. Following Aristotle's so-called “smallest division of being” into four cate-
gories (Aristotle 1952: 1a20–1b10), Lowe claims that his substantialist fourfold categorization of items into
objects, kinds, modes, and attributes can be said to be absolute because the dimension of categorization under
consideration is fundamental.7 Lowe argues that we can from here determine the number of categories and the
completeness of his system of categories. For example, Nora, as a member of the category object, instantiates a
kind. She is a human being. But qua object, Nora is also characterized by a certain mode. Her skin color is white.
Moreover, Nora's mode of being white is of a certain kind. It instantiates the attribute of being a color. These two
fundamental relations hold only among these four fundamental categories. It seems that Lowe's argument is open
to the following criticism: This dimension of categorization cannot be absolute because in non-substantialist ontol-
ogies such as some versions of factualism and structuralism there are no objects.
So far we have explored a number of debates which have shown the significance of categories in metaphysics.
Now, is the ontological search for categories the genuine subject of ontology? In the next section, we will be con-
cerned with the substantivity of the project of categorial ontology.

6 | C A TEGO RI AL MET A ONTOLOG Y

We can call “the neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontological question” the approach according to which categories
are the genuine subject of ontology because the question about categories is the most substantive ontological ques-
tion. This is a metaontological question because it is about the substantivity of the project itself of categorial
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ontology. Since the second half of the 20th century, Bergmann (1992), Grossmann (1992), Tegtmeier (1992), Lowe
(2005), and Heil (2012) have defended the thesis that the question about categories is the most substantive ontolog-
ical question because categories play certain fundamental metaphysical roles. For this reason, the different propo-
nents of the neo-Aristotelian approach have provided a variety of strong arguments for the essential, necessary, and
indispensable metaphysical roles of categories.
Bergmann (1992: 56) and Grossmann (1992: 46) have argued for what Rosenkrantz (2012) has called
“categorial essentialism,” the view that categories are essential properties of items. According to this view, a cup
of Nora's favorite hot chocolate at Angelina has essentially the property of being a particular, while the property
of being black had by the hot chocolate has essentially the property of being a property. For Grossmann, the cup
of hot chocolate, by essentially exemplifying the property of being a particular, could not undergo a change of cat-
egory, for example, from particular to property. Neither could the black color of the hot chocolate cease to be a
property and become a member of another category, for example, a member of the category of particular like the
cup of hot chocolate. By contrast, Cumpa (2011, 2018a, 2019) has defended what Rosenkrantz (2012) has called
“categorial inessentialism”, namely, the view that items do not have categorial essences. According to this view,
items do not have categories essentially but rather contingently in virtue of scientific possibilities of combination.
For example, physics determines the individual nature of Nora's cup of hot chocolate and the property nature of its
color in virtue of the behaviors of particles and photons in the scientific image.
Lowe (2005: 4) has argued that categories are necessary formal conditions of any possible or actual world. On
his view, ontology has the task of finding out what categories could exist and coexist in any possible world in order
to provide an account of the categorial structure of our world. This means that if it is possible to conceive a priori of
a possible world in which both the hot chocolate and its color are present, that is precisely because the categories of
particular and property are necessary formal conditions of the possibility of that world. Cumpa (2013: 202) has raised
a criticism of conceivability as guide to the possibility of categories based on our inability to conceive of worlds
which are categorially heterogeneous with respect to ours. For this reason, he has advanced the so-called “principle
of the categorial homogeneity of the worlds.” The idea is that in no categorially possible world could we conceive of
either the hot chocolate or its color except in terms of the categories to which they already belong in our world.8
Heil (2012: 3) and French (2018: 217) have argued that categories are indispensable in any physical world,
because otherwise objective truth and scientific explanation would be unintelligible. According to them, both the
truth-makers for ordinary judgements and the explanantia of scientific explanations are of certain categories, namely,
substances and structures, respectively. This means that the categorial nature of truth-makers and explanantia is
indispensable to the objective truth of our judgements and the scientific explanations of our best theories. Heil
(2012: 19) argues that fundamental truth-makers cannot be of a category other than substance. On the other hand,
French (2018: 217) argues that both the truth-makers of our ordinary judgments and the explanantia of scientific
explanations must belong to the category of structure.
One might argue that whether the truth-makers of judgements belong to the category of substance rather
than to that of structure is of no significance at all to their truths. Let's consider the judgement: “Nora is white.” If
Nora is white, the judgement in question will be true independently of whether Nora and her color are substances
or structures. In the case of those who think that the fundamental truth-maker of “Nora is white” is to be found
in the scientific image, one might follow the same line of reasoning and argue that what makes the judgement true
is the arrangement of electrons and photons which makes Nora white, independently of whether or not the
arrangement, the electrons, and the photons are of the category of substance or structure. And one might argue
in the same direction concerning the explanantia of scientific explanations such as “if there are electrons and pho-
tons behaving in a certain way, then Nora has the property of being white” by suggesting that what explains the
fact that Nora is white is the arrangement of electrons and photons, regardless of their categories.
Cumpa (2014, 2018b) has argued against the neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontological question. He argues
that categories are not ontologically fundamental but have certain degrees of epistemic value.9 The thought in this
context is that categories have epistemic value when they help us understand the multiple relationships which hold
CUMPA 9 of 11

between the manifest and the scientific images of the world: emergence, reduction, scientific explanation, downward
causation, etc. Thus, for Cumpa, the ontological search for the categories of the world cannot be the genuine subject
of ontological theorizing, because the question about categories is not a substantive ontological question by itself,
but only in relation to another ontological question, that is, the neo-Sellarsian ontological question about the rela-
tionships between the manifest and the scientific images of the world. Accordingly, different categories may have
different epistemic values for different relationships between the two images. For example, one might argue that the
category of structure might be said to have more epistemic value in the context of quantum mechanics, but less epi-
stemic value in the context of common sense.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. I have benefited from discussions with Peter Forrest,
Erwin Tegtmeier, and Nils Kürbis. This publication has been made possible thanks to financial support provided by
the Research Talent Attraction Program of the Consejería de Educación e Investigación de la Comunidad de Madrid
(2016-T1/HUMD-1263).

ORCID
Javier Cumpa https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8848-2117

ENDNOTES
1
In the present context, a propositional function, whose logical form Russell devised as φ(x), is a logical method for the
determination of types or categories. Propositional functions have two main components, “variables” (x) and “ranges of
significance” (the class of values of x), which make possible the formation of types or categories (φ). As Russell (1964:
appendix B) puts it: “Ranges of significance form types, i.e., if x belongs to the range of significance of φ(x), then there is a
class of objects, the type of x, all of which must also belong to the range of significance of φ(x).”
2
As Ryle (1938: 192) noted, the significance of Russell's propositional functions method for discovering sameness of type
or category is that a “ ‘propositional function’ is only ‘question’ writ sophisticatedly. The propositional function ‘x is snub-
nosed’ differs only in practical associations from ‘Who is snub-nosed?’; and ‘Socrates is φ’ exhibits no more or less than
‘Where is Socrates?’ or ‘What-like (qualis) is Socrates?’ or ‘How big is Socrates?’ according to the genre selected for φ.” In
contrast with Russell, Ryle thought that the notions of “propositional function,” “value,” “type,” or “category” are merely
linguistic.
3
For developments, see Smart (1953), Sommers (1963), Strawson (1970), Westerhoff (2005), and Magidor (2019).
4
Sider follows Quine (1948) in distinguishing between the ontology and the ideology of a theory, where the first covers the
entities accepted by the theory, and the ideology cover the indispensable beliefs of the theory.
5
For more about categorial priority, see Paul (2013) and Cumpa (2011, 2019).
6
See Heil (2012: 167–168).
7
For more details about Aristotle's “smallest” and “largest” divisions of being into four and ten categories, respectively, see
Porphyry (1887: 71.15–16).
8
For further criticisms of Lowe's categorial ontology, see Bueno, Bush, and Shalkowski (2015).
9
By the “epistemic value of a category,” Cumpa (2018b) refers to the explanatory power that a category has to improve our
understanding of the different relationships between the manifest and the scientific images. Accordingly, a certain cate-
gory has more epistemic value than other category when it helps us to better understand a particular relationship between
the two images, for example, emergence or scientific explanation.

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Javier Cumpa is Senior Fellow in the Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy at Complutense University
of Madrid. His research focuses on metaphysics. He has published articles in journals including Inquiry, American
Philosophical Quarterly, and Philosophical Studies. He is the group leader of PHYSIS: Research Group in Analytic
Metaphysics at Complutense University of Madrid (web: http://www.ucm.es/physisgroup/).

How to cite this article: Cumpa J. Categories. Philosophy Compass. 2020;15:e12646. https://doi.org/10.1111/
phc3.12646