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Personal Details
Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy,
University of Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator Prof. Sundar Sarukkai Centre for Philosophy and Humanities,
Manipal University, Manipal.
Content Writer Dr. Meera Baindur Manipal Centre for Philosophy and
Humanities, Manipal University, Manipal.
Content Reviewer Prof. R. P. Singh Centre for Philosophy,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Language Editor Miss. Udaya B L Freelancer, Bangalore

Description of Module
Subject Name Philosophy
Paper Name Metaphysics I
Module Name / Title Padārtha
Module Id 1.13
Prerequisites Nil
Objectives To introduce students to basic introductory concepts of Categories
(Padārtha) in Indian traditions , particularly in the Nyāya school
Keywords Nyāya school, Padārtha,Sunstance ( dravya), qualities (guṇa),
relations, inherence, absence (abhāva), perception errors
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Padārtha
IPM.2.1 The fundamental categories: Padārtha
What are the most fundamental kinds of entities that can be found around us? One could say these
are things like pots, chairs and dogs. Or one could also say that there are things like atoms and
molecules that make up the world. Philosophers in India listed these fundamental kinds of things as
those that we could ultimately know and name. For them, the way one perceived the world was the
way one could know it. We see here the strong empirical tradition of 'knowing reality' that continues
from the upaniṣads. Indian metaphysics is closely linked to the philosophical theory of knowledge
called Pramānaśāstra. One of the prominent schools of philosophy, the Nyāya School declares that
‘whatever is, is knowable and namable’. This indicates to us that the nature of reality in Indian
thought is closely linked to the philosophy of language. The means of knowing what they called
‘Pramāna’. And the things or objects of knowledge were ‘Prameya’ (knowable-s). These knowable
were classified into categories of reality. These philosophers agreed that the fundamentals of reality
around us can be represented through terms and these terms can stand for or point to existing objects.
A set of terms can be combined into a fundamental fact about the world that becomes a sort of a map
of reality, which can be described in a systematic manner. Potter (1977) suggests that the basic
elements for such a philosophical perspective are represented by terms that can also name the relations
between them. Such fundamental knowable entities can combine and form further entities that are
again represented by other terms. For the Indian realist, everything has a word and every word has an
entity, which is real and exists. Not all philosophical schools agree on what these fundamentals are and
if all of them are real and we shall look at some of these debates later.

We find in Indian thought, particularly for the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika realists, and for many other
philosophical schools, the fundamental unit of reality is ‘Padārtha’. The grammarian categories
underlie the basic classification of Padārthas. According to Stephen Philips (1997), one of the
important contributions to the realist perspective was made by early grammarians such as Panini (400
BCE) and Pathanjali (150 BCE) and other philosophers of language. The idea of ‘Padārtha’ is
connected to the ‘meaning’ of a word. Particularly in Sanskrit grammar, abstract terms can be
generated by adding the suffixes ‘tva’ and ‘ta’ like gotva, which means ‘cow-ness’ or ‘cow-hood’.
Such abstract terms were considered to be universals. This leads to the conceptualisation of universals
in the realist schools. We will later study universal and particulars in a separate chapter. When
referring to objects in the external world, the early grammarians preferred to take the ‘primary’
meaning called abhidha (nominal) rather than suggested or connotative meaning called lakśana
(indicative). Realists follow this and argue for a metaphysics of commonsensical reality.
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The etymology of this term indicates how closely language and reality are linked in Indian
philosophical systems. In translation, Padārtha is often referred to as ‘category’. Potter (1977) and
other philosophers sometimes refer to these fundamental types as ‘individuals.’ Since this term is
slightly ambiguous, for our purpose the word ‘categories’ is a good way to translate Padārtha.

We have to note some basic concepts about the Padārthas here. These are not the minutest
elements that make up the world, in the sense that they are not compositional entities of the universe.
These can be regarded as the most general ‘kinds’ or classes of entities. In this sense, Padārthas to
our understanding seem the most fundamental way to classify reality. Mohanty (2000) refers to
Padārthas as the most general kind of things there are –“the highest genera of entities”. In the later
chapters we shall look at these Padārtha-types in detail.

We know that any task of classification of all of reality is difficult. Even when we have decided the
types of individuals that need to be classified and under what headings, we have to find ways of
including or excluding them under the various sets of things. For one, we must also remember that the
classificatory structures such as types and kinds of entities are different from the instantiations and
members that are classified under them. Members of a set, for instance, are different from the set
itself. Secondly, it is also important to ask the question as to what kind of justification can be given to
include a particular thing in a category. We must also accept that the categories of any structure of
reality themselves must not be too general or universal or else the very act of categorization becomes
redundant. Biological classification, for instance, deals with this kind of a problem when deciding to
include a particular group of animals under a species or a genus.

Philosophers in India disagreed about the number of categories that reality could be classified into.
The disagreements were about two main issues. Firstly, these categories must be a list that includes all
of reality. Every entity that one believed to be an existent – be it cows or thoughts, must fall under one
of these Padārthas. Secondly, the categories should not be too many such that each individual is in a
class of its own. Of course, it goes without saying that there should be no ambiguity or overlaps about
these categories. Besides the classification, the relationships between all types of things must be
explained logically and methodically. Following all these requirements, the realists Nyāya suggested
that there are seven categories or Padārthas that are the best way to classify the world of reality.
Vaiśeṣika had six earlier, and Nyāya included the seventh category called absence. We shall pay
special attention to this category towards the end of this lesson.

A philosophical question we could ask about Padārthas as explained by the realist school is,
whether they are natural kinds or classes? Do these categories represent the structure of a natural
world or are they made up by human beings putting them together in groups. If they are natural kinds,
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are the philosophers describing them or just naming them? Are Indian philosophers making
observations about the nature of the reality or are they building up a system of reality using these
categories? Metaphysics in Indian philosophy therefore is seen as a project of categorization and
justification of the inclusions and exclusions of categories and explanations of the relations between
them. As Ganeri (2009) points out, metaphysics in Indian philosophy is not merely about studying
lists of categories but about understanding the rationalisation and revisions of these categories. When
we examine each of the category-types in detail we will come back to these questions of justification
and inclusion again.
IPM 2.2
Let us proceed to understand the fundamentals of reality according to the framework of
Padārthas. The conceptualisation is that existence (sat) can be broadly divided into three main types
(1) Substance (dravya) (2) Properties (guṇa) and (3) motion/action (karma). A fundamental premise
that the realist schools have is that of a resider-residence relationship between substance and the other
two types. Qualities (guṇa) are thought of as resides (dharma) and substance (dravya) is said to be the
residence (dharmin). The substance is the bearer of the properties and motion. This makes it very
clear, that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the substance and its properties (and motion) are distinct
entities. The substance as a locus is a primitive for this school of thought. The substance (dravya) is
the locus at which a property or quality (guṇa) resides. The action/motion also resides in the
substance. The properties and motion exist in a resides-residence relationship with the substance that
is termed as (āśrayāśrita-saṃbanda). The locative case for words is Sanskrit grammar called
adhikarana, refers to the relation of “in” or “on” or “at”. So we would technically say the red colour
is “in the cloth”. The idea that a thing or substance ‘bears’ its property as a shelter explains how the
perceiver sees the same pot at different times, and also how different viewers see the same pot at the
same time. Philips (1997) suggests that this accounts for inter-subjectivity. Another interesting
implication of a resider-residence relation is that the same pot can have many different properties
(guṇa). For instance, a pot could have brownness, roundness and clay-ness as its properties. The
locative description of a substance (dravya) also suggests that the relationship is not like that of a
possessor-possessed but more like a container-contained relationship. These ways of articulating
relations makes the Nyāya metaphysics unique and we shall see further implications of such a view.

Thus, in the metaphysical framework of padārthas, the real world consists of substrata (dharmin),
properties (dharma) and the relations (saṃbandha). Each of these has further subdivisions. There are
both manifest, positive (bhāva) and unmanifest, negative (abhāva) entities that are categories. The
basic list of the seven padārthas of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika realists school are substance, quality,
motion, universal, particular (individuator), inherence, and absence. Other traditions of thinkers
such as the Mimāṃsakas admit a slightly different list of padārthas. Some categories of Mimāṃsa
School are almost like the Nyāya with a few variations. The categories for philosopher Kumarila for
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instance include substance, quality, action and universal besides. The Mimāṃsa School are also
realists and pluralists. The world is constituted by many things. Philosopher Kumarila also posits
negation (abhāva) as a category. A somewhat different category for Prabhākara Mimāṃsa School is
potency (śakti). Most categories include and exclude some of the subtypes of nyāya categories, which
we shall explore in detail. Let us first briefly look at the categories of inherence and absence that are
common to Nyāya and one stream of thought in Mimāṃsa philosophy as an example of how Indian
philosophers understood reality.
IPM 2.3
The realists suggest that properties (guṇa) and motions (karma) are dependent on substance (dravya).
The relationship between qualities and their substrata is one of inherence (Samavāya). This
relationship is peculiar to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Inherence is that which relates two
things that cannot occur without each other. In other words, it is the (eternal) relationship between two
inseparable things (ayutasiddha) at a single locus. All qualities, motions, universals and individuators
are related to substances through the relationship of inherence. It also relates the wholes (which are
composed of parts) to each of the parts that are a material cause of the whole. Universals are also
related to qualities and motions through inherence. Inherence, according to the Vaiśeṣika philosopher
Praśastapāda, cannot have a universal inhering in it. Inherence cannot also have a universal such as
inherence-ness relating it to its relata as it would lead to an infinite regress. How is inherence related
to the relata? Vaiśeṣika claims that this is through identity relations called tadātmya. Inherence is
identical to its relata. So does inherence itself disappear if the relata change or disappear? No, claim
the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, inherence is always present. To explain this, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika
philosophers use the theory of knowledge. They say inherence is present when relata are present and
we either perceive it (according to some philosophers) or infer it (according to some of the other
Nyāya philosophers). There are differences between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools regarding this.
According to Praśastapāda, the Vaiśeṣika commentator, (following Kaṇāda) inherence as a real is
somewhat dependent on our knowing it. He suggests “it (inherence) is marked through our
knowledge.” In some ways the idea of inherence is linked to the way we perceive objects and know
about them. Since the primary framework of reality is knowable, inherence is real as we can know it
and name it. An important point to note here is inherence is not a mind-related phenomenon, a
subjective category. Two entities are related to each other even without us observing them like the
blueness in a lotus but reality is observable. Our inference of inherence as a sort of glue that holds the
relata together makes no difference to the object in reality. But, if the object is real, we must be able
to know it and name it. A significant point to note that even as perception that forms the basis of our
means of veridical knowing, sense objects are related to their objects through the relation of inherence
(and sometime through contact also). The idea is that inherence is not prior or posterior to our
experience of the relata, but simultaneous with the relating. Inherence for the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is
not also a kind of ‘constitutive category’ of entities. To admit inherence as constitutive will also lead
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to the infinite regress situation as per the Nyāya supposition, the whole inheres in the constitutive
parts and if inherence is a part of objects, things have to inhere in inherence and so on, which
becomes absurd.

The Mimāṃsa philosophy also admits inherence. They have a different view of inherence.
Prabhākara suggests that inherence is not an “eternal inseparable relation” as the Nyāya philosophers
claim but it is only a temporal relation. He explains it in this way. Any universal– such as ‘horse-ness’
is related to a particular horse through a relation of inherence. This relation exists only so long as that
particular horse is existent. If that particular horse dies or disappears, the relationship of inherence
ends. For inherence, there is a kind of dependence (paratantratā) between the relata - in this case the
particular horse is dependent on the horse-ness and the horse-ness is dependent on the horse to exist.
IPM 2.4

The last padārtha, absence was a later inclusion, and it is a negative entity. Early Vaiśeṣika realist
philosophers do not admit absence as a real existent. The concept of absence in Indian thought
becomes the subject matter of deep debates and speculation within different schools of thought. The
category of absence arises in explanation for a question as to how do we validly perceive something is
not there? Just we perceive things are there in front of us, we also perceive that they are not there.
Absence is a padārtha that represents a negative or a nonexistent fact.

To understand absence let us look at the understanding of existence here. The three words bhāva,
astitva and satta all represent existence and being. It is difficult to translate these terms appropriately
into English. The term astitva is closer in meaning to being-ness or existence. The term bhāva means
becoming, manifesting or being as. The term satta means something that is real and one can validly
posit as real. From these meanings, we see that absence of something has beingness but not
manifestation or valid reality. So, to suggest an entity like absence (abhāva) the commentator and
philosopher Udayana and Sridhara posit that satta is a narrower category than astitva. While positive
and negative entities all have existence (astitva), only the first six positive padārthas have reality
(satta) and can be manifest (bhāva).The category of absence is admitted by Nyāyaschool and
Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. While the Nyāya School suggests that it is perception that
cognizes the absence, the Bhaṭṭa School postulates a new means of knowledge (pramāna) called non-
cognition (anupalabdhi).
Since the criteria for reality is knowability and namebility, the Nyāya philosophers claim one
knows and names absences in a locus, so it’s a valid category of reality. Absences therefore are not
epistemological but ontological. Positive entities in the universe have an identity of their own
(swarūpa), however absences, though existent (having astitva), have no identity of their own, they are
only defined through their opposite, (which is a positive entity) called pratiyogi. The absence qualifies
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this opposite. For example, the absence of a lamp on the table, qualifies a ‘lamp on the table’ the
pratiyogi and the table is a locus in which this absence is located.

There are different ways of saying an entity is absent. One way is to claim that it is unmanifest at a
locus; the other way to refer to it is that it is mutually excluded. The mutual absence (anyonyābhāva)
is a kind of distinguishing absence. Ontologically speaking, one can say a pot is absent in a cloth.
Another kind of absence is related to manifestation which describes three ways of ‘unmanifest’
absence temporally. Something can be absent before it comes into being. This is a sort of prior
absence (prāgabhva). For instance, a pot is absent before it is made. Obviously there can also be a
posterior absence (pradhvaṃsābbāva) when something that is existent has been destroyed. The pot,
after it has been destroyed, is absent in this way. The fourth type of absence called absolute absence
(atyantābhāva) is exemplified by entities such as the horns on a hare’s head, or lotuses in the sky.
This absence is in the sense of real, identifiable absence of positive entities. There is the anticipation
of what could be there but is not in that time and space but could be present as appositive entity in
some other time and space. These are not fictional entities like the characters of a novel or a made up
entity that are being described (tuccha, alka) but locative impossibilities that have self-identity
(svarūpa). Horns cannot be present on a hare’s head, but they are real and can be present on a bull’s
head. Similarly, lotuses can be found in the ponds but not in the sky.
Mimāṃsa philosopher Kumārila suggests that absence is real; a means of knowing that arises
when all other means of knowing such as perception, inference, testimony, comparison and
implication are unavailable to us. He also mentions the four types of absences as per the NVs.
Absence for Kumārila helps to distinguish one object from another – unmixed co-existence
(asaṅkara) is perceived and understood. Because absence is a cognitive category for us, we do not
mistake milk after curds has been formed and cognize its absence and do not mistake a horse for a
cow etc. We see how the locus- based argument of the Nyāya absence is different from the Bhaṭṭa
Mimāṃsa knowledge based theory of absence.
The other Prabhākara school of Mimāṃsa, does not accept absence as a real entity at all. According
to him, there can be no existence of negative entities. What we call absence is a concept constructed
by our mind on anticipation of the presence of something. I hope to find a pen on my table and when I
don’t find it with my perception; my mind constructs ‘absence of the pen.’ A new real entity of
absence or a new means of knowing are not required to explain absence argues Prabhākara. We find
thus that categories are not mere lists of fundamentals, but are concepts through which Indian
philosophers were able to discuss and debate underlying propositions regarding the nature of reality.

IPM 2.5
As mentioned earlier, metaphysics is deeply related to epistemology or theory of knowledge in Indian
traditions of Philosophy. Pramāṇa is both the instrument and the valid evidence of obtaining
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knowledge that is true, meaning that which is veridical and real. We can understand truth as
propositional belief on one hand and we can judge if something is true or false. On the other hand we
also come across a different kind of truth; we can call as a sort of ontological truth. This aims to
describe or find the actual state of reality, truth as existence. For the Nyāya philosophers, senses are
direct causes of valid perception and this form of validation is called Pratyakṣa Pramāna. The idea of
perception as a precondition for validating the real objects becomes problematic in case of perception
of illusions or ‘unreal’ objects. Let us examine two of the theories of error to understand the debates
on substances, perception and errors of cognition that forms a part of many philosophical traditions.
For the Nyāya philosophers, senses perceive objects by contact (sannikarṣa) with the real
object. Yet how is error of perception a possibility? Nyāya philosophers explain that error is a result
of a single perception. When we see silver in a conch shell, we attribute silverness to the shell which
is not its correct locus. The proper locus of ‘Silverness’ is silver. The silverness in the shell is not
merely remembered but actually perceived. The explanation of error is thus given: When we perceive
something we are aware it is presented to our senses in a general manner. We apprehend its general
features such as brightness etc. But due to some defect we do not perceive the particular features. The
general features we perceive like shiny brightness may be associated with some ‘other’ (anya) object,
in this case it is the real silver (which is also shiny and bright). Through these general properties, a
recollection of the other object, silver occurs as a contact of knowledge-indicative contact
(jñanalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa) between the senses and the other object, in this case silver, the original
locus of silverness. So there is an actual perception of ‘silverness’ in ‘this’ object presented to the
senses and also of ‘that’ locus that is silver. So the error is when the elsewhere silver is predicated to
‘this’ perception. This is called anyathākhyāti.
In contrast Ramanuja’s philosophy as described in his work (śribhasya 1.1.1) has a theory of error
which is called satkhyāti. The contention of this philosophical thought is that all cognitions are
relatively true and none absolutely false. In their theory of substances, every object of the world has
elements of all other objects in different proportions. So in the above example of the conch shell and
silver, the cognition of silverness is true because the conch shell also has a proportion of the element
of silver in it, though it is minor compared to the shellness, which predominates. Owing to defects in
the sense organs and other conditions of perception, we fail to see the shellness properly. The
perception of silver is not false but incomplete or imperfect view. We find thus studying theories of
error in Indian philosophy would lead to a better understanding of the categories of reality and also
the phenomena of relations and processes between them.