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24.71.00007 ATU X Crosses

The document discusses an A350 EPDC LRU failure that led to the loss of network information on AFDX signals. Specifically: - An EPDC daughter board failure, like the ENMU, ATUPU, or EPCU going silent, can invalidate the functional data sets transmitted from the EPDC to aircraft systems. - This leads to issues like the ATU status appearing amber on the cockpit display or electrical busbar reconfiguration. It can also block the motor control protection units and prevent electrically operated cargo doors. - The root causes are identified as either an internal component issue affecting certain boards, an internal fuse blow on a specific ENMU part number, or other specific board failure modes

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
301 views14 pages

24.71.00007 ATU X Crosses

The document discusses an A350 EPDC LRU failure that led to the loss of network information on AFDX signals. Specifically: - An EPDC daughter board failure, like the ENMU, ATUPU, or EPCU going silent, can invalidate the functional data sets transmitted from the EPDC to aircraft systems. - This leads to issues like the ATU status appearing amber on the cockpit display or electrical busbar reconfiguration. It can also block the motor control protection units and prevent electrically operated cargo doors. - The root causes are identified as either an internal component issue affecting certain boards, an internal fuse blow on a specific ENMU part number, or other specific board failure modes

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ATU X amber on CDS - A350 EPDC LRU failure leading to the loss of EPDC FDS (network information) on AFDX

signals

Reference: 24.71.00007 Issue date: 07-OCT-2022 Last check date: 04-APR-2023 Status: Open
A/C type/serie: A350 ATA: 24-00, 24-71
Engine manufacturer: Supplier: SAFRAN ELECTRICAL & POWER
Purpose / Reason for revision: Review for harmonization
Engineering Support Status: Open

Applicability:
All A350-XWB aircraft.

References:
Ref. 1: SD A350-A-24-71-XX-01001-04CA-A “Electrical Power Distribution Center (EPDC) Interface”
Ref. 2: MP A350-A-24-71-XX-0A001-343A-A “BITE Test of the Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) (System Test)”
Ref. 3: MP A350-A-24-XX-XX-01001-132A-A “Cold Start of Electrical Power Distribution Center 2 (EPDC2)”
Ref. 4: MP A350-A-24-XX-XX-00001-132A-A “Cold Start of Electrical Power Distribution Center 1 (EPDC1)”
Ref. 5: TFU 24.71.00.019 “ENMU failures because of internal fuse blown”
Ref. 6: TFU 24.70.00.005 “Inability to operate cargo doors linked to EPDC LRU failures”
Ref. 7: ISI 24.71.00006 “DM>ELEC EMER NETWORK MANAGEMENT, DM> ELEC EMER NETWORK PROTECTION, DM> ELEC BUSBAR
or DM ELEC CB MONITORING due to EENMU failure”

Background:
EPDC (Electrical Power Distribution Center) daughter boards are electronic PCBs (Printed Circuit Board) / LRUs / boards located in
both EPDCs. Their main functions are to manage the logics, the protection and the communication of the electrical distribution
system.
This ISI focuses on the following daughter boards:
 Electrical Network Management Unit (ENMU)  ENMU-1A (1403XZ1), ENMU-1B (1403XZ2), ENMU-2A (1404XZ1) and ENMU-2B
(1404XZ2).
 Safe Redundant Power Unit (SRPU)  SRPU-1A (1407XZ1), SRPU-1B (1407XZ2), SRPU-2A (1408XZ1) and SRPU-2B (1408XZ2).
 External Power Control Unit (EPCU)  EPCU-1 (1409XZ) and EPCU-2 (1410XZ).
 Auto Transformer Unit Protection Unit (ATUPU)  ATUPU-1 (1419XZ) and ATUPU-2 (1420XZ). Note that each ATUPU owns 2 channels to
manage and protect its associated ATU (Auto Transformer Unit).

See SD Ref. 1 for the component description and functions of each PCB.

Description:
Some operators experienced ATA 24 EPDC daughter board failure with some A/C effects such as:
 ATU status amber crossed on the CDS (Cockpit Display System) ELEC AC SD page with no related Dispatch Messages and ECAM
alerts. For some cases, ELEC reconfiguration can be observed between 230VAC & 115VAC normal busbars (AC1A/AC1B & AC2A/AC2B).
 EMP (Electrical Motor Pump) fault due to MCPU (Motor Control and Protection Unit) with inability to operate the cargo doors.

Indeed, the above behaviours can occur if the ENMU, ATUPU or EPCU is failed (silent or not functional).
In case of faulty SRPU, it will lead “only” to the cargo doors operations issue.
Root cause / Investigation Status:
The root cause of these failures can be separated in three cases:
 Case A  The so-called “silent phenomenon” which is affecting the ATUPU, SRPU and EPCU units due to internal component
misbehaviour at functional FPGA level. This issue is similar to the one affecting the EENMU unit, depicted in ISI 24.71.00006.
 Case B  ENMU internal fuse blown (F6) can result with the ENMU unit detected silent. This issue is depicted in TFU Ref. 5 and
applicable to ENMU P/N 540CE06Y07 only.
 Case C  Other specific EPDC daughter board failure modes. They are considered as single cases and can lead to electronic units to be
detected silent by the EPDS.

Note:
 EPDC LRU is called silent when it is no longer communicating with the EPDS.
 When one channel of the ATUPU is failed, it will lead to ELEC busbar reconfiguration. Indeed, the failed channel of the ATUPU will not be
able to manage and protect its own ATU.

Hereafter is given the rational between the ENMU, ATUPU, SRPU or EPCU failures and the reported consequences:
 The EPDS communicates with the A/C systems through its EDMU (Electrical Distribution Monitoring Unit) cards on the AFDX (Avionics Full
Duplex Switched Ethernet) network.
 The parameters transmitted on the AFDX network are grouped by Functional Data Set (FDS).
 In case a parameter within an FDS is invalid because the LRU providing this data is failed, all the other parameters within this FDS will be
set to NCD (Non Computed Data). See Error! Reference source not found. below.
Figure 1: FDS invalidation due to EPDC LRU failure

The following FDS are the information group transmitted from EPDC to the A/C systems:
 EPDC side 1:
o Channel 1  FDS_EPDC1_NETWORK_INFORMATION_1.
o Channel 2  FDS_EPDC1_NETWORK_INFORMATION_2.
 EPDC side 2:
o Channel 1  FDS_EPDC2_NETWORK_INFORMATION_1.
o Channel 2  FDS_EPDC2_NETWORK_INFORMATION_2.
The below table gives the parameter included in each FDS channel:

FDS channel FDS_EPDC1(2)_NETWORK_INFORMATION_1 FS_FDS_EPDC1(2)_NETWORK_INFORMATION_2


ENMF_FAILED_SIDE1_NO_GO EP_CONNECTED
CONSTANT_FREQUENCY EP1(2)_READY
EMP_PWR_AVAIL EP1(2)_UNDERVOLTAGE
NETWORK1_RECONFIGURATION EP1(2)_OVERLOAD
EP1(2)_CONNECTED EP1(2)_FAULT
AC_SHUTDOWN ATU_1A(2A)_FAULT
EPDC_APU_OVERVOLTAGE ATU_1B(2B)_FAULT
Transmitted
ENMF_FAILED_SIDE1_GO OVERLOAD_ATU1A(2A)
parameters
LS1_ADIRS1 OVERLOAD_ATU1B(2B)
LS1_ADIRS3 UNDERLOAD_ATU1A(2A)
WoW_LGERS1 UNDERLOAD_ATU1B(2B)
WoW_LGERS2 EP1(2)_UNDERVOLTAGE_GREEN
EXTERNAL_POWER_FAULT_SIDE1 EP1(2)_UNDERVOLTAGE_YELLOW
EDMU_GND_FLT_ERRONEOUS_CONFIG_SIDE1
NORM_NETWORK_FUNCTION_LOSS_SIDE1

Depending on which EPDC daughter board is failed, different A/C consequences can be seen as follow:

Failed board Failure mode Invalid FDS channel A/C consequence(s)


 CDS will receive invalid data from the EPDC1 for ATU 1A and 1B  the ELEC AC
SD page will show ATUs status crossed AMBER X (Error! Reference source not
 EPDC1 channel 1
ENMU-1A/-1B Silent or not functional found.).
 EPDC1 channel 2
 MCPU1 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the GREEN EMP from faults will be
blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start.
 CDS will receive invalid data from the EPDC2 for ATU 2A and 2B  the ELEC AC
SD page will show ATUs status crossed AMBER X (similar to Error! Reference
 EPDC2 channel 1 source not found. but on side 2).
ENMU-2A/-2B Silent or not functional  EPDC2 channel 2  MCPU2 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the YELLOW EMP from faults will
be blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start and the cargo doors cannot be
operated electrically.
 MCPU1 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the GREEN EMP from faults will be
SRPU-1A/-1B Silent or not functional  EPDC1 channel 1
blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start.
 MCPU2 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the YELLOW EMP from faults will
SRPU-2A/-2B Silent or not functional  EPDC2 channel 1 be blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start and the cargo doors cannot be
operated electrically.
 CDS will receive invalid data from the EPDC1 for ATU 1A and 1B  the ELEC AC
SD page will show ATUs status crossed AMBER X with AC ELEC busbar
reconfiguration (Error! Reference source not found. / similar to Error!
ATUPU-1A/-1B Silent or not functional  EPDC1 channel 2
Reference source not found. but on side 1).
 MCPU1 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the GREEN EMP from faults will be
blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start.
 CDS will receive invalid data from the EPDC2 for ATU 2A and 2B  the ELEC AC
SD page will show ATUs status crossed AMBER X with AC ELEC busbar
reconfiguration (similar to Error! Reference source not found. but on side 2 /
ATUPU-2A/-2B Silent or not functional  EPDC2 channel 2 Error! Reference source not found.).
 MCPU2 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the YELLOW EMP from faults will
be blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start and the cargo doors cannot be
operated electrically.
 CDS will receive invalid data from the EPDC1 for ATU 1A and 1B  the ELEC AC
SD page will show ATUs status crossed AMBER X (Error! Reference source not
 EPDC1 channel 1
EPCU-1 Silent found.).
 EPDC1 channel 2
 MCPU1 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the GREEN EMP from faults will be
blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start.
 CDS will receive invalid data from the EPDC2 for ATU 2A and 2B  the ELEC AC
SD page will show ATUs status crossed AMBER X (similar to Error! Reference
 EPDC2 channel 1 source not found. but on side 2).
EPCU-2 Silent  EPDC2 channel 2  MCPU2 that uses the ATA24 signals to protect the YELLOW EMP from faults will
be blocked  the MCPU prevents the EMP to start and the cargo doors cannot be
operated electrically.

NB:
 Both MCPU use the following FDS parameters on their respective EPDC side:
o CONSTANT_FREQUENCY.
o EP1(2)_UNDERVOLTAGE.
o EMP_PWR_AVAIL.
 AC ELEC busbar reconfiguration depends on A/C power configuration:
o If A/C is supplied by external power  AC ELEC busbar reconfiguration is done between AC 230 V busbars.
o If A/C is supplied by APU  AC ELEC busbar reconfiguration is done between AC 115 V busbars.

For failures that result with EMP (YELLOW or GREEN) inoperative, refer to TFU Ref. 6 for further details.
Figure 2: ELEC AC SD page in case of ENMU failed or EPCU failed
Figure 3: ELEC AC SD page in case of ATUPU failed (A/C supplied by external power)
Figure 4: ELEC AC SD page in case of ATUPU failed (A/C supplied by APU)

Mitigation / Interim plan:


 Perform EPDS BITE Test as per MP Ref. 2.
 In case of SRPU, EPCU, ENMU, or ATUPU failure, perform a power cycle of the A/C with GPU (Ground Power Unit) not connected as per
MP Ref. 3 and Ref. 4, depending on which side the failure is triggered. This could reset the ATA 24 EPDC LRU failure.
 In case Power cycle is not effective, apply AFI associated to the FC.

Note that in case of permanent fault (i.e A/C power cycle does not clear the fault) such as ENMU internal fuse F6 failure or single
case failure, the PCB needs to be replaced.

In case PCB unit is replaced, it is highly recommended to mention the ATA24 Fault Code in the “reason of removal” when
shipping back the unit to the supplier.
Permanent solution:
 Case A (silent phenomenon)  the SRPU, EPCU, ENMU and ATUPU will benefit from the fix that will be introduced on the next EENMU
Part Number scheduled for Q4 – 2023 (See ISI Ref. 7 for details). The solution introduction will generate a new Part Number for each
affected PCB. The first selected unit is the SRPU, scheduled for 2023.
 Case B (ENMU internal fuse blown)  see TFU Ref. 5 for corrective actions.

Further, the EPDS maturity package will introduce redundancy improvements through EDMU software. Indeed, in case of failure of
a single duplicated EPDC daughter board, the EDMU shall use information from the other equipment and no FDS shall be
invalidated (not applicable to EPCU and ATUPU boards).

The EPDS maturity standard is expected for Q4 - 2023.

Additional note
Here below is given the Fault Codes when EPDC daughter board is detected silent by the EPDS:

Failure
FMC Fault Code
description
3392 24X1F2XS ENMU1A is silent
3393 24X1F2XT ENMU1B is silent
3396 24X1F2XW SRPU1A is silent
3397 24X1F2XX SRPU1B is silent
3398 24X1F2XY EPCU1 is silent
3399 24X1F2XZ ATUPU1A is silent
3400 24X1F2Y0 ATUPU1B is silent
3492 24X1F30Q ENMU2A is silent
3493 24X1F30R ENMU2B is silent
3496 24X1F30U SRPU2A is silent
3497 24X1F30V SRPU2B is silent
3498 24X1F30W EPCU2 is silent
3499 24X1F30X ATUPU2A is silent
3500 24X1F30Y ATUPU2B is silent
In the table below is given the Fault Codes when EPDC daughter board is not functional:

FMC Fault Code Failure description


1 24X1F001 ENMU 1A not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
16 24X1F00G ENMU 1B not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
31 24X1F00X ENMU 2B not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
46 24X1F01C ENMU 2A not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
501 24X1F0ER EPCU 1 not functional, and failure is latched.
502 24X1F0ES EPCU 1 not functional, and failure is not latched.
511 24X1F0F1 EPCU 2 not functional, and failure is latched.
512 24X1F0F2 EPCU 2 not functional, and failure is not latched.
531 24X1F0FM SRPU 1A not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
SRPU 1A not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is not
532 24X1F0FN
latched.
541 24X1F0FX SRPU 1B not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
SRPU 1B not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is not
542 24X1F0FY
latched.
561 24X1F0GH SRPU 2B not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
SRPU 2B not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is not
562 24X1F0GJ
latched.
571 24X1F0GT SRPU 2A not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is latched.
SRPU 2A not functional (redundancy activ), and failure is not
572 24X1F0GU
latched.
601 24X1F0HP ATUPU1 not functional, and failure is latched.
602 24X1F0HQ ATUPU1 not functional, and failure is not latched.
ATUPU1 has a failure. ATUPU1 is not fully functional. Failure is
603 24X1F0HR
Latched.
621 24X1F0J9 ATUPU2 not functional, and failure is latched.
622 24X1F0JA ATUPU2 not functional, and failure is not latched.
ATUPU2 has a failure. ATUPU2 is not fully functional. Failure is
623 24X1F0JB
Latched.

Survey for the Engineering Support section


Annex

General Information
Potential impact: Maintenance, Operational Reliability
Key information:
Solution benefit:
First issue date: 04-MAR-2019 Issue date: 07-OCT-2022 Last check date: 04-APR-2023

Technical parameters
ATA: 24-00, 24-71
A/C type/serie: A350
Engine:
Engine manufacturer:
ATUPU-1(1419XZ), ATUPU-1(1419XZ), ATUPU-1(1419XZ), ATUPU-1(1419XZ), ATUPU-1(1419XZ), ATUPU-2(1420XZ), ATUPU-
2(1420XZ), ATUPU-2(1420XZ), ATUPU-2(1420XZ), ATUPU-2(1420XZ), ENMU-1A(1403XZ1), ENMU-1A(1403XZ1), ENMU-
Fault code/ECAM 1B(1403XZ2), ENMU-1B(1403XZ2), ENMU-2A(1404XZ1), ENMU-2A(1404XZ1), ENMU-2B(1404XZ2), ENMU-2B(1404XZ2), EPCU-
warning: 1(1409XZ), EPCU-1(1409XZ), EPCU-1(1409XZ), EPCU-2(1410XZ), EPCU-2(1410XZ), EPCU-2(1410XZ), SRPU-1A(1407XZ1), SRPU-
1A(1407XZ1), SRPU-1A(1407XZ1), SRPU-1B(1407XZ2), SRPU-1B(1407XZ2), SRPU-1B(1407XZ2), SRPU-2A(1408XZ1), SRPU-
2A(1408XZ1), SRPU-2A(1408XZ1), SRPU-2B(1408XZ2), SRPU-2B(1408XZ2), SRPU-2B(1408XZ2)
FIN: 1403XZ1, 1403XZ2, 1404XZ1, 1404XZ2, 1407XZ1, 1407XZ2, 1408XZ1, 1408XZ2, 1409XZ, 1410XZ, 1419XZ, 1420XZ
Part Number:
Supplier: SAFRAN ELECTRICAL & POWER

Attachments
N/A

Links
Other articles (ISI/TFU):
- 24.70.00.005, 24.70.00.005, 24.70.00.005, 24.71.00.019, 24.71.00006

© Airbus SAS, 2023. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.The technical information provided in this article is for convenience and information purposes only. It
shall in no case replace the official Airbus technical or Flight Operations data which shall remain the sole basis for aircraft maintenance and operation. These recommendations and
information do not constitute a contractual commitment, warranty or guarantee whatsoever. They shall not supersede the Airbus technical nor operational documentation; should
any deviation appear between this article and the Airbus or airline's official manuals, the operator must ensure to cover it with the appropriate document such as TA, FCD, RDAS.
Access to WISE is supplied by Airbus under the express condition that Airbus hereby disclaims any and all liability for the use made by the user of the information contained in
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