UEFA

60 years at the heart of football

UEFA
60 years at the heart of football
André Vieli
 DES MATIERES

Published by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)

Route de Genève 46
1260 Nyon, Switzerland

Design
Messi associés Sàrl, Lausanne, Switzerland

Printing
Artgraphic Cavin SA, Grandson, Switzerland

Translation from French

Susan Angel, Paul Green and Catherine Wilson
With the support of UEFA archivist Nicolas Bouchet

@ 2014 UEFA

Printed in Switzerland
 CONTENTS

4 Foreword by the UEFA President

6 Preface

60 years at the heart of football

9 I. The birth of the union
19 II. A European cup for national teams
25 III. The Champion Clubs’ cup leads the way
33 IV. From Paris to Berne
39 V. Initial assessment and further development
61 VI. From Gustav Wiederkehr to Artemio Franchi
73 VII. Before and after the Heysel tragedy
89 VIII. The Champions League is born
101 IX. Associations from the east
109 X. The Bosman case
119 XI. Much-coveted club competitions
129 XII. Closer dialogue with the European Union
133 XIII. Entering a new era
147 XIV. Parallel activities

Gaining ground
153 I. The rapid rise of women’s football
159 II. The long journey from indoor football to futsal
165 III. A coaching licence recognised throughout Europe

At the heart of UEFA

169 I. Member associations
172 II. Congress
173 III. Presidents
184 IV. Executive Committee and honorary members
192 V. General secretaries and CEOs

3
 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Neither soothsayers nor revolutionaries

Some say that there is no point dwelling on the past. We cannot change
it, after all. However, it is useful, essential even, to be aware of it.
Unless you know, for example, why an organisation was created in the
first place, how can you be sure that the direction in which you are
taking it is in line with its original objectives?

Those who founded UEFA 60 years ago were no soothsayers, and

none of them could have imagined what the organisation they created
would become. Football has changed in step with a society whose
lightning-quick evolution means that many parents today have more in
common with their ancestors than with their own children.

Neither were UEFA’s founders revolutionaries. They had absolutely

no intention of turning the football world upside down or challenging the
established institutions. All they wanted was to better protect Europe’s
interests at a time when its position within FIFA was being weakened
by the continuous arrival of new members. They also wanted to create
a continental competition, because, in short, a football organisation
without any competitions of its own makes about as much sense as an
airport without aeroplanes.

In this respect the pioneers would delight in the vast range of

competitions that UEFA organises today, their global reach and their
incredible popularity throughout the world.

But what would they think of UEFA’s position in the world of

football? They would doubtless understand, broad-minded individuals
that they were, that UEFA’s role is not to dominate but to set an example,
to cooperate with the other confederations; in short, to make a decisive
contribution to the health and prosperity of our sport.

4
 FOREWORD BY THE UEFA PRESIDENT

This book shows that, over the years, UEFA has constantly endeavoured
to continue the work begun by its founders, that it has managed to adapt
to the constant changes going on around it, and that it is aware that the
job is never done; we must remain vigilant if pitfalls are to be avoided and,
where possible, anticipated.

This book presents UEFA as seen from the inside by an author who
worked for the UEFA administration for more than 31 years and who, as
the long-standing editor of our official publications, was ideally placed to
observe and inform about UEFA’s inner workings and myriad activities.

Michel Platini

5
 PREFACE

The history of football is of course written by the players, on the pitch and
in the stadium. However, their feats would go largely unnoticed, or soon
be forgotten, if they were not achieved in competitions with such a vast
reach. It is the game’s pioneers who created these competitions and their
successors who continue to shape them; administrators and leaders whose
main concern is to protect the interests of the game, enhance its popularity
and promote values that extend far beyond the world of football and sport
as a whole.

This book is not meant as yet another in the long line of publications,
pictures and video footage that retrace the history of the European
competitions, the top players and their accomplishments. Rather, it seeks to
recall the main stages of the development of European football’s governing
body, from its birth 60 years ago to its current position as a major force
on the international stage. It does not set out to examine every aspect of
UEFA’s activities, the range of which has become as vast as it is complex.
Neither is it intended to emulate UEFA’s golden jubilee publication, which
presented the organisation in its sociological, economic and political
context. This book simply aims to pay tribute to the pioneers of the past
and to all those members of committees, the administration and other
bodies who have followed in their footsteps, acting not for themselves but
in the interests of football and UEFA’s good name.

This work is largely based on Congress and committee meeting

minutes, accounts by some of the most prominent figures in UEFA’s history,
and various official UEFA publications.

Thank you to everyone who has contributed in one way or another.

André Vieli

6
60 years at the heart of football

7
8
© PHOTO KEYSTONE
 I. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The birth of the union

The Union of European Football Associations was founded a mere 50

years after the creation of world football’s governing body, the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Although half a century may
seem like a long time, it should be remembered that this was a period
marred by two world wars that hampered the growth of all organisations,
sporting or otherwise. Furthermore, not all European national football
association officials saw the need to establish a European grouping within
FIFA, which had been founded by seven European associations (Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) in
Paris on 21 May 1904, had set up its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland,
and had always had a European president at the helm, Jules Rimet of
France having followed in the footsteps of his compatriot Robert Guérin
and Englishman Daniel Burley Woolfall.

By 1954, the 31 European associations were by far outnumbered

within FIFA, which welcomed another four new members that year,
bringing the total to 85, and at whose congresses the principle of one
vote per association, whatever its size, history or record of success,
applied then as it does today. Nonetheless, as French journalist
Jacques Ferran wrote in UEFA 50 Years, the book published by UEFA to
commemorate its golden jubilee, FIFA remained “a federation charged
with the task of governing world football, but which was actually
dominated by Europeans.”

With all the

excitement of the
World Cup match
between Belgium
and England in Basel
on 17 June 1954,
the creation of
European football’s
governing body two
days previously went
virtually unnoticed.

9
I. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The three pioneers

Ottorino Barassi (1898-1971)

Although Italy’s Ottorino Barassi played a fundamental role in the creation
of UEFA and chaired its founding meeting in Basel in 1954, he was not
among the continental confederation’s future leaders. Paradoxical as
this may seem, the Italian Football Federation president was seeking re-
election to the FIFA Executive Committee and simultaneous membership
of both committees was not allowed at that time.

Ottorino Barassi joined the FIFA Executive Committee in 1952

PA
and was a FIFA vice-president from 1960 until his death in 1971. He also
Ottorino Barassi
played an important role in the organisation of the 1934 World Cup in
his home country and of the 1950 tournament in Brazil. However, he is
perhaps best known for hiding the Jules Rimet trophy, won by Italy at the
1938 World Cup, in a shoe box under his bed during the second world
war to keep it safe from the German occupying forces.

Henri Delaunay (1883-1955)

As one of its founders and its first general secretary, Henri Delaunay
holds a prominent position in UEFA’s history, and his role would no doubt
have been all the greater if serious illness had not cut his life short on
9 November 1955. Having helped to create the World Cup at the end
of the 1920s, Henri Delaunay was also a fervent advocate of a European
national team competition and, in collaboration with Austrian Hugo
Meisl, had, at that time, already suggested a specific competition for
European national teams. It took 30 years for that idea to become reality
AFP
and Henri Delaunay was no longer alive when the competition finally
Henri Delaunay
came into being, but the trophy awarded to its winners bears his name,
in recognition of his visionary ideas.

If we are to show proper reverence for Henri Delaunay, we should

also give him the title that is duly his: in UEFA publications he heads the
list of UEFA general secretaries but never appears in the list of Executive
Committee members. And yet, at both the 1954 founding meeting and
the assembly in Vienna, it was clear to everyone that Henri Delaunay was
a fully fledged member of the Executive Committee, on which he acted

10
 I. THE BIRTH OF THE UNION

as secretary, with Ebbe Schwartz as president. The minutes of the 1955

assembly are unequivocal: “The General Assembly unanimously confirms
in their functions the Executive Committee members who were elected at
the general assembly in Basel, i.e. President: Dr. Schwartz, Vice-president:
Mr. Sebes, Members: Mr. Crahay, Mr Delaunay and Sir Graham.” It was
not until 1956, when it was decided that a paid general secretary should
be appointed, that the statutes were changed to specify that the general
secretary took part in meetings of the Executive Committee but did
not have a vote. The fact that Pierre Delaunay had to be elected to the
Executive Committee when he stepped down as general secretary, whereas,
in the same situation, his father Henri would have would have simply had
his title changed from ‘secretary’ to ‘member’ only reinforces his case.

José Crahay (1899-1979)

Of UEFA’s three founders, the general secretary of the Royal Belgian
Football Association was the only one able to follow and influence the
early years of the new confederation, remaining a member of the Executive
Committee from its creation until 1972 and becoming vice-president
in 1961. He chaired the European Champion Clubs’ Cup organising
committee from 1958 to 1972 and left behind a valuable legacy of
written documents, including his editorials for La Voix sportive, the official
UEFA

publication of the Belgian FA.

José Crahay
Well-respected by his peers and the leaders of the other national
associations, he was named UEFA’s first honorary member when he retired
from the Executive Committee at the Vienna Congress in 1972.

José Crahay also managed the European team that beat a Great
Britain XI 4-1 (with three goals by Yugoslavian Bernard Vukas) in Belfast
on 13 August 1955. UEFA received a share of the receipts from this match,
which was played to mark the Irish Football Association’s 75th anniversary;
this was UEFA’s first income other than the statutory 250 Swiss franc annual
membership fee paid by the member associations.

11
I. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The South American example

The South American associations had opened the door to a European
alliance by forming their own confederation in 1916, which enabled them
to examine the items on FIFA Congress agendas in advance and adopt a
common position. At the start of the 1950s, the benefits of such a process
were becoming increasingly clear to the European associations, whose
individual views sometimes differed too much for them to effectively
defend their common interests. Initial discussions about forming an
alliance were therefore held, with the president of the Italian Football
Federation, Ottorino Barassi, and the general secretaries of the national
associations of France and Belgium, Henri Delaunay and José Crahay,
generally recognised as the main architects behind the creation of UEFA,
even though the idea of founding a European confederation was not
theirs alone.

José Crahay wrote a valuable account of these initial steps in

the Handbook of UEFA 1963 / 6 4: “At that time a Confederation existed
already in South America which makes it all the more understandable
that Europe, too, wished to get organized. During his frequent travels
Dr. Barassi spoke to the leaders of several National Associations about
this plan, and they were all highly interested. A first officious meeting
was called in May, 1952, in Zurich, by Mr. Henri Delaunay, Secretary of
the French FA. Only those European National Associations which on the
occasion of preliminary talks with Dr. Barassi had in principle agreed to the
project, were invited to attend.”

Founding meeting in Basel

At that meeting in Zurich, Henri Delaunay presented a draft set of statutes
for the future organisation – officially baptised the Union of the European
Football Associations (‘Union des associations européennes de football’
in French) in October 1954, with the initials UEFA. A standing committee
comprising the three aforementioned founders was appointed to operate
on this basis and to convene further (for the time being still informal)
meetings.

12
I. THE BIRTH OF THE UNION

One was held in Paris in November 1953, on the occasion of the FIFA
Congress, followed by another on 12 April 1954, also in the French
capital, at which it was decided that a formal meeting should be
convened in Berne, where the FIFA Congress was to take place ahead
of that summer’s World Cup in Switzerland. When the Swiss Football
Association announced, however, that all the hotels in Berne were full, it
was decided that Basel should host the meeting of the delegates of the
European national associations, 22 of which had already responded to a
questionnaire sent out after the meeting of 12 April to seek their views on
what shape the statutes should take.

The meeting in Basel was held in the Salon Rouge at the Euler
hotel at 10.30 on 15 June 1954. It was attended by representatives of
25 European national associations. Two other associations (Romania and
Wales), which had been prevented from attending, were represented by
Czechoslovakia and England respectively – a practice that the FIFA Statutes
did not permit. The number of voters rose again, to 28, when the Greek
delegate arrived in time for the afternoon session. Although the national
associations had not had time to examine the draft statutes, the delegates
adopted a motion that “the European football associations decide
definitively on the constitution of a group of the said associations, under a
form to be determined”.

On the eve of the World Cup, the creation of this European alliance
did not exactly make the headlines. Even the September issue of the FIFA
Official Bulletin failed to mention the foundation of UEFA, or the fact
that the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) had been created in Manila
a few days earlier, on 8 May. No reference was made to it in the minutes
of the FIFA Congress, nor in the ‘presidential programme’ of the new FIFA
president, the Belgian Rodolphe William Seeldrayers. The official report on
the 1954 World Cup indicated that “on the occasion of the World Cup,
various events took place in Switzerland”. It mentioned, among others,
FIFA’s 50th anniversary celebrations and the congress of the International
Sports Press Association but said nothing about the foundation of UEFA.

13
I. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The éminence grise

Sir Stanley Rous (1895-1986)

Although he was never UEFA president, Sir Stanley Rous held the top
job at FIFA and was at the forefront of UEFA’s early development while
still secretary of The Football Association. It was he who proposed the
first UEFA Executive Committee members. He was also involved in the
negotiations concerning the relocation of UEFA’s headquarters and
played a crucial role in Switzerland’s Hans Bangerter being appointed as
UEFA general secretary. He was behind the creation of the International
Youth Tournament, the organisation of which was taken on by UEFA

AFP
at his initiative, and was among the founders of the Inter-Cities Fairs
Sir Stanley Rous
Cup and chairman of its organising committee. A former international
referee, he also coordinated the revision of the Laws of the Game before
embarking on a career as an administrator as secretary of The Football
Association, a position he held from 1934 until 1962.

At UEFA, Sir Stanley joined the Executive Committee in 1958,

becoming vice-president in March 1960, before leaving to become FIFA
president the following year. Welcoming his election, the UEFA president
of the time, Ebbe Schwartz, described him as “the most important
personality in European football during the last 15 years”. He remained
FIFA president until 1974 when, after standing for a further term, he was
defeated at the Frankfurt Congress by Brazilian João Havelange, who
thus became FIFA’s first (and, at the time of writing, only) non-European
president.

“Looking back now over his active and creative part in the various
national and international bodies and casting an eye also over the
various decisive moments in the history of European and world football,
we continually come across the name of Sir Stanley Rous,” wrote Hans
Bangerter in a tribute published in the UEFA Official Bulletin of June
1985 on the occasion of the Englishman’s 90th birthday.

14
I. THE BIRTH OF THE UNION

The first committee

It was decided at UEFA’s founding meeting, on the proposal of Englishman
Sir Stanley Rous, to appoint a six-member executive, which met in Berne
on 22 June 1954 to distribute the roles of president (Ebbe Schwartz,
Denmark), vice-president (Josef Gerö, Austria), general secretary (Henri
Delaunay, France) and members (José Crahay, Belgium; Sir George
Graham, Scotland; and Gustáv Sebes, Hungary). A draft set of statutes in
three languages – French, German and English – was then submitted to
the 31 European member associations of FIFA, and their responses were
analysed by the committee in Copenhagen on 29 and 30 October, with a
view to the body of rules being adopted by the general assembly (known
as the UEFA Congress since 1968), which was convened at the Austrian
Football Association’s headquarters in Vienna on 2 March 1955.

There were 29 European national associations in the roll call, with

Poland the only addition to the 28 that had met in Basel the previous
year. The admission of Turkey brought the final number of associations
represented to 30. They unanimously adopted the statutes proposed by
the Executive Committee, with just one amendment: the expansion of the
committee to eight members.

The general assembly re-elected all the existing committee

members, including Gustáv Sebes, who the Executive Committee had
appointed as vice-president following the death of Josef Gerö at the
end of 1954. The seat left vacant as a result was unanimously awarded
to Austrian Alfred Frey and in a separate ballot, Peco Bauwens (West
Germany) and Constantin Constantaras (Greece) were elected as new
members.

15
I. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The legal foundations of the confederations

The creation of new continental confederations had been considered at
the 1950 FIFA Congress in Rio de Janeiro. As Sir Stanley Rous wrote in the
Handbook of UEFA 1963 / 6 4: “The idea of grouping National Associations
according to the Continents in which they were situated was first
discussed following the circulation of proposals made by two countries
– England and the Argentine.” A study group was appointed, but it
reached the conclusion that “changes in the constitution should be kept
to a minimum” and that “no reference should be made to the possible
formation of Confederations.” However, the 1953 Extraordinary FIFA
Congress in Paris, convened to revise the FIFA Statutes, had opened the
way by allowing the continents to elect their own representatives to the
FIFA Executive Committee. Associations from the same continent therefore
all had a reason to get together; Europe’s associations simply took it one
step further and, like the South Americans before them, decided not to
limit themselves to elections, but to form a proper alliance.

At its 1954 Congress in Berne on 21 June, FIFA merely noted

the fact that UEFA had been created. Jules Rimet, stepping down as
FIFA president after 33 years, did, however, express concerns about the
changes adopted in Paris the previous year: “This evolution is not without
risk, I fear, but I have confidence in you. I would also remind you that
first of all you are Members of the Federation and then representatives of
particular interests … You will have to have in mind above all the interest
of world football and not those of your group.”

FIFA had been aware of the statutory proposals UEFA was planning
to submit to its general assembly in Vienna but did not receive a copy of
the text adopted by the new confederation until Kurt Gassmann, FIFA
general secretary at the time, requested it in February 1956.

In reality, the creation of confederations did nothing to

fundamentally change FIFA’s relations with the national associations,
which remained directly affiliated to both the world governing body and
their respective confederations. This two-fold membership still exists
today. The European members of the FIFA Executive Committee were
elected by the UEFA general assembly / Congress from 1954 onwards,
although the FIFA Statutes made exceptions for the British and Soviet
associations, which were each allowed to elect a representative of their
own to the position of FIFA vice-president. Meanwhile, UEFA declared,

16
I. THE BIRTH OF THE UNION

and formally confirmed at its 1956 general assembly in Lisbon, that in

order to preserve the independence of its own Executive Committee,
members of the latter could not also be members of the FIFA Executive
Committee. As far as independence was concerned, it was soon realised,
in fact, that the European members of the FIFA Executive Committee had
perhaps a little too much, and that they did not necessarily defend the
positions adopted by UEFA. In order to improve relations between the
two organisations, a FIFA-UEFA consultative committee was established
in July 1960. After that, the UEFA Executive Committee invited the
European members of the FIFA Executive Committee to specially arranged
meetings, always with the purpose of obtaining a consensus of opinion.
Since the mid-1990s, on the initiative of the then UEFA president, Lennart
Johansson, European members of the FIFA Executive Committee who
are not members of the UEFA Executive Committee have always been
invited to attend UEFA Executive Committee meetings, for the sake of
cohesion. At the Extraordinary UEFA Congress in Geneva in June 1993,
an amendment to the UEFA Statutes was even adopted, entrusting the
Executive Committee rather than the Congress with the task of appointing
the European members of the FIFA Executive Committee. Since FIFA
considered the new article incompatible with the FIFA Statutes, the
procedure remained unchanged, but the tacit rule under which someone
could not sit on both committees simultaneously was abandoned,
allowing members of the UEFA Executive Committee to be elected to the
FIFA Executive Committee as well.

Officially, the confederations were not recognised until the FIFA

Statutes were revised at the Extraordinary FIFA Congress in London on
28 / 29 September 1961, when Sir Stanley Rous, UEFA vice-president at the
time, was elected FIFA president after his compatriot Arthur Drewry had
died mid-term.

17
18
© PHOTO KEYSTONE
 II. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

A European cup for national teams

Although primarily founded to better defend the interests of European

football, UEFA’s original aims already included the idea of a European
competition for national teams, expressed in Article 4(e) of the first UEFA
Statutes as “the arrangement when appropriate and at least every four
years of a European Championship Series, the UEFA being the sole body
competent to fix the regulations and conditions thereof”. The words
“subject to FIFA authorisation” were later added at the world governing
body’s request.

Of course, this article merely imitated what FIFA itself had done at
the time of its creation. “When the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association was founded in 1904, one of its original statutes gave FIFA
the exclusive right to run an ‘International Football Championship’,” wrote
Hans Bangerter, UEFA general secretary from 1960 to 1988, in UEFA,
Past and Present, the first chapter of UEFA’s 25th anniversary book.
Czechoslovakian
As recorded in FIFA’s Official Bulletin of May 1954: “The founders of FIFA,
goalkeeper Viliam
Schroiff catches the at the same meeting at which they adopted the Federation’s Articles of
ball in the semi-final Association, resolved to create a World Championship, worked out the
against the USSR
regulations for it and entrusted the Swiss Association with the task of
on 6 July 1960
in the inaugural organizing the semi-final and final rounds.” As Hans Bangerter pointed
Nations Cup. out: “It soon became clear that these bold plans were a little premature.”
The USSR won
that match 3-0
and went on to Times changed, the context was different for UEFA and some
beat Yugoslavia in Europeans clearly had no intention of waiting so long. Before the general
the final.
assembly had even adopted statutes the Executive Committee decided,
in October 1954, to create a sub-committee to consider draft regulations
for a European national team competition. They felt that a confederation
without its own competition would be lacking something. “So we now
have a Union of European Football Associations, and that is all well but,
in my opinion, it has not yet entirely fulfilled its objective,” Henri Delaunay
wrote in the 20 September 1955 edition of France Football Officiel.
“It has become a grouping in the legal sense but not yet in sporting
terms. And yet I’d say that this sporting aspect is as essential to it
as a national competition is to an association, the South American
Championship is for the South American Football Confederation or the
World Cup is to FIFA.”

19
II. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Fears of rivalry
On the basis of the sub-committee’s discussions, the Executive Committee
drew up a proposal at its meeting in Brussels on 3 February 1955, which
José Crahay and Henri Delaunay were invited to present at the general
assembly in Vienna. Henri Delaunay, already suffering from the illness
that would lead to his untimely passing in November 1955, never got
the opportunity to defend this project he held so dear. The idea was to
divide the competition into two phases, with a knockout stage the season
before the World Cup and a final tournament in a single country the
following season. It was also proposed that this new competition would
serve as the European qualifying competition for the World Cup, to avoid
taking up additional dates in the international calendar.

After attending the meeting in Brussels, the FIFA general

secretary, Kurt Gassmann, immediately wrote to inform Pierre Delaunay,
who had replaced his father as acting UEFA general secretary, that he did
“not entirely agree with the ideas that were presented concerning a UEFA
competition and the qualifying competition for the 1958 World Cup”.

Kurt Gassmann had, in fact, already drafted some observations

on the project two days before the Brussels meeting, in particular that it
went “against the vital interests” of FIFA. “As a matter of principle, FIFA
should not allow the final phase of a continental competition to take
place during the same year as the final stages of the World Cup. The
year of the final phase of the World Cup must be kept clear of any other
competition involving the national associations.”

The FIFA general secretary also stressed that the idea of playing
the final phase of a European competition in a single country in the same
year as the World Cup finals represented dangerous competition for the
latter and jeopardised income that was “absolutely” indispensable to
FIFA. On the subject of finance, he added that “FIFA should insist that
the financial situation be neither altered nor undermined and that its
previous resources remain guaranteed”. He therefore suggested that the
European competition be played two years (knockout stage) and one
year (final tournament) before the final phase of the World Cup, and that
“depending on the situation, it would perhaps be advisable to separate
the knockout stage of the European competition from the preliminary
stage of the FIFA competition”.

20
II. A EUROPEAN CUP FOR NATIONAL TEAMS

A project deemed premature

Kurt Gassmann’s observations were sufficiently echoed at the general
assembly in Vienna in March 1955 for the idea of a European competition
to be deemed premature and referred back to the sub-committee for
re-examination. Writing in L’Équipe, Jacques Ferran summed up the
meeting rather bluntly: “The three-member committee responsible for
this project (José Crahay of Belgium, Frenchman Henri Delaunay and
Sir George Graham of Scotland) had spent almost six months drafting the
regulations. In ten minutes in Vienna … it was swept away.”

It is not hard to imagine the disappointment of Henri Delaunay,

who, in an article entitled The European Cup published in the 20
September 1955 edition of France Football Officiel, wrote: “Our mosaic of
European countries needs this outlet for sporting expression. We cannot
continue living in an atmosphere of routine and obsolescence. All other
sports … organise European championships; will football, which has
always been in the vanguard of sporting progress, remain trapped in its
outdated models? We very much hope that the national associations will
find a fair solution to the problem they face.”

Undeterred, the sub-committee got back to work and certainly

could not be accused of having failed in its remit: amendments were
made to reassure FIFA, in particular by preventing clashes with the World
Cup finals, and the idea of group matches was abandoned in favour of a
direct knockout system, to ensure the calendar did not get too congested.

However, the project’s opponents were resolute and included

some highly influential figures, including Ottorino Barassi (despite having
previously come out in favour of the competition) and Sir Stanley Rous.
The clubs also had their word to say and even back then were reluctant
to release their players for a greater number of national team matches.
As a result, the project was postponed twice more, at the general
assemblies in Lisbon and Copenhagen in 1956 and 1957 respectively.
A step forward was taken in 1957, when a vote was won by supporters
of the competition (15 to 7, with four abstentions and one blank paper),
but still this was not enough to disarm the project’s opponents and
Ottorino Barassi was first on the offensive at the 1958 general assembly
in Stockholm, suggesting, on the Italian association’s behalf, that the
competition was undesirable because it would restrict the international
calendar and might “excite national passions”.

21
II. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Uncontainable momentum
Although supported by the Swiss and West German delegates, this
attempt to stem the tide was short-lived. In Stockholm as in Copenhagen,
15 delegates voted in favour of going ahead with the competition and,
on reconvening after lunch, UEFA president Ebbe Schwartz came out
with guns blazing in defence of the project. With the support of Pierre
Delaunay, spokesman for the sub-committee, he brought discussions to
a close by announcing that the draw for the first edition would be held
two days later, on 6 June. With enormous foresight, Pierre Delaunay had
written in France Football Officiel a short while before: “Whether we like
it or not, the momentum is uncontainable … the European international
competition will take off in the end, and sooner or later it will have the
virtually unanimous backing of the associations.”

In recognition of the role played by Henri Delaunay in the creation

of the competition, Ebbe Schwartz proposed that it be called the Henri
Delaunay Cup, while the president of the French Football Federation,
Pierre Pochonet, announced that his association would provide the
trophy, entrusting Pierre Delaunay with its production.

As Pierre Delaunay told UEFA∙direct in September 2005: “Europe is

a word of Greek origin. Europe certainly originated in the Mediterranean
Basin, and Greece invented the Olympic Games, so I thought it would be
a good idea to find an ancient Greek artefact, depicting a ball if possible
– something which was not particularly common – and reproduce this in
the form of a trophy. A Greek journalist who was a friend of Constantin
Constantaras, a member of the Executive Committee, found a sculpture
of an athlete controlling a ball at the National Archaeological Museum
in Athens. The Parisian silversmith Chobillon, who was commissioned to
make the trophy, reproduced it on the cup, on the opposite side to the
title.” The sculpture in question did not survive the recasting of the trophy
by London-based goldsmith Asprey in 2006.

22
II. A EUROPEAN CUP FOR NATIONAL TEAMS

More than 100,000 spectators

The competition draw was held on 6 June at the Foresta Hotel in
Stockholm, under the direction of UEFA vice-president Gustáv Sebes. A
total of 17 associations had entered, which meant a two-team preliminary
round was required. This involved the Republic of and Czechoslovakia
(2-0, 0-4), but for calendar reasons their matches were not played until
after the round of 16 had begun. The first match in the competition was
therefore between the USSR and Hungary, who met in Moscow on 28
September 1958. The USSR, who went on to win the competition, beat
the Hungarians 3-1 in front of more than 100,000 spectators. Overall,
the 29 matches in this first edition were watched by more than 1 million
spectators, at an average of 37,101 per game, going to show that,
although the new competition was unpopular with some in the corridors
of power, it had what it took to attract the fans and convince other
national associations to take part (29 out of a possible 33 signed up for
the second edition).

Financially, the final round of the new competition earned UEFA 24,112
new French francs: a modest but not insignificant sum for an organisation
with very limited financial resources to its name.

23
24
© PHOTO KEYSTONE
 III. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The Champion Clubs’ Cup leads the way

It is no surprise that the leaders of the national associations were more

interested in a competition for national teams than in one for clubs over
which they did not always hold much sway in their respective countries.
Paradoxically, however, the first competition to be organised under UEFA’s
aegis was for clubs, in a reversal of priorities that was, to begin with at
least, entirely unintentional and can be put down to the determination of
the journalists at the French sports daily L’Équipe.

Unsurprisingly for a competition created by journalists, the story

of the Champion Clubs’ Cup has been told many times and in minute
detail. Here we will limit ourselves to a broad recollection of the
events that followed Gabriel Hanot’s planting of the seed in L’Équipe
on 15 December 1954. “The idea of a world, or at least European,
championship for clubs, … more original than a European championship
for national teams, is worth putting out and we are going to venture it.”
This was the conclusion to his article about the match between
Wolverhampton Wanderers FC and Budapest Honvéd FC that had
prompted Britain’s Daily Mail to presumptuously hail Wolverhampton as
club world champions, the English team’s 3-2 victory coming shortly after
a 4-0 win over FC Spartak Moskva.

Gabriel Hanot’s testy response might have remained nothing more

than journalistic reverie had he not been such a big name in the field and
had his idea not been blazoned in his headline: ‘No, Wolverhampton are
not yet ‘club world champions’! But L’Équipe has ideas for a European
club championship.’ More important still was the full and resolute support
Hanot’s idea received from Jacques Goddet, owner and director of
L’Équipe, who instructed Jacques de Ryswick, in charge of the football
section, to turn this fantasy into reality as quickly as possible. The very
next day, de Ryswick wrote in L’Équipe of a “plan for a European club
championship”. Pan-European consultation in January 1955 reinforced the
Alfredo Di Stéfano’s
journalists’ confidence in their project and L’Équipe entrusted another of
face says it all after
Real Madrid’s 4-3 its staff, Jacques Ferran, with the task of drafting a set of regulations.
win over Stade de
Reims in the final
of the inaugural
European Champion
Clubs’ Cup in Paris
on 13 June 1956.

25
III. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The competition was no longer to be a championship but a cup

competition, and the first edition was designed for 16 clubs (one per
country), each chosen by the organisers on the basis of prestige (so not
necessarily national champions). The format would consist in home and
away knockout ties to be played within fixed periods.

Favourable reception from the clubs

Overall, the clubs concerned were very keen to participate, although most
were reluctant to commit without their national association’s permission.
L’Équipe, for its part well aware of the complexity of the undertaking,
had no intention of organising the competition itself. Despite a lukewarm
response from the French Football Federation, which supported the plans
for a European Nations’ Cup and did not want to jeopardise them by
subscribing to another project, the newspaper took its idea to the very
top. The FIFA president, Rodolphe William Seeldrayers, himself responded,
telling the journalists that if the calendar allowed, it would surely be an
“extremely interesting and very successful” initiative, but the organisation
of a club competition was not in the world governing body’s remit.

L’Équipe then knocked on the door of the recently founded UEFA,

which was busy preparing for its first general assembly. Although it was
too late to add the item to the agenda, Gabriel Hanot and Jacques Ferran
were invited to present their idea in Vienna. The assembly heard them out
but told them it was up to the “associations to give their clubs permission
to participate in such an event”.

It would take more to dampen the enthusiasm of the team at

L’Équipe, who knew at the end of the day that they had the support of
the clubs. And so they decided to go ahead and organise a meeting in
Paris for representatives of those clubs they had already sounded out.
Held in the Salon des Gobelins at the Ambassador Hotel on 2 and 3
April, this extremely constructive meeting resulted in the adoption of the
regulations proposed by L’Équipe and the constitution of an ‘executive
organising committee’ chaired by Frenchman Ernest Bédrignans, vice-
president of the association of French clubs that would later become the
French Professional Football League. They even decided the pairings for
the round of 16 – the only time in the competition’s history that lots were
not drawn to determine the ties.

26
III. THE CHAMPION CLUBS’ CUP LEADS THE WAY

Faced with such determination, UEFA had no choice but to respond,

especially since one of its vice-presidents, Gustáv Sebes, was on the
organising committee. Its response came from the Emergency Committee
(a panel of the Executive Committee’s highest-ranking members,
convened to deal with urgent questions arising between Executive
Committee meetings), which met in London on 6 and 7 May. Plans for
a European clubs’ cup were the first item on the agenda and the panel
decided to draft a letter to the FIFA Executive Committee, itself due to
meet in the English capital on 8 May, asking it “to examine the conditions
for the organisation of such a competition, in order to ensure that it
complied with the international rules governing the responsibilities of the
national associations.” The Emergency Committee also asked that the
label “Europe” be reserved exclusively for UEFA.

The green light from FIFA

The request was well received by FIFA, which responded by inviting UEFA
to organise the competition, on condition that the national associations
concerned gave their consent and it did not contain the word “Europe”
in its name. For the project’s initiators, who met in Madrid on 17 May at
the invitation of the president of Real Madrid CF, Santiago Bernabéu, the
joy of seeing their plan made reality outweighed the disappointment of
some members of the organising committee, who had been relieved of
their duties.

At its meeting in Madrid, the original committee suggested

that the new competition be called the President Seeldrayers Cup, in
recognition of the FIFA president’s efforts to enhance the status of
European football. The proposal was not taken up. Nor was their request
to be allowed to work with UEFA on the organisation of the competition.
Hoping to have national champions involved, UEFA called the competition
the European Champion Clubs’ Cup. After Gabriel Hanot’s death in 1968,
RSC Anderlecht suggested that it be renamed in the French journalist’s
honour but this proposal was not pursued either.

27
III. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The regulations drawn up by Jacques Ferran, on the other hand, were

adopted with just a few minor adjustments, and the fixture list was only
amended following the late withdrawal of the English representatives,
Chelsea FC, and one or two other changes at national level. UEFA had
written to all its members, inviting them to enter their champions in
the forthcoming competition, but it gave priority to the clubs previously
selected by L’Équipe, thanking the associations whose teams were
surplus to requirements “for their eagerness in showing an interest in this
competition” and promising “to take their applications into consideration
the following season”. Although no one could have imagined the
phenomenal success the competition would enjoy, clearly UEFA knew
it would be no flash in the pan.

Dissolution of the organising committee

The original organising committee met one last time after the competition
had got under way. It wound itself up, according to its secretary,
Frenchman Pierre Junqua, in his account for UEFA’s 25th anniversary
book, and issued a press release that read:

“The Executive Committee of the European Football Cup,

representing the 16 clubs participating in this competition, met in Paris on
3 November 1955, with Mr. Bédrignans in the chair, so that its members
could exchange views on the situation created by the Union of European
Football Associations, which has decided to assume all the functions for
which the Committee was elected.

“The Committee has decided to suspend all its activities for the
time being, declining all the responsibilities entrusted to it but sincerely
hoping, nonetheless, that the competition is a complete success.”

The competition trophy, created by Parisian silversmith Maeghe,

was donated by L’Équipe. With its name on the base, the French paper’s
ties to the competition were not truly cut until 12 years later, when the
UEFA president, Gustav Wiederkehr, took the cup to the Spanish capital
and presented it to Real Madrid CF on 21 October 1967 as a permanent
tribute to the club’s sixth victory in the competition. It was replaced from
the 1966 / 67 season by the famous ‘cup with the big ears’, designed
by Bernese jeweller Jürg Stadelmann, and the reference to L’Équipe
disappeared forever.

28
III. THE CHAMPION CLUBS’ CUP LEADS THE WAY

Celtic FC captain Billy McNeill was the first to hold the new cup aloft after
his team’s 2-1 win over FC Internazionale Milano at the national stadium
in Lisbon on 25 May 1967.

The first match in the European Champion Clubs’ Cup was a 3-3
draw between Sporting Clube de Portugal and FK Partizan in Lisbon on
4 September 1955. The first edition of the competition, which culminated
in the first of Real Madrid CF’s five consecutive victories, encapsulated
everything that was to follow, as Jacques Ferran pointed out 50 years
later in an interview in L’Équipe: “Everything, and I mean everything, that
has characterised the European Cup, both good and bad, was apparent
in the very first edition.” In particular, he mentioned the two quarter-
final matches between Real Madrid CF and FK Partizan (4-0 and 0-3):
“Everything was there in that match: pressure, passion, violence, politics,
refereeing and technical quality. Everything!”

Competition between competitions

Club competitions were, in fact, nothing new in Europe. Forerunners
included the Mitropa Cup (for clubs from central Europe, played between
1927 and 1939 and relaunched in the mid-1950s) and the Latin Cup
(involving the champions of Spain, France, Italy and Portugal, discontinued
after nine editions in 1957, a victim of the creation and success of the
Champion Clubs’ Cup). There had even been a short-lived European
club tournament called the ‘Cup of Nations’ staged in Geneva in 1930.
The influence of all these events was limited, however, in terms of both
geographic reach and prestige. On the other hand, with the desire for
more international competition stemming from the frustration of the war
years and their organisation facilitated by advances in air travel, L’Équipe’s
was not the only project in the pipeline and it was partly in an effort not
to be outdone that the French paper was redoubling its efforts.

The most well-honed of the other projects on the table, the one
with the best chance of seeing the light of day, was the Inter-Cities Fairs
Cup, which enjoyed the backing of several influential football officials,
including FIFA Executive Committee members Ernst Thommen (president
of the Swiss Football Association), Sir Stanley Rous and Ottorino Barassi.

29
III. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

With the support of such individuals, there was no need for the Inter-
Cities Fairs Cup to seek the approval of the international governing
bodies. Given these favourable conditions, it went ahead on 4 June 1955,
before the Champion Clubs’ Cup, from which it differed in terms of
timing (the first edition lasted almost three years), structure (it included
group matches) and participants (with teams representing cities rather
than clubs). As its name suggests, the aim was to link trade fairs and
football, in the hope that the fairs could promote the competition.

Although 12 teams entered, only 10 actually took part in the

inaugural edition, played from 1955 to 1958. The regulations were
subsequently changed so that club sides could enter, since they were
stronger and more popular than city teams, and from the third edition
(1960 / 61) the competition was played in a single season.

In the May 2009 edition of UEFA∙direct, Hans Bangerter explained:

“The competition was clearly well organised, with a permanent
secretariat hosted by Ernst Thommen who, at that time, was also a
director of the Swiss sports betting company, Sport Toto, in Basle.”

At that time, the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup was totally separate

from UEFA’s competitions. “They appointed their own referees, took
disciplinary measures and managed everything themselves,” Hans
Bangerter recalled. There was no danger of it eclipsing the Champion
Clubs’ Cup, though, and even in those early years UEFA was too busy
with its own activities to give it much thought, especially after FIFA asked
it to take on another competition, the International Youth Tournament,
in 1957.

Something for youth players

The International Youth Tournament had been created just after the war,
in 1948, with the aim of forging closer relations between young players
from all over Europe rather than establishing a hierarchy of European
youth teams. The competitive element was secondary, as explained
by Gustav Wiederkehr, UEFA president from 1962 to 1972, in a book
commemorating 25 years of the UEFA Youth Tournament: “With a
determined aim, the friendly character of the matches of this competition
is stressed … During the period of ‘apprenticeship’, the stress in football
should first of all be put on playfulness. Wit and imagination should be
displayed freely.”

30
III. THE CHAMPION CLUBS’ CUP LEADS THE WAY

For the 1955 and 1956 editions, it was even decided to dispense with
the semi-finals and final and end the tournament after the group stage
so that there would be multiple winners. However, under pressure from
the national associations, the organising committee set up by UEFA
and chaired by Sir Stanley Rous abolished this arrangement for the
following edition, which brought 15 teams to Spain in 1957. Austria beat
the hosts 3-2 in the final in a packed Santiago Bernabéu stadium in April,
but had to wait until the general assembly in June to receive their trophy.
“It was something of a disappointment when our Secretary, late in
March, received a letter from the Secretary of FIFA, saying that his
Emergency Committee had decided not to hand the old cup to UEFA,”
Ebbe Schwarz explained in his speech. “It was impossible in such a short
time to have another made up, but here in Copenhagen I have the great
pleasure to ask the President of the Austrian FA to come forward to
receive the new cup.”

31
32
© PHOTO GETTY IMAGES
 IV. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

From Paris to Berne

As UEFA’s activities increased, it was not long before the thoughts turned to
the secretariat. The first general secretary, Henri Delaunay, worked for UEFA
on a voluntary basis. Combining his UEFA duties with his role as general
secretary of the French Football Federation, he worked out of an office at
the FFF headquarters at 22 Rue de Londres in Paris, the city in which the
UEFA Statutes had been filed with the authorities so that the European body
would be officially recognised as an association. With few financial resources
of its own, UEFA could not have managed without the help of a large
national association such as the FFF.

Henri Delaunay’s son, Pierre, took over as acting general secretary

in March 1955, with the Executive Committee’s approval, when his father
fell ill. Following Henri’s death in November 1955, the position of general
secretary was discussed at length at the Lisbon general assembly in June
1956, under the item dealing with amendments to the UEFA Statutes, and
after some strenuous debate the Spanish association’s proposal to create
a salaried position was accepted. In the second half of the meeting Pierre
Delaunay was elected by acclamation.

This could have been the start of a long career, Pierre Delaunay
being only 36 years old at the time. However, UEFA’s continuous expansion
dictated otherwise. Less than three years after his election, the UEFA
general assembly decided to move the association’s headquarters to Berne
in Switzerland, putting paid to lengthy debate about whether or not to
stay in Paris. A dedicated House Committee chaired by the president, Ebbe
Schwartz, had even been set up, but not before the Finance Committee,
chaired by the influential Peco Bauwens, had made its views known, Pierre
Delaunay had been promised administrative assistance, and draft contracts
between the FFF and UEFA had been drawn up, first for ten years, then for
three. There was also talk of moving the headquarters to Zurich, while the
Council of Europe had even thrown Strasbourg’s name into the hat. Finally,
despite the UEFA Official Bulletin, edited by Pierre Delaunay, announcing in
its January 1959 ‘News in brief’ that “the principle of definite installation
of the UEFA headquarters in Paris, rue de Londres, has been accepted by
The House of
the Members of the Executive Committee,” nothing came of this and at an
European Football
moved to the shores extraordinary general assembly held in Paris on 11 December that year, the
of Lake Geneva from Executive Committee’s proposal that the headquarters be moved from Paris
Paris, via Berne.
to Berne was approved by 16 votes to 9, with three abstentions.

33
IV. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

UEFA’s Swiss headquarters

Opened on 4 January 1960 in the presence of the president, Ebbe Schwartz,

UEFA’s first headquarters of its own were located in three basement rooms
at 24 Kirchenfeldstrasse, in the diplomatic quarter of the Swiss capital.
Hans Bangerter took up his position on 1 January, initially assisted by just
two secretaries. Before long he received further administrative support, first
from Suzanne Otth, who went on to manage the office until her retirement
in 1990, and then in 1961 from Bulgarian lawyer Michel Daphinoff, who
left his national football association and Olympic committee to become
assistant general secretary and take charge of financial matters, a role he
continued to fulfil until he retired, also in 1990.

Running out of space, the administration moved on 1 August 1962

into the House of Sport on Laubeggstrasse, where it occupied seven offices
and was able to use various conference rooms.

The number of employees continued to grow in proportion to the

new tasks that the governing body assumed. “The expansion of UEFA
during the last year has been such that the amount of work has almost
doubled,” the periodical UEFA Information announced in January 1972.
This resulted in the recruitment of four new employees, almost doubling
the size of the nascent administration and bringing the staff total to 11,
including the general secretary.

Meanwhile, in 1968, in order to protect UEFA’s finances from the

effects of inflation, the Executive Committee decided to erect a 16-storey
building on the outskirts of Berne, at 33 Jupiterstrasse. The general
secretariat moved in on 11 February 1974, initially occupying one and a half
floors of the building, the rest of which was rented out as residential flats.
On account of the very busy calendar, it was not officially inaugurated until
17 September 1976. The general secretariat had 16 full-time staff at that
time. In 1987, further expansion led to UEFA taking over the remainder of the
floor that it had only been partially occupying, as well as the top floor, which
was converted into a conference room. Later on it also took over the ground
floor. Since local regulations prohibited any further extension of the office
space, UEFA then started looking for a new site for its headquarters and
found a piece of land in Nyon, in the French-speaking part of Switzerland,

34
IV. FROM PARIS TO BERNE

on the shores of Lake Geneva and within 30km of the international

airport. It moved its headquarters to temporary offices rented from an
insurance company in Nyon in February 1995, and then, after the official
inauguration on 22 September 1999, into the House of European Football,
an elegant building designed by French architect Patrick Berger and
superbly integrated into its surroundings. For the first time, UEFA had a
home all for itself and its ever-expanding activities.

In 2010, UEFA took the next-door stadium under its wing. As the
UEFA general secretary, Gianni Infantino, wrote in his editorial for the April
edition of UEFA∙direct: “It was proposed that efforts should be made to
combine our administrative offices with these adjacent sports facilities by
asking the Nyon authorities to entrust us with the long-term management
and upkeep of the Colovray centre, so that we can stage our own events
there, while protecting the interests of the sports clubs that also use the
facilities.” Numerous courses for referees and coaches have been organised
at Colovray, as well as the final rounds of the UEFA European Women’s
Under-17 Championship between 2008 and 2013, and, in 2014, the final
round of the inaugural UEFA Youth League, a pilot club competition for
youth teams in the U19 category.

At around the same time, with its administration outgrowing offices

designed to accommodate 110 people, UEFA decided to construct a new
building opposite the House of European Football. La Clairière, a circular
five-storey building with office space for some 230 staff, was inaugurated
on 18 October 2010. It was designed by Geneva-based architects Bassi
and Carella. A third building, known as Bois-Bougy, then opened in March
2012. Designed by the same company, it accommodates around 190 staff
and a match command centre from where all operations linked to UEFA
matches can be monitored – which became more important than ever
when the Executive Committee decided at its meeting in Minsk in October
2010 that UEFA would take control of competition operations itself.

In addition to the aforementioned Suzanne Otth and Michel

Daphinoff, and general secretaries Hans Bangerter and Gerhard Aigner,
several members of UEFA’s administrative staff, past and present,

35
IV. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

have served European football for more than a quarter of a century:

René Eberle (1972–2007), Silvia Meister (1971–2002), André Vieli (1982–
2013), U. Rudolph Rothenbühler (1973–2003), Manuela Pfister (1983–2013),
Ursula Krähenbühl (1964–1993), Rita McKinnon (1976–2003), Ines Lauber
(since 1987), Anna Simon (since 1988) and Dominique Maurer (since 1989).

The size of the administration has steadily increased over the years:
from 3 when UEFA arrived in Berne, the number of employees had risen to
65 by the time of the move to Nyon in February 1995. At the end of 2013,
the permanent headcount stood at 403.

In terms of structure, in September 2009 a new company, fully

owned by UEFA, was established to help the governing body carry out its
operational and commercial activities. It was given the name UEFA Events SA
at the Executive Committee’s meeting in Funchal in December that year.
David Taylor became its CEO, managing three divisions: sales and marketing,
events and operations, and technology and media, the last of which took
over the activities of UMET (UEFA Media Technologies), a UEFA subsidiary
created in 2001 under the name UEFA New Media to deal with matters
related to digital media.

In 2010, technology and media became part of UEFA’s

communications division, leaving UEFA Events SA with two divisions:
marketing and operations. In January 2013, these were placed under the
direct responsibility of the general secretary, who is supported in his work
by directors Theodore Theodoridis (national associations division, deputy
general secretary), Alasdair Bell (legal affairs), Stéphane Igolen (services),
Josef Koller (finance), Giorgio Marchetti (competitions), Martin Kallen
(UEFA Events SA, operations) and Guy-Laurent Epstein (UEFA Events SA,
marketing).

In addition, since UEFA EURO 2004, UEFA has set up companies

in various legal forms to take charge of the organisation of each EURO
tournament. The latest set-up, EURO 2016 SAS, is led by Frenchman
Jacques Lambert, who also played a major role in the organisation of the
1998 FIFA World Cup in France.

36
IV. FROM PARIS TO BERNE

Yugoslav delegate Mihajlo Andrejević was ardently in favour of the organisation

remaining in Paris and criticised the Executive Committee for acting too
quickly, forgetting that the 1958 general assembly had approved, albeit tacitly:
“That the association’s headquarters be established at a permanent address
proposed by the Executive Committee and decided by the general assembly”.

A new general secretary and a treasurer

Whether for or against the move, most of the delegates agreed with the
arguments put forward by Ebbe Schwartz regarding the secretariat. He is
recorded in the general assembly minutes as saying: “The workload has
increased considerably during recent years and it is indispensable that the
secretary is able to work full time.” Faced with the choice between a job
abroad with an uncertain future and his work as general secretary of the
FFF in Paris, Pierre Delaunay opted for Paris. His successor, Hans Bangerter,
was already prepared to take over and present at the general assembly,
where he was appointed that same day. As FIFA deputy general secretary,
he was familiar with European football and its key personalities. After his
appointment, the UEFA headquarters moved from Paris to Switzerland, where
they would eventually relocate again – many years later – from Berne to Nyon.
The FFF had little to say at the assembly. Its president, Pierre Pochonet, had
already resigned himself to the move following a visit to Paris by the House
Committee in March 1959. Now more mature and with revenue coming in
from the competitions it organised, UEFA no longer wanted to be in a large
association’s tutelage, so to speak. It wanted its own headquarters, and
although some feared that this independence was a delusion, given that
UEFA’s new headquarters would be closer to FIFA’s and that the new general
secretary himself had moved from the world governing body, they were
ultimately won over by Switzerland’s central location in Europe, its political
stability and the stability of its currency.

Meanwhile, Pierre Delaunay was rewarded for his unquestionable

merits with a seat on the Executive Committee. The general assembly decided
to increase the number of members to ten (it had been increased to nine,
excluding the general secretary, at the 1956 general assembly), allowing him
to join the executive body immediately.

It was also at the extraordinary general assembly in Paris that the

office of treasurer was created. As the Executive Committee member
responsible for financial matters, it made sense that Alfred Frey should be
given this task and title.

37
38
© PHOTO EMPICS SPORT
 V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Initial assessment and further development

Despite the stir caused by UEFA’s relocation, disagreements with FIFA

(cryptically referred to in the minutes of an Executive Committee meeting
in October 1958 as “various misunderstandings … between UEFA and
FIFA”), and the existence of a parallel club competition outside UEFA’s
control, the situation in autumn 1961 was surely not as bad as UEFA’s first
vice-president, Sándor Barcs of Hungary, described it in the speech he
gave at the funeral of the incumbent UEFA president, Gustav Wiederkehr,
on 12 July 1972: “The situation in UEFA [in 1961] was quite unacceptable.
Total anarchy ruled at Congress, the administration was practically non-
existent, hardly any attention was paid to the decisions of the Executive
Committee in Europe.”

In a worthy effort to eulogise his friend, Sándor Barcs had been

a little hasty in forgetting that, during Ebbe Schwartz’s presidency, UEFA
had managed to overcome various obstacles to successfully organise
the inaugural European Nations’ Cup, that it was efficiently running the
Champion Clubs’ Cup in spite of the complexity of the task, and that
it had recently taken the Cup Winners’ Cup under its wing. On top of
that, it had achieved unity in Europe before and, sometimes, despite the
Launched in 1960, politicians. It had also, from its very first general assembly, grasped the
the curtain fell on importance of TV, which had initially been viewed as a threat that could
the Cup Winners’
empty the stadiums. It has passed a motion prohibiting matches from
Cup on 19 May
1999 in Birmingham being broadcast without the permission of the visiting team’s national
when SS Lazio beat association and limiting broadcasts to the territory of the home country,
RCD Mallorca 2-1.
unless agreed otherwise.

UEFA had shown that it was interested not only in administrative

matters and formalities, such as the choice of UEFA’s official colours of
white, royal blue and red in March 1961, but that it was also concerned
about the quality and development of the game, as it demonstrated
by organising its first course for coaches and managers at the Swiss
national sports centre in Macolin in June 1961. Finally, the desire to share
information had led to the publication of an Official Bulletin which, from
May 1956, provided a communication platform that was mainly used, in
the early days, for official communications and to share the minutes of
meetings with a larger audience.

39
V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The Cup Winners’ Cup

The idea of a European competition for domestic cup winners took

a while to gain acceptance, not least because not all the national
associations had their own cup competition and if they did it often had
only a limited reach. At the Executive Committee meeting in Brussels in
November 1957, Spaniard Agustin Pujol mentioned “a plan to organize
a tournament involving the Cup Winners from different countries,”
echoing a proposal made by Alfred Frey at the March 1956 meeting.
The subject was raised again at the June 1958 meeting in Stockholm
when, after “lengthy debate”, a committee was created to draw up
regulations to be submitted to a general assembly. Agustin Pujol
reported back with draft regulations at that year’s October meeting of
the Executive Committee, which then decided to sound out the national
associations, explaining that it would only take the proposal further if
at least ten of them showed an interest. Only six of them did so, and in
March 1959 the Executive Committee abandoned the project.

However, meeting back in Brussels on 10 March 1960, Alfred Frey

told his fellow Executive Committee members that the Cup Winners’
Cup would replace the Mitropa Cup, and that “the [Mitropa Cup]
organizers, faithful members of UEFA, are aware of the Union’s statutes
and shall need no instruction. As soon as more associations apply for
the participation of their Cup Winner, this competition will be taken
over by UEFA.”

The Mitropa Cup organising committee therefore assumed the

task of launching the Cup Winners’ Cup for the 1960 / 61 season. From
a field of 14 participants, it was the Italian club of ACF Fiorentina who
lifted the trophy, winning both legs of the final against Rangers FC.
UEFA was then persuaded to take over the running of the competition
and appointed Alfred Frey as chairman of its organising committee. In
October 1963, it was also persuaded by the Italian Football Federation
to recognise the first edition, and added ACF Fiorentina to the official list
of competition winners.

40
V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

From 1962 / 63, the Cup Winners’ Cup final was played as a single match
at a neutral venue, like the Champion Clubs’ Cup final. The last final was
held in Birmingham on 19 May 1999, when another Italian club, SS Lazio,
completed the circle by beating Real Mallorca 2-1.

Domestic cup winners were later awarded UEFA Cup places when
the Executive Committee decided to merge the two competitions at
its meeting in Lisbon on 6 October 1998. A part of European football’s
heritage, the Cup Winners’ Cup trophy remains in UEFA’s possession.

41
V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

In the Handbook of UEFA 1963 / 6 4, Gustav Wiederkehr offered a much

more positive assessment of UEFA’s early years than the gloomy picture
painted by Sándor Barcs: “On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of
UEFA the question may be raised as to whether or not this Union of
European Football Associations has realized the expectations placed in
it when it was founded. Its main tasks were to promote football in our
continent, to defend the well-founded interests of its affiliated National
Associations, to bring under control the international management
of the game, and, last but not least, to nominate the personalities
representing Europe in the Council of the World Union of Football [FIFA
Executive Committee]. We believe that these duties were fulfilled in the
best interests and to the satisfaction of all concerned.” He concluded by
declaring that: “Today UEFA is a firm bloc and ready to master with joint
efforts the problems which future years may have in store.”

Greater authority
By succeeding Ebbe Schwartz at the ordinary general assembly in Sofia
in April 1962, Gustav Wiederkehr – the only candidate for the post of
president – had certainly not taken the helm of a sinking ship. Just the
year before, at its Extraordinary Congress in London in 1961, FIFA had
officially recognised the continental confederations and clearly defined
their responsibilities. “The efforts of UEFA to have the official recognition
of the Continental Confederations by FIFA incorporated in the Statutes
of this latter were successfully concluded at the Extraordinary Congress
of the World Federation on September 28th / 29th, 1961, in London, which
undoubtedly represents an important milestone in the history of the
Continental Confederations, their standing and activities,” wrote the
general secretary, Hans Bangerter, in his biennial report for 1960 and 1961.

This considerably strengthened the confederations’ authority

since, from then on, their member associations were bound by all general
assembly and Executive Committee decisions, which had previously
been no more than recommendations. Indeed, according to Article 8
of the UEFA Statutes valid until then: “Decisions taken by the Union
are not binding upon the National Associations: they are in the nature
of recommendations. They are binding as far as the election of the
FIFA Executive Committee and the Union Committee [UEFA Executive
Committee] is concerned.”

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V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Revision of the UEFA Statutes

UEFA overhauled its statutes in light of the confederations’ new status.
A revised version had in fact already been prepared by a committee
composed of Sir Stanley Rous, Peco Bauwens, José Crahay and Hans
Bangerter before FIFA’s decision.

After being approved by the Executive Committee, the new

statutes were adopted at the general assembly in Sofia. With 33 articles,
they were much more substantial than the previous version, which
had only contained 12. The committees, which had acted as advisory
working groups as and when required during UEFA’s early years, were
now enshrined in the statutes. There were ten of them and their
responsibilities were clearly defined. Thanks to Gustav Wiederkehr,
these committees, which had previously been composed of Executive
Committee members, were opened up to members of virtually all the
national associations. This expansion strengthened the organisation’s
unity by enabling all its members to participate in its work and share their
ideas and opinions.

Another step taken on the new president’s initiative, also in an

effort to involve the associations in the life of UEFA, was the organisation
of conferences for the general secretaries of the member associations, at
which the participants could discuss administrative questions of general
interest. The first of these was held in Copenhagen on 27 and 28 August
1963. Similar meetings were also introduced for association presidents,
with the first held in Zurich on 19 December 1967, and from 1971 the
two events were combined into a single conference for presidents and
general secretaries. Even though these gatherings – forerunners of the
strategy meetings organised during Michel Platini’s presidency – were not
officially grounded in the statutes, they constituted important platforms
for discussing topical issues affecting European football and showed the
Executive Committee the direction that the national associations wanted
it to take.

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V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

From UEFA Cup to Europa League

As UEFA general secretary, Hans Bangerter actively participated in the

negotiations that resulted in UEFA taking control of the Inter-Cities Fairs
Cup. “The competition was very successful but the time came when
the UEFA Executive Committee thought that such a major competition
should be governed and organised by UEFA itself, which could ensure
that standard rules were followed and could deal with refereeing and
disciplinary matters,” he explained in the May 2009 issue of UEFA∙direct.

“There was no coordination with our competitions. We therefore

thought that this could not last. Finally, with the support of Sir Stanley
Rous … we came to an agreement. And I remember the last meeting of
the Fairs Cup Committee, which was held in Barcelona. UEFA had been
invited to send a representative to this final meeting and the Executive
Committee asked me to go. I received a polite but rather frosty welcome.
Sir Stanley Rous, who had many other important responsibilities, had little
problem in handing over the task of chairing the committee, but some of
the other members were not exactly thrilled to be losing a position that,
when all is said and done, was quite a nice one to have. We kept one or
two of them in our committees to iron out some of the difficulties and, in
the end, everything went smoothly.”

The last Inter-Cities Fairs Cup final saw Juventus take on Leeds
United FC. The first leg on 26 May 1971 had to be abandoned at the start
of the second half because torrential rain had made the pitch unplayable.
The match was replayed a couple of days later and ended in a 2-2 draw.
The second leg was also drawn (1-1) and Leeds United FC were declared
winners under the away goals rule. As if to show the two competitions did
indeed have something in common, the same rule had been introduced in
the Champion Clubs’ Cup just the previous season!

With new ownership came a new name and new regulations,

which is why the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup winners do not appear on the list of
UEFA Cup winners. Participating teams no longer had to come from cities
with trade fairs, and the ‘one city, one team’ rule was also abolished. The
64 participants were now selected on the basis of sporting merit, i.e. their
finishing position in the previous season’s domestic league championship.

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V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Initially the number of participants per country was determined by

the Executive Committee but in 1978, after several years of careful
consideration, UEFA finished working out a system based on the results
obtained by the clubs of each association in the five preceding UEFA
seasons. The associations were ranked accordingly and their position
determined how many clubs they could enter, up to a maximum of four.
Introduced for the 1980 / 81 season, the coefficient ranking system has
since been amended several times but it is still used to determine how
many clubs from each association can enter the UEFA Champions League
and UEFA Europa League and at what stage.

The UEFA Cup also got a brand-new trophy. Created by Swiss

graphic designer Alex W. Diggelmann, it is still presented to the Europa
League winners today. Meanwhile, the old Inter-Cities Fairs Cup trophy
was given to FC Barcelona, winners of a match between the first and the
last winners of the competition, FC Barcelona and Leeds United AFC.

The first UEFA Cup final, played over two legs, was an all-
English affair between Wolverhampton Wanderers FC and Tottenham
Hotspur FC. The Londoners won 2-1 in the first leg in Wolverhampton
before drawing the second 1-1 at home. The two-leg format was retained
until 1998, when it was replaced with a single match at a neutral venue.
FC Internazionale Milano beat SS Lazio 3-0 at the Parc des Princes in Paris
in the final that year.

The UEFA Cup steadily became more prestigious and attracted

increasing levels of interest. In 1978, the British Daily Mail even suggested
that it should be transformed into a 48-club European league. The
Executive Committee rejected the idea on the grounds that it was not
the right time to launch such a competition and there were too many
drawbacks. Hence the UEFA Cup continued to prosper under the same
format until the Champions League, breaking away from the ‘one
association, one champion’ principle, opened its doors to domestic league
runners-up and, later on, to a maximum of four clubs from the same
association. By way of compensation, the UEFA Cup swallowed up the
Cup Winners’ Cup in the 1999 / 2000 season.

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V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

In addition, the system whereby clubs eliminated from the Champions

League were fed into the UEFA Cup – already applied since 1994 / 95
for clubs knocked out in the third qualifying round – was extended in
1999 / 2000 to include clubs finishing third in their group. “In sporting
terms, this measure is certainly open to criticism,” admitted former UEFA
general secretary Gerhard Aigner in the June 2009 issue of UEFA∙direct,
“but the result is positive because it adds extra interest and the
eliminated clubs often offer good value.”

Galatasaray AŞ in 2000, Feyenoord in 2002, PFC CSKA Moskva

in 2005, FC Shakhtar Donetsk in 2009, Club Atlético de Madrid in 2010
and Chelsea FC in 2013 proved Gerhard Aigner’s point by winning the
UEFA Cup / Europa League after moving into the competition from the
Champions League group stage.

Another change was made in the 1995 / 96 season, when two

new routes into the competition were opened up: one via the fair
play rankings, calculated on the basis of all the results of the national
and club teams of each national association in all UEFA competitions;
and the other through the new UEFA Intertoto Cup, which was
designed to enable clubs from every association to enjoy a taste of
European football.

Following the Champions League’s example, group matches

(eight groups of five teams) were introduced in 2004 / 05, an idea that
the UEFA Club Panel had approved back in February 2002. The UEFA
Cup was then transformed into the UEFA Europa League in 2009 /10,
with 12 groups of 4 teams, the centralised sale of media rights from the
group stage onwards and fully centralised marketing of the subsequent
knockout rounds. It was decided to introduce central marketing for the
entire competition for the 2015–18 cycle.

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V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Unlike his predecessor, Gustav Wiederkehr also benefited from the

assistance of a full-time general secretary, who had already been in the
post for more than two years and had accumulated a wealth of FIFA
experience before that. Having been modestly housed in a basement on
Berne’s Kirchenfeldstrasse, where it employed Hans Bangerter and two
additional staff, the UEFA general secretariat found more appropriate
premises in 1962 at the House of Sport, where many Swiss sports
organisations were based. It was here that the administration steadily
grew, developing a structure that enabled it to accomplish an ever-
increasing number of tasks. The Executive Committee expanded in
parallel, from 10 to 11 members in 1966.

Regulating international competition

Buoyed by its new vigour, it was not long before UEFA sought to bring
some order to the continental competitions, as was its prerogative
according to the FIFA Statutes. It had already taken charge of the
European Cup Winners’ Cup, a competition for domestic cup winners,
in 1961. In 1962, after drawing up a list of existing competitions, the
Executive Committee laid down principles for the authorisation of other
international club competitions. It did so not so much in an effort to
exert its authority as to avoid overloading the calendar and to protect
the players from playing too many matches, especially towards the end
of the season when, as Hans Bangerter later wrote in the Official Bulletin
of December 1965, “situations which are almost inconceivable for those
who are not directly involved” tended to arise.

He was alluding to the extreme difficulty of finding dates

for national team matches, domestic cup matches and postponed
championship matches. In the same article, he warned against the
growing number of matches that were being televised either live or pre-
recorded, concluding that: “Too many delicious dishes spoil the appetite
for the homely fare of the national championship.”

47
V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

UEFA therefore required clubs to obtain their national association’s

permission to participate in international competitions. The regulations
of such competitions were subject to UEFA’s approval, which had to be
renewed annually. Furthermore, meeting minutes and competition
reports had to be submitted to UEFA, which reserved the right to be
represented on the organising committees. The principles laid down by
the Executive Committee also stipulated that: “Competitions open to the
clubs of all National Associations affiliated to UEFA may only be organized
by UEFA itself.”

In this context, the days of the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup were clearly
numbered, although its good reputation and the influence held by its
organisers helped to keep it alive for a while longer.

At the 1964 general assembly in Madrid, Scotland launched

the first attack, but Sir Stanley Rous, then FIFA president, personally
intervened to save ‘his’ competition from UEFA’s grasp. The Scots, whose
proposal that UEFA should take over control of the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup
was rejected by 15 votes to 5, tried again two years later, at the general
assembly in London, this time with England’s support. Abandoned by his
national association, Sir Stanley Rous received the backing of another of
the competition’s co-founders, Ottorino Barassi, but his efforts too were
in vain and the proposal was adopted by 11 votes to 10. The margin was
so narrow that the UEFA president, Gustav Wiederkehr, suggested that
negotiations be held with the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup organising committee,
which the general assembly accepted. In 1968, the Executive Committee
decided that the competition would be held under the UEFA umbrella
from the 1969 / 70 season. Although the 1968 UEFA Congress in Rome
supported this decision, the majority of participants at the June 1969
conference of member association presidents held in Bürgenstock, near
Lucerne in Switzerland, agreed that the transitional phase should be
extended, and it was not until the 1971 / 72 season that the Inter-Cities
Fairs Cup was finally replaced by the UEFA Cup.

48
V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

More implementation than innovation

UEFA was now running three major continental club competitions, none
of which were, however, its own creations. The same was subsequently
true of the UEFA Super Cup, which was launched on the initiative
of the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf, and the UEFA Intertoto Cup,
organised between 1995 and 2008 on the initiative of pools companies
who wanted official matches to offer customers over the summer. This
competition, which offered a gateway to the UEFA Cup, was based on
the former International Football Cup, created in 1961 as the Karl Rappan
Cup (named after the Swiss national team coach) by eight national
associations (Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, West Germany,
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland), and later called the
International Summer Championship.

The European / South American Cup is another competition that

was placed partially under the aegis of UEFA but originated with someone
else, in this case the South American Football Confederation. Contested
by the winners of the Champion Clubs’ Cup and its South American
equivalent, the Copa Libertadores, this intercontinental competition had
been launched in 1960 but it was many years before it was officially
recognised by the game’s governing bodies.

A single organising committee

Another important development concerned the organisation of the UEFA
club competitions. From 1972, there was just one organising committee,
whereas each competition had previously had its own. At the same time,
the regulations of the three competitions were standardised. Match
organisation was also improved through the introduction of a calendar
with fixed dates for UEFA club competition matches. The calendar was
introduced in two stages, covering the round of 32 and the round of 16
from the 1968 / 69 season and all rounds from the following season. “The
introduction of a European fixture list for the UEFA Club Competitions
and the concentration of the matches on the same dates allow a much
better overall picture, and thus the football fan is in a much better
position to follow the Competitions,” noted Hans Bangerter in his general
secretary’s report for 1968 and 1969. “The press has already found the
right denomination for the days of the matches: they simply speak of the
‘European Cup Wednesdays’.”

49
V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Intercontinental competition

On the pitch, Europe and South America were the two main forces
of world football, so it is no surprise that the idea arose to organise
a contest between the best clubs from each continent, the South
Americans having been inspired by the European Champion Clubs’ Cup
and their own experiences in creating the Copa Libertadores
de América in 1960, a competition reserved for South American
domestic champions and organised by CONMEBOL, UEFA’s South
American counterpart.

The competition between the club champions of Europe and

South America, the European / South American Cup (also known as
the Intercontinental Cup), was also launched in 1960 and regarded as
an unofficial world club championship. It remained informal for many
years because FIFA was reluctant to recognise it, having even banned
it in 1961. UEFA was not overly enthusiastic either, according to the
25 March 1970 edition of UEFA Information, which reported Gustav
Wiederkehr’s comments at a press conference in Rome: “In principle
UEFA was also opposed to the matches between the European and the
South American champions. However, since these matches cannot be
interdicted, it is preferable that they be played under the jurisdiction of
the continental confederations concerned.”

It should also be said that this home-and-away contest – with the

possibility of a third match in the first few years, when goal difference
was not taken into consideration – lived a rather difficult existence: it
was hard to find suitable dates; the clubs, especially in Europe, were
not particularly interested; and the matches were too often marred by
scenes of violence unacceptable on a football pitch. The competition’s
very survival was even questioned and two editions, in 1975 and 1978,
did not take place.

50
V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

On the initiative of UEFA’s then sports marketing agency West Nally,

the competition found a home in Japan, where it was played from 1980
onwards as a single match at the end of the year, initially at the national
stadium in Tokyo and then in Yokohama. The competition’s sponsor
added a second trophy, the Toyota Cup, to be presented alongside the
traditional cup. Since the media tended to call the competition by the
name of the new trophy rather than use its more long-winded official
title, it became known as the Toyota Cup until 2004, after which the FIFA
Club World Cup offered the confederations a new competition.

Right from the start of the European / South American Cup,

CONCACAF, the Confederation of North, Central American and
Caribbean Association Football, had expressed an interest in participating
but was never invited to do so.

In 1988, CONMEBOL also approached UEFA to suggest a

competition, a single match, between the winners of the Cup Winners’
Cups of both continents. Although the ISL agency found a sponsor in
Miami, Florida, it was a cigarette manufacturer, which UEFA considered
undesirable. Two years later a Japanese sponsor showed an interest,
but this time it was the eternal problem of finding a suitable date that
got in the way and, in any case, UEFA had serious doubts about
the sporting merits and impact of such a match. The project was
subsequently shelved.

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V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

A first step towards a calendar covering all the UEFA competitions was
taken when fixed dates were laid down for the European Championship
quarter-finals. Another change, brought in for the 1970 / 71 season, was
the abolition of the drawing of lots to decide which team went through
from a direct knockout match that ended in a draw, with penalty shoot-
outs introduced instead.

Bolstering national team football

Gustav Wiederkehr’s presidency was marked by a desire not only
to regulate the club competitions, but also to make national team
matches more attractive. “The revaluation of the international matches
is another task which we consider to be of great importance,” wrote
the UEFA president in the Handbook of UEFA 1963 / 6 4. “As a result of
the popularity of the European Club Competitions and numerous other
international events in which club teams participate, the interest of the
public and, in part, also of the press, in international matches has in
many countries suffered considerably … Under no circumstances shall we
idly watch this development. In the great majority of cases our National
Associations depend upon the receipts of international matches in order
to be able to fulfil their duties towards amateur football, which must be
one of our main concerns.”

The European Nations’ Cup was, not surprisingly, the first to

benefit from this solicitude. It underwent a change of format for the
1966–68 edition, with the introduction of group matches followed by
a knockout stage (quarter-finals onwards) and the organisation of the
final round once again in a single country, in this case Italy. At the same
time, the competition was renamed the European Football Championship.
The new format satisfied the member associations’ desire to play more
competitive matches, given the mixed appeal of friendly matches,
depending on who they were against.

Another national team competition came into being in 1966:

the Under-23 Challenge Cup. After a quiet first edition in 1967, it grew
and became the European Under-21 Championship in 1976, with final
rounds staged as of 1994, comprising semi-finals and final to begin
with, then from 1998 the last eight. The importance of this competition
for the development of young players was highlighted by the Executive
Committee at its meeting in January 2014, when it decided to expand the
final round to 12 teams from 2017.

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V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Filling the amateur gap

Around the same time, in 1965, the Competition for Amateurs was
created to make up for the lack of pan-European competition for amateur
footballers, who accounted for 99% of all licensed players. The tricky
question of how exactly to define ‘amateur’ proved to be a stumbling
block though, and the competition was discontinued in 1978 after
four editions. An attempt to revive it failed when the presidents and
general secretaries of the member associations discussed the question
at their conference in Berne in June 1979 and concluded – as reported
by the Executive Committee – “that there was no urgent demand for
such a competition and that it was quite impossible to find criteria of
participation which would satisfy the wishes of all member associations”.

UEFA therefore decided to focus its efforts on youth footballers,

whether by organising competitions or promoting training.

It was not until 1996 that an Amateur Football Committee was

re-established and the idea of a competition for amateur footballers
reappeared on the agenda. The result was the UEFA Regions’ Cup. First
organised in 1999, it recognises the importance of amateur football and
gives Europe’s best regional amateur teams the chance to play on an
international stage.

Finally, it was during Gustav Wiederkehr’s presidency that UEFA

started to show an interest in women’s football. Although a women’s
competition remained a long way off, it was a first step in the right
direction.

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V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Politics and religion

Football spurned politics by creating a European union in an era when

certain European countries maintained no diplomatic relations with
each other. European football even built a few bridges, such as during
the first season of the Champion Clubs’ Cup, when Real Madrid CF
and FK Partizan met in the quarter-finals at a time when their respective
countries were ignoring each other. Most of the time, however, UEFA
has had to give in to political diktats. Spain refused to play the USSR
in the 1960 Nations’ Cup quarter-finals and political interference even
disrupted the 1961 International Youth Tournament, whose line-up of
participants had to be changed right at the last minute following the
withdrawals of East Germany, Hungary and Yugoslavia. UEFA initially
took a hard line in such cases, awarding matches by default and
fining those who refused to play. It later softened its approach,
following FIFA’s lead and taking the necessary steps to ensure that
teams from conflicting countries were not drawn against each other
in the first place.

Aside from the problems posed by conflicts, especially in eastern

Europe and the Balkans – resulting in Denmark being invited to take
Yugoslavia’s place in the European Championship final round in 1992
– relations with the European Economic Community (EEC), later the
European Community (EC) and then the European Union (EU), have
often been tense.

On the other hand, while guarding against any kind of religious

bias, UEFA has always been on good terms with the Roman Catholic
Church.

At the UEFA Congress in Rome in 1968, UEFA’s leaders enjoyed a

private audience with Pope Paul VI, who paid them the following tribute:
“Sports competitions, when they are not misused and are played in this
spirit of ‘Fair Play’ that ordinarily characterises football matches, help
to forge friendly relations between men of all backgrounds, all nations
and all races.

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V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Your Union … helps to bring together the sons of our old and still young
Europe, whether from the east, the centre or the west, thereby fostering
human contact that sometimes leads to true friendships between players
and administrators from different countries. It also gives, not only to the
players, but also to the countless spectators who watch these matches,
a vision of people and things that goes beyond the limited horizon
imposed on the sons of the same civilisation, of the same continent, by
barriers that are often artificially erected between different peoples.
And so, Gentlemen, we welcome this opportunity to congratulate you
and encourage you in your endeavours.”

In June 1980, the UEFA Congress was again held in Rome, during
the presidency of Artemio Franchi, who obtained an audience with
Pope John Paul II for the Executive Committee and national association
delegates. On retiring as UEFA CEO, Gerhard Aigner reminisced about the
event in the January 2004 issue of UEFA∙direct: “The Pope showed that
he knew a lot about football. He talked about when he had kept goal for
a club in Poland. He also followed teams’ results and knew what he was
talking about. I have never forgotten that audience. The Pope made a
huge impression on me.”

The Executive Committee was again received by the pope, this

time by Pope Benedict XVI in St Peter’s Square, on the occasion of its
meeting in Rome in September 2005.

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V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Fostering referees
Outside the competitions, but directly connected to them, refereeing
was another focal point for UEFA. On 28 October 1969, over 100
participants gathered at the Italian Football Federation’s technical centre
in Coverciano, near Florence, for the start of the first UEFA course
for elite referees. The aim, even back then, was to develop a uniform
interpretation of the Laws of the Game in UEFA competitions, a subject
presented at the course by legendary Scottish coach Sir Matt Busby, a
survivor of the air disaster that had destroyed Manchester United FC’s
squad on their way home from a Champion Clubs’ Cup match in Belgrade
on 6 February 1958. The course, which required the services of 14
interpreters, also covered topics such as the prevention of inappropriate
conduct by players and spectators, the structure and organisation of
UEFA, team work between the referee and his linesmen, and even elite
referees as public figures.

The UEFA Official Bulletin of December 1969 reported: “The

presence of the Presidents of FIFA [Sir Stanley Rous] and UEFA [Gustav
Wiederkehr] was ample proof of the importance of the event.” The article
concluded by saying that: “Certainly such conferences will be organized
regularly by UEFA in the future.” And so they have.

UEFA’s position in world football

Although its competitions took up a lot of UEFA’s time, the organisation
did not forget its initial raison d’être, which was to strengthen Europe’s
position within FIFA – clearly no easy task. Writing in the Handbook of
UEFA 1963 / 6 4 on the occasion of UEFA’s tenth anniversary, the president,
Gustav Wiederkehr, went so far as to place “the reconstruction of FIFA”
at the top of the list of problems that needed to be addressed.

“If, however, the voting power of the Associations of Europe,

where football is played in almost every larger village, and which
presumably still represents the majority of all football clubs in the world,
is reduced to 25 per cent, this can, in the long run, only have derogatory
effects on the position of the FIFA. This fact cannot be denied,” wrote
the UEFA president, who feared, in particular, a reduction in the number
of European places in the World Cup and Olympic Football Tournament.

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V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

However, it was not a case of asking the FIFA Congress to abandon the
long-standing principle of one association, one vote, which meant that,
as more and more associations from other continents joined, Europe
was increasingly outnumbered at the world governing body’s general
assemblies. Such a proposal would have clearly had no chance of
obtaining the majority of votes required.

The Extraordinary UEFA Congress in Monte Carlo on 16 June 1971

spent a long time debating “the position of Europe in world football”,
and an overwhelming majority approved the proposal that the UEFA
president should automatically become a FIFA vice-president. In his
general secretary’s report for 1970 and 1971, Hans Bangerter wrote:
“This is indeed an important step towards coordination of European
solidarity and its efficacious representation in the World Federation, the
result of which will certainly bear good fruit for Europe.”

The national associations were, however, less enthusiastic about

adopting an amendment to the UEFA Statutes under which: “If an item
on the agenda is discussed thoroughly, and if a majority agrees on
the subject, then the minority should accept the line followed by that
majority”. The aim was to enable UEFA to speak with one voice at the
FIFA Congress. The Executive Committee, which itself was not unanimous
on this question, was asked to present a proposal to the next UEFA
Congress and decided that a qualified majority of two-thirds should
be required. If obtained, all European associations would be required
to defend the majority position when voting at the FIFA Congress. At
the UEFA Congress in Vienna in June 1972, 20 of the 32 delegations
present voted to return the proposal to the Executive Committee for
further examination, with several delegates of the opinion that it violated
fundamental democratic principles.

The Executive Committee learned its lesson: unity came second

to individual interests and obligations. The ‘Commission of Study
concerning the position of Europe in World Football’ was abolished only
a year after its creation, and a proposal was adopted which, according
to the general secretary’s report for the period in question, simply read:
“The representatives of UEFA within FIFA should show unanimity insofar
as European affairs are concerned.”

57
V. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Meeting the media

The ever-increasing popularity of football and its major competitions also
made UEFA aware of the need to communicate not only with its member
national associations but also with the outside world, through the media.
This was not something that came naturally to an organisation for whom
discretion had always been a watchword and whose role was to manage
the game effectively rather than bask in the limelight.

In 1970, a new bimonthly publication, UEFA Information, was

launched to give journalists a better understanding of UEFA by writing
about its structures and activities. It later provided practical information
too, such as referee appointments, kick-off times and statistics concerning
UEFA matches. “I am convinced that we owe a lot to the press, radio and
television and film reporting if the development of the Union has been so
gratifying and if Europe is still looked upon as a model in world football,”
wrote Gustav Wiederkehr in the first issue.

1970 was also the year when UEFA decided to organise press
conferences at major events such as the UEFA Congress and competition
finals. “The first such conference took place in Rome. 49 journalists
from Italy, Great Britain, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany and
France attended – indeed a gratifying result!”, reported UEFA Information
about the press conference held after the qualifying round draw for the
1970–72 European Championship.

While UEFA’s leadership had clearly understood the need to

open up to the media, it took longer to convince the administration, for
whom communication remained a foreign concept – so much so that, in
June 1973, the general secretary had to issue a memo to the staff about
providing the newly appointed chief of press with the information that
needed to be communicated to the media.

UEFA’s communications policy was extended to include the

distribution of press releases throughout Europe by the agency
Sportinformation, occasional meetings with media representatives and,
in the late 1990s, the creation of the UEFA website, which was made
public in 1998 and is now split into two sites: UEFA.org for information
about UEFA itself, and UEFA.com for information about its competitions
and related matters.

58
V. INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

In addition, close cooperation was established with the International

Sports Press Association (AIPS) in 1967, and later with its European
section (UEPS), to help deal with technical and accreditation matters at
UEFA matches. UEFA and the AIPS had previously worked together to
launch, on the AIPS’s initiative, a fair play campaign in April 1963, with the
aim of curbing unsporting conduct and incidents at UEFA matches. The
campaign, which all member associations were invited to join, included
the creation of a logo and posters, newspaper articles, competitions,
symbolic gestures such as handshakes between referees and players,
public address announcements in the stadiums and fair play slogans.

59
60
© PHOTO UEFA
 VI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

From Gustav Wiederkehr to Artemio Franchi

The sudden death of Gustav Wiederkehr, who suffered a heart attack in

his Zurich office on 7 July 1972, plunged European football into a state
of mourning but at a practical level UEFA at least had the structures in
place to ensure his work could be pursued with continuity. In accordance
with the statutes, Sándor Barcs, the longest-serving vice-president, took
over as acting president and an Extraordinary Congress was convened
for elections to be held. On 15 March 1973 in Rome, Artemio Franchi
was elected UEFA president on home soil. With 21 votes he finished a
long way ahead of the other two candidates, Sándor Barcs (7 votes) and
UEFA sent a
Englishman Denis Follows (4).
sure sign of
the importance
it attaches to As Hans Bangerter pointed out in his general secretary’s report for
youth football
1972 and 1973: “The policy of UEFA … did not alter due to this change at
when it launched
an Under-16 the top level. Our Union has, regardless of the new leadership, continued
competition to to show great efficiency in the fields of the Competitions, deepened
run alongside
the relations between the 33 affiliated Associations, nearly 200,000
its Under-18
championship. Spain clubs, more than 385,000 teams, approx. 12 million players and 250,000
lifted the trophy in referees, has ascribed great importance to Courses, to the Control and
2001 after beating
Disciplinary fields and also devoted its attention to all the problems
France 1-0 in the
final. The following beyond the field of the Competitions and the promotion of our sport.”
season the age
limits of the two
In terms of discipline, this new era was marked by an important
competitions were
raised to Under-17 legal development: the principle of the separation of powers was adopted
and Under-19 at the 1973 Congress in Rome, creating a ‘judiciary’ that would be truly
respectively.
independent of the legislature and executive represented by the Congress
and Executive Committee respectively.

61
VI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Organs for the Administration of Justice

A first step towards independent disciplinary authorities came when the

statutes were revised at the Extraordinary Congress in Rome on 7 June
1968 (actually the same day as the Ordinary Congress). A clause was
adopted under which a disciplinary committee could be established.
The new committee held its first meeting in Geneva on 3 October that
year, with future UEFA president Artemio Franchi in the chair. Until that
point, disciplinary cases had been dealt with by the various specialist
committees working from a catalogue of sanctions – a system clearly
not conducive to the uniform treatment of cases. There was a possibility
of appealing to an appeals panel, which from 1968 was composed
exclusively of Executive Committee members.

UEFA’s disciplinary system was later amended, as part of a two-

stage process concluded at another Extraordinary Congress. The process
was initiated at the 1972 Congress in Vienna, where a partial revision
of the statutes was on the agenda and the West German delegation
proposed that the independence of UEFA’s disciplinary bodies be
incorporated. The Congress mandated the Executive Committee to
look into the proposal and a year later, at the Extraordinary Congress
in Rome, the principle of the separation of powers was approved and
enshrined in the statutes. Since that time, members of the Organs for
the Administration of Justice, as they are now known, have not been
allowed to be serving members of the Executive Committee or any
other UEFA committee. As far as disciplinary matters are concerned,
the president and Executive Committee’s only powers are to appoint
the members of the Organs for the Administration of Justice and
approve the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations, in which the catalogue of
possible sanctions is defined. They have no influence whatsoever on
disciplinary decisions.

62
VI. FROM GUSTAV WIEDERKEHR TO ARTEMIO FRANCHI

UEFA’s disciplinary system was developed further when a full revision of

the statutes – the first since 1968 – was undertaken at the Extraordinary
Congress in Helsinki in October 1997. It was here that the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was introduced as an arbitral body. The role
of disciplinary inspector was then introduced in 1998 and written into
the statutes at the 2001 Congress in Prague. Disciplinary inspectors,
who represent UEFA in disciplinary procedures, may initiate disciplinary
investigations, lodge appeals and be asked to conduct investigations.

The creation of the Club Financial Control Body to deal with

cases linked to financial fair play resulted in a further amendment to the
statutes, adopted at the 2012 Congress in Istanbul.

Two years later, in Astana, the Congress changed the name of the
Control and Disciplinary Body to ‘Control, Ethics and Disciplinary Body’
and the disciplinary inspectors became ‘Ethics and Disciplinary Inspectors’.

At the 1992 Congress in Gothenburg all the different provisions

on disciplinary matters were brought together in a single set of UEFA
Disciplinary Regulations.

63
VI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Off the pitch

It was during the 1970s that UEFA began to see its competition-related
workload matched by the other demands on its time, as recorded by
Hans Bangerter in his report for 1974 and 1975: “A decisive role is
played here by the increasing interference of outside factors, such as
supranational legislation, political authorities, trade unions, etc., into
our field of activity: for football has long ceased to be an object of
interest for the sports world alone. Thanks to its popularity, it also offers
a very attractive field of activity for advertising and for influencing the
masses. Here it is, among other things, its commercialization which led
to problems that cannot be solved easily, as it is essentially a problem of
safeguarding the popularity and independence of the game in the face
of all financial and public implications (publicity, sponsorships, players’
unions, television, etc.).”

Four years later he wrote: “Today, it is practically no longer

possible to hold an important sporting event without involving
commercial interests from outside the game. The business of
merchandising clearly has a firm foothold in football. With first division
clubs, for example, now well established as business enterprises,
this additional source of income obviously appears appropriate or
even necessary. But it is still important that a few basic principles be
maintained, with the sporting authorities under no circumstances being
allowed to lose overall control.”

UEFA stuck to its guns, “expressly forbidding any form of

advertising on players’ equipment”. It was not until the Dresden Congress
on 28 April 1982 that the governing body allowed shirt advertising in its
club competitions – in all matches except finals. In the 1994 / 95 season
this rule was extended to all matches except the Cup Winners’ Cup final,
which was not included until 1997 / 98.

64
VI. FROM GUSTAV WIEDERKEHR TO ARTEMIO FRANCHI

Two books for two anniversaries

A pleasant break from everyday activities, UEFA’s 25th anniversary

celebrations in Berne on 13 June 1979 brought together some 260
guests from the worlds of football, politics and media, including the FIFA
president, João Havelange, and Swiss federal councillor Rudolf Gnägi.
In his speech, Artemio Franchi reminded the leaders of the national
associations that UEFA was “a forum in which to discuss your problems,
a place to bring your ideas, your criticisms and your suggestions …
We wanted this celebration to be more than simply a feast in the
traditional sense. We wanted it also to be a working meeting, a chance
to discuss things among ourselves; for every time we meet, we part
enriched by the experience.”

The official ceremony at Berne city hall was followed by a cruise

on Lake Thun and a gala dinner.

UEFA’s 25th anniversary was also marked by the launch of a

contest for professional photographers on the topic ‘The fascination
of football’, and the publication of a book, 25 Years of UEFA, edited
in UEFA’s three official languages by its press officer, U. Rudolph
Rothenbühler. In this book, Artemio Franchi discussed the topic of
Europe and world football and, like his predecessor before him, called
on FIFA to recognise the role played by the confederations: “I believe it
would be in the general interests of world football for the continental
confederations to be granted official and formal recognition for the role
which they are in reality now already fulfilling.”

This book remains a useful source of information, thanks to

contributions such as Hans Bangerter’s, which retraces the first 25 years
of UEFA, and first-hand accounts by pioneers such as José Crahay,
Sir Stanley Rous and Jacques Ferran.

65
VI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Another, more ambitious publication, comprising around 700 pages in

two volumes, was produced to mark UEFA’s golden jubilee. U. Rudolph
Rothenbühler was again the architect but he was unable to see his
project through to completion (he passed away in October 2003).
Keith Cooper, former FIFA communications director recruited to
coordinate UEFA’s golden jubilee celebrations, was appointed chief
editor of the first volume, devoted to the history of UEFA, its member
associations and the context of football, while UEFA media officer
Frits Ahlstrøm assumed responsibility for the second, which focused
primarily on the competitions and evolutions in the game, its
infrastructure and its equipment.

UEFA’s golden jubilee celebrations were held on Monte Caputo,

high above the Cypriot city of Limassol, on 22 April 2004, taking
up the entire first day of the 28th Ordinary Congress. “It was an
opportunity to pay tribute to some deserving servants of football, as
well as to remember the pioneers and visionaries who built UEFA,
and their successors, who have made it the dynamic and efficient
organisation that it is today,” wrote UEFA CEO Lars-Christer Olsson in his
editorial for the June 2004 edition of UEFA∙direct. “The representatives
of the national associations also had the possibility to relive – through
archive pictures and commentaries from some of the great figures
of European football – the evolution of the game and some of the
moments in the history of the European competitions that remain firmly
etched in the memory.”

Franz Beckenbauer, Emilio Butragueño, Sven-Göran Eriksson and

Michel Platini took to the stage to answer questions from another
former football star, Hansi Müller, and to reminisce together about the
history of European football. UEFA also celebrated its golden jubilee with
a project to provide mini-pitches to all its member associations, who
were invited to join in the celebrations by participating in the Summer of
Grassroots Football, the forerunner of UEFA Grassroots Day. Finally,
UEFA stayed true to its commitment to defend the specificity of sport,
staging a highly successful exhibition on the topic in Brussels in
September that year.

66
VI. FROM GUSTAV WIEDERKEHR TO ARTEMIO FRANCHI

Meanwhile, the televising of matches, which had been on the agenda

of the very first UEFA assembly, remained a constant source of debate
thanks to rapid advances in technology and the development of
international live broadcasts in particular, which could run the risk of
drawing spectators away from the stadiums. Nevertheless, the football
authorities no longer saw TV as just a threat, but also as an opportunity
to increase the popularity of their sport while at the same time
generating significant financial resources. “With respect to negotiations
between National Associations and their television companies, it might
be useful for them to know that figures prove the viewing audiences for
TV broadcasts of important football matches is much above the average,”
Hans Bangerter noted in his report for 1974 and 1975. “This proves the
interest that viewers have in these broadcasts and their high market-
rating. This fact will come in useful to back the justified claims of football
with respect to television.”

Competition growth
In terms of competitions, the European Football Championship continued
to evolve under Artemio Franchi’s presidency, with the final round
expanded from four to eight participants for the 1980 tournament in
Italy. With the teams split into two groups, the winners contested the
final and the runners-up played for third place. The mark one format
did not meet with great success, though, and a number of adjustments
were made for the 1984 edition in France, in particular the introduction
of semi-finals and the removal of the match for third place, which
was considered largely irrelevant. This was the first real ‘EURO’, as the
European Championship final round would now become known.

67
VI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The Super Cup finds its feet

The UEFA Super Cup, a contest between the winners of the Champion
Clubs’ Cup and the Cup Winners’ Cup, initially struggled to find its niche
in the European calendar, not least because of its initial home-and-away
format. Moreover, participation was not compulsory. The two legs of
the first edition could not be scheduled until January of the following
year and what should have been the second edition, in 1975, had to
be cancelled altogether. Neither was the competition played in 1981 or
1985, although the latter was because of the Heysel tragedy rather than
calendar constraints.

Further evidence of the Super Cup’s inauspicious start: unlike in

UEFA’s other competitions, there was no trophy. The winners merely
received a plaque embossed with the UEFA logo. It was not until after
the 1983 edition, when Aberdeen FC beat Hamburger SV, that the
delegate from the second leg – future UEFA treasurer Jo van Marle of
the Netherlands – suggested that a cup be presented to the winners, a
proposal that was supported by the UEFA president, Jacques Georges.
Produced by Italian firm Bertoni, it was presented for the first time in
1987 to the FC Steaua București captain, Ştefan Iovan, after his team’s
1-0 victory over FC Dynamo Kyiv.

In parallel, UEFA had started work in 1983 on a new approach

to the competition, similar to that of the European / South American
Cup. Various problems meant, however, that these plans did not come
to fruition until the match between the winners of the 1985 / 86 club
competitions, which was played as a single match on neutral territory
in Monaco, but not until 24 February 1987 – hardly the ideal slot in
the calendar. Furthermore, as a match between two eastern European
teams, FC Steaua București and FC Dynamo Kyiv, it failed to generate
sufficient general interest to get sponsors behind the new format:
a crowd of only 8,500 or so attended the game, while TV channels
showed only limited interest. The old format was therefore reintroduced
for the following season, when calendar problems immediately
resurfaced, resulting in the second leg between FC Porto and AFC Ajax
not being played until January 1988.

68
VI. FROM GUSTAV WIEDERKEHR TO ARTEMIO FRANCHI

In addition, since the club that staged the second leg considered the
game a home match, “criteria regarding UEFA’s protocol for such events
were barely met,” as the UEFA general secretary, Gerhard Aigner,
explained in a memo to the Executive Committee members. “This
affected transportation, ticket allocation, hotel reservations, protocol in
the VIP box, order around the pitch and press work, causing unreasonable
situations for the UEFA delegation,” he added.

Since it in any case no longer lived up to its initiators’ vision of

the ultimate decider between the best club sides of the season, the
question was should it simply be abolished? Meeting in Moscow on
31 March 1995, the Executive Committee decided that, on the contrary,
more should be done to raise its profile. Another new formula was
introduced in 1998 – the right one this time. The only aspect retained
from the first attempt at staging the competition as a single match was
the venue, Monaco’s Stade Louis II, which was the perfect size for this
sort of occasion. With the clubs that qualified now obliged to take part,
the Super Cup became the sporting highlight of a much bigger football
gathering held each August that included club competition draws, various
meetings, a gala evening with awards for the best players of the season
and a get-together with journalists. “By linking it with the first-round
draw, we hope to achieve a dual effect: to associate the competition
with the excitement of the draw, on the one hand, and to bring a purely
sporting element to the draw ceremony, on the other. Both events should
be reinforced as a result, as should football as a whole,” wrote Gerhard
Aigner in a UEFAflash editorial. This format lasted from 1998 to 2012,
with a few small adjustments along the way and the replacement of the
Cup Winners’ Cup holders by the winners of the UEFA Cup (from 2000)
and Europa League (2010).

On the initiative of Michel Platini, who had since taken the helm
as president of UEFA, the Super Cup left the principality of Monaco after
the 2012 edition, to visit a different European city each year. Its first two
stops were in Prague (2013) and Cardiff (2014). Monaco, meanwhile,
continued to host the annual draws and meetings.

69
VI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Meanwhile, there was a new addition to the list of UEFA club

competitions. Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf came up with the idea of
the Super Cup, a contest between the winners of the Champion Clubs’
Cup and the Cup Winners’ Cup, designed to determine, once again,
which really was the best club side in Europe. A first unofficial edition,
held in January 1973, saw Johan Cruyff’s AFC Ajax, Champion Clubs’ Cup
winners, beat Rangers FC over two legs (3-1 and 3-2). The two clubs in
contention the following year – AFC Ajax and AC Milan – also expressed
an interest in going head to head. Considering “that it would be wrong
if UEFA did not take under its control these matches,” the Emergency
Committee met on 29 June 1973 to lay down some guiding principles,
which the Executive Committee ratified in October that year. The new
competition was dubbed the ‘Super Competition’ and participation
was optional, a principle reconfirmed by the Executive Committee at its
meeting in Marbella on 27 January 1976. AFC Ajax, Champion Clubs’ Cup
winners again but now without Cruyff, who had left for FC Barcelona,
beat AC Milan (0-1, 6-0) in this official first edition in January 1974.

During this time the most noteworthy changes were actually

happening in youth football. The International Youth Tournament was
replaced by the European Under-18 Championship from the 1980 / 81
season and in 1980 UEFA launched a second age-limit competition –
the European Under-16 Tournament – initially played over two seasons.
This acquired the status of European Under-16 Championship in 1998,
and in 2001 the age limits in the both categories were raised to Under-19
and Under-17 respectively.

Meanwhile UEFA took up the fight against doping, creating a new

study group to examine the possibility of carrying out doping controls at
UEFA matches. The group met for the first time in Zurich on 10 July 1979,
with Austrian Executive Committee member Heinz Gerö in the chair. An
initial set of regulations was drawn up so that controls could be carried
out at the 1980 European Championship in Italy and the rules were
then adapted to include the finals of the Champion Clubs’ Cup and Cup
Winners’ Cup as of 1981.

70
VI. FROM GUSTAV WIEDERKEHR TO ARTEMIO FRANCHI

A tragic accident
Like his predecessor, Gustav Wiederkehr, Artemio Franchi was unable to
complete his term of office. A road accident in Tuscany on 23 August
1983 brought a sudden end to the life of a leader who had seemed
destined to become FIFA president one day.

As UEFA first vice-president at the time, Frenchman Jacques

Georges stepped in, initially on an interim basis. He was then elected
president for two years at the Paris Congress on 26 June 1984, to cover
the two remaining years of Artemio Franchi’s term, and was re-elected
for a further four years at the Munich Congress in 1998.

Once again, the transition was smooth and undisruptive, with due
respect paid to everyone’s opinions. Jacques Georges, like those before
him, favoured dialogue over dogmatism.

And yet it was during Jacques Georges’s presidency that UEFA

was to endure the darkest night in its history, when, on 29 May 1985,
the Heysel disaster transformed the annual celebration of European club
football into a tragedy that cost 39 spectators their lives.

71
72
© PHOTO GETTY IMAGES
 VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Before and after the Heysel tragedy

Violence in and around football stadiums was one of the first serious
problems that UEFA had to deal with, after the very first UEFA
competition match ever played, the Champions Clubs’ Cup match
between Sporting Clube de Portugal and FK Partizan, was marred by
violence both on and off the pitch.

UEFA relied on tough disciplinary measures to deal with players

who resorted to violent behaviour. These were strictly enforced, to good
effect, and even served as an example for the national associations’
own domestic competitions. In 1979, to mark its 25th anniversary,
UEFA thought it should grant a partial amnesty, cancelling more than
100 player suspensions of up to three matches and reducing more
severe punishments. “UEFA hoped this partial amnesty would act
as an encouragement for greater sportsmanship and more fair play.
Unfortunately it did not have this effect. On the contrary: the level of
disturbances had never been so high as it was at the beginning of the
1979–80 season. This provided plenty of food for thought and also
provided the UEFA authorities with plenty of work,” the general secretary,
Hans Bangerter, wrote a few months later. There was nothing else for
it but for UEFA to return to its hard line, an approach that it has never
veered from since.

A much more difficult task was that of eradicating crowd trouble

in and around the stadiums. Twenty years after UEFA came into being,
Hans Bangerter noted in his biennial report for 1994 and 1995 that:
“… much more obvious was the increase in incidents and disturbances
Football matches
wouldn’t be the caused by the public … Violence does not only occur in the stadia, where
same without the mob believes that it is particularly easy to give vent to its violence
passionate fans.
in the anonymity of the crowd; examples from other walks of life show
Sadly they do not
always manage sufficiently clearly that this is a serious social problem.”
to channel their
emotions as well as
the Bayern München
crowd at the 2013
UEFA Champions
League final in
London, where
the Bavarians beat
Borussia Dortmund
2-1.

73
VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

A series of measures taken

While there was no denying that hooliganism was a social problem,
and UEFA sometimes criticised the public authorities’ failure to take
a harder line with the troublemakers, it did not merely sit back and
wait for them to take stringent action. Instead, it emphasised in its
disciplinary framework the clubs’ responsibility for their supporters,
whether genuine fans or just troublemakers; it issued ‘Binding guidelines
and recommendations for the prevention of crowd disturbances’,
which entered into force in 1976 and were revised in May 1983; and it
imposed harsh disciplinary sanctions, ranging from the disqualification
of clubs from UEFA competitions to stadium bans and heavy fines.
Between 1973 and 1975 alone, SS Lazio and Leeds United AFC were
disqualified for supporter misconduct, while stadium bans were imposed
on Panathinaikos FC, Olympiacos FC, Fenerbahçe SK and Tottenham
Hotspur FC for crowd disturbances or violent conduct by their supporters.

Even UEFA finals were not immune. The 1972 Cup Winners’
Cup final between Rangers FC and FC Dinamo Moskva on 24 May in
Barcelona had to be interrupted several times when visibly drunk Rangers
supporters repeatedly invaded the pitch. At its meeting in Vienna
on 6 June, the Executive Committee unanimously decided that finals
staged at neutral venues should only be held in stadiums with adequate
security installations, such as wire fences or moats. It also “urgently
recommended” that all national associations and their clubs should put
such security installations in place for all UEFA competition matches, and
declared that associations or clubs that failed to do so would be held
responsible for any incidents.

This did not prevent further disgraceful incidents occurring at

the Champion Clubs’ Cup final between FC Bayern München and Leeds
United in Paris on 28 May 1975, when, despite all the security measures
that had been taken, so-called ‘supporters’ of the English club went on
the rampage at the Parc des Princes, causing damage inside the stadium.
During the economic crisis of the early 1980s, when unemployment was
high, hooliganism became increasingly common and posed a constant
threat to international competitions. In 1984, the Council of Europe
showed how serious the problem by issuing ‘Recommendations on
the reduction of spectator violence at sporting events and in particular
at football matches’, themselves based on binding instructions issued
by UEFA. These recommendations, which were approved by the sports

74
VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

ministers of the countries concerned, urged that public authorities do

everything in their power to combat hooliganism. This was clearly not
always the case.

Fearing the worst

So, despite the steps taken, there was a constant sense at this time that
disaster could strike. It did on 11 May 1985, albeit by accident, when
a stand at the Valley Parade stadium in Bradford caught fire during an
English Third Division match between Bradford City and Lincoln City,
causing the death 56 spectators and injuring many more.

Some two weeks later, the Heysel Stadium in Brussels was to host
the Champion Clubs’ Cup final and, although the clash between Juventus
and Liverpool FC was a mouth-watering prospect on the pitch, many
feared the worst on account of the hostility between certain English and
Italian ‘supporters’. Those fears were confirmed when 39 supporters died
that night, with several hundred more left injured.

This was, without doubt, the blackest day in the history of

European international football, as Hans Bangerter wrote in the preamble
to the general secretary’s report for 1984 and 1985: “UEFA, together
with the entire European football community, suffered during this period
the darkest day in its whole history, when on May 29, 1985, what was to
have been … the highlight of the 1984 / 85 European club season turned
out instead to be the most terrible tragedy in the history of football in
our continent. Senseless acts of violence by criminal elements caused the
death of 39 innocent people, and inflicted injuries on a further 400. This
bloody spectacle with its record of horror unleashed a wave of sorrow
and helplessness, as millions of people witnessed the catastrophe on live
television.”

Investigatory panel
UEFA immediately set up an investigatory panel, which comprised two
Executive Committee members, Antero da Silva Resende of Portugal and
Günter Schneider of East Germany, who had been the UEFA delegate at
the match. Technical problems meant that it was Resende who had to
present to the Executive Committee the conclusions of the investigation,
together with the report written by Schneider immediately after the final.

75
VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The report’s conclusion was clear: “The tragedy was in the first place
caused by the aggressive, undisciplined and violent behaviour of a part
of the English supporters. It might, however, have been avoided by
preventive and efficacious interventions of the security forces.” Having
rushed to the scene of the initial incidents, Günter Schneider realised
immediately that the police presence was inadequate, but his requests for
reinforcements went unheeded.

Preparations for the final had nonetheless been carried out in

accordance with UEFA’s requirements and special measures had been
taken, including the construction of a fence to segregate the two groups
of supporters on the terraces and another barrier around the stadium
to create a ‘neutral zone’ which could only be accessed after initial
checks had been carried out. The Royal Belgian Football Association
had suggested additional measures, such as a ban on the sale of alcohol
within a certain radius of the stadium on the day of the match, but the
authorities had rejected them. Recalling that the Heysel Stadium had
hosted nine previous UEFA finals, Antero da Silva Resende stressed that:
“Five meetings took place as from 12 February. At each of these meetings
one representative of the police was present, and a representative of the
gendarmerie attended three of the meetings. The police had also sent a
representative to the European Cup Winners’ Cup final Everton – Rapid
Vienne on 15.5.1985 in Rotterdam to examine the security measures
taken there, and to Liverpool to consult the local police authorities.
Representatives of the two finalist clubs were present at least at one of
the meetings mentioned above.” Ticket sales had also been arranged to
keep the supporters apart, but the production of counterfeit tickets in
Italy, the black market and the inordinate number of Italian supporters
upset the organisers’ plans. Finally, as detailed by the investigators, the
police (around 120 officers were stationed inside the stadium when
the incidents took place, with around 300 outside, mainly searching
spectators) were totally overwhelmed for a number of reasons:
–– the stadium was divided into two zones, one controlled by the
police and the other by the gendarmerie, with no coordinating
officer;
–– the action plan was too rigid and it was clear that it could not be
adapted to the situation;
–– there were insufficient officers on duty and no special forces
on standby (even though this was clearly stipulated in the UEFA
requirements);

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VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

–– there was no police surveillance in the city centre;

–– controls at the stadium entrances were ineffective and supporters
were able to take dangerous objects into the stadium, or even
enter without tickets;
–– the fences did not have the desired effect because the police
presence around them was inadequate.

English clubs out in the cold

After receiving the investigators’ report, the UEFA Executive Committee
met in Basel, Switzerland, on 2 June 1985. Since it was unable to impose
disciplinary measures itself because of the principle of the separation
of powers adopted by UEFA, the committee submitted the file to the
Control and Disciplinary Committee. It did, however, decide that UEFA
would not allow any English clubs in its competitions until further notice
and that action would be taken to improve safety in and around stadiums.
It also decided that the England national team’s participation in the 1988
European Championship qualifying competition would be discussed but
at a later date.

Shortly before that, under pressure from the British prime minister,
Margaret Thatcher, The Football Association, chaired by Bert Millichip,
had itself decided that English clubs should not be allowed to play in
UEFA competitions until football hooliganism had been properly dealt
with. The Belgian government, meanwhile, banned English clubs from its
territory.

The UEFA Control and Disciplinary Committee, meeting in Zurich

on 20 June with Vladimir Petr of Czechoslovakia in the chair, suspended
Liverpool FC from all UEFA club competitions for three seasons, as of
when the other English clubs were readmitted. The Italian club, which
already had a disciplinary record, was ordered to play its next two
UEFA competition home matches behind closed doors for the less than
exemplary conduct of some of its supporters. Finally, the Royal Belgian
Football Association was banned from hosting a Champions Clubs’ Cup
or Cup Winners’ Cup final for ten years.

Appeals from both clubs were rejected by the Board of Appeal on

8 August 1985.

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VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

UEFA’s press release

“Following the tragic events which occurred before the European

Champion Clubs’ Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus Turin at the
Heysel Stadium in Brussels on May 29, 1985, UEFA wishes to express its
deepest condolences to the families of all those victims of acts of criminal
violence by so-called supporters. Sympathies are also extended to the
clubs, associations and countries affected.

The decision to play the game despite the tragedy was taken in
consultation between UEFA, the finalist clubs, their national associations,
the organizing association and the police and gendarmerie forces. It was
felt that it would have been an enormous risk to evacuate the stadium
without playing, and that this might have caused more victims.

As a result of this catastrophe, which calls the future of the

European competitions into question, UEFA will immediately launch an
investigation to identify those responsible to ensure that such a tragedy
does not happen again.” Brussels, May 29, 1985

On 7 June, UEFA created a fund for the families of victims of the

Heysel disaster. Following an initial donation of 500,000 Swiss francs, a
total of around 1.2 million Swiss francs was raised and distributed with
the help of the Red Cross.

The Belgian FA’s reaction

The president of the Royal Belgian Football Association, Louis Wouters,
a former UEFA Executive Committee member, was quoted in the 30 May
edition of the daily newspaper Le Soir as saying: “We deployed 2,500
helmeted gendarmes. We could not justify mobilising all the country’s
gendarmes to keep order at a football match.”

“As a last resort,” he added, “before the match finally kicked off at
21.40, it was decided to call in the army to assist … Calling the match off
would have added fuel to the fire. We plunged into a full-blown disaster;
that evening, Belgian football, European football and football as a whole
suffered one of the darkest tragedies in the history of sport.”

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VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

“We had to play”

Much has been written about the Heysel tragedy, which moralisers of all
kinds used as a choice platform from which to make noxious comments
not so much about the hooligans but rather about the organisers, in
particular UEFA, which was described as reckless, immoral, and even
greedy. Professional football itself was thrown to the lions and had shame
heaped upon it.

One aspect that came in for particular criticism was the fact that
the match went ahead while bodies lay nearby. The players were also
criticised for celebrating during the match. “We weren’t told”, says Michel
Platini, who was playing for Juventus that evening. “Admittedly, kick-off
was delayed, but incidents were common in those days. Fights happened
all the time; supporters took knives and other weapons into the stadium,
and the authorities did not do enough to stop them. At the time, we
weren’t told about the scale of the tragedy.”

While the players waited, representatives of UEFA, the two

clubs and their national associations, the mayor of Brussels, an Italian
politician, and representatives of the Royal Belgian Football Association
and the Belgian public authorities held a crisis meeting in a stadium
lounge plunged into darkness for fear of attracting the attention of
the hooligans. The atmosphere was toxic, with criticism flying in all
directions, and there was no sign of a decision being reached. It took
all the sang-froid and clear-headedness of the UEFA general secretary,
Hans Bangerter, to break the impasse. When the police representatives
said they would be unable to control the situation if the final was
cancelled, only one decision was possible: the match had to go ahead
if further tragedy were to be avoided. The two captains would address
the supporters over the loudspeaker but they were not be told of the
seriousness of what had happened, since most were unaware of the
situation that had unfolded around them.

As Michel Platini still says today: “Had we known, we’d probably

have refused to play, but there was no other option.”

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VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

New preventive measures

The Executive Committee took some time to reflect before dismissing
the idea of cancelling the UEFA competitions for a season, or even
longer, concluding that this would be tantamount to giving in to the
troublemakers and condemning football for a problem for which it was
not ultimately responsible. It also rejected measures such as banning the
sale of tickets to visiting supporters, judging that this would be impossible
to enforce

At its meeting in Paris on 20 and 21 August 1985, the Executive

Committee established a Stadia Committee, which was given the task
of closely inspecting all stadiums put forward to host club competition
finals. It also decided to draw up a list of requirements to be met by
stadiums wishing to host UEFA finals. Until then, the national associations
had been responsible for the state of these stadiums, with the UEFA
administration only visiting them in advance to sort out matters relating
to protocol, technical and contractual issues, and media facilities. At
that same meeting in August 1985, the Executive Committee approved
a revised version of its binding instructions and recommendations to
avoid crowd disturbances, which divided UEFA competition matches
into two categories: high-risk matches and normal-risk matches. High-
risk matches included all UEFA club competition finals and semi-finals,
European Football Championship final rounds, matches involving clubs
whose supporters had caused trouble at previous matches, sold-out
matches, matches played in front of more than 50,000 spectators,
matches at which more than 3,000 visiting supporters were expected,
and matches that were likely to attract a large number of nationals of the
country of the away team residing in the country of the home team or in
neighbouring countries.

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VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

Appealing to the authorities

UEFA also knew that football could not solve this societal problem on
its own and needed the unconditional support of the public authorities.
It was therefore quick to accept the invitation of the Council of Europe
to participate in a meeting of an expert commission on the problem
of violence in sport in general and in the football stadium in particular,
which convened in Strasbourg on 24 and 25 June 1985. As reported in
the 28 August 1985 issue of UEFA Information, the Executive Committee
“noted with satisfaction the Convention drawn up by the Sports Ministers
of the Council of Europe [and] expressed its hope that all the member
States would ratify and observe the Convention in full, so that the public
authorities would support the enormous efforts involved in organizing
major football matches.” UEFA was given a permanent seat as an
observer on the Standing Committee of the Convention.

The Executive Committee also asked three independent, reliable

individuals who lived in England to monitor hooliganism in the country
and report regularly to the general secretariat.

At its meeting in Vienna on 17 October 1985, the Executive

Committee unanimously decided to allow the English national team
to participate in the qualifying matches for the 1988 European
Championship, which was to be held in West Germany. However, it did so
on condition that The Football Association obtained the full cooperation
of the British government in order to avoid incidents at its team’s
matches, including checks on supporters’ travel arrangements and travel
agencies involved in away matches, and if necessary the deployment of
specialist British police officers in the countries hosting those matches.

Before the start of each season, the Executive Committee, on

the basis of the aforementioned reports and other documents, assessed
whether the time was right to readmit English clubs into the UEFA club
competitions. In 1987 and 1988, it said no. The English themselves were
not convinced that they had managed to get hooliganism under control.
The Liverpool FC chairman, John Smith, said at a press conference that,
in his opinion, the English public was still not ready, psychologically,
to return to European football. He also said that although some other
countries were experiencing the same problems, they did not export their
hooligans in the way the English did.

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In 1988, The Football Association itself decided not to request

readmission to the UEFA club competitions following trouble by English
supporters at the recent European Championship.

A winning return
The following year, the Executive Committee decided the time had come
to give English clubs a chance, even though the reports coming out of
England were still not entirely positive, far from it in fact. On 12 April
1989, following its meeting in Palmela in Portugal, it issued the following
press release: “Having regard to the enormous efforts undertaken by the
English Football authorities in order to improve the security measures at
football matches, the Executive Committee of UEFA decided unanimously
the re-integration of the English clubs into the European Club
Competitions, with effect from the 1990–91 season. This re-integration
will take place subject to the implementation and observation by the
British government of the European Convention for the fight against
violence in sports, and provided the government gives its support and aid
to the English Football authorities. UEFA President Jacques Georges will
seek a meeting with the British Minister for Sports in April 1990. Based
on the President’s report, the Executive Committee will confirm or refuse
the decision taken today in Portugal.”

That meeting with the British sports minister had not taken
place by the time Jacques Georges stepped down as UEFA president at
the UEFA Congress in Malta in April 1990. It was his successor, Lennart
Johansson, who travelled to London on 12 May and met the minister for
sport, Colin Moynihan, along with the chairman and chief executive of
The Football Association, Bert Millichip and Graham Kelly. They agreed to
see how England supporters behaved at the 1990 FIFA World Cup in Italy
before taking a final decision.

At the Executive Committee meeting in Geneva on 10 July, Bert

Millichip reported on the positive feedback he had received from the
British sports minister. As a result, English clubs were readmitted to the
UEFA club competitions for the 1990 / 91 season.

Having not been represented in the UEFA club competitions for

five seasons, The Football Association’s coefficient ranking had reached
rock bottom and, according to the UEFA access list, it was only entitled to
enter two clubs. With the champions, Liverpool FC, suspended for three

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VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

more seasons, those places were awarded to Aston Villa FC in the UEFA
Cup and Manchester United FC in the Cup Winners’ Cup. To mark the
English clubs’ return in the best possible way, Manchester United went all
the way to the Cup Winners’ Cup final, where they beat FC Barcelona 2-1
in Rotterdam on 15 May 1991.

The suspension of Liverpool FC was lifted by the Executive

Committee a season later, at its meeting in London on 18 and 19
April 1991.

Hauled before the courts

While the return of English clubs was undoubtedly good news, the
Brussels appeal court’s guilty verdict against the UEFA general secretary,
Hans Bangerter, was met with incomprehension and indignation by the
Executive Committee. At its meeting in Zurich in July 1988, it had already
declared that it was “deeply troubled by the direct summons to appear
before a court in Brussels” and had objected to “these summons, which
are contrary to the conclusions of the investigation led by the court
authorities entrusted with the inquiry and prosecution. Said investigation
did not raise any accusation nor any charge of negligence against UEFA
which could serve as a basis for legal action.” At the same time, the
Executive Committee said that it had “every confidence in the Belgian
courts.” It was initially proved right, since the Brussels court of first
instance absolved UEFA of all responsibility, while issuing a guilty verdict
against the general secretary of the Royal Belgian Football Association,
Albert Roosens. However, it had not reckoned on the tenacity of the civil
action lawyers, who lodged an appeal.

On 26 June 1990, the Brussels appeal court gave the by then

former UEFA general secretary a three-month suspended prison sentence
and a fine, a verdict described as “incomprehensible” by his successor,
Gerhard Aigner, in the September 1990 UEFA Official Bulletin. Under the
heading ‘The end justifies the means’ he wrote: “For any observer of the
trial there can be no doubt whatsoever that this verdict was passed with
the sole intention of finding in UEFA a party which would be able to meet
the financial demands of the injured parties.” He continued: “Not only has
the Court in Brussels perpetrated a gross miscarriage of justice, but it has
also placed in jeopardy all football events and other sporting occasions …
The situation could, therefore, arise where the local organizers who are
directly responsible for safety completely underestimate the realities of

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VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

staging a football match and flout the regulations which have been laid
down by the European national associations themselves, but they would
still be either wholly or partially released from their responsibility.”

Standing firmly behind its former general secretary, UEFA

appealed to the court of cassation but failed to persuade it to overturn
the decision, which was confirmed on 16 October 1991. Making it clear
that it had never recognised the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts, UEFA
did not take the case any further. However, in a press release issued
after its meeting in New York on 4 December, the Executive Committee
announced that there could be no question, under these circumstances,
of Belgium hosting a UEFA club competition final or a European Football
Championship final round.

Defining responsibilities
The European governing body’s implication in the tragedy, through its
general secretary, forced it to take steps to ensure that legal proceedings
could not be taken against it, directly or through one or other of its
representatives, whenever the slightest incident occurred in a competition
organised under its auspices. In 1987 it had already set up an ad hoc
legal committee, chaired by Austrian Heinz Gerö and composed of
legal experts from various other UEFA committees. They were asked to
better define the responsibilities of the hosts and UEFA in relation to
UEFA competition matches, especially finals and final tournaments. They
also recommended that the UEFA Statutes be amended at the 1988
UEFA Congress in Munich in order to make a distinction between the
administrative side, which was UEFA’s responsibility, and the operational
side, which was part of the local organisers’ remit.

As well as amendments to its directives on safety and security in

stadiums, UEFA adopted a plan to gradually reduce the use of standing
areas at UEFA competition matches, culminating in a total ban as of
the 1998 / 99 season. In addition, from 1990 / 91, clubs entering UEFA
competitions had to submit a certificate from the public authorities
confirming that their stadiums complied with the applicable safety
regulations. National associations wishing to participate in European
Championship qualifiers had to do the same. Clubs and member
associations were also required to have the necessary insurance policies
in place, in particular for civil liability.

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VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

At its meeting in New York in December 1991, the Executive Committee

also decided to amend the procedure for selecting stadiums to host club
competition finals. Instead of inviting the member associations to submit
nominations, it asked the Stadia Committee to draw up a list of stadiums
that met a very strict set of criteria, so that it could choose the host
stadiums of future UEFA club competition finals itself, in principle on the
recommendation of the Club Competitions Committee.

In the first few months after the tragedy, UEFA also expressed
a desire to implement educational and preventive measures alongside
its crackdown on hooliganism. One of the first things it did was
to encourage fair play in its competitions, starting with the youth
competitions, in which fair play trophies were awarded from 1988.
A fair play trophy was then introduced at EURO ’92, and awarded to
the Netherlands. Fair play rankings for all the national associations were
introduced in the 1995 / 96 season, taking all UEFA club and national
team matches into account. The reward for the top three associations has
been an extra place – in principle, for the winners of their domestic fair
play competition – in the qualifying rounds of the UEFA Europa League
(or the UEFA Cup before that).

European football starts to thrive

It would be completely unjust to limit an account of Jacques Georges’s
presidency to that ill-fated evening at Heysel and its consequences.
The 1980s were also a period in which European football thrived and
saw its popularity steadily increase. Its leaders’ initial distrust of TV
had long disappeared, and they no longer feared that televised football
would empty the stadiums, at least not where major international
matches were concerned. Also long gone was the time when the holders
of football match rights had been forced to fight for a decent return on
their investment because the lack of competition between broadcasters
had provided no incentive for them to be generous. In 1960 UEFA had
signed an agreement for the transmission of its club competition finals
and the European Nations’ Cup with the European Broadcasting Union
(EBU), essentially composed of western European broadcasters, and in
1963 with the International Radio and Television Organisation (OIRT),
an eastern European network. In 1976 UEFA created a UEFA-EBU joint
committee to deal with TV matters.

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VII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

As far as the balance sheets of the associations and clubs were

concerned, television income was poised to overtake gate receipts,
while the sale of advertising boards in the stadiums became more
lucrative as TV – albeit reluctantly – introduced them to an international
audience. Even though marketing agencies, who were more familiar
with commercial negotiations than the average football administrator,
sometimes kept a significant share of the financial windfall for themselves,
the future looked bright as more and more independent broadcasters
started to appear on the scene.

The main beneficiaries of the increasing media coverage of

football and the financial income that it generated were, not surprisingly,
the top professional footballers, who were gradually transformed into
true international stars, with pay packets to match, often thanks to
agents who acted as intermediaries between players and clubs. However,
salaries were still a world away from the astronomical sums paid to
subsequent generations of footballers, as journalist Chérif Ghemmour
wrote in ‘Football champagne et soirées paillettes’ (Champagne football
and glitzy parties), published by the French magazine So Foot in 2013:
“When he signed for Parma in 1998, Alain Boghossian, a decent player,
earned as much in a month as the great Michel Platini had earned in a
year when he was at Juve … That says it all. In the 1980s, except for a
handful of stars, footballers earned a good living, but nothing more.”

In search of new resources

By the end of the 1970s, football had become more professional and
the clubs had to keep boosting their coffers if they were to afford the
best players. Not all the methods they used were above board, with
some creating secret funds in an attempt to evade the taxman. The clubs
entered a world of commercial enterprise. While their income steadily
rose, they needed to be very sensible if they were to really make the most
of it, and reason and passion do not always go hand in hand …

Paradoxically, the richer the game became, the greater the number
of clubs that went into the red. A report by the Study Commission on the
Crisis in Football, submitted to the Executive Committee in April 1986,
described the situation in no uncertain terms under the heading ‘The poor
management of professional clubs’: “The clubs’ expenditure is higher by
about 10% than their receipts, and this in spite of substantial television
and publicity [advertising] receipts. The players’ wages are too high.

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VII. BEFORE AND AFTER THE HEYSEL TRAGEDY

Some transfers cost the clubs a fortune.” Ten years earlier, UEFA had
already started to worry about club debts and had sent its member
associations a circular asking for their views, in order to try to remedy
the situation. In contrast to most of the replies, which were generally
positive, the West German association accused UEFA of interfering in
the associations’ internal affairs, “to the astonishment of the Executive
Committee,” according to the minutes of its March 1977 meeting.

Promoting development
UEFA also benefited financially from the growing popularity of its
competitions. It dedicated this income exclusively to football development
activities, subsidising its youth competitions and regularly organising
courses for coaches and referees. It also made payments to the clubs
knocked out in the early rounds of its competitions, which had incurred
losses by participating.

It organised special activities from time to time, too. To mark

International Youth Year in 1985, for example, it invited two young
footballers from each of its 34 member associations to attend the
match between France and Uruguay at the Parc des Princes in Paris on
21 August in the European / South American Nations Cup, a short-lived
competition (only two editions ever took place) between the champions
of Europe and South America, dedicated to former UEFA president
Artemio Franchi. During their stay, the youngsters also took part in a
cultural programme, visited the French Football Federation headquarters,
enjoyed a training session with the French national team and met its
coach, Michel Hidalgo. The UEFA president, Jacques Georges, was in Paris
to greet them. “I hope that this visit will be about more than a football
match and everything that goes with it, enjoyable though that may be,
and that it will bring all the countries that make up UEFA closer together,”
he told them.

As the turbulent 1980s drew to a close, the 1988 UEFA Congress

in Munich adopted the proposal tabled by the Danish Football Association
and seconded by the British and the other Nordic associations to expand
the Executive Committee to 12 members, in view of the governing bodies
growing number of activities.

87
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© PHOTO GETTY IMAGES
 VIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The Champions League is born

Deeply affected by the Heysel tragedy and all the criticism that had
followed (some of which even suggested, without a hint of evidence,
that the match had been fixed), Jacques Georges stepped down as
president at the Congress in Malta on 20 April 1990 and was appointed
UEFA honorary president. Another significant change had taken place just
over a year earlier, when Hans Bangerter had retired from his position
as UEFA general secretary at the end of December 1988, after 29 years
of service. He was succeeded at the helm of the general secretariat by
Gerhard Aigner of West Germany, a UEFA employee since 1969 who had
been in charge of the competitions department when he was appointed
general secretary.

Two very different candidates, both Executive Committee members,

were in the running to succeed Jacques Georges as UEFA president. It was
Sweden’s Lennart Johansson who came out on top, beating UEFA vice-
president Freddy Rumo of Switzerland by 20 votes to 15.

The very core of European football

Lennart Johansson’s presidency was a particularly eventful period for
UEFA, which, more than ever before, established itself as an indispensable
link between the European national associations. “The associations no
longer see UEFA as the classic sporting authority of yesteryear, but as
the very core of European football. UEFA has become an institution
which … has to realize the revenue that our sport deserves, in accordance
with its popularity, for the benefit of football. At the same time, UEFA,
on account of its tradition, history and expertise, must effectively
represent the continent’s interests within the world footballing body,
FIFA,” Gerhard Aigner said in his general secretary’s report for 1994 and
1995. “All in a growing Europe, which, in all areas of life, including the
world of sport, is seeking a new identity.”

Danny Blind,
after AFC Ajax’s
1-0 victory over
AC Milan in the
inaugural UEFA
Champions League
final on 24 May
1995 in Vienna.

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VIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Lennart Johansson hit the ground running and the foundations for the
Champions League were laid within a few months of his election. Gerhard
Aigner, who was also heavily involved in this process, explains: “We had to
do something. The clubs, especially Real Madrid, wanted more matches,
more financial security. The Champion Clubs’ Cup was overshadowed
by the UEFA Cup at the time because it only included one club from
each association, whereas there were several from each country in the
UEFA Cup. The answer was to introduce group matches.” Back in 1968,
in the September edition of the Official Bulletin, Hans Bangerter had
posed the question: “Has the time come for a European Football League
Championship?” He had imagined, among other things, a competition
combining group and knockout matches. However, he had concluded that
“a European Championship for Clubs … cannot be set up without careful
preparation work and will not come into being in the near future.”

Almost a quarter of a century later, the time for “careful

preparation work” had come. “Directors Klaus Hempel and Jürgen Lenz
were about to leave UEFA commercial partner ISL and they had invited
us to a farewell dinner in Zurich to mark the occasion,” Gerhard Aigner
explained. “Various discussions and exchanges of opinion that evening
resulted in a meeting at the Käfer restaurant in Munich, where an
agreement to develop the project was signed on four beer mats! The final
could not be included in the deal immediately because there were existing
contracts in force. We also had to work with a different agency so that
there would be no conflicts of interest.”

The plan was discussed in detail at the Executive Committee

meeting in London on 18 and 19 April 1991. The minutes of the meeting
are discreet – not everyone was in favour of the project. The official
record focuses on the financial considerations: “The introduction of a
new system of staging the European Champions Cup also calls for a re-
assessment of the financial requirements. UEFA must make it clear to the
world at large that this phase of the competition is under the complete
control of the European Confederation.”

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VIII. THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE IS BORN

A new format
A working group was set up to lay the groundwork for a new set of
regulations, to be discussed at the next Executive Committee meeting
in Bari, on 29 May. The group met three times: in Muri, near Berne,
on 6 May; in Rotterdam on 14 May; and in Bari the morning of the
Executive Committee meeting on 29 May. The committee approved
the working group’s proposal that 1991 / 92 be used as a transitional
season, in which the Champion Clubs’ Cup would follow a new format.
Originally proposed by Rangers FC and backed by the Club Competitions
Committee, the new format involved a final round of two groups of four
teams who met each other home and away, with a final between the
two group winners but no central marketing of the commercial rights
because there was still no legal basis for such an arrangement. In order to
establish a basis in the UEFA Statutes, an Extraordinary Congress was held
on 19 September 1991 in Montreux, where the presidents and general
secretaries of the member associations were already due to meet the
following day.

Under the headline ‘All-inclusive contract required’, Gerhard

Aigner clearly explained the Executive Committee’s thinking in his editorial
for the September issue of UEFAflash, a monthly publication launched
at the start of that year to supplement the Official Bulletin: “There are
several reasons for this proposal: Developments in politics, economics and
technology are increasingly pushing the medium of television to the fore
as a means of communication in Europe. The various holders of rights
(associations / clubs) have also recognized this, but insufficient experience
in the field has brought them into contact with third parties whose prime
interest, generally speaking, is not the game of football, and this leads to
the uncontrolled marketing of television pictures of football matches.

“However, the Executive Committee is convinced that a lucrative

all-inclusive contract can be concluded for the matches in the final phase
of the Champion Clubs’ Cup, which would in turn provide significant
sums for all those involved. By distributing the money in a fair manner
which has been carefully thought out in advance, it will be possible to
guarantee that the marketing of these matches will be to the benefit of
the game of football as a whole and not merely the eight clubs involved,
who, as a rule, are among the most significant ones from a financial point
of view …

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VIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

“Consequently, UEFA will be in a position to improve the technical and

organizational structures of the competitions by virtue of the income
which it receives from the venture. This will mean in particular that
all costs for referees at each European Competition match can be
assumed by UEFA; drug testing can be carried out at all matches from
the quarter-final stage onwards or, in the cases of the European Club
Competitions, from the final round; two delegates can be used at all
high-risk matches … ; the final tournaments of the youth competitions
will be able to benefit from extensive financing, including the travelling
expenses of the teams, as well as payment of substantial contributions
towards the travel expenses for qualifying matches in the youth
competitions; the Women’s European Championship can also receive
extensive financing, and the referees can be given more intensive training
and preparation for the European competitions.”

The green light from Congress

At the Extraordinary Congress in Montreux, the national association
delegates unanimously approved the amendments to the statutes that
were required to establish the new format, although some expressed
concerns, in particular about the high number of televised matches and
the congested calendar.

The new format, with its two groups of four in which first place
led straight to the final, was tried out during the 1991 / 92 season while,
behind the scenes, preparations were made for centralised marketing.
This included, where necessary, negotiations to resolve cases in which
clubs were already tied to long-term contracts with marketing agencies.

The Executive Committee reviewed the experiment in Brussels

on 22 April 1992, based on the conclusions of the Club Competitions
Committee, which had met in the same city earlier in the day. One
opinion in particular held sway – that of a panel of renowned technicians
Jupp Heynckes, René Hüssy, Josef Hickersberger and Gérard Houllier,
all of whom welcomed the new format, believing that it enabled the
coaches of the eight participating clubs to prepare better, that it reduced
the risk / luck factor, and that the referees detected less tension in the
early matches, since a defeat at that stage did not put the clubs in too
precarious a position. They also pointed out that club directors liked
knowing they had three matches’ worth of guaranteed gate receipts.

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VIII. THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE IS BORN

Centralised marketing
The new format was therefore adopted until further notice. All that was
left was to finalise the centralised marketing of the 24 group matches.
UEFA had decided not to give up the TV and advertising rights to an
agency that would re-sell them, but to market them centrally itself. To
help it in this task, UEFA wanted an agency that could dedicate itself
entirely to the competition. After an in-depth analysis of the seven
bids submitted, the Executive Committee convened in London for an
extraordinary meeting on 2 February 1992 and chose The Event Agency
and Marketing, or TEAM AG, a Swiss company based in Lucerne. Until
that point, the European confederation had worked with agencies only
in connection with the Champion Clubs’ Cup and Cup Winners’ Cup
finals, and European Football Championship final rounds. Its partners,
dealing initially only with advertising inside the stadiums and later with
merchandising as well, had been Sport TV Bruxelles (1973–78), West Nally
Group (1979–82), ROFA (1983–1990) and ISL (since 1983). Still under
contract when the new European Cup format was adopted, ISL remained
a EURO partner until it went bankrupt in 2001.

“The new system,” explains Gerhard Aigner, “was broadly

based, only more successfully, on the same principles as the European
Championship final round. But as far as the club competitions were
concerned, the partnership between rights holders, TV broadcasters and
sponsors was a revolutionary idea that subsequently became the norm in
other competitions, not only in football but in many other sports.”

Uniformity and visibility

The name ‘Champions League’ was adopted to give prominence to the
group stage and a corresponding logo was unveiled to the media at the
club competition first round draws in Geneva on 15 July 1992. The ‘UEFA’
prefix was added the following season to reinforce the event’s identity as
a UEFA competition.

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VIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Changes to the UEFA Champions League

The basic concept of the Champions League was to offer the clubs
group matches to help them manage their budgets more efficiently.
They were each guaranteed a fixed number of home games, as well
as a share of TV and advertising revenue that did not depend on the
attractiveness of the opposition. However, they still had to qualify for
the group stage, which could be more than a mere formality, as Leeds
United AFC, VfB Stuttgart and holders FC Barcelona (who faced CSKA
Moskva) all learned to their cost in the 1992 / 93 season. The following
year, it was Manchester United FC’s turn to fall before reaching the
group stage, when they were knocked out by Galatasaray AŞ.

When eliminated, the clubs themselves were not the only ones
feeling downcast: the broadcasters in their respective countries also lost
out because audience figures were bound to suffer from the national
champions’ absence, making it more difficult for them to recoup the
money they had invested.

After the introduction of single-leg semi-finals in 1993 / 94, when

each group winner played host to the other group’s runner-up, the
format was therefore adjusted again in 1994 / 95. This time the basic
structure of the competition was reversed: after just one qualifying
knockout round, the main part of the competition started with group
matches, then quarter-finals, semi-finals and the final. In addition, the
number of group stage participants was doubled, from 8 to 16. The
holders and the national champions of the seven countries at the top
of the UEFA rankings received a bye in the qualifying round, which
only involved domestic champions from the associations occupying the
next 16 places. This meant that the other national champions were
excluded from the Champion Clubs’ Cup. By way of compensation they
were awarded a place in the UEFA Cup, which now numbered 100
participants rather than 64.

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VIII. THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE IS BORN

In the editorial for the December 1993 issue of the UEFA Official Bulletin,
Gerhard Aigner commented on the new system: “By changing the
format of its club competitions and by reserving the Champion Clubs’
Cup for an elite selection of teams, and a large one at that, the European
Football Union has not departed from the original pioneering spirit
[of the competition’s founders]; in fact, UEFA has merely adapted its
competitions to the changed circumstances. The new system adopted
does not ultimately close the door on anyone as far as participation is
concerned; the clubs will, however, have to cross this particular threshold
on merit by achieving worthy performances over a number of years …
UEFA feels that by introducing its new format, it has considered the
interests of European football in general. The Champion Clubs’ Cup
must remain what its initiators intended it to be: a competition to
determine the best club team in the continent, without the burden of
a surfeit of preliminary-round matches that merely serve to dilute the
interest in the event.”

Another change was introduced in 1997 / 98, when the access

list again included 48 domestic champions. The top eight national
associations in the UEFA rankings were invited to enter two clubs: their
league champions, who, in principle, qualified for the group stage
automatically, and the runners-up, who had to negotiate qualifying.
The champions of the 32 lowest-ranked associations played in the first
qualifying round; the 16 winners then contested a second qualifying
round, where they were joined by the domestic runners-up and the
remaining champions. The number of group stage participants rose to
24, split into six groups. The group winners and the two best runners-up
went through to the quarter-finals.

This format only lasted two seasons, as the competition was

expanded further in 1999 / 2000 to accommodate a group stage of 32
teams divided into eight groups. The associations at the top of the UEFA
rankings were each able to enter up to four clubs, two of which had
to go through qualifying. The top two in each group entered a second
group stage; the top two in each of these groups then contested the
quarter-finals.

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VIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Despite opposition from the big clubs, the Executive Committee decided
to get rid of the second group stage as of 2003 / 04 on the grounds
that it made the competition more cumbersome without generating
any sporting benefit. It replaced it with a round of 16 played home
and away.

After Michel Platini’s election to the UEFA presidency in 2007,

his desire to make it easier for champions from the lower-ranked
associations to participate in the Champions League led to the
qualifying stage being divided into two paths, one for champions that
failed to qualify directly and the other for the teams finishing second,
third or fourth in the domestic championships of the highest-ranked
associations. After a round of play-off matches, five teams from each
path would qualify for the group stage.

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VIII. THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE IS BORN

A total of 23 broadcasters signed a contract guaranteeing them exclusive

rights to broadcast all Champions League matches in their respective
countries. They agreed to provide live coverage of one of the four
matches each evening and to show recorded highlights of the other
three. Studio programmes completed the package, which was designed
to ensure excellent Europe-wide coverage of the competition. To this end,
as the November 1992 issue of UEFAflash reported: “The Champions
League signature tune, commercial airtime, interviews, tables and charts
must all follow a uniform pattern, to ensure that the public can identify
with the competition in the same way throughout Europe.” This desire
for uniformity and visibility also translated into standardised kick-off
times for all matches (20.45CET) and the adoption of a competition ball,
anthem and flag.

Meanwhile, the sponsors, of which there were four for the first
edition, along with an official supplier, enjoyed exclusive rights for their
respective product categories on the advertising boards in the stadiums,
in the TV commercials shown during match broadcasts, and on printed
materials such as tickets and official match programmes.

Inclusion of the final in 1995

The first Champions League event was the 1992 / 93 group stage
draw, held at the Intercontinental hotel in Geneva on 6 November
1992. Meetings for the clubs, sponsors and broadcast partners were
organised at the same time. The competition broadcasters also held the
broadcasting rights for the draws, which added a unique dimension
to the event. The décor was even changed after the Cup Winners’ Cup
and UEFA Cup draws so that the Champions League visual identity could
be displayed.

Based on the solidarity principle that remains, to this day, one

of the key characteristics of the Champions League revenue distribution
system, 54% of total revenue was earmarked for the eight participating
clubs, 18% for the clubs knocked out in qualifying or the first two
rounds of the three UEFA club competitions, 8% for the UEFA member
associations and 20% for UEFA.

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VIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The new format of the champions’ competition was immediately a great

success. “With the Champions League, European football has managed
to create a mouth-watering shop window for itself, a symbol of its
unity and of its openness to new ideas,” Gerhard Aigner wrote in his
editorial for the April 1993 issue of UEFAflash. “Moreover, it is from this
enticing window that the rest of the shop must now be built, which will
ultimately constitute the future of the European club competitions.”
In financial terms, the centralised marketing of the advertising and
TV rights generated revenue of around 70 million Swiss francs for the
inaugural 1992 / 93 season, compared with a figure of less than 10 million
reported by the clubs the previous season, when they had still been
responsible for marketing the rights themselves.

The competition as a whole initially retained its title of ‘Champion

Clubs’ Cup’ because the qualifying matches and final were not covered by
the centralised marketing contract. This original name was not dropped
until 1994 / 95, when the final was included in the commercial programme
for the first time. The final at Vienna’s Ernst Happel stadium on 24 May
1995, when AFC Ajax beat AC Milan 1-0, was therefore not only the
competition’s 40th overall, but also the first UEFA Champions League final.

To prevent matches in UEFA’s new flagship competition from

clashing with those in its other club competitions, from 1994 / 95 the match
schedule was arranged such that Champions League matches were played
in the traditional Wednesday evening slot, Tuesdays were reserved for
the UEFA Cup and Thursdays for the Cup Winners’ Cup. When those two
competitions merged, Champions League matches were held on Tuesdays
and Wednesdays, while UEFA Cup matches were played on Thursdays.

Knock-on effects
The creation of the Champions League and, especially, the fact that the
top-ranked associations were later allowed to enter up to four clubs,
inevitably had an impact on the other two UEFA club competitions. When
the UEFA Cup and Cup Winners’ Cup merged in 1999, it was a logical
consequence of the dwindling popularity of these two competitions.

The possibility of entering several clubs in the Champions League

also had repercussions on the domestic championships of the major
leagues, in which the prospect of ending the season in a Champions
League position created new incentives for clubs.

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VIII. THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE IS BORN

On the financial front, the Champions League and its influx of revenue,
combined with the steady rise in income from the European Football
Championship final round, or EURO, meant that UEFA enjoyed an
enviable degree of financial stability that was threatened neither by the
collapse of its commercial partner ISL nor by predictions of an imminent
drop in revenue linked to the financial crisis and saturation of the market
– predictions that remain all-too common but have never yet materialised.

UEFA’s medical programme

This new-found prosperity enabled UEFA not only to finance its other
competitions, in particular in youth and amateur football, but also to
cover the costs of all its assistance and development programmes and
assume its social responsibility, in particular in the fight against racism
and other forms of discrimination, aid for charitable work and support of
integration.

None of this in any way detracted from UEFA’s core mission and
as much attention as ever was directed at the many facets of football.
In 1993, for example, a project was launched to establish a European
coaching licence, which proved to be a great success, and in January
that year the first sports medicine symposium was held in Frankfurt.
If UEFA’s initial work in the medical field focused almost entirely on anti-
doping controls and increasing their use in UEFA competitions, as of
1986 and the creation of the UEFA Medical Committee activities
extended into all sorts of other areas, such as player injury studies,
advice for players and referees, pre-tournament examinations, the
publication of a specialist journal, Medicine Matters, and, more recently,
the development of an education programme for football doctors. At
the same time, the fight against doping, based on the list of prohibited
substances and methods published by the World Anti-Doping Agency,
was stepped up with out-of-competition controls and the testing of
blood samples, first at EURO tournaments and then, since 2013, as part
of UEFA’s general anti-doping programme. Furthermore, at its meeting
in London in May 2013, the Executive Committee gave the green light to
a study aimed at retrospectively analysing the steroid profiles of around
900 players who had been tested at least three times in the UEFA club
competitions since 2008.

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 IX. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Associations from the east

At the start of the 1990s, economic considerations were by no means

the only factors to influence the development of the UEFA competitions.
Politics also played a crucial role. The map of eastern Europe was
redrawn following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the break-up
of Yugoslavia and a host of previously non-existent national associations
needed adopting by European football’s governing body in the space of
just a few years.

Although UEFA lost one member after the fall of the Berlin
Wall and German reunification, it was very quickly inundated with new
requests from the national associations of the newly formed states.
Between 1992 and 1994 UEFA’s membership rose from 35 to 49 – a rapid
expansion that was all the more problematic because almost all the new
members lacked both experience and the necessary structures.

UEFA immediately set about looking for ways and means of

helping these associations to play their newly acquired role as fully
fledged UEFA members. They were obviously entitled to participate in
UEFA competitions, for example. The Federation of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), founded in Moscow on 11 January 1992, was
Mini-pitches such as provisionally recognised as the successor of the USSR Football Federation
this one in Belarus
and all players from the territory of the now defunct USSR Football
have played an
important role in Federation were eligible to play for the CIS team, which took part in
the development of EURO ’92 in Sweden. At its meeting in Istanbul on 30 November 1992, the
grassroots football.
Executive Committee decided to double the number of participants from 8
to 16 for EURO ’96, for which England had already been selected as hosts.

Meanwhile, the number of participants in the club competitions

also shot up, rising by almost a third from 128 in 1990 / 91 to 170 in
1995 / 96. Initially, the expansion was kept in check, since not all clubs
were able to meet the criteria imposed by a task force set up to examine
the safety and security standards, structures and infrastructure of the
new associations. In 1992 / 93, for example, 151 clubs were entered in the
different competitions but the Club Competitions Committee, chaired by
Executive Committee member Şenes Erzik of Turkey, authorised only 136
of them to participate. This removed the need for a preliminary round
in the UEFA Cup, but not in the other two competitions. At its meeting
in Berne in April 1993 the Executive Committee instructed another

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IX. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

working group to analyse all the economic and sporting data and the
calendar, in order to find a solution and shape the future of the UEFA
club competitions. Lennart Johansson had just recently planted the idea
of merging the Champion Clubs’ Cup and UEFA Cup but withdrew the
suggestion in the face of opposition.

While looked down on by some, the UEFA Intertoto Cup, launched

in 1995, played an interesting role in this regard, as Gerhard Aigner noted
in his editorial for the August 1995 issue of UEFAflash: “Its most positive
aspect is certainly the opportunity it offers numerous clubs to participate
in a true European club competition for the first time and to familiarize
themselves with the standards in force (neutral referees, presence
of a UEFA delegate, safety and security criteria, etc.). This is exactly
the direction that UEFA wishes to pursue … i.e. to help all European
associations and their clubs to attain high standards.”

Creating an assistance programme

While their clubs’ participation in competitions was the most urgent
aspect of the new associations’ integration into the UEFA family, it
was not the most fundamental. As Lennart Johansson wrote on ‘The
UEFA President’s Page’ in the December 1992 Official Bulletin, the main
requirement was “to provide the correct structures to guarantee a swift
and complete integration of these new member associations.” This had
been the reason behind UEFA’s decision to create the Ad-hoc Committee
for Technical and Administrative Assistance to Eastern European
Associations in 1990. Composed of experts from western Europe, this
committee organised meetings for representatives of the new associations
on topics such as club privatisation, club organisation and structures,
budgets, sponsors and marketing, and even insurance. On the initiative of
this ad hoc committee, the Executive Committee, at its meeting in Berne in
April 1993, approved an assistance programme and agreed to set up the
East European Assistance Bureau (EEAB), which had its own department
within the UEFA administration and was financed by a special UEFA fund.

Conferences involving the associations concerned (Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia
and Ukraine, with Albania joining later) had been held in 1990 and
1991, and in June 1993, drawing on the lessons learned, UEFA invited
these associations to sign a charter setting out the conditions of their
cooperation with the EEAB. The proposal was for a five-year agreement,

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IX. ASSOCIATIONS FROM THE EAST

with the possibility of renewal. Instead of being purely financial, UEFA’s

assistance comprised two main facets: material support in the provision
of equipment and other materials, and expert advice designed to enable
the participating associations to fulfil their administrative and technical
responsibilities.

The charter required the associations to entrust the EEAB with the
sale of advertising and TV rights for international matches played by their
national teams and clubs. All transfers of players leaving their territory
were also to be managed by the EEAB. The associations were to receive
the lion’s share of the transfer fees, although a percentage would also be
paid into a solidarity fund managed by the EEAB. The idea was to protect
the associations and their clubs from agencies and agents anxious to profit
from their arrival on the market by purchasing rights at low cost in order
to make a tidy profit later on.

Some agents had already taken advantage of the situation by

the time the charter was presented, which in theory meant that some
associations were unable to sign it as they were tied into existing
contracts. The EEAB therefore had to amend the charter, allowing the
member associations to choose whether to deal with these matters
themselves or entrust them to either the EEAB or an agent. Whichever
option they chose, all negotiations had to take place in the presence of
a UEFA representative. In addition, so as not to be stretched too thin,
the EEAB decided to deal only with the national associations and not
with their clubs. With these new conditions in place, all 11 associations
were able to sign the charter for a four-year period. A further four-year
agreement containing various amendments was subsequently adopted
and the associations of FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
joined the programme in 1998 and 1999 respectively.

Achievements
In the first year of its existence, the EEAB organised courses for coaches
and referee instructors, ran pitch restoration projects, installed inflatable
tents to house training pitches and provided management training for
administrative staff, as well as sports, IT and technical equipment. It
also visited all the participating associations in order to inspect their
organisational structures and define specific measures for improving them.
These visits were also used to examine aspects of safety and security and
problems specific to non-amateur football in the countries concerned.

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IX. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The UEFA president himself visited the countries that had signed up to
the charter to show his support and see for himself the progress that had
been made.

In a show of solidarity, other UEFA member associations also

offered assistance to the charter’s signatories. Representatives of eastern
European associations were, for example, invited to visit their western
counterparts, in order to study their administrative structures with a
view to transposing them back at home. In 1994, 29 officials from EEAB
countries were able to attend knowledge-sharing courses hosted by
12 western European associations. Other associations offered material
assistance, donating projectors and other equipment, while some,
including those of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, also invited youth
teams to participate in tournaments they were hosting.

In 1996, a seminar for the presidents and general secretaries

of the signatories to the charter was held in Riga. The meeting was
considered so useful that it was repeated in Chisinau in 1998, in Baku in
2000 and in Minsk in 2002.

New programmes initiated

November 1996 saw the launch of ‘Progress’ courses as part of the
second phase of UEFA assistance. Hosted by the signatory associations
themselves and coordinated by the EEAB, they were designed to give
clubs in the most outlying regions an opportunity to receive professional
training. At the same time, the EEAB associations were offered favourable
terms on credit for stadium renovation projects and the installation
of artificial pitches to be used primarily for youth coaching. As a result,
every association ended up with at least one stadium that met
international standards.

Although the programme was therefore fulfilling its objectives

very successfully, a number of small national associations outside
the charter were also finding it difficult to modernise and felt they
were at an unfair disadvantage. UEFA therefore launched ‘Kiosk’, a
parallel programme which, as its name suggests, offered support to
each association according to its needs. A total of 13 UEFA member
associations benefited from this programme.

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IX. ASSOCIATIONS FROM THE EAST

The EEAB had been established for a ten-year period, by the end of which
it had achieved everything it had set out to do. It was therefore wound
up in summer 2003 and replaced with the HatTrick programme, which
was aimed at all the member associations, offering both direct subsidies
and training courses.

Dissolution of the groups of influence

With the influx of new national associations, it was only right that the
influential groups that had long existed within UEFA should be disbanded.
There were four such groups: the group of Eastern bloc associations, set
up in 1954; the Nordic associations; the British associations, who often
took a similar line to the Nordic group; and the ‘Entente de Florence’,
which had been founded on Artemio Franchi’s initiative to represent
the southern and western European associations. These groups, which
had been set up along political, sporting or simply geographical and
linguistic lines, had tended to get together shortly before important
UEFA gatherings, especially the Congress, in order to discuss the items
on the agenda and, if necessary, prepare for elections. Their role was to
guarantee a healthy balance within UEFA by ensuring that all the regions
of Europe were fairly represented on the Executive Committee and
that everyone’s interests were taken into account. They also sometimes
submitted proposals to the Executive Committee.

The large number of new eastern European associations would

have created an imbalance that could have jeopardised UEFA’s unity, as
Lennart Johansson pointed out on ‘The UEFA President’s Page’ of the
March 1994 Official Bulletin: “The integration of these associations has
brought to an end the situation whereby influential groups attempted
to determine policy. Nowadays, the major focus is on solidarity.” The
Executive Committee was also expanded from 12 to 14 members at
the 1996 Congress in London on 29 June, to ensure that all parts of
the continent were fairly represented and to help it deal with the huge
number of tasks for which it was now responsible.

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IX. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The HatTrick programme

The assistance provided by UEFA through its HatTrick programme is not
only used to improve infrastructure, modernise administration and support
participation in UEFA competitions; it is designed to strengthen the national
associations by enhancing quality at all levels. This was stressed by Lennart
Johansson in his opening speech at the conference of presidents and
general secretaries in Nyon on 3 February 2005, when he presented one
of the HatTrick components, the Top Executive Programme (TEP), aimed at
senior national association officials and designed to promote new initiatives.
His intervention was recorded in the March 2005 issue of UEFA∙direct, a
publication that resulted from the merger of the UEFA Official Bulletin and
UEFAflash in April 2002: “The UEFA President placed the new programme
in the current context of European football, where the massive influx of
financial resources had led to a shift in power from the national associations
to the leagues and clubs. It was therefore necessary to redress the balance
and help restore the importance of the national associations, which were
the foundation on which UEFA was built.” The TEP was initially based on the
following ten key points:
–– national association management
–– relations with national authorities
–– commercial / marketing management
–– information technology
–– relations and cooperation with other sports entities
–– human resources, qualification of staff
–– setting of targets and long-term strategies
–– financing, budgeting and accounting
–– project management
–– media relations, communication and public relations.

Organised as round-table discussions, TEP meetings have since been

expanded to include other important subjects of general interest, such as
the centralised sale of rights for national team qualifiers, the format of the
European Football Championship final round and the future of the UEFA
club competitions.

The HatTrick programme also includes the KISS project (Knowledge

& Information Sharing Scenario), which was devised by UEFA to help its
member associations to improve their governance through the sharing of
information, good practices and knowledge. This is organised by means
of workshops on various subjects, such as marketing, communication and

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IX. ASSOCIATIONS FROM THE EAST

media, and event management, as well as through tailor-made IT tools.

Launched in March 2005, the HatTrick programme is currently in its third
four-year cycle (2012–16). The next cycle will be funded with a record
budget of € 600 million, which should enable the member associations to
run their activities and finance long-term projects. More than € 1.2 billion
of revenue from the European Football Championship has already been
distributed to the associations during the first three cycles, funding the
construction and renovation of stadiums and training centres, grassroots
football projects and women’s football development, for which a special
grant was awarded to each member association as part of HatTrick III.

Supporters brought to the fore

While the crucial role of supporters has never been overlooked, and
UEFA is no exception in this regard, it was primarily those who caused
trouble in stadiums who drew the most attention from football’s leaders.
Nonetheless, as the end of the millennium approached, competition
organisers became fully aware of the importance of supporters’ well-
being and the fact that spectator comfort could also enhance crowd
safety and fan loyalty. According to a report in the March 1999 issue of
UEFAflash on the European club workshop held in Geneva, a large part
of which had been devoted to supporters: “Stadiums are … becoming
meeting places where spectator clients have to be able to enjoy – apart
from a comfortable seat and shelter from inclement weather conditions
– maximum security, refreshment stands and even restaurants, as well
as sanitary facilities (including facilities for women, which were all too
often overlooked in the past), shops and giant TV screens, not to mention
crèches – the surest way to ensure the loyalty of spectators being to allow
them to bring their families with them to the stadium.”

It was this concern for supporter well-being that led, among other
things, to the creation of fan zones. After a trial culminating at UEFA EURO
2004 in Portugal, the project was repeated on a much larger scale in
Austria and Switzerland in 2008 and in Poland and Ukraine in 2012.

UEFA has also forged links with supporters’ organisations, which it

regularly invites to the House of European Football in Nyon to engage in
constructive dialogue. In order to ensure positive relations between clubs
and supporters, the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations
have required clubs to appoint a supporter liaison officer since 2012 /13.

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© PHOTO GETTY IMAGES
 X. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The Bosman case

On 25 March 1957, some three years after UEFA was founded, Belgium,
France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had laid
the foundations for political and economic unity in Europe by signing
the Treaty of Rome which, among other things, guaranteed the free
movement of workers between the signatory states.

For more than a decade, the newly founded European Economic

Community (EEC) and UEFA coexisted without any problems at all. Since
sport was not mentioned in the treaty, it did not fall under the jurisdiction
of the EEC authorities. “At first sight,” wrote Gerhard Aigner in an editorial
for the UEFA Official Bulletin, “the European Union and the European
Football Union, sharing the same ideal, can only agree and complement
one another, one dealing with the economy, the other sport.”

When it came to professional sport, however, conflicts of interest

could not be ruled out. Even though only a small minority of UEFA’s
member associations were from countries originally represented by
the EEC, the governing body considered it vitally important to study
the matter in detail. From 1970, various committees, study groups,
conferences and experts were asked to examine the relevant issues and it
soon became clear that player transfers were one of the most important,
especially when the European Court of Justice decided in 1973 that
professional footballers were salaried workers and therefore entitled to
freedom of movement between member states.

The need to find some common ground on this issue was clear, to
The final of the prevent the EEC authorities from being able to challenge the regulations
1995 / 95 UEFA of the national associations concerned. The authorities issued a decision
Cup between
on 23 February 1978 requiring the associations of the EEC member states
Bayern München
and Girondins to amend their transfer regulations. The associations were no longer
de Bordeaux. By allowed to limit the number of players from other EEC member states
agreeing to respect
in their domestic championships, although in the two highest divisions
the rules in place
pre-Bosman, they could still limit them to two per team per match. It was also at this
the clubs still in point that the notion of ‘assimilated players’ came into being, referring to
the running for
players who had played in a foreign country for a certain number of years.
European silverware
that season enabled
the competitions to
run their course.

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X. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The national football associations of the EEC member states reacted by

adopting ‘Principles of Co-operation between Clubs of different National
Associations of the EEC Countries’, under which players were free to
join any club of their choice once their contract had expired. At the
same time, UEFA drew up a list of experts who could be appointed to
an ad hoc committee authorised to iron out disagreements relating
to player transfers between EEC countries. This list was subsequently
expanded to include names from nine different member states.

According to Hans Bangerter’s report on 1980 and 1981, a

conference of delegates of the associations of the EEC member states,
held in Zurich on 5 December 1980, noted that: “The internal regulations
of all the countries concerned were now in accordance with the EEC’s
regulations on the free movement of labour, which were introduced on
February 23, 1978.”

New tensions
Despite appearances, the question was still far from resolved, however,
and tensions reappeared, as Hans Bangerter explained in his report for
1984 and 1985: “The tug-of-war in which we have been engaged with
the European Community Commissioner has now reached a critical and
decisive phase, with the EC insisting stubbornly on wide-scale (and even
total) freedom for professional players – something which would have very
serious consequences for the game. If the EC continues to insist on blindly
applying the Treaty of Rome to the very specific sphere of professional
football, as we may fear it will do after the last round of talks, then it is
to be feared that UEFA will in the foreseeable future no longer have an
intermediary role to play; instead, negotiations will be held at a strictly
national level, with each national association having to appeal for the
support of its own political authorities and having also to defend itself.”
Jacques Georges, the UEFA president, expressed the same view at the
Executive Committee meeting in Vienna on 17 and 18 October 1985, after
he had met the new European Commissioner, Peter Sutherland. According
to the minutes of that meeting: “Quite apart from the fact that [Peter
Sutherland] proved to be a rather disagreeable interlocutor Mr Georges
came to the conclusion that UEFA should no longer act as negotiating
party to the EC, since only 15 countries of the 34 UEFA member
associations were affiliated to the EC.”

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Moreover, the UEFA club competitions were not affected by this problem
since their regulations had never limited the number of foreign players
that could be fielded, as the European Champion Clubs’ Cup organising
committee had pointed out in February 1957, following a complaint by
Grasshopper Club about the eligibility of ACF Fiorentina players: “The
question of limiting the number of foreigners in a team taking part in this
competition is not specifically dealt with in the Regulations of the Cup.”
The only rule was that players had to be considered eligible to play for
their club at specific points in time, with the national associations deciding
on questions of player eligibility.

Differences of opinion
UEFA nevertheless remained at the heart of negotiations. The stumbling
block was undoubtedly the concept of professional sport, or of
professional football in this case. As far as the EEC was concerned, it
was an economic activity like any other – and a rather lucrative one at
that – which was subject to European law. Football association leaders,
on the other hand, constantly pointed to football’s specific nature and
asked not to live above the law but to have a legal framework that
respected the sport’s unique characteristics. Their objective was – and still
is – to preserve the European sports model with its system of promotion
and relegation, rather than fall into the sports entertainment industry
championed by the American model, to preserve teams’ local and national
identity, and to promote the training of young players rather than buying
in seasoned players trained elsewhere. This was also the best way of
encouraging volunteer coaches, with the promise of seeing talented young
players break through to the top. Finally, the link between the top and
bottom of the pyramid, i.e. professional and amateur football, was sacred.
While this seemed obvious to football’s leaders, it was apparently less
so to the advocates of EEC law, especially as, once again, football failed
to speak with one voice. Club directors were vocal about the fact that
they had to manage their clubs like commercial enterprises, while players,
advised by their agents or unions, were reluctant to accept anything that
might hinder their chances of getting better contracts. Any discussions
between the EEC and UEFA therefore fell on deaf ears.

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Adding fuel to the fire, certain associations could not understand why a
minority of countries should be able to impose their laws on the whole
of Europe, or the entire world even, through political and economic
alliances. Others such as Switzerland even called for a limit on the number
of foreign players in UEFA competitions, a wish that was granted when,
from the 1988 / 89 season, the number of non-nationals among the 16
players named on the match sheet was limited to 4.

With FIFA’s help, UEFA nevertheless continued to look for a

solution that would suit everyone’s interests. “The football authorities
had indicated their readiness for a dialogue on the issue and appointed
a commission to negotiate with the EEC,” Hans Bangerter noted in his
report for 1986 and 1987. However, the EEC, whose convictions had been
strengthened by the signature of the Single European Act in 1986, stuck
to its guns and wanted first three, then six foreign players to be allowed
per team, followed by total freedom of movement for footballers from
1992. “The European football association representatives felt quite unable
to accept this proposal, and this refusal amounted to the negotiations
being broken off,” the UEFA general secretary added soberly in his report.

A very temporary solution

This was but a brief interlude, however, as the EEC continued to pile
on the pressure. As far as football was concerned, recognition of the
specificity of sport was central to any solution: “The aim … is to obtain
a special ruling which would apply to football and to convince the EEC
authorities that top-class football needs to be organized in the same way
throughout Europe,” wrote Gerhard Aigner, who had succeeded Hans
Bangerter as UEFA general secretary, in his report for 1988 and 1989.
With Lennart Johansson having just been elected president, UEFA was
also dealing with the arrival of the new eastern European associations
and was in the process of revamping the Champion Clubs’ Cup. It was
therefore necessary to look at all these issues from a global perspective
and, in May 1990, the aforementioned principles of cooperation between
the associations of EEC member states were completely overhauled and,
with the approval of the majority of the national associations, extended
to all 36 UEFA member associations for the 1990 / 91 season under the
title ‘Principles of Co-operation between Member Associations of UEFA
and their Clubs’.

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X. THE BOSMAN CASE

Incomprehension and anger

Seen as a victory for individual interests over the general good, the
Bosman ruling was met with incomprehension and indignation among
football’s leaders. Gerhard Aigner spoke on their behalf in the December
1995 issue of UEFAflash, in an editorial tinged with bitter humour entitled
‘The saviours are here!’: “The footballing community was not exactly
unprepared for the verdict by the European Court of Justice. The Bosman
case had indeed been pending for several years. The issue had been
examined by experts from a variety of fields, and all possible scenarios
had been highlighted. Furthermore, just days before the verdict was
announced, the European Commissioner for competition was already
letting it be known via the press just what was in store for football’s
‘bigwigs’; i.e. an end to the enslavement of players and immediate total
freedom of movement. Now that the European Union exists, national
teams and the interests of the national associations no longer matter.

“Brussels obviously assumes that football will finally start to head

along the right track after a century of ploughing its own tortuous path.
After all, clear conditions are needed in an area that is so important in
economic terms … It was also high time that the last of the ignoramuses
were made aware that clubs are businesses that make massive profits,
and that players must be considered as members of a profession like
anyone else. Consequently, the linguistic rules can also be modified.
The terms usually employed in sport must now be replaced by those
used in the world of work. Thus, players become employees; fans and
supporters become consumers; training sessions and matches become
working hours, and teams are asked to fulfil their planned production
target. The football pools and lottery competitions are replaced by stock-
market reports, and the phrase ‘this is a commercial presentation’ will
soon have to accompany televised football transmissions.”

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Meanwhile, in Stockholm on 31 January 1990, a conference of national

football associations of the EEC states proposed the basis for an
agreement with the EEC, the so-called 3 + 2 rule, which was presented
thus: “The number of non-selectable players per team would be limited
to three. Nevertheless, two assimilated players could be fielded, who had
played for five years in the association concerned, three of which had been
at youth level.” Although it had intended the 3 + 2 formula as a threshold
not a ceiling, the European Commission, chaired by Martin Bangemann of
Germany, accepted this gentlemen’s agreement on 18 April.

It would enter into force on 1 July 1992 for all top-division clubs
affiliated to the national associations of EEC member states and be
extended to all non-professional leagues from the 1996 / 97 season.
Clubs subject to the rule were free to recruit more non-national players,
they just had to adhere to the 3 + 2 limits in each match, and the national
associations were, of course, free to adopt more liberal rules for their
domestic activities should they wish. Also under the agreement, the
European Commission and UEFA would meet regularly from 1996 / 97
to review the situation. On the initiative of the UEFA Club Competitions
Committee, the Executive Committee decided to apply the 3 + 2 formula
in UEFA competitions from 1992 / 93.

Changing the rules

It was in this context of apparent harmony – especially since the
restriction applied to team line-ups rather than to contracts – that, on
15 December 1995, the European Court of Justice published the so-called
Bosman ruling, named after the Belgian player Jean-Marc Bosman, who
wanted to leave Belgian club RFC Liège to play for USL Dunkerque in
France. Since there were still no provisions on sport in EEC legislation,
the court was able to flout the gentlemen’s agreement and issue a
verdict based on purely economic considerations. It ruled that the transfer
system restricted the free movement of players and could not be allowed
to continue. In addition, limiting the number of players from other
countries bore all the hallmarks of discrimination and therefore had to be
condemned. In reality this had little to do with Jean-Marc Bosman’s direct
interests – by taking his case to a civil court his lawyers wanted more than
just to assert his right to carry out his profession.

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X. THE BOSMAN CASE

Coaches and players have their say

The leaders of UEFA and of the national associations were not the only
ones upset by the effects the Bosman ruling would have on European
football. At the fourth UEFA National Coaches’ Conference, held in
Geneva and Nyon from 11 to 13 September 2000, the coaches issued
an appeal to the EU, expressing their concern about the threats hanging
over the transfer system and their support for “the efforts being made
to protect the training, development and education of young players,
and the proper use of contracts and compensation to support stability
in the game”.

The players themselves were not immune to the practical

repercussions of the Court of Justice’s decision. Professional footballers
in Spain, for example, appointed a committee of eight players to find
solutions to the problems posed by the Bosman ruling, in particular the
invasion of La Liga by foreign players. The committee included Josep
Guardiola, future coach of FC Barcelona and, later, FC Bayern München,
who was a midfielder of some repute for the Catalan club at the time.
He sounded the alarm in the UEFA Official Bulletin of September 1998:
“The situation has made it absolutely essential to hold emergency
meetings. We have to find a route out of this mess … We would like
to continue to produce good players. But this seems impossible unless we
can find ways of restricting the presence of foreign players … without
infringing the new rules. It’s complicated, but urgent and necessary.”
A solution? “Work at youth level is the key to producing talent …
But we do need the state, the government and the Council for Sport to
help us work on measures which will give young players more protection
and more hope.”

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X. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Moreover, despite the disagreement between the clubs concerning the

financial aspect of the transfer, the case should never have got so far.
Article 2(2) of the Regulations of UEFA governing the fixing of a Transfer
Fee was perfectly clear: “The financial relations between the two clubs
in respect of the compensation fee for training and / or development shall
exert no influence on the sporting activity of the player. The player shall
be free to play for the club with which he has signed the new contract.”
In other words, if the case had been submitted to UEFA at the outset,
Jean-Marc Bosman would have been able to play for Dunkerque and the
financial differences between the two clubs would have been resolved by
UEFA’s committee of experts.

“UEFA’s rules were different to FIFA’s,” recalls Gerhard Aigner,

“and since FIFA’s prevailed if there was a discrepancy between the two,
the court ignored those of UEFA.”

Safeguards disappear
The consequences of the Bosman ruling were precisely what football’s
leaders had feared. Gerhard Aigner’s successor, Lars-Christer Olsson,
summed them up ten years later in his editorial for the December 2005
issue of UEFA∙direct: “The Bosman ruling is certainly not the cause of all
the evils afflicting European football but it did away with safeguards that
the game’s leaders had established quite consciously, not to raise football
above EU legislation, but to preserve the special nature of the game and
to prevent exploitation.”

“Since then, transfers have mushroomed and the masses of

money flowing into the game have accentuated this tendency, gradually
depriving clubs of their local identity. Some astute clubs have taken
advantage of this enlargement of the market to reach unprecedented
heights, but they are in a minority. Generally speaking, the gap between
the rich and the less well-off has widened, a phenomenon which can be
nothing but detrimental on the competitions, making them less interesting.”

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X. THE BOSMAN CASE

Abolishing the 3 + 2 rule

In the short term, however, with the decisions of the European Court of
Justice entering into force in March 1996, UEFA needed to take urgent
steps to preserve the integrity of its club competitions that were already
in progress. On 19 February 1996, at its meeting in London, the Executive
Committee decided to abolish the 3 + 2 rule with immediate effect,
in the knowledge that, a few days earlier, the clubs still involved had
voluntarily agreed to play their remaining matches under the conditions in
place since the start of the season. Meanwhile, FIFA and UEFA formed a
working group to devise a new transfer system that would give priority to
compensation for training clubs, a certain degree of contractual stability
and the retention of fixed transfer windows.

From 2006 / 07, UEFA required clubs participating in its

competitions to include a certain number of locally trained players in
their 25-strong squads. This measure, which was primarily intended to
safeguard the training of young players at local level, was confirmed on
28 May 2008 when the European Commission gave its official backing
to the rule, declaring it in line with the freedom of movement principle
because it did not mention players’ nationality. The quota of locally
trained players has since grown steadily to eight, up to four of whom may
have been trained by another club within the same association.

Meanwhile, the clubs, no longer entitled to transfer fees, found

a way round the problem by requiring their players to sign long-term
contracts with an indemnity clause that would be triggered if they left
ahead of time. The players have benefited greatly, as have their agents!

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© PHOTO EMPICS SPORT
 XI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Much-coveted club competitions

Faced not only with the serious problems caused by the Bosman ruling,
UEFA also had a fight on its hands to protect its club competitions from
the covetous desires of third parties outside the game. The success of the
Champions League and the influx of money that it was generating for
professional football prompted plans for a European ‘SuperLeague’, the
threat of which materialised in summer 1998. An international group of
investors, Media Partners, approached the big European clubs with the
promise of revenue out of all proportion with what they could earn from
the Champions League if they joined the new SuperLeague, accompanied
by a ‘ProCup’. The SuperLeague would have involved 36 prominent
clubs, split into three groups, with play-off matches at the end of the
season. Half the clubs would have had founder club status, which would
have guaranteed their participation in the competition for at least three
seasons. The ProCup, meanwhile, would have involved 96 clubs in a direct
knockout system. If the proposal had been adopted, it would have led
to a set-up similar to the American sports model, with clubs contracted
for several years in a system not dissimilar to that of the franchises used
in the USA. There is no doubt that the unity of European football would
have suffered, since the eastern European clubs, which were considered
financially less attractive, would have been left out in the cold.

Under the heading ‘Europe’s football under attack’, Lennart

Johansson issued a vigorous response in his editorial for the August 1998
issue of UEFAflash: “UEFA is not surprised by these new plans, and is also
ready to react to this new challenge. However, money will not dictate the
course of this reaction. Financial profit can be only one of the criteria.
Sporting credibility and the consideration of the needs of the associations,
leagues and spectators are other key factors. And discrimination against
large areas of the continent is out of the question.

“European football has been developing in an organised manner,

The dramatic ending
in a spirit of solidarity, for more than 100 years, and this attempt to lop
to the 1999 final
as Manchester off the most lucrative part and exploit it financially will not succeed. UEFA
United snatched will not let European football be shed of its credibility.”
victory from Bayern
München in extremis
only enhanced Only a few months after the FIFA presidential election and the
the appeal of the stir that it had caused, this attack on the European game provided an
Champions League.
opportunity to reaffirm the unity of world football, as the new FIFA

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XI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

president, Joseph S. Blatter, demonstrated by attending the August

meeting of the UEFA Executive Committee in Monaco. The FIFA president,
whose presence was described by UEFAflash as “not only a first, but also a
sign of football’s unity”, assured the committee members that FIFA “gave
its total backing to UEFA’s efforts to protect football from the control of
financial or other sectors.”

A change of format
European Club Football 2000, a task force led by the UEFA general
secretary, Gerhard Aigner, was also created to consider the future of
the European club competitions. Comprising representatives of various
UEFA committees and clubs, the task force was instructed to report to
the Executive Committee and did so at a meeting in Lisbon on 6 October
1998, less than a month after it had been given its remit. “Now the
speculations about the future of European football must come to an end,”
announced Lennart Johansson as he presented the decisions taken by the
Executive Committee, the most important of which was to increase the
number of places in the Champions League group stage from 24 to 32.

Since the top associations would be able to enter up to four clubs

in the newly expanded competition, the UEFA Cup would be deprived
of some big names. The Executive Committee therefore decided to
merge the UEFA Cup with the Cup Winners’ Cup, which had been losing
momentum for a number of years. During its discussions, the committee
also expressed concern about the financial health of the clubs, some of
which were accumulating losses that left them with considerable deficits,
forcing them to chase money at any cost. It wondered whether access to
the UEFA competitions should be restricted to clubs on a sound financial
footing, thereby already anticipating financial fair play.

National association fears

During this period, UEFA also had to make a concerted effort to keep its
member associations informed of its activities, especially as some feared
that direct dialogue between UEFA and the clubs would undermine their
authority over their clubs, and that national team football would suffer.

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The situation was reviewed at an extraordinary conference of UEFA

member association presidents held in Geneva on 24 November 1998,
during which multi-club ownership was unanimously condemned as a
threat to sporting ethics, and support was pledged for UEFA’s efforts to
ensure the EU heard and understood its views more clearly.

Following this conference, UEFA’s president and general secretary,

Lennart Johansson and Gerhard Aigner, wrote a lengthy open letter to the
member associations in which they explained that, although it was the
national associations rather than the leagues and clubs that were UEFA
members, the situation was not that simple. Referring to the problems
caused by the Bosman ruling, they continued: “UEFA’s hard-line stance
vis-à-vis the clubs was based on the assumption that it could count on
the full and unconditional support of the national associations and their
leagues. Investigations soon revealed, however, that a united front did not
exist. Consequently, we embarked on a policy of negotiation.”

The letter went on to say that since the Bosman ruling complaints
of various kinds had been lodged with the European Commission,
challenging UEFA’s regulations. “As with the Bosman case, certain national
associations have contributed to this situation, either because they have
not adopted a resolute stance, or because they have not observed the
regulations in force,” it said. However, the purpose of the open letter was
not to settle scores but to give a realistic assessment at a delicate time
in UEFA’s history. As UEFA’s leaders noted: “Clubs, leagues, sponsors,
TV stations and players’ union representatives, as well as every possible
kind of grouping which has a commercial interest in football, are all
entitled to go unhindered before the European Commission and make
pronouncements on European football.”

Appealing to governments
“How can football deal with this situation?” The president and general
secretary pointed the way forward: football needed to fight to be treated
as an exception in European legislation. To this end, they called for the
“active co-operation of the associations” and urged their leaders to do
everything possible to convince the governments of the EU member states
that “only when we are allowed to apply suitable regulations will it be
possible to maintain football’s traditional structures, to protect the real
values of our sport and its national identity”.

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XI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The authors of the letter also promised that UEFA would “continue to do
its utmost to support its members, i.e. the national football associations.”
At the same time, however, they called for the national associations’
understanding and support, stating that to meet the current demands,
“the leagues and clubs have to be involved in an appropriate manner
in the work of those bodies dealing with professional football and the
European club competitions”. Gerhard Aigner reiterated this position in his
general secretary’s report for 1998 and 1999: “The leagues and their clubs
have become direct partners of UEFA, and it is only natural for them to
have access to UEFA. Nevertheless, UEFA stands firm on the principle
that it cannot and will not recognise a group of self-constituted clubs
as a partner.”

Relations with the leagues …

Dialogue with the leagues had, in fact, begun many years earlier in the
context of the Committee for Non-Amateur and Professional Football
which, in 1964, had seen its membership increase from 5 to 11 in order to
put an end to what the UEFA general secretary, Hans Bangerter, described
in his secretary general’s report for the period as “a most inadequate
situation”. Representatives of non-amateur and professional football had
come together before that even, in 1958, to form an International Liaison
Committee of Football Leagues outside UEFA’s control. They were invited
to cooperate with the governing body and, in exchange for the dissolution
of their own committee, were given seats on UEFA’s Committee for
Non-Amateur and Professional Football. In 1968, the committee was
expanded even further to accommodate one representative from each
national association that organised a non-amateur championship. With
17 members, it remained UEFA’s largest committee until 1974, when it
was reduced in size and temporarily divided into two sub-committees.
In March 1998, following the Dublin Congress at which Lennart Johansson
was re-elected UEFA president for a second term, the committee
was replaced by the Professional Football Committee, comprising
representatives of Europe’s major professional leagues. These leagues
had formed a European association in 1997 which in 2005 would become
the European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL). A memorandum of
understanding was signed with the leagues in 1998, setting out their
objectives (to protect clubs, promote national championships and improve
relations between the leagues in different countries) while stressing the
need to avoid any form of conflict with UEFA. A new memorandum of
understanding was signed in 2005.

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… and with the clubs

For a long time, UEFA’s only contact with clubs had essentially been
administrative or disciplinary in nature, and only with those clubs
participating in its competitions. It was true that, through their national
associations, a number of club administrators were members of the
Organising Committee of the UEFA Club Competitions, the most long-
standing being the Belgian Roger Vanden Stock of RSC Anderlecht, who
joined the committee in 1982 and was still a member in 2014. However,
it was not until economic questions assumed greater significance that
more direct links were forged. In March 1995, on the occasion of the club
competition quarter-final draws in Geneva, UEFA decided to convene a
meeting of representatives of the clubs still involved in order to improve
cooperation and gain from their experiences and ideas. This was the first
UEFA club workshop, an event that was repeated in subsequent years and
expanded in 1998 to include the 24 clubs participating in the Champions
League. Also in 1998, UEFA invited five leading clubs to participate in
the discussions of the European Club Football 2000 task force. In 1999,
new criteria were laid down to determine who should be invited to the
club workshop: some 50 clubs were chosen from the top 27 national
associations in the UEFA rankings. At its July meeting in Geneva, the
Executive Committee reached another milestone when it created a Club
Advisory Board with a view to stepping up UEFA’s dialogue with the clubs.
This group included clubs that had won five or more UEFA competitions –
and had qualified for the new season – as well as the current Champions
League holders. Members of the committee, which was chaired by Martin
Edwards of Manchester United, were also entitled to attend the plenary
meetings of the UEFA Club Competitions Committee.

This new advisory body was dissolved in the course of the

restructuring UEFA underwent after the 2000 Congress in Luxembourg.

Structural change
In view of the complexity, specific nature and permanent relevance of
issues as delicate as the integration of new associations, relations with
the EU, the fight against violence and the management of competitions,
it was clear that UEFA’s traditional structures had become outdated and
were too rigid to cope with current demands. With the help of the Boston
Consulting Group, an audit was therefore carried out, resulting in the
establishment of the FORCE project (Football Organisation Redesign
for the next Century in Europe). At the 2000 Congress in Luxembourg,

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XI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

the national association delegates accepted the proposed new structure,

in which some of their powers were transferred to a chief executive officer
(CEO), established as an organ in the UEFA Statutes, and to the UEFA
administration. The Executive Committee, whose members were divided
into four working groups, was to concentrate on the organisation’s
overall policy, political matters and financial control. Meanwhile, the
operational management of UEFA’s affairs became the responsibility of
the CEO, assisted by seven directors, who had broader powers than the
previous heads of department and were instructed to report directly
to the Executive Committee on their respective areas of responsibility.
Gerhard Aigner was appointed CEO. The UEFA committees – of which
there were now only 11, each with 11 members – were no longer chaired
by Executive Committee members but reported directly to the CEO and
his administration, whereas previously the administration, or general
secretariat, had been at the service of the committees. These changes
were designed to make UEFA more efficient, by entrusting full-time
specialists to deal with the various problems rather than committee
members who only met once or twice a year and were now restricted
to expert or advisory roles.

In this context, the Club Advisory Board was partly swallowed up

by the Club Competitions Committee, which saw its own membership
reduced to 11 and was chaired by French former Executive Committee
member Jean-Fournet Fayard. The final piece of the jigsaw was a panel of
62 clubs, chosen on the basis of both their national associations’ position
in the UEFA rankings, which took into account results from the past five
seasons, and their own UEFA coefficient. They could be invited by the
committee to work on various specific topics.

Clubs come together

Despite all its efforts to consult and cooperate more closely with the clubs,
at the end of 2000 UEFA was confronted with the creation of the G14, an
interest group comprising 14 major European clubs. After the Executive
Committee had been informed of the group’s existence at its meeting in
Nyon on 4 and 5 October, an initial discussion between the representatives
of these clubs and a UEFA delegation led by UEFA vice-president and
former Club Competitions Committee chairman Şenes Erzik was organised
in Geneva at the group’s request on 10 November. The clubs explained
that they had no intention of breaking away from UEFA or creating their
own competition, but that they wanted, among other things, to promote

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cooperation, unity and friendly relations between clubs, defend the

interests of member clubs and negotiate with FIFA and UEFA regarding
the format, administration and organisation of their club competitions. In
addition, in view of the EU’s increasing interference in football’s affairs,
the group considered direct relations with the EU a necessity and had
decided to set up its permanent headquarters in Brussels.

The G14 was officially founded that same day.

At its meeting in Lausanne on 14 and 15 December 2000, the

Executive Committee noted its delegates’ report and, in the uncertain
legal climate of the post-Bosman period, adopted a cautious approach to
its relations with the G14. It avoided any direct confrontation, preferring to
ignore its existence altogether. Nevertheless, it adopted a set of principles
concerning club football, reaffirming in particular that there could only
be a single governing body for European football and for international
competitions in Europe: UEFA. It also emphasised that domestic club
football was the very lifeblood of the professional game and that UEFA
competitions should run alongside domestic calendars, acting as a
stimulus rather than exercising a dominant or damaging influence.

The Executive Committee also announced that it would open

broader discussions about the future format of the club competitions,
including at the annual club workshop, to which the 62-strong UEFA Club
Panel would be invited from now on.

A European Club Forum

In 2002, UEFA took the additional step of creating the European Club
Forum, a group of 102 clubs chosen by UEFA in accordance with
their national associations’ UEFA coefficient rankings and their own
performances in UEFA competitions. After seven editions the club
workshops thus became a thing of the past.

The European Club Forum held its first general assembly in

Monaco on 30 August 2002, with Karl-Heinz Rummenigge of FC Bayern
München in the chair. Under the heading ‘The need to communicate’,
Gerhard Aigner explained in the September 2002 UEFA∙direct editorial:
“This platform, set up so as to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the
clubs, reflects UEFA’s general desire to keep its finger on the pulse of
football and to listen to all its various voices.”

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XI. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

“Certainly in the dynamic and fast-changing environments of modern

football,” he continued, “the UEFA Executive Committee sometimes has
to take major decisions at a rapid pace. In order to do so, it needs to be
aware of the ideas, needs and concerns of the European football family
as a whole so that, when the time comes, it can decide on the basis of
a thorough knowledge of the issues and take account of the general
interests of European football.”

The European Club Forum was managed by UEFA and was

restricted to an advisory role. However, it offered the clubs a chance
to get to know each other better and to find common ground in spite
of their differences in resources and interests. It was invited to have a
real say on the future development of the UEFA competitions and the
related revenue distribution models, as well as on issues of general
interest concerning club football. Furthermore, from 2004, the European
Club Forum was able to appoint its own representatives to the Club
Competitions Committee.

The European Club Forum included virtually all the G14 clubs,
who therefore wore two hats, contributing to the European Club
Forum’s discussions on the one hand, while continuing to defend their
independent interests on the other, to the point of dragging UEFA before
the courts of the EU.

A licence for clubs

Despite this latent threat and the instability it caused, UEFA’s cooperation
with the professional leagues and clubs enabled initial steps to be taken
to help the clubs improve their governance. At the UEFA Congress in
Luxembourg in 2000, the European Commissioner responsible for sport,
Viviane Reding, pointed out that it was “up to the clubs alone to decide
what players to recruit and from what countries,” emphasising, albeit
indirectly, that the clubs’ problems could not all be put down to the
free movement of players and the abolition of the transfer system as
they knew it.

It was in this context that the idea of a licence for clubs – a kind of
passport that would be required to participate in the UEFA competitions
– had been suggested. “Why a licence for the clubs?” asked Gerhard
Aigner in the editorial of UEFAflash in October 1999. His answer: “Such
a system already exists in many European countries, and ensures that

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XI. MUCH-COVETED CLUB COMPETITIONS

only clubs which are in an acceptable financial situation can take part
in the top competitions. The idea would be to follow this example for
UEFA’s club competitions. At a time when these competitions tap larger
and larger sums of money, it is essential to ensure that this money stays in
football, and is not used to try and mop up bottomless debts.”

The first stage of this project was the creation, in September

1999, of a working group on club licensing and salary caps. While the
second element was quickly abandoned, work on the licensing project
started immediately and four different sets of criteria were laid down:
sporting, administrative, financial and legal. These were designed to cover
everything from infrastructure to youth training and the clubs’ overall
financial well-being, the aim being to improve football through healthy
clubs with proper structures in place, a good technical set-up and high-
quality facilities. The system was also meant to bring all clubs up to the
same high standard. It would be implemented by the national associations,
some of which already applied similar systems at national level.

The Executive Committee approved the project in Rotterdam

on 26 June 2000 and a working group chaired by Şenes Erzik met for
the first time that September. A timetable was set out, with 2003 / 04
chosen as the introductory season, and eight pilot associations
(England, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Scotland, Slovenia,
Spain and Sweden) were selected to help fine-tune the project and the
accompanying manual that defined the licence conditions. The club
workshop in 2001 was then used to present the project and get the clubs
on board.

Given the complexities of the project, the amount of time required

to provide the licensors with the necessary information and training,
and the final adjustments made, the introduction of the UEFA club
licensing system was postponed by a season. It therefore entered into
force in 2004 / 05.

Since then, the UEFA licence has been mandatory for clubs
wishing to participate in the UEFA competitions and licensing has also
become common practice at national level. In addition, the licensing
process represents a unique source of information for UEFA, which the
administration analyses as the basis for its highly informative annual
overview of the European club football landscape.

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128
© PHOTO AFP
 XII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Closer dialogue with the European Union

Much like with the clubs, UEFA felt that dialogue and consultation was
the best way of moving forward in its relations with the EU. “There is
no point in calling the Bosman ruling into question; it would be a waste
of time to do so. What matters is learning from the past and from the
Bosman ruling and, as a result, maintaining close dialogue with the
European Union in order to be able to convince its leaders of the special
nature of our game and of the challenges facing it. Such dialogue is
already on the right track, but if football’s arguments are to be clearly
heard and understood, then it has to speak with one voice.” These were
the words of Lars-Christer Olsson, in an editorial written by the UEFA CEO
ten years after the Bosman ruling, clearly illustrating UEFA’s thinking in
the post-Bosman period.

UEFA hoped that improved communication and closer dialogue

with the EU would lead to better mutual understanding which, in turn,
would produce results that everyone could live with. Indeed, non-
nationals and transfers were not the only questions attracting attention
in Brussels: TV broadcasts (the UEFA Statutes had already been amended
more than once in this regard), the centralised sale of commercial rights
and attempts to clean up debt-ridden club football had not escaped the
watchful eye of the EU’s lawyers. UEFA’s objective therefore remained
to achieve recognition of the specific nature of football’s in European
legislation in order to create a stable legal framework in which it would
be protected from all manner of civil actions and able to develop without
interference.

Numerous contacts
This was the start of a long journey which, some 20 years later, is still not
complete. Along the way, UEFA opened an office in Brussels in April 2003
(operational until November 2009), has worked with the International
Olympic Committee and other sports federations and had close contact
The European
with top EU officials such as Jacques Delors in October 1989, then
Parliament in
Strasbourg: European Commission president, to whom the first UEFA President’s
dialogue with the Award was presented in 1998.
EU authorities has
become increasingly
important for At the end of 1998, in an editorial for UEFAflash, Gerhard Aigner
the leaders of wrote: “Without being recklessly optimistic, 1998 can be said to have
European sport.
ended by giving European football reasons to approach the future

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XII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

with confidence … At the heart of the problem [are] relations with the
European Union, and its manner of reducing professional football to
a purely economic activity. Nothing has yet been decided in this area,
and there is still a long way to go before sport obtains the status it
deserves in the European treaties. However, the concerted efforts of
football and other sports, notably with the support of the International
Olympic Committee – and perhaps, paradoxically, the very excesses of the
economic circles which are prepared to take football into their clutches –
seem to have opened the eyes of the political authorities and reminded
them that sport has too important a social dimension for the wheeler-
dealers to be allowed to extract its economic value to the detriment of its
other elements.”

Promises …
At the UEFA Congress in Luxembourg in June 2000, the European
Commissioner responsible for sport, Viviane Reding, became the first
European Commissioner to address the general assembly of the European
football associations. She welcomed the improvement in relations
between sports authorities and the European Commission and was sure
that “certain misunderstandings could have been avoided if this dialogue
had started sooner”. She also called on football to show that it was
innovative and assured UEFA of her active support.

A number of documents also gave UEFA reasons for hope, such as

the Amsterdam Declaration of 1997, the 1999 Helsinki Report on Sport
and, in December 2000, the European Council’s Nice Declaration, which
was welcomed as “a step in the right direction” in Gerhard Aigner’s
UEFAflash editorial. “Although the declaration does not have force of
law,” he said, “it nevertheless clearly indicates the way ahead in terms of
conserving the role of sport in society.” He was especially pleased that
the declaration recognised the role of sports federations and the need to
preserve sports competitions and the welfare of young sportsmen and
women. The Independent European Sport Review was then published by
former Portuguese minister José Luis Arnaut in 2006. UEFA’s efforts to build
and deepen relations with the EU authorities seemed to be bearing fruit.

… and problems
Nevertheless, progress remained slow and gradual. For it to be considered
credible football’s authorities needed to speak with one voice, and this
was still far from being the case. The FIFA presidential election in June

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XII. CLOSER DIALOGUE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

1998 is a case in point. Despite written confirmations from 50 of them,

the UEFA member associations failed to give the support they had
promised to the UEFA candidate, Lennart Johansson, who ultimately lost
out to the FIFA general secretary, Joseph S. Blatter.

On the club front, the self-appointed G14 (now with 18 members)

threw their support behind a club which had challenged before a civil
court the requirement to release players for national team duty without
compensation. At the UEFA Congress in Budapest on 23 March 2006, the
governing body felt obliged to emphasise the indispensable role played by
the national associations, whose delegates in turn unanimously adopted
a seven-point resolution, backed by FIFA and the other continental
confederations, to serve as a public reminder of some of UEFA’s essential
values. It ended: “UEFA will not stand in the way of those who want to
leave the family (which also means the domestic competitions) and who
do not share our sporting values. But you cannot ‘pick and choose’. We
will defend our beliefs and we will defend our rules. Our structures may
evolve but our core beliefs are set in stone. All national associations stand
together with UEFA on this fundamental issue.”

A vision
In the face of all the issues it was having to deal with, UEFA, for the
first time, felt the need to put down in writing a strategy expressing
more than just the objectives enshrined in its statutes. Ratified by the
UEFA Congress in Tallinn in 2005, this Vision Europe document was
supposed to be “binding on all UEFA organs.” Published in the form of
a 38-page brochure, Vision Europe was meant to “clearly and concisely
summarise the strategy” of UEFA and serve as a guide during a period
of significant and rapid change. According to a UEFA∙direct editorial by
Lars-Christer Olsson, it also reflected “a general awareness of the fact
that after years of unrestrained developments a certain degree of control
is now required”. Vision Europe set out a three-point summary of UEFA’s
philosophy: football is UEFA’s raison d’être, UEFA is an association of
associations based on representative democracy, and the football family
must remain united.

Although the idea was commendable, the document was too

heavy-going to survive past Lennart Johansson’s presidency.

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132
© PHOTO UEFA
 XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Entering a new era

Lennart Johansson’s long presidency came to an end at the Ordinary UEFA

Congress in Dusseldorf on 26 January 2007, when the national association
delegates elected Frenchman Michel Platini with 27 votes to Johansson’s
23. Michel Platini’s victory signalled a desire on the part of the associations
to see some changes brought to UEFA’s activities and structures, as
promised by the incoming president in his election manifesto.

The first reforms were carried out four months later, at UEFA’s
tenth Extraordinary Congress, in Zurich on 28 May, when the UEFA
Statutes were amended to reflect the principles proposed by the new
president. The general assembly unanimously adopted the amendments,
under which the UEFA president replaced the CEO as a UEFA organ
alongside the Congress and the Executive Committee. As such, the
president was given responsibility for:
a) relations between UEFA and FIFA;
b relations between UEFA and other confederations;
c) relations between UEFA and its member associations;
d) relations between UEFA and political bodies and international
organisations;
e) implementing the decisions of the Congress and the Executive
Committee through the administration;
f) supervising the work of the administration.

For the first time in its history UEFA now had a full-time president
based at its headquarters, much like at FIFA since Joseph S. Blatter had
been elected. Michel Platini explained the advantages of such a system:
A symbol of
European football “A full-time president knows what he is talking about and is aware of
unity: at the 2012 what’s going on. He devotes his full attention to the job. All major sports
UEFA Congress in
associations are heading in this direction – otherwise, it’s the general
Istanbul, the UEFA
president, Michel secretary who leads, the administration has all the power and there is
Platini, shares the no political vision.”
stage with Sergey
Pryadkin of the
EPFL (professional
leagues), Philippe
Piat of FIFPro Europe
(players’ union)
and Karl-Heinz
Rummenigge of the
ECA (clubs).

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XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

More power for the national associations

As he had promised, the new president gave back to the national
associations the power that had been taken away from them by the
FORCE project. In his opening address to the Extraordinary UEFA
Congress, he said: “The philosophy underlying these changes will
continue to inspire our action in the future. I want to return power
to those who exercise it at national level thanks to the fundamental
democracy which lies at the root of the European sports movement.”

The committees reported directly to the Executive Committee

and were chaired by Executive Committee members. The number
of committees was increased to 19, meaning that all the member
associations could be represented by at least two of their officials in UEFA
bodies and thereby forge closer links with the European governing body.
“We gave the national associations a different vision of UEFA; UEFA is the
national associations,” said Michel Platini.

Another new UEFA body, the Professional Football Strategy

Council, was written into the statutes at the Extraordinary Congress.
Composed of representatives of UEFA, the professional leagues, the clubs
and professional footballers through their union, FIFPro Division Europe, it
was given an advisory role. The idea behind the PFSC dated back to 2004
and its foundations were laid during the last days of Lennart Johansson’s
presidency, when a meeting of what was then known as the European
Professional Football Strategy Forum was held on 19 January 2007. The
footballers themselves were not represented at that stage.

Administrative changes
On the administrative front, with Michel Platini’s election came the
departure of the CEO, Lars-Christer Olsson, who was replaced by a
general secretary. After Gianni Infantino had filled in for a time, David
Taylor of Scotland took up the new post on 1 June 2007. Gianni Infantino
himself became general secretary in October 2009.

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XIII. ENTERING A NEW ERA

With the turbulence of the electoral period behind it, the Executive
Committee enjoyed a period of relative calm. Meanwhile, the
administration, which had rarely seen previous presidents at the
headquarters in Nyon, needed time to adapt and to finalise the
distribution of tasks and responsibilities between the president and the
general secretary, especially as both were newcomers to the House of
European Football. The situation was completely different at FIFA in
that respect, Joseph S. Blatter having already been familiar with the
administrative machinery when he became president.

By amending the UEFA Statutes Michel Platini had already partially

fulfilled one of his pre-election pledges, i.e. to restore power to the
national associations. However, it was not a question of simply turning
back the clock to how things were before the FORCE project came into
being. The president’s role had been strengthened and the reintroduction
of the role of general secretary did not undermine the role of the
directors or reduce the administration.

Guiding principles
Once these changes had been made, Michel Platini set to work on a
collection of fundamental principles that would underpin UEFA’s activities,
in the spirit of a central phrase from his election speech: “Football is
a game before a product, a sport before a market, a show before a
business.” UEFA’s 11 key values were presented to the Congress in
Copenhagen on 25 March 2009, where they received the unanimous
approval of the national association delegates. Based on the concept of
‘Football first’, they relate to football’s pyramid structure, unity, good
governance and autonomy, grassroots football and solidarity, youth
protection and education, sporting integrity, financial fair play, the
balance between clubs and national teams, respect and the European
sports model.

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XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Seeking unity
Michel Platini’s presidency, although marked by various innovations, has
also demonstrated continuity, building on the work done in numerous
fields under his predecessors’ leadership, in particular with regard to such
fundamental objectives as unity in football and closer dialogue with the
authorities of the EU. Methods have changed where necessary, though.
As a player Michel Platini showed no lack of creativity in breaking down
his opponents’ defences, and as a leader he has not hesitated to break
with dogma, where necessary, in an attempt to find new solutions to old
problems. In March 2007, shortly after being elected president, he had
told the European Club Forum: “The football family has for too long been
torn apart by internal squabbles, and these rifts have allowed outsiders to
‘move the goalposts’. This has simply got to stop.”

When asked by the Executive Committee to initiate dialogue with

the clubs, the president got straight down to business with the newly
formed Professional Football Strategy Council and the European Club
Forum. Encouraged by positive feedback from these initial discussions,
the Executive Committee then asked him to reach an agreement with the
clubs. The world governing body also joined the discussion table and a
declaration of intent was signed by FIFA, UEFA and a dozen European clubs
in Zurich on 15 January 2008.

From a forum to an association of European clubs

Just under a week later, on 21 January, the next step was taken at a plenary
meeting of the European Club Forum: 16 clubs founded the European
Club Association (ECA) and signed a memorandum of understanding with
UEFA, recognising the new body as the only authority defending the clubs’
interests at European level and granting it four seats on the Professional
Football Strategy Council. Instead of being managed by UEFA, the new
body was independent. It had its own board and secretariat in Nyon,
headed by a general secretary, Michele Centenaro, a former employee of
the UEFA administration. All the members of the now dissolved European
Club Forum were invited to join the ECA. “Normally with agreements there
are winners and losers but this time everyone is a winner,” said Karl-Heinz
Rummenigge, who was elected chairman by the ECA board at the end of
the association’s first meeting in Nyon on 7 and 8 July 2008. The ECA had
103 member clubs at that time; by 2014 it had 214.

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XIII. ENTERING A NEW ERA

Presenting the agreement to the UEFA Congress in Zagreb on 31 January

2008, Michel Platini said: “The member clubs of this association have
promised to call an end to the legal proceedings they have instigated
against our bodies and not to start any more. They have promised not to
belong to any other association of clubs from more than one country. And
they have promised to recognise the value of the national teams and not
to organise or take part in any competition that is not recognised by either
UEFA or FIFA.”

Dissolution of the G14

This agreement also signalled the dissolution of the G14. It had meant
reconciling two previously irreconcilable positions: on the one hand,
the clubs wanted, or demanded even, a share of the revenue from the
major international competitions for national teams, arguing that they
were the players’ employers throughout the year and that they should be
compensated for releasing their players for national team duty, with all the
risks that this entailed; football’s international governing bodies; on the
other hand, had always firmly opposed this idea, explaining that they paid
significant prize money to the participants, i.e. the national associations,
and that it was up to them to come to an agreement with their clubs. They
also pointed out that the national associations were not responsible for the
salaries paid to the players, which were astronomical in some cases, and that
the value of international players could be boosted by their participation in
these major competitions, ultimately benefiting the clubs too. To each his
own. Believing, with the backing of the Executive Committee and then the
Congress, that a compromise was needed to protect the unity of the game,
Michel Platini achieved a settlement. Clubs whose players participated in a
EURO would therefore receive a share in the profits of the tournament as of
2008, and FIFA would put a similar system in place for the World Cup. The
UEFA president made it clear that this share in the profits was not a form of
compensation and that, far from undermining the fundamental principle of
releasing players for national team duty, it reinforced it because the clubs
“finally recognise the value of the national teams”.

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XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

However it was interpreted, this memorandum of understanding, which

complemented those signed with the leagues in 2005 and the European
division of the players’ union FIFPro in 2007, created a relationship of trust
between UEFA and the clubs, and helped them to realise that they were
partners, not adversaries.

The desire for unity expressed by the UEFA president on numerous

occasions was fully realised at the Istanbul Congress on 22 March 2012,
when UEFA signed memorandums of understanding with the European
Club Association, the European Professional Football Leagues and FIFPro
Division Europe, all on the same day. Although separate memorandums of
understanding had previously been signed with all three branches of the
European football family, Istanbul was the first time their representatives
had stood together, alongside the UEFA president, at a UEFA Congress. It
was a highly symbolic demonstration of the unity of European football.

Less than a month later, on 19 April, UEFA, the EPFL, the ECA
and FIFPro Division Europe met again in Brussels under the banner of
European social dialogue, as advocated by the EU. They signed the first
ever social agreement in the European professional football sector, aimed
at protecting footballers through the adoption of minimum requirements
for player contracts.

Recognising the specific nature of football

Michel Platini also wasted little time before showing his determination to
improve relations between UEFA and the EU. He sent out a very strong
message when he met the president of the European Commission, José
Manuel Barroso, in Brussels on 12 March 2007, the day before a match
between Manchester United FC and a ‘Europe XI’, held to celebrate
the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. The UEFA
president also wrote to the EU heads of state and has since constantly
sought to maximise contact and maintain a permanent dialogue with the
various institutions of the EU and their leaders.

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XIII. ENTERING A NEW ERA

Following the publication of the European Commission’s White Paper on

Sport in July 2007, the adoption of a new treaty by the EU member states
in Lisbon on 13 December that year marked an important step towards
fulfilling the objective of UEFA and the other sports organisations.
Article 149 of the treaty stipulated: “The Union shall contribute to the
promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the
specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its
social and educational function.” To this end, the EU’s activities should,
among other things, be aimed at “developing the European dimension in
sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and
cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the
physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially
the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen.”

“A treaty-based reference to the specific nature of sport is

a positive development. We look forward to these principles being
applied in practice,” Michel Platini was quoted as saying in UEFA∙direct
in February 2008. Ratified by the 27 EU member states, the new treaty
entered into force on 1 December 2009. Under the treaty, “the EU has
a supporting competence in the field of sport, meaning that its activities
are limited to coordinating, where necessary, sports-related initiatives
undertaken at Member States level,” UEFA explained in a document
entitled ‘UEFA’s position on Article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty’. Although
the aim of UEFA and the other sports organisations had still not been fully
achieved, the specificity of sport was now enshrined in EU constitutional
law. “In other words,” the document continued, “while sport is not
‘above the law’, there is now a provision in the Treaty itself recognising
that sport cannot simply be treated as another ‘business’, without
reference to its specific characteristics.”

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XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Financial fair play

Having restored a relationship of trust with the clubs and initiated
cooperation with the EU, UEFA had laid the foundations it needed to
embark on the ambitious project of financial fair play in 2009.

Even though their incomes remained on an upward curve despite

the financial crisis, too many clubs, even prominent ones, were struggling
to cover their costs, mainly because their wage bills were out of all
proportion with their revenue. In order to put an end to the spiralling
debts that threatened the very existence of many of these clubs, blanket
action was needed since most of them could not bring themselves to
abandon the quest for silverware. They would rather get into debt in
an attempt to qualify for the lucrative Champions League, for example,
even though they clearly had no guarantee whatsoever that this would
generate the desired revenue in return.

In the face of this situation, to which it had unwittingly

contributed by creating a competition with such mouth-watering prize
money, UEFA looked for solutions that would help the clubs, such as
salary caps or at least wage-bill restrictions. However, it abandoned
this approach, convinced that the cause of the problem was not the
abundance of money but mismanagement of it. The clubs themselves
were prepared to accept restrictive measures, as long as they were the
same for everyone and enforced everywhere with the same rigour.

A financial control panel

It was in this context that Michel Platini launched the concept of
financial fair play, which was defined as follows in the 11 key values
adopted by the Executive Committee and the March 2009 Congress in
Copenhagen: “Financial fair play means that clubs operate transparently
and responsibly, to protect both sporting competition and the clubs
themselves. Financial fair play means clubs not getting into a spiral of
debt to compete with their rivals but rather competing with their own
means, ie the resources they generate.” The financial fair play rules would
apply to all clubs participating in UEFA competitions, with the hope that
they would subsequently be applied at national level too.

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XIII. ENTERING A NEW ERA

Presenting the concept to journalists in January 2011, the UEFA president

explained: “It is a complex project, but one which I consider vital for
football’s future. Financial fair play is not aimed at putting clubs in
difficulty. On the contrary, it aims to help them exit an infernal spiral
which prevents certain of them from having a viable medium-term or
long-term model. Supporters and lovers of football have no interest in
seeing clubs that are part of European football’s heritage disappear as
a result of hazardous management. It was necessary for an authority to
intervene, and this is what we are doing.”

A Club Financial Control Panel, composed of independent financial

and legal experts, was created in March 2009 and former Belgian prime
minister Jean-Luc Dehaene was appointed its chairman in September
that year. At the 2012 UEFA Congress in Istanbul, the UEFA Statutes were
amended to include what was now the Club Financial Control Body as one
of UEFA’s Organs for the Administration of Justice. The UEFA Emergency
Panel then appointed the members of the Club Financial Control Body,
which is composed of an adjudicatory chamber chaired by José da Cunha
Rodrigues, formerly a judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union,
and an investigatory chamber that was chaired by Jean-Luc Dehaene until
his death in May 2014. The Club Financial Control Body is responsible for
overseeing the application of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair
Play Regulations, which replaced the club licensing manual in June 2010.
If necessary, it can impose disciplinary measures in case of non-fulfilment
of the regulations and decide on cases relating to club eligibility for UEFA
club competitions. The Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne is
competent to hear appeals against Club Financial Control Body decisions.
In February 2012 the European Parliament adopted a report on sport,
recognising the legitimacy of sports courts for resolving disputes in sport,
which strengthened UEFA’s position in this field.

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XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Universal support
Having obtained the unqualified backing of all sections of the football
family, in particular the clubs, and following a series of discussions with
the authorities, the project also received the support of the EU when a
joint statement was issued by the European Commission and UEFA on
21 March 2012, the day before the Istanbul Congress. The UEFA president
welcomed a “marvellous victory for UEFA and for football” in his opening
speech the following day. The European authorities have since reiterated
their support of financial fair play on several occasions, including as
recently as April 2014 via the European Commission vice-president,
Joaquín Almunia, and the European Commissioner responsible for
education, culture, multilingualism and youth, Androulla Vassiliou, during
her second trip to the House of European Football in Nyon following an
initial visit in January 2011.

UEFA’s position is clearly strengthened by this support just as it

has been in the past in fields such as the centralised sale of TV rights, the
intellectual property rights of competition organisers, the fight against
illegal betting and the preservation of the European sports model.

Innovations
Another new idea implemented on the current UEFA president’s
initiative, this time in the competitions field, was a change of date for
the Champions League final, which was moved from a Wednesday night
to a Saturday in 2010 so that more families and children could watch
the final of UEFA’s flagship club competition. This also made it easier to
organise a whole week of football activities in the same city, including the
Women’s Champions League final, Grassroots Day (celebrated throughout
Europe with the Champions League final host city as the epicentre),
the Champions Festival and various exhibitions and other activities,
culminating in the week’s showpiece event, the UEFA Champions League
final itself.

In Kyiv in June 2012, Michel Platini also launched the idea of a

‘EURO for Europe’ to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the European
Football Championship. The 2020 final round would be played in 13 cities
across Europe, giving the event a special dimension. The idea was so
popular that it was adopted even before all the organisational principles
had been finalised.

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XIII. ENTERING A NEW ERA

A significant change to the competition had already been introduced

in Bordeaux in September 2008, when the Executive Committee decided
to increase the number of final round participants to 24 from 2016.
In addition, on the commercial front, Michel Platini was able to announce
at the 2011 UEFA Congress in Paris that all the member associations had
agreed to the centralised sale of the rights to their European Football
Championship and FIFA World Cup qualifying matches. This project,
implemented for the first time for the UEFA EURO 2016 qualifiers,
coincided with the introduction of a new ‘week of football’ concept,
designed to give greater exposure to national team football by enabling
supporters and TV viewers to watch matches spread between a Thursday
and the following Tuesday. This arrangement should also see national
associations achieve more stability in their income, since their earnings no
longer depend on the attractiveness of their opponents.

Following the collapse of ISL in 2001, UEFA decided to create

its own structure to manage the commercial exploitation of it EURO
tournaments and other main national team competitions. At its meeting
in St Petersburg on 1 October 2012, the Executive Committee changed
tack and appointed a new partner, the agency CAA Eleven, to sell the
rights for matches in its national team competitions. The marketing
of club competition matches remains the responsibility of the agency
TEAM, but UEFA has taken over the operational management of these
competitions, previously also dealt with by TEAM.

A new national team competition

Along similar lines, the national associations agreed to the launch of a
new competition, the UEFA Nations League, at the 2014 Congress in
Astana. The participating teams will be split into four divisions, with a
system of promotion and relegation and centralised marketing of the
commercial rights. The idea of a second continental competition for
national teams had already been suggested at the 1999 conference of
presidents and general secretaries in Geneva, in view of the general
lack of interest in friendly matches and as a counterproposal to FIFA’s
suggestion that the World Cup should be held every two years. After
being raised again at the October 2001 conference in Prague, the idea
has since taken shape.

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XIII. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

As regards refereeing, Michel Platini championed the introduction of two

additional assistant referees, stationed along the goal line to help the
referee deal with contentious incidents inside the penalty area. Trialled
initially in 2008 and subsequently in the club competitions and at EURO
2012, the system was approved by the International Football Association
Board, the guardians of the Laws of the Game, on 5 July 2012. It is now
used by UEFA in all its major competitions, as well as by several national
associations.

Greater involvement of the associations

UEFA’s policy of openness towards the east, which was initiated in the
1990s, has continued during Michel Platini’s presidency in the form of
closer involvement of these national associations in the organisation of
UEFA events. First and foremost, on 18 April 2007, Poland and Ukraine
were chosen as co-hosts of UEFA EURO 2012. Although this decision was
not without risk, and numerous working meetings, site visits and other
measures were required to pull it off, the tournament proved to be a
resounding success both for the organisers and, on the pitch, for Spain.
Meanwhile, the 2008 Champions League final took place in Moscow
and the 2012 Europa League final in Bucharest. The 39th Ordinary UEFA
Congress was held in Astana in Kazakhstan on 27 March 2014, and
several associations of the erstwhile East European Assistance Bureau
have hosted final tournaments in youth football or futsal in recent years.
The decision to hold the UEFA Super Cup in a different city each season,
rather than Monaco, where it was held for many years, was taken for the
same reason, with all UEFA member associations in mind. The idea was to
make it clear that each association is a fully fledged member of UEFA and
able to play a full part in the life of European football’s governing body
by hosting one of its events, whether an Executive Committee meeting, a
Congress, a final tournament or a final, depending on its resources.

Major reforms under way

Numerous other important projects have been launched during Michel
Platini’s presidency, but since they relate more closely to the present
and future than to the past, they are not included here. Mention should
nonetheless be made of UEFA’s sustained efforts to protect young players,
the fight against corruption, illegal betting and match-fixing (including
a betting fraud detection system covering all UEFA matches as well as
the top division and domestic cup matches of its member associations,
run in cooperation with betting agencies from all over the world),

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XIII. ENTERING A NEW ERA

the assistance provided by public authorities and police forces in these

crucial areas, UEFA’s determination to ban third-party ownership of
players, and the stepped-up fight against all forms of discrimination,
and racism in particular. At the two most recent UEFA Congresses, the
member associations reaffirmed their position in two of these key areas.
In London in 2013, they unanimously adopted a resolution against racism
and discrimination in football, while an amendment to the statutes
was adopted in Astana in 2014, requiring the member associations to
“implement an effective policy aimed at eradicating racism and any other
forms of discrimination from football” and to ensure that misconduct
in this area is met with strict sanctions. Also in Astana, the national
association delegates approved a resolution entitled ‘European football
united for the integrity of the game’ and, following on from this, in
May 2014, UEFA and Europol signed a memorandum of understanding
designed to step up the fight against match-fixing in European football.

Strategy meetings
While conferences of the national association leaders, i.e. presidents
and general secretaries, had long been used by UEFA as a means of
communicating with its members, Michel Platini wished to revitalise these
meetings, which had tended to become more informative than advisory
and interactive. They were therefore transformed into strategy meetings
at which, in line with their original purpose, the national association
representatives were able to tell the Executive Committee which direction
they wanted it to take. The first such meeting was held in Limassol in
Cyprus in September 2011 and resulted, among other things, in several
amendments to the UEFA competitions, including an increase in the
number of European Women’s Championship final round participants to
16 (as of 2017) and the expansion of the European Women’s Under-17
Championship final round from four to eight teams.

The second of these two-yearly strategy meetings was held in

Dubrovnik in Croatia on 17 and 18 September 2013, when the member
association leaders discussed, among other things, the future of the
national team competitions post-2018 and condemned third-party
ownership of players.

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 XIV. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

Parallel activities

Since its creation in June 1954, UEFA has never stopped working on its
relations with FIFA – the cordiality of which has varied over the years and
across different topics – and its ever-expanding competitions. It has also
closely monitored developments in TV and the effects of broadcasting
on match attendance, has negotiated contracts and dealt with associated
commercial issues, and has consistently kept pace with the growth
of professional football, fought against its excesses and analysed its
problems, be they political or financial. What began as purely a sports
organisation has become a true governing body that defends the interests
of its member associations, coordinates their activities and gives them all
the support it can.

As soon as it had the necessary financial resources, UEFA also

set about improving the game, its infrastructure and its environment.
In 1961, it organised its first course for coaches. Referee training soon
followed, with courses for elite referees launched in 1969. Youth
football, meanwhile, has been a central part of UEFA’s activities ever
since it assumed responsibility for the International Youth Tournament
in 1957. UEFA’s dedication to this part of the game can also be seen in
its establishment of a conference for youth football leaders, who came
together in Baden-Baden in 1967 for the first in a long series of meetings
between youth football’s administrators. Later on, it played a major part
in the development of women’s football and brought futsal into the fold,
while concerning itself only to a limited extent with beach soccer.

Last but by no means least, UEFA’s constant efforts to promote

grassroots football should not be overlooked, the principle being that
strong, healthy foundations are the best guarantee of excellence at the
highest levels of the game.

UEFA is unrelenting
in its fight against
racism.

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XIV. 60 YEARS AT THE HEART OF FOOTBALL

The power of football …

As the years passed and football’s social value became more evident,
with UEFA also venturing outside its purely sporting environment to
engage with politicians, public bodies and government authorities,
European football’s governing body – and the game as a whole – started
to realise just how much power it wielded and set itself an objective
far more ambitious than simply to inject into people’s daily lives a bit
of entertainment and excitement. “A football pitch on Moscow’s Red
Square, opposite Lenin’s mausoleum; match tickets serving as visas
for English supporters travelling to the UEFA Champions League final;
European Championship accreditations allowing the holder to use public
transport free of charge in order to protect the environment; a Turkish
national youth team playing in a mini-tournament in Armenia,” wrote
Michel Platini in his editorial for the July 2008 issue of UEFA∙direct.
“Football can certainly make unusual things happen, but should we really
be surprised? When you see the enormous demand for tickets for finals
or major tournaments, when you see supporters snapping up tickets
to watch a team training session, when heads of state and ministers
find the time in their busy schedules to go to the stadium, when crowds
celebrate in the streets late into the night following a victory, you are left
in no doubt that elite football – and more generally, top-level sport –
is a tremendous social phenomenon, a characteristic feature of our
modern world.”

… and its social responsibility

For those who play it, football helps to foster integration, mutual
understanding, team spirit, physical well-being and broader horizons.
Making use of its high profile, financial resources and appeal, football
has chosen to do more than just promote its own values in society. With
increasing determination and the conviction that to do so is an obligation
rather than an act of charity, it has devoted itself to a variety of projects
with the common goal of enhancing the well-being of individuals and of
society as a whole. Without going into detail – for the list would be too
long – mention should be made of UEFA’s unambiguous stance against
racism and all forms of discrimination and the associated educational
and punitive measures it has introduced (including the possibility of
interrupting or even abandoning a match); the annual presentation,
since 1998, of a cheque to a selected charity; the use of disciplinary fines
for charitable purposes; support for athletes with physical and learning
disabilities; measures taken to make it easier for disabled people to

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XIV. PARALLEL ACTIVITIES

attend football matches; the launch of the Respect campaign at UEFA

EURO 2008, echoing one instigated by Lennart Johansson in 2002;
various forms of participation in projects aimed at promoting health and
environmental protection; and, finally, in March 2014, the creation of a
UEFA children’s foundation which, according to Michel Platini, will help
“to preserve the magic of football and give hope to those children who
need it most”.

Cooperating with the other confederations

Aware of its social responsibility, UEFA also knows – as the FIFA president,
Joseph S. Blatter, regularly points out in his speeches to the UEFA
Congress – that it is a driving force and even a role model for world
football. It therefore has a duty to show solidarity, and one of the main
ways it fulfils this duty is through its relations with the other continental
confederations. After the Meridian project, implemented in partnership
with the African confederation and launched in 1997 with a gala match
in Lisbon, and with the aim of strengthening cooperation at global level,
UEFA has since signed memorandums of understanding with all the
confederations. In 2013 Portugal’s Fernando Gomes was appointed as
special advisor to the Executive Committee in charge of UEFA’s relations
with the other confederations.

UEFA has also forged closer links with other sports federations
and, on 8 December 2009 in Nyon, became one of the founder members
of the Association of European Team Sports (ETS), alongside FIBA
(basketball), the EHF (handball), the IIHF (ice hockey), the FIRA-AER
(rugby) and the CEV (volleyball). In partnership with these federations
and a number of academic institutions, it launched the Executive Master
in European Sport Governance (MESGO), the highest qualification in a
range of programmes that, for football, also includes the UEFA Certificate
in Football Management (CFM) and the UEFA Diploma in Football
Management (DFM). Lots of national association staff have already taken
part in these courses, thereby deepening their knowledge and expertise
in football management. UEFA also created a dedicated research grant
programme in 2010 to support football-related research projects.

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XIV. PARALLEL ACTIVITIES

Corporate identity
Since the early 1990s, when UEFA’s commercial activities began to take
off and it created its own marketing department, UEFA has also paid
close attention to its corporate identity, updating its traditional logo and
creating new ones to give its competitions better-defined identities. It
has adopted notions such as ‘business philosophy’, ‘identification’ and
‘product enhancement’. At commercial level, it has also kept up with
current business trends, adopting a slogan, developing brands, producing
advertising spots of various kinds and, through its subsidiary UMET,
entering the world of digital media. It has revitalised its website and even
started producing the TV feed for UEFA matches itself, in particular for
EURO tournaments. It has also endeavoured to strike the difficult balance
between the need to optimise revenue for the benefit of football on the
one hand and respect for the game’s fundamental values on the other.

Has any of this changed the public’s perceptions of UEFA? It is

hard to say without commissioning an extensive survey and an unbiased
analysis of the results. However, there is no doubt that Michel Platini’s
election as UEFA president has changed things appreciably, the aura of
the former French national team captain being such that some people
confuse the institution itself with its president, even in areas such as
disciplinary matters, with which he has nothing to do.

Be that as it may, UEFA and football authorities in general do

not have to bow to social media and their no holds barred approach to
communication, which is more about individuals than institutions. The
image projected by their competitions remains their greatest asset in
terms of corporate identity. By resolutely committing itself to high-quality
football played by excellently trained players who respect the principles of
fair play, and by fighting to preserve the integrity of its competitions and
the environment in which they evolve, UEFA has endeavoured to remain
faithful, throughout its 60-year history, to the principle that its founders
held so dear: the interests of football must come first.

150
 Gaining ground

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 I. GAINING GROUND

The rapid rise of women’s football

The earliest evidence of UEFA’s interest in women’s football appears in

a report by UEFA general secretary Hans Bangerter, submitted to the
Executive Committee at its meeting at the French Football Federation’s
headquarters in Paris on 17 November 1970. According to the minutes
of that meeting: “It was decided to recommend the Associations to keep
a watchful eye on the further development of ladies’ football in their
country in order to avoid that wily business managers get a hold of it.”

The following year, women’s football was one of the two main
topics on the agenda of an Extraordinary UEFA Congress held in Monte
Carlo on 16 June 1971. It was still the subject of wide-spread prejudice,
as illustrated by the head of the Soviet sports council’s medical service
who, according to the December 1972 edition of UEFA Information,
“explained … that football when practiced by women increases the
formation of varicose veins, that the close fight for the ball may cause
harm to the sexual organs and that a violently thrown ball may damage
the organs protected by the pelvis.”

Women’s football nevertheless grew rapidly in some European

countries, although it remained outside the national football association’s
control in all but eight cases. Consequently, the UEFA Executive
The 2011–13
Committee considered it a matter of urgency to bring the sport under
Women’s European
Championship final, the wing of the national associations before anyone else got to it. The
won by Germany Congress adopted a resolution along these lines and asked the Executive
against Norway.
Committee to monitor the situation. A Committee concerning Women’s
Football was set up, composed entirely of men.

The committee was asked to draft a set of guidelines on

women’s football structures and standardisation, given the amount of
variation from one country to the next in areas as fundamental as the
size of the ball and the length of matches. A summary was submitted
to the Executive Committee and approved at its meeting in Brussels
on 15 March 1972. The guidelines were then submitted to the 1972
Congress in Vienna in June, where they were adopted in principle, but
given the reservations expressed about certain specific points the matter
was referred back to the Executive Committee.

153
I. GAINING GROUND

First female committee member

The Executive Committee’s response was to establish a Women’s Football
Committee, this time including a woman, Kerstin Rosén of Sweden – the
first female member of a UEFA committee. The new committee met
in Zurich in March 1973, at a women’s football conference involving
representatives of 11 UEFA member associations. A survey carried
out before the conference, to which 23 national associations had
responded, revealed some support for the introduction of an international
competition managed by UEFA, although some favoured the idea of
a competition for national teams and others a competition for clubs.
The majority, however, thought it was still too early to launch any
type of continental competition for women. The conference delegates
unanimously agreed that regulating women’s football by placing it under
the authority of the national associations remained the top priority.

Loss of momentum
The women’s football movement ran out of steam somewhat during
the years that followed, as the sport’s growth slowed down in all but
a few countries such as West Germany and England. Although indoor
football was added to the remit of the Women’s Football Committee
in 1974, it met only once that year, noting, among other things, that
there were still many, primarily financial obstacles to the creation of a
European competition. This was the committee’s last meeting before
it was dissolved in 1978. “It was not felt absolutely necessary to have
any further direct influence on the development of women’s football on
a European level,” explained Hans Bangerter in his general secretary’s
report. “After a pause for reflection, however, this aspect of the game
will shortly be receiving the appropriate attention again.”

This apparent change of policy followed a survey conducted

among the member associations that same year, in which many of the
respondents had reported a new upsurge in women’s football activities.
After the aforementioned period of reflection, another women’s football
conference was convened, the urgency of which was heightened by
the fact that an Italian association not recognised by the Italian Football
Federation had announced plans to hold an international congress on
women’s football. UEFA’s conference took place in Zurich on 20 February
1980 and was attended by delegates from 17 national associations.

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I. THE RAPID RISE OF WOMEN’S FOOTBALL

The participants thought that UEFA should devote more attention to the
women’s game and that the national associations should do everything
possible to save it from the clutches of organisers who were putting their
own interests over those of the sport itself. They also felt that the time
had come to launch a European competition for national teams.

The UEFA Women’s Football Committee was reinstated with two

female members – Patricia Gregory of England and Hannelore Ratzeburg
of Germany – sitting alongside the Belgian chairman Louis Wouters, who
had recently been elected to the UEFA Executive Committee, Poland’s
Bronisław Kołodziej and Carl Nielsen of Denmark.

A favourable response
Meeting in Florence on 24 April 1981, after the Women’s Football
Committee had informed it of its support for the creation of a women’s
football competition, the Executive Committee gave the green light to the
project on condition that at least 12 of UEFA’s 34 member associations
were prepared to take part. “Everything moved really fast,” recalled
Hannelore Ratzeburg in the April 2006 issue of UEFA∙direct. “The decision
was taken in 1981 and the first matches were already played the next
year. The fact that 16 associations entered in such a short space of time
was brilliant. In Germany, the DFB entered the competition first and then
I had to set about creating a national women’s team afterwards. We even
had to postpone our first match, against Belgium because we still didn’t
have a team.”

The competition kicked off on 18 August 1982 with Finland v

Sweden – the first women’s match played under the UEFA banner – and
culminated in May 1984 with Sweden beating England in a two-leg final.

The 1985–87 competition ended with a four-team final round

and in its fourth edition, in 1989–91, it became the European Women’s
Championship. Meanwhile, women’s football enjoyed such a global boom
that FIFA organised the first Women’s World Cup in China in 1991.

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I. GAINING GROUND

A competition for clubs

The 140 or so participants who gathered at UEFA’s next women’s football
conference in London from 27 to 30 October 1998 were well aware
that much had changed since the previous event, held 18 years earlier.
Women’s football was now played in almost every European country and
the ever-growing impact of the European Women’s Championship was
proof of the game’s popularity. A total of 33 teams had taken part in the
1995–97 edition, which, on account of the huge differences in standard
between some of the teams, had been split into two divisions, the 16
strongest teams playing for the title and the other 17 vying for promotion
to the top division. This two-division format was abandoned in 2008.

The conference in London stressed the importance of grassroots

activities, primarily in schools and clubs. Those driving women’s
football were also challenged to come up with a financially viable plan
for a European club competition. They rose to the challenge and the
UEFA Women’s Cup was established in 2001. The first draw for the
competition was held in Ulm on 6 July that year, during the European
Women’s Championship final round in Germany. As women’s football
continued to grow, other competition-related landmarks included
the Executive Committee’s decision in November 2005 to expand the
European Women’s Championship final round from 8 to 12 teams,
the transformation of the UEFA Women’s Cup into the UEFA Women’s
Champions League as of 2009 /10 and the decision to hold the Women’s
Champions League final in the same city and during the same week as
the men’s equivalent, thereby significantly raising its profile. More than
50,000 spectators watched Olympique Lyonnais beat 1. FFC Frankfurt 2-0
in the 2012 final in Munich.

In addition, UEFA has organised women’s youth competitions for

Under-18s /19s since 1997 and for Under-17s since 2007.

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I. THE RAPID RISE OF WOMEN’S FOOTBALL

A woman on the Executive Committee

As well as creating competitions and recruiting and training ever more
players – reaching beyond the 1 million mark – efforts were made to
involve more women in all the other areas of the game, by recruiting
female coaches, referees and administrators. On the refereeing side,
one particular milestone was reached at the 1997 European Women’s
Championship final round in Norway – the first involving eight teams and
the first to be refereed entirely by women. Courses for female referees
have been organised since September 1991 and UEFA’s traditional elite
referees’ course was opened up to women for the first time in 2013.

In the meantime, the UEFA Executive Committee sent out a

strong signal against institutional discrimination at its meeting in Paris
in March 2011 by appointing a woman to chair the Women’s Football
Committee and inviting her to participate in Executive Committee
meetings. Karen Espelund, former general secretary of the Football
Association of Norway, was selected for the role and the UEFA Statutes
were amended at the following year’s Congress in Istanbul to give her the
same rights and obligations as her fellow Executive Committee members.
She was also given the task of devising and overseeing a women’s
football development strategy, which receives funding from the HatTrick
programme and is supported by a women’s football ambassador, former
German international Steffi Jones.

Within the UEFA administration, however, all the key posts are still
held by men.

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© PHOTO SPORSTFILE
 II. GAINING GROUND

The long journey from indoor football to futsal

In July 1974, the Executive Committee decided to bring women’s

and indoor football under the umbrella of a Committee for Women’s
Football and Indoor Football. However, for “practical reasons”, it was the
Committee for Non-Amateur and Professional Football that made the
greatest contribution to the development of indoor football by submitting
to the Executive Committee, in September 1977, a series of guidelines
it had drawn up in consultation with the member associations. The aim
was to bring some measure of consistency to indoor football, a vast
concept that covered everything from five- to eight-a-side versions of the
game, with pitches and balls of varying sizes, different lengths of game
and the possibility or not of playing with rebound boards around the
pitch. These were very humble beginnings and, as demonstrated by the
dissolution of the Committee for Women’s Football and Indoor Football
in 1978, the sport was not considered a priority, especially as only five
European countries even played in organised competitions, at national
or international level. In most cases football was played indoors only for
training purposes, especially during the winter months.

Characterised by
high-drama, futsal
is now going from
strength to strength.

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II. GAINING GROUND

Hesitations
In 1980 indoor football was still so vaguely defined that even the
Executive Committee had to be told that “the type of football … played
indoors with 22 players on a pitch of normal dimensions was not indoor
football … The so-called ‘indoor football’, on the other hand, was played
on smaller pitches with sides of only 5 to 6 players each.”

The Royal Belgian Football Association thought it was time to

convene an international conference with a view to standardising the
rules but refused to take the initiative itself, on the grounds that it was
UEFA’s responsibility to do so. The president of the Belgian FA, Louis
Wouters, who was also a member of the UEFA Executive Committee,
also warned his colleagues that indoor football could end up competing
with the outdoor game if it managed to poach some of its players. It was
therefore absolutely essential for indoor football to be placed under the
authority of the national football associations.

UEFA wanted to wait for the conclusions of a study FIFA was

conducting on indoor football before taking any action itself. It did,
however, create a committee, chaired by Louis Wouters, which met for
the first time on 20 November 1980 and immediately set about revising
the 1977 guidelines. It turned to outside experts for help, including
the future FIFA president, Joseph S. Blatter, recently appointed general
secretary of the world governing body. New rules, identical to those used
by FIFA, were adopted in 1982, although it was made clear that they
only applied to international competitions, with national associations free
to regulate the sport as they saw fit at domestic level. As for a UEFA-
organised international competition, this remained out of the question.
Virtually everyone agreed that it was too early.

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II. THE LONG JOURNEY FROM INDOOR FOOTBALL TO FUTSAL

A first European tournament

The Committee for Indoor Football nevertheless continued to monitor the
sport’s development closely and even attended a tournament, in January
1985, involving the national champions of four countries where indoor
football was played virtually all year round: Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands
and Spain. The committee also insisted that indoor football should be
exclusively controlled by the national football associations and later that
year the chairman of the Committee for Indoor Football and Executive
Committee member Ellert Schram of Iceland attended an international
conference organised in the Netherlands by the Royal Netherlands
Football Association to review the development of the indoor game.

The idea of creating a UEFA competition was given crucial

impetus in January 1989, when FIFA held its first indoor football
competition, the FIFA World Championship for Five-a-side Football, in
the Netherlands. Brazil beat the hosts in the final and the competition
was deemed a success. However, the UEFA committee, which had been
renamed the Committee for 5-a-Side Football in July 1987, noted serious
differences of opinion between supporters and opponents of the use
of rebound boards. It therefore considered it still too early to launch
a European competition, a view echoed at the conference of UEFA
member association presidents and general secretaries in Montreux on
20 September 1991. Meanwhile, UEFA firmly rejected an EEC proposal
to organise an indoor tournament for the national teams of EEC member
states, pointing out that such a tournament could only be organised
by a national association, and only after the rules had been approved by
FIFA and UEFA.

Once again, it was FIFA who took the initiative by asking its
confederations to organise qualifying matches for the second World
Championship for Five-a-side Football, to be played in Hong Kong in
November 1992. Only national associations that organised their own
domestic five-a-side championship were eligible to take part. Ten
European associations put their names into the hat and UEFA organised a
draw in Geneva on 17 December 1991 – its first five-a-side football event
– where the teams were split into two qualifying groups. Their matches
took the form of mini-tournaments, in Spain and Italy respectively.

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II. GAINING GROUND

Standardised rules
Despite a rather discouraging survey of the UEFA member associations,
only 13 of which organised an official championship, the UEFA
committee, now chaired by Ángel María Villar Llona of Spain, decided to
forge ahead. For financial reasons, however, they had to limit themselves
to organising a European five-a-side tournament, which would serve
as the qualifying competition for the FIFA world championship. The
Executive Committee gave the project its blessing at its meeting in
December 1993. The final plans comprised three qualifying mini-
tournaments, through which five teams would earn a place not only at
the world championship in November / December 1996 but also in the
first ever UEFA tournament, to be played in Cordoba in the January of
that year. Meanwhile, indoor football had been rebranded as futsal, with
standardised rules (without rebound boards) and, before long, its own list
of FIFA referees.

Creation of a European championship

Encouraged by the success of the first UEFA tournament and the increase
in the number of national associations interested in competing, the
Executive Committee created a European Futsal Championship, the
regulations of which were approved in Geneva in December 1997.
A total of 24 teams – of widely varying standards, as illustrated by one
24-0 scoreline – took part in qualifying, in the form of mini-tournaments
played in November and December 1998. The 25th participant, Spain,
hosted the seven mini-tournament winners in Granada in February 1999.
The Spaniards reached the final, where they lost to Russia on penalties.

The teams have become much more evenly matched since that first
edition, and in 2009 the final tournament was expanded to 12 teams.

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II. THE LONG JOURNEY FROM INDOOR FOOTBALL TO FUTSAL

The UEFA Futsal Cup

Futsal’s growing popularity within UEFA’s member associations prompted
the Executive Committee, at its meeting in Nyon in March 2001, to grant
a request from the Futsal Committee to launch a club competition. The
first edition, which was also made up of mini-tournaments, attracted
entries from 27 associations. The eight group winners contested the final
round in Lisbon, where the Spanish team Playas de Castellón FS became
the first UEFA Futsal Cup winners on 3 March 2002.

A few months later, from 26 to 28 November 2002, UEFA held

its first futsal conference at the Italian Football Federation’s technical
centre in Coverciano. The fact that 49 of the 52 member associations
attended – even though only 30 were involved in futsal competitions at
the time – showed that the game was now attracting widespread interest
throughout Europe.

The 2006 / 07 edition of the Futsal Cup was the first to reach the
landmark of 40 participating teams and a new format was therefore
introduced, in which the last four teams remaining after a multi-stage
qualifying competition contested the semi-finals and final in the same city.

Finally, at its meeting in Cardiff in April 2007, the Executive

Committee approved the launch of a pilot European Under-21 futsal
tournament, which ended with Russia beating Italy after extra time in
St Petersburg on 14 December 2008. Although there were some positive
sides to the experiment, it was decided not to repeat it.

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 III. GAINING GROUND

A coaching licence recognised

throughout Europe

Alongside coaching courses organised since 1961, other events, studies

and technical reports, UEFA’s efforts to enhance the quality of coach
education – and thereby improve standards of play – received new
impetus in 1991 when the Executive Committee asked the Committee for
Technical Development to come up with a detailed plan for a coaching
licence that would be recognised throughout Europe. A task force chaired
by René Hüssy of Switzerland kicked the process off and presented its
conclusions early in 1993. The project was named after former UEFA
vice-president Václav Jira of Czechoslovakia, in honour of his significant
contribution to coach education before he passed away in November
1992. It was perfectly in keeping with the times and with the principle of
free movement advocated by the European Community.

The project to develop coaches at three levels (B, A and Pro)

was given the go ahead by the Executive Committee in April 1993. The
next step was to recruit a full-time coordinator. The Romanian Football
Federation had proposed creating such a post in 1978, but at that
time the Executive Committee had not seen the need. By this point,
however, the appointment of a technical director was perfectly justified,
indispensable even, if the project was to be successfully implemented.
The role was assigned to Andy Roxburgh, former coach of the Scottish
national team, which he had guided to EURO ’92 in Sweden, and since
1992 a member of the Committee for Technical Development. He took up
the new post on 1 March 1994.

UEFA programmes
are constantly
helping to enhance
the quality of the
game through
education and
development.

165
III. GAINING GROUND

Convention and charters

It was certainly a wise choice, as borne out by the infectious enthusiasm
and incredible capacity for hard work that Andy Roxburgh demonstrated
throughout his 19 years at UEFA. Besides the UEFA coaching licence, the
requirements for which were set out in the Convention on the Mutual
Recognition of Coaching Qualifications, he was the driving force behind
two other agreements to which the member associations all signed
up: the UEFA Grassroots Charter and the UEFA Convention on Referee
Education and Organisation.

The Grassroots Charter was launched in 2005, with a star system

to reward the efforts of the national associations with the most effective
grassroots programmes. This system was revised and simplified in 2014
in order to better meet current and future needs, as explained by former
UEFA Executive Committee member Per Ravn Omdal of Norway, a fervent
advocate of integration and grassroots football, for which he is a UEFA
ambassador: “All over Europe, coaches and leaders are organising football
activities for millions of boys and girls, every day, year after year. UEFA’s
new Grassroots Charter will stimulate participation from all age groups
even further, as well as improve quality in education and training.”

Created in 2006, the Convention on Referee Education and

Organisation was first signed by ten member associations in 2007. It aims
to strengthen the role of referees and improve refereeing at all levels, as
well as providing financial support to its signatories.

To supplement its long-established courses for referees and those

subsequently introduced for assistant referees, UEFA set out to raise
refereeing standards further still in 2001 by creating a programme in
which seasoned former match officials act as mentors for talented young
referees. Since 2010 UEFA has also run the UEFA Centre of Refereeing
Excellence (CORE) at the Colovray sports centre in Nyon, opposite
the House of European Football. Here, promising young referees and
assistant referees from all over Europe are given specific, intensive training
designed to prepare them to officiate at the very top.

166
III. A COACHING LICENCE RECOGNISED THROUGHOUT EUROPE

Meetings for coaches

Andy Roxburgh also came up with the idea of inviting elite club coaches
to get together to share ideas and opinions on UEFA’s competitions
and developments in the game, away from all the pitchside pressures.
The inaugural Elite Club Coaches Forum was held in Geneva on
1 September 1999 and the event has been organised every year since,
providing a platform for coaches to make the Executive Committee
aware of their views and to make valuable proposals, many of which
are subsequently adopted.

Conferences for national team coaches are also held after each
World Cup and EURO, when the technical aspects of the tournament
are analysed. The results of this analysis are then also published, as
a complement to the UEFA periodical The Technician. In addition,
UEFA maintains regular contact with the Alliance of European Football
Coaches’ Associations (AEFCA).

As regards coach education, the UEFA Study Group Scheme

is another valuable initiative, enabling trainee coaches to broaden
their knowledge and horizons during study visits to other national
associations.

After Andy Roxburgh’s retirement in summer 2012, UEFA’s

technical sector was restructured and, in January 2014, former
Manchester United FC coach Sir Alex Ferguson was named UEFA
coaching ambassador. His goal is to share his vast wealth of experience
with young coaches, in particular by participating in the numerous
events that UEFA organises for its technicians.

167
 At the heart of UEFA

168
I. MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS

The founding members

The following 25 national Austria

associations were represented Belgium
at UEFA’s founding meeting Bulgaria
in Basel on 15 June 1954: Czechoslovakia
Denmark
England
Federal Republic of Germany
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Northern Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Republic of Ireland
Saarland
Scotland
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
USSR
Yugoslavia

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I. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

The national associations

Since the Romanian association’s representatives had been unable to

get visas to enter Switzerland, the assembly agreed that they could be
represented by Czechoslovakia. The Welsh association, whose delegate
was unable to travel due to illness, was represented by England.

The representatives of the Hellenic Football Federation arrived in

time for the afternoon session.

Three other national associations were among the 31 European

FIFA member associations when UEFA was founded: those of Albania,
Iceland and Poland. Even though they were not represented at the
founding meeting in Basel (Poland attended its first European general
assembly in 1955, Iceland in 1956 and Albania in 1962), they were
recognised as UEFA members as of 1954.

One of the founding associations, that of Saarland, put an end to

its international activities at the end of July 1956. The people of Saarland
had voted in a referendum to join the Federal Republic of Germany and
its football association in turn asked to be affiliated to that of the Federal
Republic (the DFB). As well as appearing on the list of UEFA’s founder
members, the Saarland association left its mark in the history books
of the European Champion Clubs’ Cup, in which it was represented in
1955 / 56 by 1. FC Sarrebruck, who were knocked out by AC Milan in
the round of 16. Furthermore, the association’s president, Hermann
Neuberger, went on to become DFB president and a FIFA vice-president,
while its national team coach for the 1954 FIFA World Cup qualifiers,
Helmut Schön, lifted the World Cup with West Germany 20 years later.

The Turkish Football Federation joined UEFA at the general

assembly in Vienna in 1955, but FIFA vetoed its membership, considering
Turkey to be part of Asia. On 23 February 1956, the FIFA general
secretary wrote to his UEFA counterpart that: “The request by the Turkish
Association to be considered as belonging to the continent of Europe has
been unanimously rejected by the Executive Committee.”

170
I. MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS

He took the opportunity to point out that the same applied to the
national associations of Cyprus and Israel, but that the Executive
Committee saw “no disadvantage with your Union authorizing them to
participate in competitions organized by you”.

At the 1956 general assembly in Lisbon, the delegates ratified the

Turkish Football Federation’s affiliation to UEFA, but without voting rights.
It was not recognised by FIFA as a fully fledged member of UEFA until
1962. The Cyprus Football Association had to wait until 1964, while the
Israel Football Association was finally allowed to join UEFA in 1994, after
lengthy negotiations.

In the meantime, UEFA had granted membership to the

associations of Malta (1960), Liechtenstein (1974), San Marino (1988),
the Faroe Islands (1990), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1992), Armenia,
Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine (1993). Azerbaijan,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia all joined UEFA in 1994, followed by Andorra
in 1996, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998, Kazakhstan in 2002 and
Montenegro in 2007. The Gibraltar Football Association became UEFA’s
54th member in 2013.

Considered the successor of the Yugoslavian Football Association,

the Football Association of Serbia is deemed to have been a UEFA
member since 1954.

Saarland was not the only German founder member later

absorbed by the DFB: on 21 November 1990, after the reunification of
Germany, the football association of the German Democratic Republic
(DFV) merged with that of West Germany under the banner of the DFB.

171
II. CONGRESS

Congress

Known as general assemblies until 1968, the UEFA Congress met annually
until 1958, when the delegates convened in Stockholm and decided
to amend the UEFA Statutes so that they could meet every two years.
This biennial rhythm continued until 2002, when the UEFA Congress,
meeting in Stockholm again, decided that they would once more convene
annually, mainly in order to facilitate the management of the organisation’s
financial affairs. Additional Extraordinary Congresses have been held
when necessary.

02 / 03 /1955 Vienna 19 / 0 4 /1990 Malta

08 / 0 6 /1956 Lisbon 25 / 0 6 /1992 Gothenburg
28 / 0 6 /1957 Copenhagen 28 / 0 4 /1994 Vienna
04 / 0 6 /1958 Stockholm 29 / 0 6 /1996 London
21 / 0 8 /1960 Rome 30 / 0 4 /1998 Dublin
17 / 0 4 /1962 Sofia 30 / 0 6-01 / 07 / 2000 Luxembourg
17 / 0 6 /1964 Madrid 25 / 0 4 / 2002 Stockholm
06 / 07 /1966 London 27 / 03 / 2003 Rome
07 / 0 6 /1968 Rome 22-23 / 0 4 / 2004 Limassol
08 / 05 /1970 Dubrovnik 21 / 0 4 / 2005 Tallinn
07 / 0 6 /1972 Vienna 23 / 03 / 2006 Budapest
22 / 05 /1974 Edinburgh 25-26 / 01 / 2007 Dusseldorf
15 / 0 6 /1976 Stockholm 31 / 01 / 2008 Zagreb
22 / 0 4 /1978 Istanbul 25-26 / 03 / 2009 Copenhagen
21 / 0 6 /1980 Rome 25 / 03 / 2010 Tel Aviv
28 / 0 4 /1982 Dresden 22 / 03 / 2011 Paris
26 / 0 6 /1984 Paris 22 / 03 / 2012 Istanbul
24 / 0 4 /1986 Cascais 24 / 05 / 2013 London
24 / 0 6 /1988 Munich 27 / 03 / 2014 Astana

Extraordinary Congresses

11 /12 /1959 Paris 19 / 09 /1991 Montreux

27 / 09 /1961 London 17 / 0 6 /1993 Geneva
07 / 0 6 /1968 Rome 24 / 09 /1997 Helsinki
16 / 0 6 /1971 Monte Carlo 11 /10 / 2001 Prague
15 / 03 /1973 Rome 28 / 05 / 2007 Zurich

172
 III. PRESIDENTS

Presidents

Ebbe Schwartz
(1901-1964)
UEFA President from 1954 to 1962

In its early days, when football in Europe was characterised by lots of

strong personalities who did not always see eye to eye, UEFA was more
in need of a mediator than a heavy-handed leader and Denmark’s Ebbe
Schwartz was the ideal man for the job. He had successfully resolved the
conflict between professional players and amateur football at home and
was a keen advocate of collaboration and concerted effort. That is not to
say that he could not show a firm hand when necessary, as demonstrated
UEFA

in 1958 when he brought an end to the procrastination concerning the

launch of the European Nations’ Cup.
Ebbe Schwartz

Elected by the Executive Committee on 22 June 1954, he was

confirmed in his position as president by the general assembly in Vienna
the year after and was unanimously re-elected for a second term at the
1958 assembly in Stockholm. Two years later, at the general assembly
in Rome, he told the delegates: “We have, in fact, progressed so quickly
that it may be wise to make a halt, in order to consolidate what we
have achieved.”

He took a step back himself by deciding not to seek a third term

as UEFA president, although he did not hang up his boots entirely, instead
joining the FIFA Executive Committee in 1962. He died of a heart attack
in Honolulu on 19 October 1964, on his way home from the Olympic
Football Tournament in Tokyo.

Paying tribute to him in the December 1964 issue of the UEFA

Official Bulletin, his successor, Gustav Wiederkehr, wrote that Ebbe
Schwartz’s greatest strength was “loyalty in friendship”.

173
III. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Gustav Wiederkehr
(1905-1972)
UEFA President from 1962 to 1972

President of the Swiss Football Association from 1954 to 1964, vice-

president of the 1954 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee and
elected UEFA president in 1962, Gustav Wiederkehr, a qualified
economist, was an able negotiator and a stickler for detail. He fervently
defended UEFA’s position within FIFA, judging that the principle of ‘one
association, one vote’ was detrimental to Europe, which accounted for

KEYSTONE
the majority of players and clubs and was clearly the heavyweight of
world football. It was already too late to go back on this principle but
that did not stop him from trying, suggesting, for example, that FIFA
Gustav Wiederkehr
become a ‘Supreme Body of the Continental Confederations’ in which
voting rights were distributed in proportion to the number of clubs or
players represented, or that the confederations be given an advisory
role at the FIFA Congress. Europe would have needed to speak with one
voice if it were to push through these plans but the European members
of the FIFA Executive Committee did not always see eye to eye with the
UEFA executive.

In an attempt to reinforce the cohesion of European football,

Gustav Wiederkehr opened the membership of UEFA committees
to representatives of virtually all the member associations. He also
organised conferences that gathered together the presidents of the
national associations. Although not enshrined in the UEFA Statutes,
these conferences provided a forum in which to discuss topics affecting
European football and showed the Executive Committee which path
to take. At the conference in Bürgenstock in June 1969, the delegates
unanimously urged Gustav Wiederkehr to stand for a third term as
president, despite his plans to step down.

174
III. PRESIDENTS

Gustav Wiederkehr’s desire to maintain unity in European football was

also demonstrated by his commitment to negotiations that resulted
in the abolition of the Liaison Committee of Football Leagues, a body
founded in 1958 without UEFA’s consent. It was dissolved in 1964 and
several of its members joined the UEFA Committee for Non-Amateur
and Professional Football.

“Clearly and purposefully, G. Wiederkehr set the course and stuck

to it unerringly, inspiring the same zeal in all who worked alongside him,”
wrote Victor de Werra, president of the Swiss Football Association, in a
publication dedicated to the late UEFA president.

Extremely friendly, with a real sense of humour, he attached

great importance to the quality of human relationships and had many
friends. In order that his memory might live on, they paid tribute to him
by organising the ‘Guschti Cup’ in Zurich, an annual football match
and social get-together for leading figures from the worlds of football,
politics and finance.

175
III. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Artemio Franchi
(1922-1983)
UEFA President from 1973 to 1983

It was in refereeing that Artemio Franchi began his career as a football

administrator, before climbing to the top of the ladder in his home country
and becoming president of the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) in 1967.
His involvement at UEFA began in 1962, when he joined the Publicity
Committee. He then served as a member of the Organising Committee of
the UEFA Club Competitions and was elected to the Executive Committee
in 1968, immediately taking up the role of vice-president, a position he

ROWELL
held until being elected president at the 1973 Congress in Rome.

Artemio Franchi
What better way of paying tribute to Artemio Franchi than by
quoting some of the words used by his successor, Jacques Georges, at
a ceremony held at the FIGC technical centre in Coverciano a month
after his death in a road accident: “He pursued his career correctly and
honestly, with intelligence and with courage and with a sense of goodwill
and determination that were universally acknowledged. It was no mere
chance that he had so many honours bestowed upon him, for he was a
man of culture, of human warmth, a refined man with a sharp and precise
intelligence. He combined intellectual ability with striking emotional
qualities … Whether in the UEFA or the FIFA Executive, Artemio always
tried to address his words to his colleagues as men, as human beings,
people of intelligence and not people who were there simply to do as they
were told. His aim was always to convince rather than to constrain.”

As a further tribute to Artemio Franchi, the Executive Committee

decided that the 1984 European Champion Clubs’ Cup final should be
played at the Olympic Stadium in Rome. His name was also given to the
trophy of the European / South American Nations Cup, a national team
competition between the European and South American champions.
Having failed to secure a slot in the calendar it was held only twice, in
Paris in 1985 and in Mar del Plata in 1992, when it was won by France
and Argentina respectively.

176
 III. PRESIDENTS

Jacques Georges
(1916-2004)
UEFA President from 1983 to 1990

Mayor of Saint-Maurice-sur-Moselle and owner of the family textile

firm, Jacques Georges certainly did not shy away from responsibility. He
was not even 30 when he began his career in football administration,
as chairman of his village club. After climbing the domestic ladder and
becoming president of the French Football Federation, he joined the UEFA
Executive Committee in 1972 and was first vice-president when he was
unexpectedly called on to succeed Artemio Franchi as president. He had
SABE

to make some hard decisions during his presidency but always stood by
them without pretence, in particular when he decided that the ill-fated
Jacques Georges
final at Heysel should go ahead.

Throughout his career, all those who knew him from the
numerous committee meetings he chaired found him to be a man who
listened to others, a firm leader who nevertheless wanted to reach
a consensus and, for many, a friend. The staff of the UEFA general
secretariat who served under him appreciated his human touch and
his constant concern for their well-being. Jacques Georges liked people
and knew how to listen to them, appreciate them and help them to be
their best.

He always campaigned for fair play and opposed violence,

including by supporting the activities of the International Association for
Non-Violent Sport (AICVS). He also fought against political interference
in sport, writing in the French Football Federation’s official publication in
October 1975: “We have often said it, we have often written it: football
is just a game. A game that must be played and managed seriously, of
course, but one that should never be considered by a nation as a test of
its strength or influence. There are plenty of other avenues for that.”

177
III. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

He described his philosophy as follows: “To all of us passionate people

whose love of our club, of our association sometimes makes us
unreasonable, should someone not sit us down and say: ‘But you have
the same goal, the same ideal, you should be brothers; brothers united
by the ideal of sport, the ideal of football.’”

It was in this spirit that, in autumn 1987, he established the

circle of former UEFA committee members, best known by its French
name, the Amicale des anciens, whose aim it was – and still is – “to
make it possible for former members of UEFA and of the FIFA Executive
Committee, who had worked at least 12 years in these bodies, to see
their old friends again from time to time and to avoid losing contact
altogether with UEFA”.

After stepping down as president and being named honorary

president by the UEFA Congress in April 1990, Jacques Georges
completed one more term as FIFA vice-president before retiring from the
international stage for good. FIFA also made him an honorary member.
In the meantime he had returned to office with the French Football
Federation, taking the role of acting president after the Furiani stadium
disaster in Bastia.

Jacques Georges died peacefully at home in Saint-Maurice-sur-

Moselle during the night of 25 / 26 February 2004.

178
 III. PRESIDENTS

Lennart Johansson
(born in 1929)
UEFA President from 1990 to 2007

Elected UEFA president at the 1990 Congress in Malta, where he beat

Switzerland’s Freddy Rumo by 20 votes to 15, Lennart Johansson of
Sweden, who had been an Executive Committee member since 1988,
led UEFA for a record-breaking four terms, spending a total of 17 years
at the helm of European football and as a vice-president of FIFA at a
time when relations between the two organisations were not exactly
idyllic. A constant advocate of balance and unity, Lennart Johansson set
UEFA

an example of great dignity during the 1998 FIFA presidential election

and in the period that followed he rejected controversy in favour of
Lennart Johansson
dispassionate dialogue, which was not always an easy task. He remained
faithful to his philosophy, as expressed in the first issue of UEFAflash in
May 1991: “I am against radical solutions, as experience has shown me
that we will only move forward if we add to our ‘mosaic’ step by step.”
It was a message he repeated 11 years later in an interview for the first
issue of UEFA∙direct: “I like people to help each other. I like us to be
honest with each other if we are in disagreement. I like us to talk directly
to each other – not through the media.”

Lennart Johansson’s long presidency was marked by many

important events. On the pitch, the main innovation during his tenure
was the creation of the UEFA Champions League, which is considered his
‘baby’, and which was destined to give unprecedented impetus to the
global phenomenon that is European club football.

179
III. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Events off the field also left their mark: at a political level, the break-
up of the USSR and Yugoslavia led to the creation of new states and
the arrival of many new UEFA member associations in a very short
space of time, with all the challenges of integration that one would
expect. “Football has once again proven that it is more than capable of
achieving such integration,” the president observed in his message for
the December 1994 issue of the UEFA Official Bulletin. “Football has
succeeded – long before the politicians, scientists and technocrats – in
creating a united Europe. And we should all be proud of this.”

In terms of politics and law, the Bosman case destroyed all

the safeguards that football had established to protect its values
and identity. Once again, Lennart Johansson chose dialogue over
confrontation, convinced that better mutual understanding between the
EU and UEFA was the best way of maintaining the principles of the EU
while keeping football’s own values alive.

The rapid growth of women’s football and futsal, the

introduction of club licensing and the opening of new headquarters in
Nyon were just a few of the other developments that helped to make
Lennart Johansson’s presidency a highly eventful period for UEFA.

Since becoming UEFA honorary president at the 2007 Congress in

Dusseldorf, Lennart Johansson has remained a regular face at Executive
Committee meetings and other UEFA events. On 14 April 2014, for
example, he travelled to Nyon to present the trophy that bears his name
to the captain of the FC Barcelona U19 team that beat SL Benfica in
the final of the first edition of the UEFA Youth League, the first ever
UEFA club competition organised for youth teams, on a trial basis to
begin with. It was a highly symbolic day, since UEFA had also invited the
members of its Amicale des anciens to this showcase of young talent.

180
 III. PRESIDENTS

Michel Platini
(born in 1955)
UEFA President since 2007

It can hardly be said that Michel Platini’s election to the Executive

Committee and later as UEFA president was met with universal
enthusiasm. Had he not supported Joseph S. Blatter in the 1998 FIFA
presidential election campaign against UEFA’s Lennart Johansson, and
had he not remained too close to the FIFA president? And yet there were
genuine reasons to welcome his arrival, not least because it is always
good when a player stays in football after hanging up his boots – the
UEFA

examples are growing all the time. Second, the former France captain’s
extraordinary reputation and popularity gave UEFA a media platform with
Michel Platini
unprecedented punch. It could also be argued that his ascent to the top
vindicates the supporters of the current system, proving that the UEFA
presidency is not an impregnable fortress even if Michel Platini, with his
unique aura, did not exactly follow the traditional route.

It was doubtless for all these reasons, and more besides, that 27
national associations voted for him over than his rival, the incumbent
president, Lennart Johansson, at the UEFA Congress in Dusseldorf on
26 January 2007.

181
III. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Michel Platini joined the UEFA family at the instigation of his compatriot
and mentor Jacques Georges, who in January 1988 informed the
Executive Committee that “Mr Platini had offered his services to UEFA
for the European Championship 1988 and that it was intended to
appoint him Member of the Technical Committee after the Congress”.
Subsequently, on a different level altogether, he and Fernand Sastre
co-chaired the French organising committee for the 1998 FIFA World
Cup. It was in this capacity that he met the then FIFA general secretary,
Joseph S. Blatter. “He suggested I become FIFA president,” Michel
Platini recalled. “But I didn’t even know what FIFA was! So I helped
Blatter in his campaign, and then as advisor. Later on Lennart Johansson
announced that he was stepping down as UEFA president. So, there was
this vacancy and not necessarily any candidates who represented my
ideas. That’s why I put my name into the hat.”

For Michel Platini, becoming UEFA president was not a about

power but legitimacy, as he explained in an interview for L’Équipe
Magazine in May 2008: “The difference is that, before, I had the
power to speak. Now I have the power to act.” He continued: “There
is no ‘logic of power’. You have to convince people and strike the right
balance, just as you have to strike a balance between club and national
team football: I played both. There is only one football.” In his very
first message for UEFA∙direct after his election, he admitted: “My aim
is to convince the leaders of European football to share my vision of
football … I am deeply democratic and I put the interests of football
above all else.”

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III. PRESIDENTS

Michel Platini has also managed to carry into the world of politics and
diplomacy his remarkable ability to ‘read the game’, an invaluable skill
for anyone wanting to progress in today’s football environment and
persuade those around them to adopt their ideas. It has enabled him,
for example, to push through major projects such as the restructuring
of UEFA, the introduction of financial fair play, the women’s football
development programme, the creation of a week-long celebration of
club football culminating in the Champions League final, the opening of
the Champions League to more national champions, the centralisation of
the sale of rights for national team qualifying matches and the launch of
the ‘week of football’, measures taken in all areas to protect the integrity
of football, including the appointment of national association integrity
officers, strengthening of the fight against doping, the relentless battle
against racism and all forms of discrimination, the expansion of the EURO
to 24 teams from 2016 and the adoption of an unprecedented ‘EURO for
Europe’ format to celebrate the competition’s 60th anniversary in 2020.
All this has been achieved through permanent dialogue with the entire
European football family, the EU authorities and national governments, as
well as with the police where integrity is concerned.

Michel Platini was re-elected by acclamation for a second four-

year term at the Paris Congress in 2011.

183
IV. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Executive Committee

Initially composed of six members, including the president and general

secretary, the Executive Committee was expanded to eight members
at the first general assembly in Vienna in 1955. It grew to 9 members
in 1956 (no longer including the general secretary), ten in 1959, 11 in
1966, 12 in 1988, 14 in 1996, 16 in 2009 and 17 in 2012, when the
Istanbul Congress confirmed that one seat would be reserved for a
woman appointed by the Executive Committee at the proposal of the
Women’s Football Committee.

Ordinary terms of office have lasted four years ever since UEFA
was founded. However, at the 2005 Congress in Tallinn the national
association delegates decided to move the elections to odd-numbered
years from 2007 onwards in order to keep in step with FIFA, which
had decided in 2003 to elect its president the year after the World Cup.
Five-year terms were served during this period.

Under the heading ‘True servants of UEFA’, Lars-Christer Olsson

paid tribute to the Executive Committee in an editorial published in the
November 2005 issue of UEFA∙direct:

“Men in the shadows? This expression does not really apply to

a group of people who all either hold or have held top positions within
their national football associations and whose media profile within their
respective countries is therefore considerable.

“Nevertheless, when they are elected to the UEFA Executive

Committee, the supreme body of European football, these same
leaders are still able to function together as a group, chaired by the
President … , and exercise shared responsibility in a way that shuns
any form of individualism. Even the tasks they are called on to fulfil
individually are carried out on the Executive Committee’s behalf rather
than their own. They work as a team and are well aware that, in
football, it is the players who are the stars.

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IV. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

“These men are nonetheless key personalities in the fabric of European

football. They have been entrusted by the national association
representatives who elected them with the job of taking our sport
forward whilst upholding its traditions, protecting its interests,
maintaining its equilibrium and, in particular, ensuring that the general
good prevails over individual concerns.

“Their task is huge; they are required to study carefully countless

documents on the broadest possible range of subjects, from sporting
aspects to legal and financial questions, as well as constantly evolving
information on new media technologies.

“Whether in meetings, travelling, pitchside, at seminars or in their

offices, the Executive Committee members spend endless hours working
to promote the development and popularity of football in general,
particularly within the continent of Europe.

“It is fitting that … they should each be the subject of a brief …

tribute.”

185
IV. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

UEFA Executive Committee members past and present

President Ebbe Schwartz Denmark 22 / 0 6 /1954 17 / 0 4 /1962

Gustav Wiederkehr Switzerland 17 / 0 4 /1962 07 / 07 /1972
Artemio Franchi Italy 15 / 03 /1973 12 / 0 8 /1983
Jacques Georges France 12 / 0 8 /1983 26 / 0 6 /1984 * 
26 / 0 6 /1984 19 / 0 4 /1990
Lennart Johansson Sweden 19 / 0 4 /1990 26 / 01 / 2007
Michel Platini France 26 / 01 / 2007

* Acting president

Vice-presidents Josef Gerö Austria 15 / 0 6 /1954 03 / 02 /1955

Gustáv Sebes Hungary 01 / 03 /1955 21 / 0 8 /1960
Peter Joseph Bauwens West Germany 08 / 0 6 /1956 22 /11 /1963
Sir Stanley Rous England 21 / 0 8 /1960 27 / 09 /1961
José Crahay Belgium 27 / 09 /1961 07 / 0 6 /1972
Sándor Barcs Hungary 17 / 0 4 /1962 07 / 07 /1972*
15 / 03 /1973 22 / 0 4 /1978
Agustin Pujol Spain 14 / 02 /1964 07 / 0 6 /1968
Artemio Franchi Italy 07 / 0 6 /1968 15 / 03 /1973
A. Dahl Engelbrechtsen Denmark 08 / 07 /1972 22 / 0 4 /1978
Heinz Gerö Austria 15 / 03 /1973 16 / 09 /1976
26 / 0 8 /1984 24 / 0 6 /1988
Jacques Georges France 16 / 09 /1976 12 / 0 8 /1983
Václav Jira Czechoslovakia 22 / 0 4 /1978 25 / 0 6 /1992
Sir Harold Thompson England 22 / 0 4 /1978 28 / 0 4 /1982
Nikolay Ryashentsev USSR / Russia 24 / 0 8 /1982 28 / 0 4 /1994
Ellert B. Schram Iceland 26 / 0 6 /1984 25 / 0 4 /1986
David H. Will Scotland 25 / 0 4 /1986 19 / 0 4 /1990
Freddy Rumo Switzerland 24 / 0 6 /1988 19 / 0 4 /1990
Antonio Matarrese Italy 19 / 0 4 /1990 01 / 07 / 2000
Sir Bert Millichip England 19 / 0 4 /1990 29 / 0 6 /1996
Egidius Braun Germany 28 / 0 4 /1994 01 / 07 / 2000
Şenes Erzik Turkey 28 / 0 4 /1994
Per Ravn Omdal Norway 29 / 0 6 /1996 09 / 02 / 2007
Ángel María Villar Llona Spain 01 / 07 / 2000
Des Casey Republic of Ireland 01 / 07 / 2000 25 / 0 4 / 2002

* Acting president from 07 / 07 /1972 to 15 / 03 /1973

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 IV. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Vice-presidents Geoffrey Thompson England 25 / 0 4 / 2002 24 / 05 / 2013

Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder Germany 09 / 02 / 2007 25 / 03 / 2009
Marios N. Lefkaritis Cyprus 01 / 0 6 / 2007
Joseph Mifsud Malta 25 / 03 / 2009 22 / 03 / 2011
Giancarlo Abete Italy 22 / 03 / 2011
Grigoryi Surkis Ukraine 24 / 05 / 2013

Treasurers Alfred Frey Austria 11 /12 /1959 17 / 0 4 /1962

Lodewijk Brunt Netherlands 17 / 0 4 /1962 13 /11 /1966
Herbert Powell Wales 18 /11 /1966 19 / 02 /1972
Jos Coler Netherlands 08 / 0 6 /1972 22 / 0 4 /1978
Lucien Schmidlin Switzerland 22 / 0 4 /1978 26 / 0 6 /1984
Jo van Marle Netherlands 26 / 0 6 /1984 14 / 03 /1995
Egidius Braun Germany 14 / 03 /1995 01 / 07 / 2000
Mathieu Sprengers Netherlands 01 / 07 / 2000 09 / 02 / 2007
Marios N. Lefkaritis Cyprus 09 / 02 / 2007 01 / 0 6 / 2007 *

* The office of treasurer changed to that of vice-president

Members Gustáv Sebes Hungary 15 / 0 6 /1954 01 / 03 /1955

Henri Delaunay France 15 / 0 6 /1954 10 /11 /1955
George Graham Scotland 15 / 0 6 /1954 04 / 0 6 /1958
José Crahay Belgium 15 / 0 6 /1954 27 / 09 /1961
Peter Joseph Bauwens West Germany 02 / 03 /1955 08 / 0 6 /1956
Constantin Constantaras Greece 02 / 03 /1955 17 / 0 6 /1964
Alfred Frey Austria 02 / 03 /1955 11 /12 /1959
Leszek Rylski Poland 08 / 0 6 /1956 17 / 0 6 /1964
06 / 07 /1966 07 / 0 6 /1968
Sir Stanley Rous England 04 / 0 6 /1958 21 / 0 8 /1960
Agustin Pujol Spain 06 / 0 6 /1956 13 / 02 /1964
Pierre Delaunay France 11 /12 /1959 17 / 0 4 /1962
Lodewijk Brunt Netherlands 21 / 0 8 /1960 17 / 0 4 /1962
Herbert Powell Wales 17 / 0 4 /1962 18 /11 /1966
Toivo Ekholm Finland 17 / 0 4 /1962 06 / 07 /1966
Ota Beck Czechoslovakia 17 / 0 6 /1964 07 / 03 /1966

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IV. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

UEFA Executive Committee members past and present

Members Hermann Gösmann West Germany 12 / 0 6 /1964 07 / 0 6 /1968

Giuseppe Pasquale Italy 17 / 0 6 /1964 07 / 0 6 /1968
Tore Brodd Sweden 06 / 07 /1966 08 / 05 /1970
Nikolay Ryashentsev USSR 06 / 07 /1966 24 / 0 8 /1982
José Luis Costa Spain 07 / 0 6 /1968 07 / 0 6 /1972
Jos Coler Netherlands 07 / 0 6 /1968 15 / 03 /1972
Francisco do Cazal-Ribeiro Portugal 07 / 0 6 /1968 07 / 0 6 /1972
Václav Jira Czechoslovakia 07 / 0 6 /1968 22 / 0 4 /1978
25 / 0 6 /1992 09 /11 /1992
A. Dahl Engelbrechtsen Denmark 08 / 05 /1970 08 / 07 /1972
Heinz Gerö Austria 07 / 0 6 /1972 15 / 03 /1973
16 / 09 /1976 26 / 0 6 /1984
Jacques Georges France 07 / 0 6 /1972 16 / 09 /1976
H. S. Nelson Scotland 07 / 0 6 /1972 22 / 05 /1974
Roger Petit Belgium 07 / 0 6 /1972 21 / 0 6 /1980
Lucien Schmidlin Switzerland 15 / 03 /1973 22 / 0 4 /1978
Sir Harold Thompson England 22 / 05 /1974 22 / 0 4 /1978
Günter Schneider GDR 22 / 0 4 /1978 Dec. 1990
Einar Jørum Norway 22 / 0 4 /1978 28 / 0 4 /1982
René Van Den Bulcke Luxembourg 22 / 0 4 /1978 28 / 0 4 /1982
Louis Wouters Belgium 21 / 0 6 /1980 26 / 0 6 /1984
Ellert B. Schram Iceland 28 / 0 4 /1982 26 / 0 6 /1984
Jo van Marle Netherlands 28 / 0 4 /1982 26 / 0 6 /1984
Thomas Younger Scotland 28 / 0 4 /1982 13 / 01 /1984
Antero da Silva Resende Portugal 26 / 0 6 /1984 25 / 0 6 /1992
Freddy Rumo Switzerland 26 / 0 6 /1984 24 / 0 6 /1988
19 / 0 4 /1990 25 / 0 6 /1992
Federico Sordillo Italy 26 / 0 6 /1984 24 / 0 6 /1988
David H. Will Scotland 26 / 0 6 /1984 25 / 0 4 /1986
Lauri Pöyhönen Finland 25 / 0 4 /1986 24 / 0 6 /1988
Egidius Braun Germany 24 / 0 6 /1988 25 / 0 4 /1994
Lennart Johansson Sweden 24 / 0 6 /1988 19 / 0 4 /1990
Antonio Matarrese Italy 24 / 0 6 /1988 19 / 0 4 /1990
Sir Bert Millichip England 24 / 0 6 /1988 19 / 0 4 /1990
Ellert B. Schram Iceland 19 / 0 4 /1990 25 / 0 4 /1994
Şenes Erzik Turkey 19 / 0 4 /1990 25 / 0 4 /1994

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 IV. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Members Jean Fournet-Fayard France 25 / 0 6 /1992 01 / 07 / 2000

Per Ravn Omdal Norway 25 / 0 6 /1992 29 / 0 6 /1996
09 / 02 / 2007 25 / 03 / 2009
Ángel María Villar Llona Spain 25 / 0 6 /1992 01 / 07 / 2000
Des Casey Republic of Ireland 28 / 0 4 /1994 01 / 07 / 2000
Viacheslav Koloskov Russia 28 / 0 4 /1994 25 / 03 / 2009
Joseph Mifsud Malta 28 / 0 4 /1994 25 / 03 / 2009
František Chvalovski Czech Republic 29 / 0 6 /1996 25 / 0 4 / 2002
Marios N. Lefkaritis Cyprus 29 / 0 6 /1996 09 / 02 / 2007
Giangiorgio Spiess Switzerland 29 / 0 6 /1996 26 / 01 / 2007
Mathieu Sprengers Netherlands 29 / 0 6 /1996 01 / 07 / 2000
09 / 02 / 2007 06 / 0 4 / 2008
Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder Germany 01 / 07 / 2000 09 / 02 / 2007
Claude Simonet France 01 / 07 / 2000 25 / 0 4 / 2002
Geoffrey Thompson England 01 / 07 / 2000 25 / 0 4 / 2002
Eggert Magnusson Iceland 25 / 0 4 / 2002 26 / 01 / 2007
Michel Platini France 25 / 0 4 / 2002 26 / 01 / 2007
Henri Roemer Luxembourg 25 / 0 4 / 2002 23 / 0 4 / 2004
Franco Carraro Italy 23 / 0 4 / 2004 25 / 03 / 2009
Grigoriy Surkis Ukraine 26 / 01 / 2007 24 / 05 / 2013
Mircea Sandu Romania 26 / 01 / 2007
Gilberto Madaíl Portugal 26 / 01 / 2007 22 / 03 / 2011
Giancarlo Abete Italy 25 / 03 / 2009 22 / 03 / 2011
Allan Hansen Denmark 25 / 03 / 2009
František Laurinec Slovakia 25 / 03 / 2009
Avraham Luzon Israel 25 / 03 / 2009
Michael van Praag Netherlands 25 / 03 / 2009
Liutauras Varanavičius Lithuania 25 / 03 / 2009 22 / 03 / 2011
Theo Zwanziger Germany 25 / 03 / 2009 24 / 05 / 2013
Karen Espelund * Norway 16 / 0 6 / 2011
Sergey Fursenko Russia 22 / 03 / 2011
Peter Gillieron Switzerland 22 / 03 / 2011
Borislav Mihaylov Bulgaria 22 / 03 / 2011
David Gill England 24 / 05 / 2013
Wolfgang Niersbach Germany 24 / 05 / 2013

* Appointed by the Executive Committee

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IV. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

UEFA Executive Committee members past and present

Co-opted members (without voting rights) Grigoriy Surkis Ukraine 2004 2007
Gilberto Madaíl Portugal 2004 2007
Giangiorgio Spiess Switzerland 2007 2008
Friedrich Stickler Austria 2007 2008

Advisor (without voting rights) Fernando Gomes Portugal 2013

Honorary members

Honorary presidents Jacques Georges † France

Lennart Johansson Sweden

Honorary members Gerhard Aigner Germany

Hans Bangerter Switzerland
Sándor Barcs † Hungary
Egidius Braun Germany
Des Casey Republic of Ireland
Jos Coler † Netherlands
José Crahay † Belgium
Jean Fournet-Fayard France
Artemio Franchi † Italy
Viacheslav Koloskov Russia
Antonio Matarrese Italy
Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder Germany
Joseph Mifsud Malta
Sir Bert Millichip † England
Per Ravn Omdal Norway
Sir Stanley Rous † England
Nikolay Ryashentsev † Russia
Lucien Schmidlin † Switzerland
Giangiorgio Spiess Switzerland
Geoffrey Thompson England

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IV. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Meetings outside Europe

The Executive Committee has already met on the territory of most UEFA
member associations. In many cases this has been at the invitation of the
associations and is seen as a good way to demonstrate that, in UEFA’s
eyes, all the national associations are of equal importance, whatever their
size, prestige and means. This approach has also enabled the Executive
Committee to strengthen its relationship with the associations concerned.
In recent years it has regularly invited the president and general secretary
of the host association to attend the meeting, as a sign of openness and
transparency, but also so that they can see how the executive works and
the diversity and sheer number of topics it deals with.

Looking at where the Executive Committee has been over the

years, two meetings, or rather two pairs of meetings, stand out for not
having been held on UEFA territory. The first, in New York on 4 December
1991, was a double meeting because it was followed the next day by a
meeting with the European members of the FIFA Executive Committee.
The UEFA executive met in the United States because most of its members
had to be there for FIFA meetings connected to the qualifying draw for the
1994 FIFA World Cup held on 6 December in New York.

The other was in Cape Town, on 26 and 27 January 1999, when

the UEFA Executive Committee convened at the invitation of the
Confederation of African Football (CAF), ahead of a joint meeting with
the CAF executive on the second day to review the progress of the
Meridian project, launched by the two confederations in Lisbon two
years earlier. This joint meeting itself was, in fact, a prelude to the second
edition of the UEFA-CAF Meridian Cup, a competition for youth teams
from the two continents held between 1997 and 2007.

A third, so-called consultative meeting was held in Chicago on

15 June 1994 on the eve of the FIFA Congress and two days before the
start of the FIFA World Cup. The meeting was called in order to discuss,
before the club competitions kicked off, a proposal from the disciplinary
bodies concerning yellow cards. The Executive Committee agreed to
simplify the procedure by abolishing automatic suspensions after three
cautions, given that players were already suspended after two.

191
IV. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

General secretaries and CEOs

Henri Delaunay
(1883-1955)
UEFA General Secretary from 1954 to 1955
(see pages 10-11, The three pioneers)

Pierre Delaunay
(born in 1919)
UEFA General Secretary from 1956 to 1959

When he was struck down by illness, Henri Delaunay had alongside

him the ideal candidate to take up the torch as UEFA general secretary:
his son Pierre, who had already been immersed in the world of football
for several years and was secretary of the French professional league at
the time.

Officially appointed UEFA general secretary at the 1956 general

UEFA
assembly in Lisbon, Pierre Delaunay also succeeded his father as general
secretary of the French Football Federation (FFF) and, working from the
Pierre Delaunay
same office as UEFA had yet to acquire its own headquarters, he divided
his time between the two institutions.

When UEFA moved to Berne without him, Pierre Delaunay

continued to work at the FFF and attended the meetings of the UEFA
Executive Committee, on which a seat had been created for him. He
completed one term of office and remained a member of the European
Football Championship organising committee until 1969. Following the
occupation of the FFF and his being held hostage in May 1968, and with
very little enthusiasm for the changes set out in the new FFF statutes,
Pierre Delaunay radically changed direction and opened an antiques
shop in Versailles. He did not turn his back on the game though, his
interest in the past leading him to accept a proposal to write a book,
100 Ans de Football en France, on the last century of French football.

192
V. GENERAL SECRETARIES AND CEOS

Pierre Delaunay is still a member of the Amicale des anciens. Along with
Polish former Executive Committee member Leszek Rylski, he is its most
senior member, although unlike the latter, who attended the UEFA Youth
League final in Nyon in April 2014, ill health has prevented the erstwhile
head of the secretariat from attending the gatherings of these valued
servants of football.

When he stepped down as UEFA general secretary, Pierre

Delaunay wrote a message in the January 1960 UEFA Official Bulletin that
remains as pertinent now as it was back then:

“Knowing the extraordinary enthusiasm of the crowds for

football, its power to reach all classes of society and the moral influence
it exercises over our youth, we must all, as European leaders, be deeply
aware of our responsibilities.

“It behoves us therefore to fight against any split, to subordinate

all personal interests to the general one, to continue to make great
efforts to understand each other better, to promote an active interchange
of ideas, which after all is only following our statutes, and to permit no
one to appropriate the rights and powers which are recognised as ours as
much by the FIFA as by our own members.”

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V. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Hans Bangerter
(born in 1924)
UEFA General Secretary from 1960 to 1988

“I was secretary to the administration of the Swiss federal school of

gymnastics and sport in Macolin and, as I spoke several languages,
I was responsible, among other things, for looking after foreign guests.
One day the ‘big bosses’ of world football, Peco Bauwens, Sir Stanley
Rous and Ottorino Barassi, came to Macolin and invited me to work
at FIFA.” Hans Bangerter spent seven years at the world governing
body, where one of his tasks was to help organise the 1954 World

SABE
Cup in Switzerland. UEFA then came knocking on his door when it
was looking for a new general secretary. “I was offered the job but I
Hans Bangerter
wanted the secretariat to be based in Switzerland. Zurich and Geneva
were proposed to me but I wanted Berne.” Although a hard runway
had recently been built at Berne-Belp airport, there were still no
international connections, which would have made getting to UEFA’s
new headquarters somewhat easier. But who cared? Responding to
those at the Extraordinary Congress in Paris who had criticised Berne
for being a “provincial” town, the May 1960 issue of the UEFA Official
Bulletin pointed out: “The speakers were unaware that the policy of the
UEFA Executive Committee is not to hold its meetings always in the city
where the offices are situated, but to meet the members of its affiliated
Associations in various countries and cities.”

One of the things Hans Bangerter was responsible for as general

secretary was the introduction, of two regulatory provisions that, as he
himself wrote in 25 Years of UEFA, “were adhered to resolutely, despite
widespread opposition from different sides”: the introduction, partial
in the 1968 / 69 season then general from 1969 / 70, of fixed dates for
European club matches and a “system to reward teams for goals scored
away from home”, which was mainly brought in to dissuade visiting
teams from adopting the overly defensive style of play all too often seen
away from home. This innovation also had the advantage of eliminating
the need for play-offs, thereby easing some of the congestion in the
match calendar.

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V. GENERAL SECRETARIES AND CEOS

An attentive and privileged observer of the development of European

football, Hans Bangerter wrote numerous reports, analyses and
commentaries for official UEFA publications. He was never short of ideas.
For example, in an article entitled ‘Prospects of the new Decennium’
published in the UEFA Official Bulletin of March 1970 he suggested:
“Would it not be possible to have a nursery in or close to the stadium
so that even couples with small children can go and see the match
together? How many a young house-wife might thus become a serious
fan of the game!”

Hans Bangerter retired on 31 December 1988. He was made a

UEFA honorary member at the Congress in Gothenburg in June 1992,
and as such he regularly attends the UEFA Congress and other important
European football gatherings.

Jacques Georges gave the following résumé of the Swiss general

secretary’s career on this 60th birthday: “Hans Bangerter has managed
his career with the precision of a watch, the rigour of a bank and the
softness of chocolate, a symbol of friendship.”

195
V. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Gerhard Aigner
(born in 1943)
UEFA General Secretary from 1989 to 2000
UEFA CEO from 2000 to 2003

A football fan through and through, Germany’s Gerhard Aigner tried his
hand at all aspects of the game: player, coach, referee and administrator,
and it was clearly in this final role that he established his excellent
reputation in football circles.

Having joined UEFA in 1969, polyglot Gerhard Aigner headed the

competitions department before being appointed general secretary on

UEFA
1 January 1989, following Hans Bangerter’s retirement.

Gerhard Aigner
Heavily involved in the creation of the UEFA Champions League
and the restructuring of the other club competitions, Gerhard Aigner
also played a crucial role in the relocation of the UEFA administration
from Berne to Nyon in 1995. Moreover, he completely reorganised the
administration to meet the needs of its constantly and rapidly changing
environment. “The situation had become impossible for me, because
all the projects dealt with by the administration ended up on my desk.
I was swamped,” he recalls. He therefore proposed to change the
system and did so by means of the FORCE project, approved by the
2000 Congress in Luxembourg. As part of the project, he had been
appointed to the new post of CEO in December 1999 already and was
able to hand some of his work to a team of newly appointed directors.

196
V. GENERAL SECRETARIES AND CEOS

Gerhard Aigner was at the heart of UEFA’s efforts to repair the damage
caused by the Bosman ruling and preserve the balance and values of
football. “The effects of this ruling can still be seen today,” he says.
“Before, integration went deeper, with assimilated players who often
ended up even applying for the nationality of the countries they played in.
It also discouraged all those who looked after young players voluntarily,
by depriving them of the pleasure of seeing their protégés climb the
ladder and become big names themselves on day. Now, attracted by
money, players leave their clubs at a younger and younger age and
volunteers rarely see the fruits of their labour.

“The balance in football must come from the players, not the
money. It was crazy to think that, by getting rid of transfer compensation,
TV revenue would finance youth development. This would not have been
possible in lots of countries where TV revenues are not very high.”

Gerhard Aigner retired at the end of 2003 to devote more time to

family life. He was made a UEFA honorary member at the 2004 Congress
in Cyprus, and in that capacity he continues to attend big European
football gatherings. Retirement may have given him more time to travel
and play golf, but it has done nothing to diminish his love of football.

197
V. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Lars-Christer Olsson
(born in 1950)
UEFA CEO from 2004 to 2007

Appointed general secretary of the Swedish Football League in 1990,

Lars-Christer Olsson took up the same position at the Swedish Football
Association a year later. His new employers were busy preparing for
UEFA EURO 1992 at the time, and the new general secretary, who
was also appointed tournament director, found this to be the ideal
opportunity to demonstrate his organisational skills on the international
stage. The tournament in Sweden, which was won by Denmark – invited

UEFA
to participate at the last minute following Yugoslavia’s suspension – was
a great success and it was not long before Lars-Christer Olsson was
Lars-Christer Olsson
appointed to his first UEFA post as a member of the Committee for the
European Championship.

In 2000 he stepped down from his advisory role as a committee

member in order to join the UEFA administration in the newly created
position of director of professional football and marketing. When
Gerhard Aigner announced that he would be retiring at the end of
2003, he then applied for the job of CEO and the Executive Committee
appointed him at its meeting in Seville on 22 May 2003.

During his term as CEO, Lars-Christer Olsson focused his efforts

on the marketing of the UEFA competitions and the creation of new
structures for the organisation of the EURO. He also lent his support
to the Independent European Sport Review and made a significant
contribution to the Vision Europe strategy document.

Famed for his exemplary punctuality, Lars-Christer Olsson

endeavoured to strengthen team spirit within the UEFA administration
by advocating interdivisional cooperation, while also encouraging
initiative and flexibility. Having never disguised his loyalty to Lennart
Johansson, he left UEFA shortly after Michel Platini’s election in
January 2007.

198
 V. GENERAL SECRETARIES AND CEOS

David Taylor
(1954-2014)
UEFA General Secretary from June 2007
to October 2009

General secretary of the Scottish Football Association, David Taylor

acted as spokesperson for the advocates of a 24-team EURO at the
2007 UEFA Congress in Dusseldorf. Having been a member of the UEFA
Control and Disciplinary Body since 2002, he took up the post of general
secretary on 1 June 2007. In October 2009, he became CEO of the
company UEFA Events SA, but health problems forced him to step down
at the end of 2012.
UEFA

He then became a business advisor to UEFA, representing it on

David Taylor
the boards of its commercial partners TEAM and CAA Eleven.

David Taylor died on 24 June 2014 after a short illness.

“He was … a football administrator of the highest calibre. In

addition, he gave us his boundless enthusiasm as a lover of football …
We will all greatly miss his outstanding professional competence, as
well as his countless qualities as a colleague and a person,” the UEFA
president, Michel Platini, wrote in tribute to him.

199
V. AT THE HEART OF UEFA

Gianni Infantino
(born in 1970)
UEFA General Secretary since October 2009

A multilingual lawyer with dual Swiss and Italian nationality, Gianni

Infantino joined the UEFA administration in summer 2000 as a member
of the professional football and marketing division. He then took charge
of relations with the leagues before becoming director of the legal
division in 2004.

After Lars-Christer Olsson’s departure, he became acting CEO.

UEFA
Appointed deputy general secretary in October 2007, he replaced
David Taylor at the head of the administration two years later.
Gianni Infantino

As well as managing the UEFA administration (“a huge machine

that generates a lot of pressure”), Gianni Infantino dedicates a lot of
his time to the implementation of financial fair play, which has already
produced a massive reduction in the losses registered by clubs. He
also plays an active part in protecting the integrity of football. “Even
if we are convinced we have good arguments, it’s not always easy to
get them across and convince others,” says the general secretary, who
nevertheless has an obvious sense of diplomacy. “It’s a question of
balance; you have to strike the right balance between all the different
interests,” he adds before revealing the one thing every football
administrator needs: “to be passionate about the game”. This passion
and his desire to share it with his staff is evident in initiatives such as the
annual UEFA interdivisional football tournament.

200