[ G.R. No. 221538.

September 20, 2016 ]

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, PETITIONER, VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

Gracy is a 35-year-old foundling whose mother and father were initially unknown. She filed a
certificate of candidacy to join the senatorial race. Gracy is a registered voter and a college
graduate and has never left the Philippines since birth. In a petition for denial of due course to
and cancellation of her certificate of candidacy (COC), her opponents were able to prove that
Gracy’s father was a Spanish who left her in front of Quiapo church when she was just an infant—
(a) Is she eligible to run for the position?; (b) Assume the foregoing set of facts except that Gracy
is not a foundling but knows her mother as a Filipina who raised her but abandoned by her
Spanish father. Is she eligible to run as a senator?

A. Yes, Gracy is eligible to run for the Senatorial position even her father is a Spanish.

B. Yes, Gracy is eligible to run as a Senator even though she is not foundling since her
mother is a Filipina.

LEONEN, J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all foundlings from public service.

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence
is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least
one or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born
citizen. When these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive
prerogative to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion
remediable by either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.

This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single foundling as natural-born. The
circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born.
The nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political powers, as devised by the
Constitution, are likewise different from the other ways to raise questions of citizenship.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the nullification
of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.[2] The assailed November 17, 2015 Decision[3] dismissed the Petition for Quo
Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office
under Article VI, Section 3[4] of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015 Resolution[5] denied David's
Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.[6] Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.[7] He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.[8] Emiliano Militar
reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968.[9] She was given
the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.[10] Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER
3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY
OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO . . . [11]
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption
of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(more popularly known as Susan Roces).[12] The Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.[13] October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III
Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality.[14]

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and
noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.[15] This
hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San
Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.[16]
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18 years old.[17] The
Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila on December 13, 1986.[18]

On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport.[19] Her passport was renewed on
April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.[20] Having become Senator,
she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013.[21]

Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United
States in 1988 to obtain her college degree.[22] In 1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.[23]

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino
national since birth.[24] The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.[25] On July 29,
1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her husband.[26] For some time, she lived with her husband and
children in the United States.[27]

Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa
Anika (Anika).[28] Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika
on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the Philippines.[29]

Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001.[30] She was subsequently given
a United States passport.[31]

Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004
National Elections.[32] To support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Philippines on April 8, 2004.[33] After the Elections, she returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.[34] It was during
her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.[35]

Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into a coma."[36] Senator Poe
returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004.[37] On December 14, 2004, her father died.[38] She stayed in the
country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate.[39]

In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for work again in the United States.
[40]

Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.[41] After consulting her children, they all agreed to return to the
Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces.[42] In early 2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia,
United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the following semester.[43] She came back on May 24,
2005.[44] Her children also arrived in the first half of 2005.[45] However, her husband stayed in the United States to
"finish pending projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home there."[46]

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN)
on July 22, 2005.[47]

On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines:[48]
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.[49]
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through
Republic Act No. 9225.[50] She also "filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who
were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time."[51]

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by
Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:[52]
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate that David was a former citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine
citizen; thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued an ACT and
ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed
to have re-acquired her Philippine Citizenship.[53] (Emphasis in the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of
R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225."[54] Until now, the Order "has not been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other
agency of Government."[55]

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her
children.[56] It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18,
2006."[57]

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.[58]

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and 2009 using her United States
Passport No. 170377935.[59] She used her passport "after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07
July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010."[60] The following
are the flight records given by the Bureau of Immigration:
Departures Flight No.  
November 1, 2006 SQ071  
July 20, 2007 PR730  
October 31, 2007 PR300  
October 2, 2008 PR358  
April 20, 2009 PR104  
July 31, 2009 PR730  
October 19, 2009 PR102  
November 15,
PR103  
2009
December 27,
PR112  
2009
March 27, 2010 PR102  
   
Arrivals Flight No.  
November 4, 2006 SQ076  
July 23, 2007 PR731  
November 5, 2007 PR337  
May 8, 2008 PR103  
October 5, 2008 PR359  
May 21, 2009 PR105  
August 3, 2009 PR733  
November 15,
PR103[61]  
2009
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).[62] On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship,[63] stating:

I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive,
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby
depose and state that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States
nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity
thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or
undue influence.[64] (Emphasis in the original)

The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010.[65] On October 21, 2010, she took her
Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010.[66] Her oath of office stated:
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN

Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot
ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng
Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga
dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong
babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.

Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.
[67]
 (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States[68] in the presence of
Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.[69] On this occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire
Information for Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.[70] On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian
executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.[71] The certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen
Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012.[72]

Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.[73] On September 27, 2012, she executed a Certificate
of Candidacy, which was submitted to the Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.[74] She won and was
declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.[75]

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for
Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015.[76] He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the
citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution."[77]

Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David "to correct the formal defects
of his petition."[78] David filed his amended Petition on August 17, 2015.[79]

On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive
Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the
amended Petition.[80]

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship
Re-acquisition and related documents from the Bureau of Immigration on August 25, 2015.[81] The documents
requested included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate.[82] On August 26, 2015, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion.[83] The same Resolution directed the Secretary of
the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics
Office.[84] The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested documents.[85] The subpoenas were complied with by
both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015.[86]

On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2)
Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for
Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court.[87]

On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a
preliminary conference brief on or before September 9, 2015.[88] The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference
on September 11, 2015.[89] During the Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on
the ground of prescription."[90]

Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015.[91] The parties were then
"required to submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator
Poe] within thirty (30) days from the said date."[92]

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of DNA test results.[93] The Senate
Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.[94] On November 5, 2015,
Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing,[95] which stated that "none of the tests that
[Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed light to the real identity of her biological parents."[96] The
Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any
development to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino
citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in her submissions to the Tribunal."[97] On
November 6, 2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and
considered the case submitted for resolution."[98]

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.[99] The Decision stated:
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue to be a natural-born
citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.

....

In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired
her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.

Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225),
the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship.

....

To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her American citizenship on
20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[100] (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.[101] The Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No.
15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration.[102]

Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.[103] David's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015:[104]
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated
on 17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.

The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November 2015 issued by the Executive
Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December
2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean Arturo de
Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before
the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."

SO ORDERED.[105] (Emphasis in the original)

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received by David.[106] On December 9, 2015,
David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this Court.[107]

On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the
Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice."[108] The Resolution also set oral arguments
on January 19, 2016.[109] The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its
Comment on December 30, 2015.[110] Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January 4, 2016.[111]

This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on Elections case on the issue of private
respondent's citizenship.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding
that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.

Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this
Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—
a petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
seek relief from this Court.

I. A

The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:[112]
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

....

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies
(particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections[113]) the power to rule on contests[114] relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives). These powers are
granted to a separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such
contests is its only task; it performs no other function.

The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal system an "independent, impartial
and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose."[115] The 1935
Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to members of the National Assembly.[116] This was a departure from the system introduced by
prior organic acts enforced under American colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of
1916—which vested the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution was
amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate
electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress.[117] The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals,
but they have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.

All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide for the creation of electoral
tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral
tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.

In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:[118]

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of the
power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and complete." . . . Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power
was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.[119]
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials
falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-
election challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the
President and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.

The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of
electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement
that "[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
[120]

The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal]
the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . .
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even
affect the same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond
judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of
a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy
for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct
an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
[121]
 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in
judgment.

I. B

A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court
through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a
continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil
action.[122] The viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of discretion."[123]

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave.[124]
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence,
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation,
are ignored or not accounted for.[125]

A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or

misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion.[126] The arbitrariness
consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.

Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from settled principles engenders a
strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent against a party.

Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an issue is premised on wrong
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;[127] (b)
where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective
assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used";[128] "(c) where the tribunal's action on
the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable";[129] and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.[130]

I. C

We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution,
one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the aspirations of all its provisions.

Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted with a
novel legal question: the citizenship status of children whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to
exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial
precedent.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law
while needfully considering the established personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the
impossible of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to establish her parentage, when the
controversy before it arose because private respondent's parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout
her life.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on burdening private respondent
with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short months, the one thing that she has never been in a
position to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts
known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping with the degree of proof required
in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or
preponderance of evidence, but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."[131]

In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the misfortune of having been abandoned
by their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did
justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public service.
 II

Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he
[or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of
the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, private
respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which
is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she
could never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply with
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.

Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its
enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose
fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as private respondent's foundling
status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With private respondent having supposedly
failed to discharge this burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

III

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or
both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown.[132] Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation.

Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to identify which
among competing interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual
words—text—and how they are situated within the whole document—context—govern. Secondarily, when discerning
meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable.
Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be
resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.

III. A

The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily begin with the text itself. The language
of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from which this Court determines constitutional intent.[133]

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba
legis.[134] The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the
Constitution, therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding.
Thus:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that
is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness,
its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[135] (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the Constitution. A
constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the Constitution that animates
each of its components through the dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is called into operation is
the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a
singular, whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.[136] Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that
gives life to all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.[137]

The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each provision at the heart of a controversy
in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:[138]
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on
a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.[139] (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact same text,
if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system."[140] Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law.
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally
passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect.
[141]
 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation as immutable.

Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has evolved. Unless completely novel,
legal provisions are the result of the re-adoption—often with accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing
rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and
excesses of previously existing rules.

One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current iteration with prior counterpart provisions,
keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes such as
the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or
more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change
galvanizes meaning.

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines, may be
compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier Constitutions but even in organic laws[142] and in similar
mechanisms[143] introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still resonate today.

Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal interpretation must grapple with the truth
that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,[144] this
Court explained the place of a holistic approach in legal interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be plainly evident from
Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between
direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section
5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation.
The variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what they claim to be the Fair
Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate
insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means
endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for
humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and
uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider
context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation
entails the convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal
apparatus, chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the
vernacular that describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse
provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the
ideal of fair elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present authoritative
effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.
[145]
 (Emphasis supplied)
III. B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of
multiple, viable meanings.[146] It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous
construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.

Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the business of understanding the
Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily
means that all organs of government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to
arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however,
judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same
principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards
this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.[147]

When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions on similar, but not the
very same, matters or concerns),[148] as well as thematically similar statutes and international norms that form part of
our legal system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts under
consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying
notions of the framers, as articulated through records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be illuminating.

III. C

In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed intent of the
framers or fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest
approach.

These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The
alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may
have voted for or against a proposition for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely
erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension
of actions made within specific historical episodes through detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern
lenses.

Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always uniform with the original understanding of
the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk,
much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's understanding
thereof.[149] (Emphasis supplied)
IV

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an express
statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable
reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to
delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading
proceeds from several levels.

On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally governs: the
Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized
with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in
relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts,
and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to
the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its
provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal
protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions,
and international instruments.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from birth means that private
respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though
subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

V. A

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[150]
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from
Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
those who may count themselves as natural-born.

The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated when supplemented with an
understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and natural-born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term
"natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept.

V. B

Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have rights."[151] It is one's personal and . . .
permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the
right to petition the government for redress of grievance.[152]

Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is part.[153] Citizenship, therefore, is
intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it.
This is particularly so if these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections[154] reckoned with the historical development of our concept of citizenship,
beginning under Spanish colonial rule.[155] Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were
identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects."[156] Church records show that native inhabitants were referred to
as "indios." The alternative identification of native inhabitants as subjects or as indios demonstrated the colonial
master's regard for native inhabitants as inferior.[157] Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.

Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were
considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly
mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by special laws.[158] It was only on December 18, 1889, upon the
effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical enumeration of who were
Spanish citizens,[159] thus:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.[160]
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain to the United States of
America under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not
automatically convert the native inhabitants to American citizens.[161] Instead, it left the determination of the native
inhabitants' status to the Congress of the United States:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain
in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their decision
to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

Thus -

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall
be determined by Congress.[162]
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish subjects
were "issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States."[163]

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise
known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:[164]
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who
were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands
to parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or
citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.[165]

On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to
include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein.[166]
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of
1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended:[167]
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have
since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of
the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country."[168]

There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution
that made sole reference to parentage vis-a-vis the determination of citizenship.[169] Article III, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision stipulating the
qualifications for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read:
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding the election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define the term.

Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law provisions that stipulated the automatic
loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards women.[170] The 1973
Constitution rectified this problematic situation:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by
her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her citizenship.[171]
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.[172]
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on citizenship, "except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution."[173]

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[174]
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of natural-born citizens, as follows:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction as
part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for President and Vice-President of the Philippines.

In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a
single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the presidency.[175] It is not defined in that Constitution or in American
laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the presidency are not even found in the records of
constitutional deliberations.[176] However, it has been suggested that, as the United States was under British colonial
rule before its independence, the requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against foreign
infiltration in the administration of national government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a letter sent by John Jay to
George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July 25, 1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners
into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the
American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served valiantly in the Revolutionary
forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign
monarch.[177]
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.

V. C

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen
is one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal[178] articulates this definition
by dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.[179]
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of naturalized citizens in his
Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a
rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens."[180]

One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally required to file a verified petition.[181] He
or she must establish. among others, that he or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the capacity
to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant period
of time.[182] Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the
Filipinos' core beliefs.[183]

V. D

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-
born citizens." This constitutional definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born
citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential clarification is
deemed written into the interpreted text, thus establishing its contemporaneous intent.

Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is misplaced. It is
inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the
succeeding Section's unequivocal definition.

Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To
determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to
perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent the naturalization
process to become a Filipino.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual naturalization process. There is
no more straightforward and more effective way to terminate this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of
proof.

At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as well as compliance with
Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at analogies are misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for
naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children,
individuals whose capacity to act is restricted.[184] It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the
relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that
he or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the
immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise
from the restrictive process of naturalization.

So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is clear. It should be with the actual
process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to
citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.

V. E

Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.

Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's father or one's
mother must be a Filipino citizen.

That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of
citizenship.

Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to
conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
ethnically foreign.

Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one's
ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.

Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence
adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.

V. F

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings attests to how at least one—if not
both—of her biological parents were Filipino citizens.

Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned
as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who,
in 1968, were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and
finding. Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
economic cost, prohibitive.

However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to establish her parentage.

In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:[185]
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption; while
circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence.[186]
People v. Raganas[187] further defines circumstantial evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in issue, which by experience
have been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory
conclusion.[188] (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.[189] There
is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not
considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of
life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy
the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.[190]

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.
[191]
 In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population.[192] Private
respondent is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an oval-
shaped face."[193] She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.[194] Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro,
Iloilo.

These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a
predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously
coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is
unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.

In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,[195] the Solicitor General underscored how
it is statistically more probable that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He
submitted the following table is support of his statistical inference:[196]
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014

FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN

YEAR
IN THE PHILIPPINES IN THE PHILIPPINES
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
1967 1,440 840,302
1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
 1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible][197]

Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners.
This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.

Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after half a century, a range of
substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable conclusion as to private respondent's parentage.

VI

Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained by a general assumption on
foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a contemporaneous construction of the
Constitution, and considering that we have just discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private
respondent's birth, it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore the burden of
proving—through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status.

Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a mere showing that she is a
foundling is a serious error.

Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all newborns who have been abandoned in
rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the
circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require proof from private respondent borders
on the absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is
simply not known.

"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations;[198] that
is, the party who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"[199] Burden of proof never shifts from one party to another. What
shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor.[200] The
other party then bears the "burden of going forward"[201] with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly been
established against him or her.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges
that the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies
such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence.[202] This burden was
petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the
respondent.

Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While
it does establish that the identities of private respondent's biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.

The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence
establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of evidence to private respondent.

Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances
that we have previously established as substantive evidence of private respondent's parentage:
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;

(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;

(3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;

(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a foundling;

(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and

(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As against petitioner's suggested
conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts is that at least one of private respondent's parents is a
Filipino.

VII

Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article
IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains
a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2),
any such countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino
citizens.

VII. A

Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November
17, 2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be
indulged in resolving this case.[203] He insists that it is private respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her
Filipino parentage.

Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates that actual proof is preferable.
Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.

In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the allegations that former presidential
candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this
Court proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born sometime
in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish colonial rule;[204] and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of
residence, as indicated in his dearth certificate, must have also been his place of residence before death, which
subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine
Bill of 1902.[205] This Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando
Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he
was born while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, was in
effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship
of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.[206]
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan[207] and Go v. Ramos[208] (which merely cites Paa)—to the effect that
presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.

Paa, decided in 1967, stated:

It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he
is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more recent ruling in Tecson.

Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty
of "the respondent." The syntax of this Court's pronouncement—using the definitive article "the"—reveals that its
conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used generic
language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could have used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of a claimant of Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used
other words that would show absolute or sweeping application, for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in favor
of any/every claimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of
Philippine citizenship."

The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate
precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence
already indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this
case presents no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.

Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear that the same pronouncement was
generally applicable:
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In any case, Go was decided by this Court
sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual
and even procedural backdrops are different from those of this case. Go involved the deportation of an allegedly
illegal and undesirable alien, not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the
Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.

VII. B

The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the
Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."[211]

As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions
on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the
well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service,
and to respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.

Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the state to enhance children's well-
being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this
mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination
that hide behind the veneer of the legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

....

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

....

ARTICLE XV
The Family

....

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

....

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution
makes the following offices exclusive to natural-born citizens:
(1) President;[212]
(2) Vice-President;[213]
(3) Senator;[214]
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;[215]
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;[216]
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission;[217]
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;[218]
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;[219]
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;[220]
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;[221] and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.[222]
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include, among others, city fiscals,
[223]
 assistant city fiscals,[224] Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices.
[225]
 Certain professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,[226] as are other legally established benefits and
incentives.[227]
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against
our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through
the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from
office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.

If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.

The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public service:
ARTICLE II

....

State Policies

....

SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.

....

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

....

ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (Emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like circumstances and falling within the same
class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"[228]

Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction[229] differentiates foundlings from
children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment
of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them—an inability arising from
no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior,
second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those who know their
parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the
very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.

This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of
defending and promoting the well-being and development of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory
classes based on circumstances of birth.

Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are human persons whose dignity we value
and rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ARTICLE II

....
 State Policies

....

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
VII. C

Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of constitutional text, the presumption
that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of
both of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction
of the Constitution with acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of
executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.

Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted
mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put
this mandate into effect.

Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed at all times:

....

(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings
before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which allows the child to
participate and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the program and policy formulation
and implementation related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" as the "totality of the circumstances
and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most
encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional development."

Consistent with this statute is our ratification[230] of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
specifically requires the states-parties' protection of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and nationality
after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of their birth status.
[231]
 Pertinent portions of the Convention read:
Preamble

The State Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental
human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International
Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is
entitled to special care and assistance,

....

Have agreed as follows:

....

Article 2
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.

2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or
beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or
her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.
....

Article 7
1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name,
the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law
and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the
child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines likewise ratified[232] the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth
and to acquire a nationality. It similarly defends them against discrimination:
Article 24. . . .

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part
of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

....

Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation."[233] Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate
before they became binding:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It then has the force and
effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III, et al.:[234]
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when,
by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go
through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.[235] (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole of
government—including the judiciary—is duty-bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt
servanda.

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested
with the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their
development.

Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from
discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.

Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was
enacted as a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption of every
child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."[236]

Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No. 8552:[237]
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-
caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such
efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings
where he/she shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally
entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other
Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be
adopted:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption, hi order
that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted: to the Board:

    a) Child study;

    b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

    c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;

    d) Medical evaluation/history;

    e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

    f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy
the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then facilitate their adoption by foreigners:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true copy of the Court Order of
Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a
minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under
R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be required:

a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate of
the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed after the birth of the
child.

b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.

c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate. [238] (Emphasis supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They
benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the
naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.

Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her natural-born status.
This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a
viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-
Llamanzares, private respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official
public acts.

First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the domestic adoption process.
Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed her as
MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born citizenship.[239]

VIII

As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's
proposition as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born
Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the
United States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. A

"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law."[240] Commonwealth Act No. 63,
which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in
Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private
respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006,
she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three
(3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition
of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.[241]

Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63[242] and Republic Act No. 8171[243] specifically "to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries."[244]

The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship."[245] This Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:[246] "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country."[247]

Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and immutable despite naturalization as
citizens of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are
naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this
retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities
(i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the
other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire"
their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain
solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a
mere restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-
born status as though it was never lost at all.

VIII. B

Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the
enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities."[248] However, other
conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the
country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or

b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces

of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must
comply with all of the following requirements:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a
natural-born Filipino.[249] This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9225 are satisfied.[250]

Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,[251] Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.[252]

Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath."[253] This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant
laws, makes one eligible for elective public office.

As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,[254] this required sworn renunciation is intended to

complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law."[255] It is also in view of this
that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed
forces of other countries from being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.

VIII. C

Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.[256] Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.[257] This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.[258] This was complemented by her execution
of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States[259] before Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-
Briers on July 12, 2011,[260] which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality on December 9, 2011[261] and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service,
Department of State, on February 3, 2012.[262]

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of
the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. D

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is
a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act
No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2
of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino
citizen's naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.

To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire
natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante
that one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225
intended to mean the investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have used a word such as "reacquire."
Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the
moment of compliance with its requirements.

Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that repatriation involves the restoration of former
status or the recovery of one's original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.[263] (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic
Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship."[264] In Bengson's words, the once naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought
back to his or her natural-born status. There may have been an interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the
interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates this intervening
fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He
or she is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences
de facto.

Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring
compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not
for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization as
there is no singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must comply.

IX

To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless[265] is not only to set a dangerous and callous
precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional
order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly
remedied by any economic relief.

If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate an interpretation that condemns
foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered
inert and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.

Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against other reasonable interpretations of our
basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but always with justice in mind.

It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must always sustain. Not only will this
manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional competence when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments,
there is no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.

Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator
of the Republic.

SO ORDERED.