RIZALITO Y. DAVID, PETITIONER, VS.

SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as to callously exclude all
foundlings from public service.

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent
search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that
satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or
her parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a
natural-born citizen. When these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
in the exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative to decide the qualifications of the
members of the Senate, then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by either
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I of the Constitution.

This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single
foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial
proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The nature of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and its place in the scheme of political powers, as devised by the
Constitution, are likewise different from the other ways to raise questions of
citizenship.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari [1] filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David
(David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision
and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in
SET Case No. 001-15.[2] The assailed November 17, 2015 Decision[3] dismissed the
Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought to unseat private respondent
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under
Article VI, Section 3[4] of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015
Resolution[5] denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological

parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo.[6] Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about
9:30 a.m.[7] He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. [8] Emiliano
Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on
September 6, 1968.[9] She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar.[10] Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate stating:
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH
CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY
EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE
CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL
STREET, JARO . . .[11]
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision
granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more
popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known
as Susan Roces).[12] The Decision also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from
Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
[13]
October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio certified that the Decision
had become final in a Certificate of Finality.[14]

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the
San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that
she was adopted by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe. [15] This hand-written
notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling certificate:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per
Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated
May 13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.[16]
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when
she turned 18 years old.[17] The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on
December 13, 1986.[18]

On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport.
[19]
Her passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009,
December 19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.[20] Having become Senator, she was also
issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December 19, 2013. [21]

Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila,
but eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. [22] In
1991, she earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Boston College,
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.[23]

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both
an American and Filipino national since birth. [24] The marriage took place in
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish, San Juan, Manila.[25] On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe
returned to the United States with her husband. [26] For some time, she lived with her
husband and children in the United States.[27]

Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna
MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika).[28] Brian was born in the United States
on April 16, 1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both
Hanna and Anika were born in the Philippines. [29]
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001.
[30]
She was subsequently given a United States passport. [31]

Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. [32] To support her father's candidacy,
Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004.
[33]
After the Elections, she returned to the United States on July 8, 2004. [34] It was
during her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.
[35]

Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into
a coma."[36] Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004. [37] On
December 14, 2004, her father died. [38] She stayed in the country until February 3,
2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend to the settling of his estate. [39]

In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for
work again in the United States.[40]

Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. [41] After consulting her children, they all
agreed to return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces. [42] In early
2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United States that they would
be transferring to the Philippines the following semester. [43] She came back on May
24, 2005.[44] Her children also arrived in the first half of 2005.[45] However, her
husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending projects, and to arrange for the
sale of the family home there."[46]

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax
Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.[47]

On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines:[48]
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.[49]
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention and or Re-acquisition of
Philippine Citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225.[50] She also "filed applications
for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen
(18) years of age at that time."[51]

The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on July 18,
2006 through an Order signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:[52]
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of the instant petition indicate
that David was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to
Filipino parents and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter,
became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American passport; was issued
an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her
Philippine Citizenship.[53] (Emphasis in the original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed Citizens of the Philippines in
accordance with Section 4 of R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225." [54] Until now, the Order "has
not been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other agency of
Government."[55]

On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificates in the
name of Senator Poe and her children.[56] It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 . . .
in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate Commissioner
Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."[57]

Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on
August 31, 2006.[58]

Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of America between 2006 and
2009 using her United States Passport No. 170377935. [59] She used her passport "after
having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07 July 2006, but not after she
has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010." [60] The
following are the flight records given by the Bureau of Immigration:
Departures Flight No.
November 1, 2006SQ071
July 20, 2007 PR730
October 31, 2007 PR300
October 2, 2008 PR358
April 20, 2009 PR104
July 31, 2009 PR730
October 19, 2009 PR102
November 15,
PR103
2009
December 27,
PR112
2009
March 27, 2010 PR102

Arrivals Flight No.

November 4, 2006SQ076
July 23, 2007 PR731
November 5, 2007PR337
May 8, 2008 PR103
October 5, 2008 PR359
May 21, 2009 PR105
August 3, 2009 PR733
November 15,
PR103[61]
2009
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Senator Poe as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
[62]
On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship,[63] stating:

I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently

residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state that
with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily renounce my United States
nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and privileges and all duties
and allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally,
voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any duress or undue influence.
[64]
(Emphasis in the original)

The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on October 21, 2010. [65] On
October 21, 2010, she took her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed
office on October 26, 2010.[66] Her oath of office stated:
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN

Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa katungkulan

bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, ay
taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga
iba pang pagkaraan nito'y gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas;
na aking itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na
mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at
mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika
ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang
pasubali o hangaring umiwas.

Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21 ng Oktubre 2010,

Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.[67] (Emphasis in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States[68] in the presence of Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12,
2011.[69] On this occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for
Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship. [70] On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul
Jason Galian executed a Certificate of Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe. [71] The
certificate was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on
February 3, 2012.[72]
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections. [73] On September 27,
2012, she executed a Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012. [74] She won and was declared as
Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.[75]

David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. [76] He contested the
election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution."[77]

Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-01 requiring David
"to correct the formal defects of his petition." [78] David filed his amended Petition on
August 17, 2015.[79]

On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, through its Executive Committee, ordering the Secretary of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal to summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended Petition.
[80]

Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a Motion Subpoena the Record
of Application of Citizenship Re-acquisition and related documents from the Bureau
of Immigration on August 25, 2015.[81] The documents requested included Senator
Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth Certificate. [82] On August 26, 2015, the
Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the Motion. [83] The
same Resolution directed the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the
concerned officials of the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics Office.
[84]
The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m.
before the Office of the Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the requested
documents.[85] The subpoenas were complied with by both the Bureau of Immigration
and the National Statistics Office on September 1, 2015. [86]

On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified Answer with (1) Prayer for
Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for Direct Contempt of
Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt of Court. [87]

On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-05
requiring the parties to file a preliminary conference brief on or before September 9,
2015.[88] The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference on September 11, 2015.
[89]
During the Preliminary Conference, the parties "agreed to drop the issue of
residency on the ground of prescription."[90]

Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on September 21, 2015.
[91]
The parties were then "required to submit their respective [memoranda], without
prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within thirty (30) days
from the said date."[92]

On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15 days the submission of
DNA test results.[93] The Senate Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27,
2015 through Resolution No. 15-08.[94] On November 5, 2015, Senator Poe filed a
Manifestation regarding the results of DNA Testing, [95] which stated that "none of the
tests that [Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed light to the real identity
of her biological parents."[96] The Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to
continue to find closure regarding the issue and submit any development to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe submitted "the issue of her natural-born
Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set forth in
her submissions to the Tribunal."[97] On November 6, 2015, through Resolution No.
15-10, the Senate Electoral Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the
case submitted for resolution."[98]

On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal promulgated its assailed
Decision finding Senator Poe to be a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to
hold office as Senator.[99] The Decision stated:
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution and
continue to be a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is
a citizen of the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.

. . . .

In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a natural-born Filipino

citizen, Respondent validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon
taking her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.

Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-002 (the Revised Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to
reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship.

. . . .

To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced
her American citizenship on 20 October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born
Filipino citizen from that time on until today.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo warranto is

DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[100] (Citations omitted)

On November 23, 2015, David moved for reconsideration.[101] The Senate Electoral
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator Poe five
(5) days to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration.[102]

Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on

December 1, 2015.[103] David's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Senate
Electoral Tribunal on December 3, 2015:[104]
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on 17 November 2015) of David
Rizalito Y. David dated 23 November 2015.

The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-11 dated 24 November
2015 issued by the Executive Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the
Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01 December 2015;
to GRANT the motion for leave to appear and submit memorandum as amici
curiae filed by Dean Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for
Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de Castro before the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139 (DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez,
Petitoner, versus Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."

SO ORDERED.[105] (Emphasis in the original)

On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's Resolution was received by
David.[106] On December 9, 2015, David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this
Court.[107]

On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate Electoral Tribunal and Senator
Poe to comment on the Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from notice."[108] The Resolution also set oral arguments on January 19, 2016. [109] The
Senate Electoral Tribunal, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its
Comment on December 30, 2015.[110] Senator Poe submitted her Comment on January
4, 2016.[111]

This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Commission on
Elections case on the issue of private respondent's citizenship.

For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding that private respondent is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial review through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to
annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which
state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.

Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a consideration of two (2)
factors: first, the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for
certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.

I. A

The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:[112]
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

. . . .

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections [113]) the
power to rule on contests[114] relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives). These powers are
granted to a separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2) aspects to the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such
contests is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task;
it performs no other function.

The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to introduce into our legal
system an "independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature
and specially created for that singular purpose."[115] The 1935 Constitution similarly
created an Electoral Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to members of the National Assembly. [116] This was a
departure from the system introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American
colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which
vested the power to resolve such contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935
Constitution was amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a corresponding
amendment was made for there to be separate electoral tribunals for each chamber of
Congress.[117] The 1973 Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but they
have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.

All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide

for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission),
have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole"
judge.

In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:[118]

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. . . . The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full, clear and complete." . . .
Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.[119]
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus,
vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges
against the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as
well as of the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.

The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review. Article VI,
Section 17's stipulation of electoral tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in
harmony with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that "[j]udicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Judicial review is, therefore,
still possible. In Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[120]
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal] on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this
Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even
affect the same."

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases.
In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained
that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court
may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by
the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave
abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."

In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court has ruled that the
power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.
[House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of
correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in
only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion
so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
[121]
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.

I. B

A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings
in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as an independent civil action.[122] The viability of such a petition is
premised on an allegation of "grave abuse of discretion." [123]

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it
must be grave.[124]
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate
Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in
its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been
nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of
stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.[125]

A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well

as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also
considered grave abuse of discretion.[126] The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of
the current state of our law.
Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or frivolously departs from
settled principles engenders a strong suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of
hostile intent against a party.

Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where the tribunal's approach to an
issue is premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross
misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence; [127] (b) where a tribunal's
assessment of a case is "far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be
used";[128] "(c) where the tribunal's action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable";[129] and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant
considerations in resolving an issue.[130]

I. C

We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping with a faithful and
exhaustive reading of the Constitution, one that proceeds from an intent to give life to
all the aspirations of all its provisions.

Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by petitioner, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal was confronted with a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children
whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the Constitution, in Article
IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled
to exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional ambiguity that, at that
point, was without judicial precedent.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a
reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully considering the established
personal circumstances of private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible
of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to establish her
parentage, when the controversy before it arose because private respondent's
parentage was unknown and has remained so throughout her life.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human capacity. It did not insist on
burdening private respondent with conclusively proving, within the course of the few
short months, the one thing that she has never been in a position to know throughout
her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously appreciated the implications of all other facts
known about her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner in keeping
with the degree of proof required in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body: not
absolute certainty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence,
but "substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." [131]

In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the
misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological parents. Far from reducing
them to inferior, second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the
Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the well-being of children, advancing
human rights, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to
opportunities for public service.

II

Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o
person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."

Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore,
not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he
argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, private respondent fails to
satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino
"blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of
who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion,
petitioner insists that as private respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could
never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that
ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.

Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution and its enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically
on Section 1(2), which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims that, as private respondent's
foundling status is settled, the burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With
private respondent having supposedly failed to discharge this burden, the supposed
inevitable conclusion is that she is not a natural-born Filipino.

III

At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings

have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of
their being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this
controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to
no fault of the foundling, remains unknown. [132] Resolving this controversy hinges on
constitutional interpretation.

Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in discovering the sovereign's

purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of the same text is
the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words—text—and
how they are situated within the whole document—context—govern. Secondarily,
when discerning meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous
construction may settle what is more viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the
plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to
as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the
Constitution.

III. A

The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision must necessarily begin

with the text itself. The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal
source from which this Court determines constitutional intent. [133]

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent
with the basic precept of verba legis.[134] The Constitution is truly a public document in
that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People exercising their right of
suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in
reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular,
rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.[135] (Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of
the Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is
the framework of the Constitution that animates each of its components through the
dynamism of these components' interrelations. What is called into operation is the
entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution should, therefore, be
appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.[136] Each
provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the
Constitution contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings. [137]

The words and phrases that establish its framework and its values color each provision
at the heart of a controversy in an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:[138]
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.[139] (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously
considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic
principle that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form part of [our] legal system."[140] Jurisprudence is not an independent source
of law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text
itself as of the date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial construction
articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect. [141] Nevertheless,
one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation as immutable.

Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has
evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re-adoption—
often with accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules. Even when
seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the
inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.

One may trace the historical development of text by comparing its current iteration
with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with
accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and
deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more
emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The
tension between consistency and change galvanizes meaning.

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which enumerates who are citizens of
the Philippines, may be compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier
Constitutions but even in organic laws[142] and in similar mechanisms[143] introduced by
colonial rulers whose precepts nevertheless still resonate today.

Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic appreciation of legal interpretation

must grapple with the truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform. In Social
Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,[144] this Court explained the place
of a holistic approach in legal interpretation:
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what they (respectively)
construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC,
that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between direct purchasers
and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that
Section 5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word "subscriber" means that
subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The variance in the parties' positions,
considering that they are both banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's
plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.

Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments
absurdity. The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are
commonsensical and need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic
to legal interpretation. Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal
interpretations are fodder for humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no
less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can stifle, rather than
facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled textualism purports to bolster.

Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is
erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary
belief wrongly assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than
parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary,
and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social
realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus,
chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed,
the word in the vernacular that describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates
this imperative of constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we
consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the
statute of which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We
consider not a cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present authoritative
effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty
from the Constitution.[145] (Emphasis supplied)
III. B

Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to
when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. [146] It is only then that one can
go beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning
has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous
construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.

Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the

business of understanding the Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic
democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of
government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it.
When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue
requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which interpretation
shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however, judicial
involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional
avoidance. This same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain
from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional
issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.[147]

When permissible then, one may consider analogous jurisprudence (that is, judicial
decisions on similar, but not the very same, matters or concerns), [148] as well as
thematically similar statutes and international norms that form part of our legal
system. This includes discerning the purpose and aims of the text in light of the
specific facts under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when external aids
may be consulted—that the supposedly underlying notions of the framers, as
articulated through records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be
illuminating.

III. C

In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation, inferring meaning from
the supposed intent of the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the
individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest approach.

These methods leave the greatest room for subjective interpretation. Moreover, they
allow for the greatest errors. The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily
encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that
have been otherwise silent and have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate
may have voted for or against a proposition for reasons entirely their own and not
necessarily in complete agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even
possible that the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely erroneous
premises. Fathoming original understanding can also misrepresent history as it
compels a comprehension of actions made within specific historical episodes through
detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.

Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution is not always uniform
with the original understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of
the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass
of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's understanding thereof.
[149]
(Emphasis supplied)
IV

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without
the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such
is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its
plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve
into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal
instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.

On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision,
which principally governs: the Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section
2, of "natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized with Section 1's
enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be
appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances
adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.

On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a
complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on
citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children,
guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access to opportunities for public
service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring natural-born
status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive
and administrative actions, and international instruments.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from
birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this
status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she
reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act
No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

V. A

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the
Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[150]
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition of the term "natural-
born citizens." This is distinct from Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As
against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may
count themselves as natural-born.

The weight and implications of this categorical definition are better appreciated when
supplemented with an understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and natural-
born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term "natural-born citizen" was a
transplanted, but tardily defined, foreign concept.

V. B

Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is the "right to have

rights."[151] It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political
community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is,
the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to
hold public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.
[152]

Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which one is part.
[153]
Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the
state, considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if
these benefits and protection have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's
birth.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections[154] reckoned with the historical development of

our concept of citizenship, beginning under Spanish colonial rule. [155] Under the
Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens
but as "Spanish subjects."[156] Church records show that native inhabitants were
referred to as "indios." The alternative identification of native inhabitants as subjects
or as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard for native inhabitants as
inferior.[157] Natives were, thus, reduced to subservience in their own land.

Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not
just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not
extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago
was to be governed by special laws.[158] It was only on December 18, 1889, upon the
effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,[159] thus:
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy.[160]
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine Islands were ceded by
Spain to the United States of America under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered
into on December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically convert the
native inhabitants to American citizens.[161] Instead, it left the determination of the
native inhabitants' status to the Congress of the United States:
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain
by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making . . . a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
may reside.

Thus -

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.[162]
Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native inhabitants who had
ceased to be Spanish subjects were "issued passports describing them to be citizens of
the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States." [163]

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in legislation in the
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:[164]
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the
Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899.
However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands to parents
who were not Spanish subjects. A view was expressed that the common law concept
of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the United States,
applied to the Philippine Islands. [165]

On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. It was made to include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a
law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso read:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens
of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.[166]
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law of 1916,
replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It restated the citizenship provision of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended:[167]
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine
Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she
was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said
date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country." [168]

There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a mode of acquiring
citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution that made sole reference to parentage vis-a-
vis the determination of citizenship.[169] Article III, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
provided:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this jurisdiction in the 1935
Constitution's provision stipulating the qualifications for President and Vice-President
of the Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read:
SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of President or Vice-President,
unless he be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of
age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding the election.
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935 Constitution did not define the
term.

Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with the then civil law
provisions that stipulated the automatic loss of Filipino citizens lip by women who
marry alien husbands—was discriminatory towards women.[170] The 1973 Constitution
rectified this problematic situation:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to
have renounced her citizenship.[171]
The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually define the term "natural-
born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provided:
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
[172]

The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution on
citizenship, "except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution." [173]

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[174]
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's previous definition of
natural-born citizens, as follows:
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a "foreign" concept that was
transplanted into this jurisdiction as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility
requirements for President and Vice-President of the Philippines.
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept originated, the term
"natural-born citizen" appears in only a single instance: as an eligibility requirement
for the presidency.[175] It is not defined in that Constitution or in American laws. Its
origins and rationale for inclusion as a requirement for the presidency are not even
found in the records of constitutional deliberations.[176] However, it has been suggested
that, as the United States was under British colonial rule before its independence, the
requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against foreign
infiltration in the administration of national government:
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language was inserted in response to a
letter sent by John Jay to George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July
25, 1787, which stated:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check
to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government;
and to declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American army shall not be
given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.
Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von Steuben, who had served
valiantly in the Revolutionary forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by
Jay. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting constitutional provision,
responded to rumors that the Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a
foreign monarch.[177]
In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus soli, not jus sanguinis.

V. C

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and
naturalized.

A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the
Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is
not natural-born. Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral
[178]
Tribunal articulates this definition by dichotomy:
[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are
only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.[179]
Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of
naturalized citizens in his Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he
stated, are "former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which
they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens."[180]
One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization is generally required
to file a verified petition.[181] He or she must establish. among others, that he or she is
of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the capacity to adapt to Filipino
culture, tradition, and principles, or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a
significant period of time.[182] Further, the applicant must show that he or she will not
be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the Filipinos' core beliefs.[183]

V. D

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. Section 2
categorically defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional definition is further
clarified in jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized
citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil Code, this jurisprudential
clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text, thus establishing its
contemporaneous intent.

Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish

bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's
mere enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding Section's
unequivocal definition.

Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on, and Section 2, it is
Section 2 that is on point. To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born
citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In
view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into whether she underwent the
naturalization process to become a Filipino.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual
naturalization process. There is no more straightforward and more effective way to
terminate this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of proof.

At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential approach to foundlings, as

well as compliance with Republic Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts
at analogies are misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for naturalization are clear,
specific, and narrowly devised. The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits
children, individuals whose capacity to act is restricted. [184] It is a glaring mistake to
liken them to an adult filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to
become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must
himself or herself adduce. As shall later be discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is
premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens
and proceeds from an entirely different premise from the restrictive process of
naturalization.

So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-vis natural-born status is

clear. It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is
to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the
door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.

V. E

Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.

Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen,

either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.

That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity
are not determinative of citizenship.

Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does
not even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or
ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.

Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The
citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as
petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.

Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship

may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially
proves that either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.

V. F

Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced in these proceedings
attests to how at least one—if not both—of her biological parents were Filipino
citizens.

Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now practically impossible. To

begin with, she was abandoned as a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a
century ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968, were able-
minded adults who can still lucidly render testimonies on the circumstances of her
birth and finding. Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA evidence
may be tested is improbable, and by sheer economic cost, prohibitive.

However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for private respondent to
establish her parentage.

In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence.

In Suerte-Felipe v. People:[185]
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts
from which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in
dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence.[186]
People v. Raganas[187] further defines circumstantial evidence:
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of facts other than the fact in
issue, which by experience have been found so associated with such fact that in a
relation of cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory conclusion. [188] (Citation
omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for instance, stipulates when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is
in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of
circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. [189] There is no rational basis for making
the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not
considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings.

In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction

(which may result in deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest
standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable
doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it
suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-
judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e.,
substantial evidence.[190]

Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo on September 3, 1968.[191] In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine
provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population.[192] Private respondent is
described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black
hair and an oval-shaped face."[193] She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. [194] Further, in
1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.

These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her

biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or
less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious
and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an international
airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a
foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to
give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her
physical features nonetheless attest to it.

In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,[195] the

Solicitor General underscored how it is statistically more probable that private
respondent was born a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the
following table is support of his statistical inference:[196]
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014

FOREIGN CHILDREN BORN FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN

YEAR
IN THE PHILIPPINES IN THE PHILIPPINES
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
1967 1,440 840,302
1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749
1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible][197]

Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in 1968, only 1,595 or
0.18% newborns were foreigners. This translates to roughly 99.8% probability that
private respondent was born a Filipino citizen.

Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of identifying her parents after
half a century, a range of substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable
conclusion as to private respondent's parentage.

VI

Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born status is sustained by a

general assumption on foundlings arising from a comprehensive reading and validated
by a contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and considering that we have
just discussed the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's
birth, it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that private respondent bore
the burden of proving—through proof of her bloodline—her natural-born status.

Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to private respondent upon a
mere showing that she is a foundling is a serious error.

Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential presumption that all

newborns who have been abandoned in rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos.
His emphasis on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the circumstances of
her birth places upon her an impossible condition. To require proof from private
respondent borders on the absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the
controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply not known.

"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law." Burden of proof lies on the party making the allegations; [198] that is, the party
who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"[199] Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a
party makes a prima facie case in his or her favor. [200] The other party then bears the
"burden of going forward"[201] with the evidence considering that which has ostensibly
been established against him or her.

In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the party who
brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible for the office
involved in the controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such as the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of proof is substantial evidence.
[202]
This burden was petitioner's to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie
case, the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.

Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not establish a prima facie
case in favor of petitioner. While it does establish that the identities of private
respondent's biological parents are not known, it does not automatically mean that
neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.

The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint of doubt, however, is by
no means substantial evidence establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden
of evidence to private respondent.

Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling, petitioner trivializes other
uncontroverted circumstances that we have previously established as substantive
evidence of private respondent's parentage:
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a church in Jaro, Iloilo;
(2) She was only an infant when she was found, practically a newborn;
(3) She was-found sometime in September 1968;
(4) Immediately after she was found, private respondent was registered as a foundling;
(5) There was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo; and
(6) Private respondent's physical features are consistent with those of typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates an imperceptive bias. As
against petitioner's suggested conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these
facts is that at least one of private respondent's parents is a Filipino.

VII

Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a
reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and
Section 1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all
foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a
Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.
Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must show
that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.

VII. A

Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro's Dissenting

Opinion to the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no
inference or presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be indulged in
resolving this case.[203] He insists that it is private respondent's duty to present
incontrovertible proof of her Filipino parentage.

Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal. Common sense dictates that
actual proof is preferable. Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on
presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.

In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of presumptions. Ruling on the
allegations that former presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino citizen, this Court
proceeded from the presumptions that: first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo
Pou, was born sometime in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish colonial
rule;[204] and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of residence, as indicated in his dearth
certificate, must have also been his place of residence before death, which subjected
him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping investiture of Filipino citizenship
effected by the Philippine Bill of 1902. [205] This Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's
citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe Jr.'s father, Allan F.
Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr. would then have been a natural-born Filipino
as he was born while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino citizenship to
those born to Filipino fathers, was in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and,
in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and
that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.[206]
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan[207] and Go v. Ramos[208] (which
merely cites Paa)—to the effect that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship
cases.

Paa, decided in 1967, stated:

It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of this Court's more recent
ruling in Tecson.

Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no presumption can be indulged in
favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was
preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of "the respondent." The
syntax of this Court's pronouncement—using the definitive article "the"—reveals that
its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his circumstances. Otherwise, this
Court would have used generic language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could
have used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence: "no presumption can be
indulged in favor of a claimant of Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could
have used other words that would show absolute or sweeping application, for instance:
"no presumption can be indulged in favor of any/every claimant of Philippine
citizenship;" or, "no presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of
Philippine citizenship."

The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those of this case. Its
statements, therefore, are inappropriate precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence
was adduced showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien with
the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise registered as an alien. These
pieces of evidence already indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut the door
to any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case presents no proof, direct or
circumstantial, of private respondent's or of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.

Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it to make it appear that the
same pronouncement was generally applicable:
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the state.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in proverbial translation. In any
case, Go was decided by this Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson,
which was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's factual and even
procedural backdrops are different from those of this case. Go involved the
deportation of an allegedly illegal and undesirable alien, not an election controversy.
In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the Chinese citizenship of
Go and of his siblings were adduced.

VII. B

The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either
a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as
to "effectuate [its] whole purpose."[211]

As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV, Section 2 with Article IV,
Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation.
They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of
children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for
public service, and to respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction
with the Constitution's reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public
offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that
considers related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments.

Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution require the
state to enhance children's well-being and to project them from conditions prejudicial
to or that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this mandate includes
preventing discriminatory conditions and, especially, dismantling mechanisms for
discrimination that hide behind the veneer of the legal apparatus:
ARTICLE II

. . . .

State Policies

. . . .

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

....
ARTICLE XV
The Family

. . . .

SECTION 3. The State shall defend:

. . . .

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes the following offices exclusive to natural-
born citizens:
(1) President;[212]
(2) Vice-President;[213]
(3) Senator;[214]
(4) Member of the House of Representatives;[215]
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court;[216]
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission;[217]
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections;[218]
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;[219]
(9) Ombudsman and his or her deputies;[220]
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;[221] and
(11) Chairperson and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.[222]
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-born citizens include,
among others, city fiscals,[223] assistant city fiscals,[224] Presiding Judges and Associate
Judges of the Sandiganbayan, and other public offices. [225] Certain professions are also
limited to natural-born citizens,[226] as are other legally established benefits and
incentives.[227]

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to

permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of
service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to
excluding them from certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which
will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be
tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged
proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular politician
from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an
inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of
their own.

If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.

The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to
opportunities for public service:
ARTICLE II

. . . .

State Policies

. . . .

SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

....

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

....

ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. (Emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of
'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of
inequality.'"[228]

Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial

distinction[229] differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents.
They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of
their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned
them—an inability arising from no fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a
rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class citizens
who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those who
know their parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is
dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very beginning of their lives, were
abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.

This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional organ, mandated to effect
the Constitution's dictum of defending and promoting the well-being and development
of children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes based on
circumstances of birth.

Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines, foundlings are human
persons whose dignity we value and rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:
ARTICLE II

. . . .

State Policies

. . . .

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights. (Emphasis supplied)
VII. C

Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of

constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the
foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress, international
instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive organs such as the
Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the Philippines.

Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that foundlings are Filipino
citizens at birth. It has adopted mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to
protect children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put this mandate into
effect.

Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006, provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed
at all times:

. . . .

(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will
ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, especially
those to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be
conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which allows the child to
participate and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of children in the
program and policy formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and
welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best interest of the child" as
the "totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the
survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the
child's physical, psychological and emotional development."

Consistent with this statute is our ratification [230] of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection of: first,
children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth; second, against
statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of their birth status.
[231]
Pertinent portions of the Convention read:
Preamble

The State Parties to the present Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,

Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the
Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity
and worth of the human person, and have determined to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,

Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,

. . . .

Have agreed as follows:

. . . .

Article 2

1. State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion,
 political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status.

2. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the

child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or
beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or

private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be
a primary consideration.

2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and

care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the
rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take
all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

. . . .

Article 7

1. The child, shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in

accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the
child would otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis supplied)

The Philippines likewise ratified[232] the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty
requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a
nationality. It similarly defends them against discrimination:
Article 24. . . .

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

. . . .

Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between state| in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." [233] Under Article
VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate
before they became binding:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress.
In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, et al.:
[234]

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the
force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
[235]
(Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action, legislative or otherwise, is
necessary. Thereafter, the whole of government—including the judiciary—is duty-
bound to abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt servanda.

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of

discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted nationality
upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them
stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their
development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of
promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from discrimination. Other
legislative enactments demonstrate the intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens
from birth.

Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic
Adoption of Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as a
mechanism to "provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption of every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."[236]

Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act No.
8552:[237]
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child
to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail,
the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal
proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as the Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other Purposes. As with
Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly includes foundlings among "Filipino children"
who may be adopted:
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of
inter-country adoption, hi order that such child may be considered for placement, the
following documents must be submitted: to the Board:

a) Child study;

b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of

parents;

d) Medical evaluation/history;

e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be presented in lieu of
authenticated birth certificates to satisfy the requirement for the issuance of passports,
which will then facilitate their adoption by foreigners:
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must present a certified true
copy of the Court Order of Adoption, certified true copy of his original and amended
birth certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a minor, a Clearance from
the DSWD shall be required. In case the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents
under R.A. No. 8043, the following, shall be required:

a) Certified true copy of the Court Decree of Abandonment of Child, the Death Certificate
of the child's parents, or the Deed of Voluntary Commitment executed after the birth of
the child.
b) Endorsement of child to the Intercountry Adoption Board by the DSWD.
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling Certificate.[238] (Emphasis supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings' Filipino citizenship
on account of their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to
perfect their citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization process.
Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.

Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have

recognized her natural-born status. This status was never questioned throughout her
life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a viable candidate for
President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case
of Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed and
reaffirmed through various official public acts.

First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the
domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau
of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the President of the Philippines appointed
her as MTRCB Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born citizenship.[239]

VIII

As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born

citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act
No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired
natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the
United States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. A

"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by

law."[240] Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent
was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1)
that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign
country." Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was
naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly
after, this Petition was granted.[241]
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 [242] and Republic Act
No. 8171[243] specifically "to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No.
63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries."[244]

The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own
words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."[245] This Court shed light
on this in Calilung v. Commission on Elections:[246] "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is
allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country." [247]

Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and immutable
despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic
Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their
Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to
exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to certain
solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or
acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of
another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their
Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon
compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2's declaration
of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a
vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-
born status as though it was never lost at all.

VIII. B

Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born

citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities."[248] However, other conditions must be met
for the exercise of other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as "the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for
elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or
reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino.[249] This also enables the
enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.[250]

Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, [251] Republic
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and
other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to
allow for voting in elections.[252]

Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." [253] This, along with
satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible
for elective public office.

As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,[254] this required sworn

renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in
that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at
all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law."[255] It is also in view of this that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who
seek or occupy public office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of
other countries from being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.

VIII. C

Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006,
she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. [256] Second, on
August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.
[257]
This evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to comply with
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship.[258] This was complemented by her execution
of an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States [259] before
Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011, [260] which was, in turn,
followed by Vice Consul Jason Galian's issuance of a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality on December 9, 2011[261] and the approval of this certificate by the
Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012. [262]

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship;
she has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to elective
public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.

VIII. D

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic
Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino
citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies
the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.

To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and

immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated
in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen's
naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.

To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-born citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies
reference to the preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that one returns.
"Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things were." Had Republic Act
No. 9225 intended to mean the investiture of an entirely new status, it should not have
used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate
to make new citizens whose citizenship commences only from the moment of
compliance with its requirements.

Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, ruled that repatriation

involves the restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original nationality:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.[263] (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its
ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No. 9225 's policy of permanence and
immutablity: "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship."[264] In Bengson's words, the once naturalized citizen
is "restored" or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There may have been an
interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was
naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-born status expurgates this
intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the
point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a
Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de
facto.

Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath
of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for
facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from
naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with which the former natural-
born citizen must comply.

IX

To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is stateless [265] is not only to set
a dangerous and callous precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.

Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual, and social justice are the
bedrocks of our constitutional order. By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or
outright irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are compelled to begin
their very existence at a disadvantage. Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never
be truly remedied by any economic relief.

If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then we an never tolerate an
interpretation that condemns foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their
being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert and meaningless for them
by mechanical judicial fiat.

Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be deployed against other
reasonable interpretations of our basic law. It does command us to consider legal text,
but always with justice in mind.

It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the Constitution that we must

always sustain. Not only will this manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it
establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of its constitutional
competence when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to
sit as Senator of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, there is no basis for
annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate

Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.

Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

SO ORDERED.