This document is a summary of a court case from June 16, 1951 regarding a petition for certiorari seeking to annul a lower court order placing Felipe Lopez in possession of land and a decision ordering foreclosure of a mortgage on the property. The court summarizes the facts of the case, which involve a mortgage taken out on land by Eladio Ramos using a power of attorney. It was later foreclosed on. The court rejects the petitioners' claims, finding the lower court order valid and that petitioners were properly served in the original case through their attorney. The court also finds the writ of possession was properly issued to put the purchaser of the property in possession.
This document is a summary of a court case from June 16, 1951 regarding a petition for certiorari seeking to annul a lower court order placing Felipe Lopez in possession of land and a decision ordering foreclosure of a mortgage on the property. The court summarizes the facts of the case, which involve a mortgage taken out on land by Eladio Ramos using a power of attorney. It was later foreclosed on. The court rejects the petitioners' claims, finding the lower court order valid and that petitioners were properly served in the original case through their attorney. The court also finds the writ of possession was properly issued to put the purchaser of the property in possession.
This document is a summary of a court case from June 16, 1951 regarding a petition for certiorari seeking to annul a lower court order placing Felipe Lopez in possession of land and a decision ordering foreclosure of a mortgage on the property. The court summarizes the facts of the case, which involve a mortgage taken out on land by Eladio Ramos using a power of attorney. It was later foreclosed on. The court rejects the petitioners' claims, finding the lower court order valid and that petitioners were properly served in the original case through their attorney. The court also finds the writ of possession was properly issued to put the purchaser of the property in possession.
This document is a summary of a court case from June 16, 1951 regarding a petition for certiorari seeking to annul a lower court order placing Felipe Lopez in possession of land and a decision ordering foreclosure of a mortgage on the property. The court summarizes the facts of the case, which involve a mortgage taken out on land by Eladio Ramos using a power of attorney. It was later foreclosed on. The court rejects the petitioners' claims, finding the lower court order valid and that petitioners were properly served in the original case through their attorney. The court also finds the writ of possession was properly issued to put the purchaser of the property in possession.
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G.R. No.
L-2610
June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,
vs. ANATOLIO C. MAALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents. D. Ignacio Castillo for petitioners. Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing one Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court on August 24, 1939, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to satisfy the payment of an obligation. The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on therefore said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes final. The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence this petition for certiorari. The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question; and (2) to the validity of the order of the court dated September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgagee. As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717). Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served with summons in civil case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service was cured when the petitioners voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared in their behalf in all stages of the case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners must be presumed to have been authorized by them when he
appeared in their behalf in all the stages of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor to overcome such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is specially so when, as in the instant case, it is only after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the judgment has been rendered that petitioners thought of challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple reason that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession. In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the litigation and save multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why the court cannot issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser in the possession of the property. The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero de Ortegavs. Natividad, 71 Phil., 340). It has also been held: In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto intervenes and the debtor continues in possession of the real property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) provides that the confirmation of the sale by judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action of their respective rights and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at the public auction sale and become his by virtue of the final decree confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). Emphasis supplied. The following American authorities may also be involved in support of the order of the lower court: A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and having decreed a sale of the premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has authority to put the purchaser in possession of the property, without compelling him to resort to an action of law. (27 Cyc., 1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases there cited.) (Bold types and emphasis supplied). . . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle that the court which has exclusive authority to foreclosure the equity of redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest before it, and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to put the purchaser into possession against one of the very parties to the suit, and who is bound by the decree. When the court has obtained jurisdiction of a case, and has investigated and decided upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends of justice merely to declare the right without affording the remedy. If it was to be understood that after a decree and sale mortgaged premises, the mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or perhaps, those who have been let into possession by the mortgagor, pendente lite, could withhold the possession in defiance of the authority of this court, and compel the purchaser to resort to a court of law, I apprehend that the delay and expense and inconvenience of such a course of proceeding would greatly impair the value and diminish the results of sales under a decree. (See Notes to Wilson v. Polk, 51 Am. D., 151). (Kershew v. Thompson, 4 Johns, Ch., 609). Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
