THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 143689-91. November 12, 2002.]

SIXTO M. BAYAS and ERNESTO T. MATUDAY , petitioners, vs . THE

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ,
respondents.

CRC Law Firm for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Three informations were led charging petitioners herein with violation of Section 3
(e) of RA No. 3019; and two counts of malversation through falsi cation. They were
charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of their
municipality. Petitioners, together with their counsel, signed a joint stipulation of facts and
documents and submitted the same to the Sandiganbayan. Later, however, the same
lawyer moved to withdraw as counsel for the two accused. His motion was granted by the
anti-graft court and the pretrial was rescheduled. Thereafter, a new counsel represented
the accused and moved to withdraw the above-mentioned joint stipulation of facts and
documents stating, among others, that the said stipulation of facts leaves less or no room
for the accused to defend themselves. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, as well as
the motion for reconsideration. In this petition, the issue raised by the petitioners is
whether they may be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the joint stipulation of facts and
documents.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, hence, denied the petition. According to the
Court, to be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact and not,
as in the case at bar, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise
due diligence in ascertaining it. Petitioners may not assail the said stipulation on the mere
ground that it would allegedly put the accused at a disadvantage. Furthermore, a new
counsel cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple expedient of passing the blame on
the previous counsel who had supposedly not su ciently discharged his duty to the client.
The Court, therefore, found that the petitioners failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that
they had freely and voluntarily entered into.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; STIPULATION OF FACTS; PURPOSE

THEREOF. — The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of
facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify,
shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time
and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets. Once validly
entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be
enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who
validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress,
fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue in uence; or upon a showing of su cient
cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to
relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court's sound discretion which,
unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. ISTECA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE AS GROUND FOR RELIEF MUST BE ONE OF FACT; NOT
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake
must be one of fact — not, as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of
failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that
parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes,
the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client.
The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the
counsel. The records reveal that the parties were the ones who volunteered to make the
Joint Stipulation of the facts of the case. Thus, the anti-graft court can rightfully expect
that both parties arrived upon it with fairness and honesty. Therefore, petitioners may not
assail it on the mere ground that it would allegedly put the accused at a disadvantage.
Furthermore, a new counsel cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple expedient of
passing the blame on the previous counsel, who had supposedly not su ciently
discharged his duty to the client.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSISTENT WITH THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. — There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases.
The policy encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that ".
. . everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the bene t and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without
detriment to the community at large." In the present case, the Joint Stipulation made by the
prosecution and petitioners was a waiver of the right to present evidence on the facts and
the documents freely admitted by them. There could have been no impairment of
petitioners' right to be presumed innocent, right to due process or right against self-
incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and
is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
4. ID.; ID.; PRE-TRIAL; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF TO BE BINDING UPON THE
ACCUSED. — Based on Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, for a pretrial agreement
to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the, agreement
or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their
counsel. The court's approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section,
is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary
merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control
the ow of the proceedings. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by
the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They
become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a
disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must
assume the consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused are allowed to plead guilty
under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed
to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. — Pretrial is meant to simplify, if not
fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. It is therefore important that the parties take
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 active roles in the proceedings. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel
for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an
acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or
penalties. Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as
to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or
inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a
case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by
their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully
assented to. cTACIa

6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;

CONSTRUED. — As already discussed, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly
made lies at the sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. There is "grave abuse of discretion" where "a
power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, so patent and so gross as to amount to evasion of positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law."
7. ID.; LAWYERS; DUTY AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT; ASSISTANCE IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — Lawyers can wiggle in and out
of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember, however,
that they are not merely representatives of the parties but, rst and foremost, o cers of
the court. As such, one of their duties — assisting in the speedy and e cient
administration of justice — is more signi cant than that of acquitting their client, rightly or
wrongly. Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice. They should realize that the earlier they dispose of their
cases, especially at the pretrial stage, the better for them. In doing so, they can now
concentrate and work more efficiently on their other cases.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

May pretrial stipulations duly signed by the accused and their counsel be unilaterally
withdrawn before the commencement of the trial? To this main issue, the answer is "No."
Stipulations freely and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside
unless for good cause. The Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to stipulate
facts. Once they have validly and voluntarily signed the stipulations, the accused and their
counsel may not set these aside on the mere pretext that they may be placed at a
disadvantage during the trial.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying for
the setting aside of the April 28, 2000 1 and the May 26, 2000 2 Orders of the
Sandiganbayan 3 (SBN) in Criminal Case Nos. 25280-82. The rst Order denied petitioners'
Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, 4 while the second
denied reconsideration. 5
The Facts
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 On May 6, 1999, three Informations 6 were led before the SBN, charging Petitioners
Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as
amended; and two counts of malversation through falsi cation penalized under Article
217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. They were charged in their
capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of
Kabayan, Province of Benguet.
During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners pled "not guilty." The
pretrial conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was cancelled and reset to November
5, 1999, because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose M. Molintas, was not prepared. 7
On November 5, 1999, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of Atty.
Molintas, who was allegedly "suffering from the u." Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan
urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by
Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. They were asked to do so, so that at the
resumption of the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass upon all
other matters that still remained to be resolved. 8
On December 10, 1999, the parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents," which had been duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty.
Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero. It is reproduced hereunder:
"JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND DOCUMENTS

"COME NOW the accused, counsel for the accused and the Prosecution, by
and through the undersigned Special Prosecution O cer, O ce of the Special
Prosecutor, unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully aver: THAT —
"1. After a conference the Defense and the Prosecution admitted the
following facts as follows:

"a. Accused Ernesto Matuday was then the Municipal Mayor and
accused Sixto Bayas was and [is] still the Municipal Treasurer and designated
Municipal Accountant both of Kabayan, Benguet during the period relevant to this
case;

"b. Both of the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of

P510,000.00 and P55,000.00.
"2. The Prosecution and Defense jointly admit the following
documents as their respective documentary exhibits . . . ([with] reservation to
mark additional exhibits during the trial of the case) as follows:

For the Exhibits Description

Prosecution for the
Common Defense
Exhibits
'A' '1' COA Report dated February
29, 1996
'B' '2' COA Memorandum Dated
September 25, 1996
'C' '3' Page of journal entry of the
Office of the Municipal
Accountant
'D' '4' Resolution No. 138 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Municipality of Kabayan
Benguet carried on August
15, 1996
'E' '5' Transcript of the
[S]tenograghic Notes taken
during the closed door
session of the Sangguniang
Bayan[,] Kabayan, Benguet
on August 15, 1996 at
1:50 P.M.
'F' '6' Result of the Statement of
Investigation conducted On
March 24, 1997
'For Criminal
Cases Nos.
25280-25281
'G' '7' Undated disbursement
Voucher No. 401-9505186
For the payment of
Mobilization fee for the
various Projects at Kabayan,
Benguet For P510,000.00
'H' '8' Check No. 60915S-1 for
P510,000.00 dated May 4,
1995 signed by both Accused
Mayor Matuday and
Treasurer Bayas
'H-1' '8-a' Dorsal portion of Check No.
60915S-1
'H-1-a' '8-a-1' Signature of accused Mayor
Matuday at the Dorsal
portion of Check No.
60915-S-1
'Criminal Cases
Nos. 25282-25280
'I' 'a' Check No. 609177 for
P55,000.00 dated June 28,
1995 signed by Mayor
Matuday and Treasurer Bayas
'I-1' '9-a' Dorsal portion of Check No.
609177
'I-1-a' '9-a-1' Signature of Yolanda Millanes
'I-1-b' '9-a-2' Signature of Mayor Matuday
'J' '10' Undated Disbursement
Voucher for P55,000.00

"3. The Defense shall present at least four witness while the
Prosecution opts not to present any witness considering that Defense admitted all
the documentary evidence of the Prosecution.
"Quezon City, December 10, 1999.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 (signed) (signed)
ATTY. JOSE M. MOLINTAS ATTY. EVELYN TAGUBA LUCERO
Counsel for Accused Ombudsman Prosecutor II

(signed) (signed)
SIXTO BAYAS ERNESTO MATUDAY
Accused Accused" 9

On January 14, 2000, the pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence
of Atty. Molintas. The hearing was rescheduled for February 14, 2000. However, on
February 7, 2000, he moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. His motion was
granted by the anti-graft court in an Order dated February 14, 2000. In the same Order, the
pretrial was rescheduled for March 31, 2000, to give the accused ample time to employ a
new counsel.
On April 26, 2000, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia M.
Cinco, moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. Speci cally, they
sought to withdraw, rst , Stipulation 1(b) which states that "Both the accused admit the
disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00"; and second, Exhibits "1" to
"8-a". They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan justi ed its denial of petitioners' Motion to Withdraw Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Documents in this wise:
". . . . [For] the fact that there [was] express statement from Atty. Rogelio A.
Cortes this morning that neither fraud nor any other mistake of a serious
character vitiated the consent of the parties when they a xed their conformity to
the stipulations of facts, the reason put forth by the accused or movant's counsel
at this time, is that if these stipulations were to remain, then the accused might as
well not present any evidence on the entire accusation against him as this will
already be supported by the evidence on record. While the court, indeed, sees this
as a possibility, that, by itself, is not a ground for withdrawing any stipulation
freely and knowingly made and given." 1 0

In the second assailed Order, the anti-graft court denied reconsideration and
reiterated its previous stand, as follows:
". . . . The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the
accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial order; in
fact, an accused can plead guilty if he so desires or make admissions as he
deems appropriate and truthful, even if in the mind of the new counsel, it gave
very few opportunities to present contesting evidence." 1 1

It then added that "the pre-trial order shall remain. The admissions therein contained
can be used in this case and for whatever purpose the Rules on Evidence will allow."
Hence, this Petition. 1 2
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court's
consideration:
"I
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners'
Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, considering
the relevant facts and applicable laws and rules.
"II
Whether or not the denial by respondent Sandiganbayan of the withdrawal
of the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents would result in manifest
injustice and impairment of the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

"III
Whether or not there is a law or rule which would bar petitioners from
withdrawing their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents from the respondent
Sandiganbayan." 1 3

Plainly put, the issue raised by petitioners is whether they may be allowed to
withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. DcTSHa

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Withdrawal from the Joint Stipulation
Petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the
accused because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a
pretrial order approving them. We are not persuaded.
Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy
disposition of cases. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on
matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they
simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save
costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets.
Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. 1 4
They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good
morals and sound public policy. 1 5 When made before the court, they are conclusive. And
the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of
collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue in uence; 1 6 or upon a
showing of su cient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. 1 7
Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court's
sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.
18

Validity of the Joint Stipulations

While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not
allege that these were false or misleading or were obtained through force or fraud. On the
contrary, they do not dispute the nding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious
mistake vitiated their and their counsel's consent to the signing of these stipulations. They
even admitted, in answer to its query, that they had freely given their consent.
Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position, petitioners lay the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 blame on the alleged incompetence of their former counsel. They claim that, in agreeing to
the Joint Stipulation, he failed to consider their legal interests.
SAHEIc

To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact — not,
as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due
diligence in ascertaining it. 1 9
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by the action or the inaction
of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the
prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and
the simple negligence committed by the counsel. 2 0
Presumption of Innocence
In their effort to withdraw from the Joint Stipulation, petitioners argue that the two
questioned items impair their constitutional right to be presumed innocent, violate their
right against self-incrimination, and deny them due process in the sense that the trial
would be a "useless formality, an idle ceremony." 2 1
Other than by generalized argumentation, petitioners have not convinced us that the
aforementioned constitutional rights would be violated. True, the old Rules of Court
frowned upon stipulations of facts in criminal cases because of a perceived danger — that
by the mere expedient of stipulating with the defense counsel the elements of the crime
charged, the prosecution would relieve itself of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. 2 2 However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to
enable parties to stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. 2 3
The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence.
In a case involving illegal possession of rearms, 2 4 the prosecution and the defense
stipulated the fact that the accused had been found in possession of a gun without the
required permit or license. In People v. Bocar , 2 5 the Court considered as valid the
admission by the accused of the existence of certain a davits and exhibits, which the
prosecution had presented to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter contained
therein. In People v. Hernandez 2 6 which involved illegal recruitment, the Court upheld the
joint stipulation that the accused had not been licensed or authorized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency to recruit workers for overseas jobs. THIECD

There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy
encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that ". . .
everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the bene t and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without
detriment to the community at large." 2 7
In the present case, the Joint Stipulation made by the prosecution and petitioners
was a waiver of the right to present evidence on the facts and the documents freely
admitted by them. There could have been no impairment of petitioners' right to be
presumed innocent, right to due process or right against self-incrimination because the
waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
Necessity of a Pretrial Order

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Petitioners further contend that the law on pretrial requires the issuance of a pretrial
order to make pretrial stipulations binding. We do not agree.
Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:
"Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or admissions made or
entered [into] during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.
The agreements covering the matters referred to in Section 1 of this Rule shall be
approved by the court." 2 8

Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the

accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be
in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court's
approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to
make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to
emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the ow of
the proceedings.
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their
counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial
admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. 2 9 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position,
a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences
of the disadvantage. 3 0 If the accused are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate
circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair
and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.
There is another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must
be noted that the SBN could not fully act on the matter, not through its fault, but because
of the continued absence of petitioners' counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the
intended completion of the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint
Stipulation because he was absent. Also, the pretrial conference had to be re-scheduled six
times, just to ensure the attendance of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them
for the conference.
Therefore, under these circumstances, the SBN cannot be faulted for its failure to
approve expressly the stipulations. It had the opportunity to rule on the matter only when
the accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia L. Cinco, moved to withdraw their
stipulations. In its rst assailed Order, the SBN upheld their validity, thereby effectively
approving the submitted Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. The assent of the
court to agreements of the parties, assisted by their counsel, is assumed until they
indicate a dissent. 3 1 Thus, the stipulations freely made by the latter are to be respected as
their true will and intention with regard to the facts and evidence of the case, especially if
the anti-graft court has not struck them down for being violative of the law.
Role of Lawyers in Pretrials
Pretrial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. It is
therefore important that the parties take active roles in the proceedings. The Rules on
Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do
not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of
cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. 3 2
Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or
inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a
case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by
their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully
assented to. 3 3
The records reveal that the parties were the ones who volunteered to make the Joint
Stipulation of the facts of the case. Thus, the anti-graft court can rightfully expect that both
parties arrived upon it with fairness and honesty. Therefore, petitioners may not assail it on
the mere ground that it would allegedly put the accused at a disadvantage. Furthermore, a
new counsel cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple expedient of passing the blame
on the previous counsel, who had supposedly not su ciently discharged his duty to the
client.
If we allow parties to renege on stipulations they validly entered into during the
course of pretrial proceedings, there would be no end to litigations. 3 4 Lawyers can wiggle
in and out of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember,
however, that they are not merely representatives of the parties but, rst and foremost,
o cers of the court. As such, one of their duties — assisting in the speedy and e cient
administration of justice 3 5 — is more signi cant than that of acquitting their client, 3 6
rightly or wrongly. cHCSDa

We stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice. 3 7 They should realize that the earlier they dispose of
their cases, especially at the pretrial stage, the better for them. In doing so, they can now
concentrate and work more efficiently on their other cases. 3 8
Grave Abuse of Discretion
As already discussed, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made
lies at the sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion
will not be disturbed on appeal. 3 9 There is "grave abuse of discretion" where "a power is
exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, so patent and so gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law." 4 0
Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely
and voluntarily entered into. Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the anti-
graft court for failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not
to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued absence of petitioners' counsel.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners. HAICcD

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 27.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 2. Id., pp. 28-29.
3. First Division. Signed by Justice Francis E. Garchitorena (Division chairman) and
Justices Catalino R. Castañeda Jr. and Gregory S. Ong (members).

4. Rollo, pp. 45-48.

5. Id., pp. 49-52.
6. Records, pp. 224-229.
7. Sandiganbayan Order dated October 15, 1999; records, p. 77.

8. Sandiganbayan Order dated November 5, 1999; id., p. 67.

9. Rollo, pp. 41-43.
10. Assailed Order dated April 28, 2000; rollo, p. 27-A.
11. Assailed Order dated May 26, 2000, p. 1; id., p. 28.
12. The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 10, 2001, upon this Court's
receipt of petitioners' Memorandum, which was signed by Attys. Rogelio A. Cortes and
Cecilia L. Cinco of the "CRC Law Firm." Respondents' Memorandum, filed on April 25,
2001, was signed by Attys. Rodrigo V. Coquia and Ireneo M. Paldeng of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman.

13. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 128: Original in upper case.

14. National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Scheiber, 169 NW 272, October
25, 1918.

15. Esch v. Forster, 168 So. 229, January 20, 1936.

16. 83 CJS 90 (1953).

17. Woods v. First National Bank of Chicago, 41 NE2d 235, April 20, 1942.
18. Ibid.
19. 83 CJS 91 (1953).

20. Villa Rhecar Bus v. De La Cruz, 157 SCRA 13, January 7, 1988; Legarda v. CA, 280 SCRA
642, October 16, 1997.
21. Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 24; rollo, p. 140.

22. People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25, July 30, 1996.

23. Section 1, Rule 118:
"SECTION 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider
the following:

'xxx xxx xxx

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 '(b) stipulation of facts;

'xxx xxx xxx.'"

24. See People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164, August 30, 1967.

25. 27 SCRA 512, March 28, 1969.

26. 260 SCRA 25, July 30, 1996.

27. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, 2001 ed., pp. 667-668, citing People v. Donato, 198
SCRA 130, 154, June 5, 1991; People v. Hernandez, supra.

28. 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

29. Schreiber v. Rickert, 50 NE 2d 879, October 13, 1943.
30. See Dequito v. Llamas, 66 SCRA 504, September 4, 1975.

31. McLeod v. Hyman, 116 A. 535, February 6, 1922.

32. Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

33. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rickenbaker, 146 F. 2d 751, December 15, 1944.
34. Gacutana-Fraile v. Domingo, 348 SCRA 414, December 15, 2000.
35. Muñoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190, September 28, 1973.
36. City Sheriff, Iligan City v. Fortunado, 288 SCRA 190, March 27, 1998.
37. Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30, October 1, 1998.
38. J. Bellosillo, Effective Pre-trial Technique, 1990 ed., p. 199.
39. Supra, note 17.
40. Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 142738, December 14, 2001.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com