TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

1. People vs. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

FACTS:A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his
wife, and DalmacioBondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse
during the period from theyear 1946 to 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the
complaint.The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months
of arresto mayorwhich penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the
offended husband filed anothercomplaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife
and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17September 1948, the date of the filing of
the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed
a motion to quash the complaint on the ground thatthey would be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be
deemedone continuous offense.2. Whether or not it violates the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution
.HELD:
1. No. For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of
time;unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose,
whichmeans that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the
sameintent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. In the instant case the
lastunity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every
sexualintercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After
the lastact of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the
defendants againcommitted adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the
second complaintwas filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that
another crime of adultery wascommitted, if the defendants, after their provisional release
during the pendency of the case inwhich they were later on convicted, had sexual intercourse up
to the time when they were sent toprison to serve the penalty imposed upon them. 2. No. If the
second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the sameoffense, the
adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, shouldhe be
absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know thathis
codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up byhim
against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, becauseat the
time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew thatthis
codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
2. Arroyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
FACTS
Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo
for adultery. In November 1982, Ruby went to Baguio with Mrs. Sare and witness Jabunan. They
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
stayed at the Neri spouses’ Mines View Park Condominium. Arroyo arrived at 7:00 p.m. at the
condominium. Jabunan said he opened the door for Arroyo and knocked on Ruby Neri’s door.
Ruby then asked Mrs. Sare, who was in the room with her, to leave her and Arroyo alone. The
two were left alone in the room and went out 45 minutes later. In December 1982, Dr. Neri then
found incriminating pictures of his wife and Arroyo in bed. When questioned by her husband,
Ruby admitted that she and Arroyo slept together in Baguio.

On August 26, 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, praying that the case against his wife and
Arroyo be dismissed because he had tacitly consented to his wife’s infidelity. Ruby moved for
reconsideration, contending that pardon had been extended by her husband and that Dr. Jorge
Neri had married another woman with whom he is cohabiting. Both Arroyo and Ruby Neri filed
their respective motions praying for the dismissal of their cases based on Dr. Neri’s
manifestation.

Arroyo and Ruby used Dr. Neri’s affidavit to cast doubts on the doctor’s credibility as witness.

ISSUE
Whether or not the pari delicto rule can be invoked in adultery.

RULING
No. The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code but only in Article 1411
of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the said article relates only to contracts with illegal
consideration. The case at bar does not involve any illegal contract.
3. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They
lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila on
January 23, 1983.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter
had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice
Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against petitioner

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.

Held:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Concubinage
4. People vs. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990
Facts:
Alma T. Aggabao filed with the RTC, an information against private respondents Elvino
Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage. Upon being arraigned, private
respondents entered a plea of not guilty. During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the RPC is punishable with prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the RTC
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable penalty on the
concubine has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Issue:
1. Whether or not private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after the
prosecution has rested its case and the defense has started to present its evidence.
2. whether or not the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage.

RULING
1. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. And as soon as the accused
discovered the jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to
dismiss
2. That a crime punishable with the penalty of destierro is within the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. This is so because in the scale of penalties outlined in Art. 71, destierro comes after
arresto mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Republic Act No. 296], crimes
punishable with arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows that
crimes punishable with destierro are also within the jurisdiction of such courts. In explaining its
conclusion that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and therefore cognizable by the inferior
courts.
5. People vs. Pitoc, G.R. No. 18513 September 18, 1922
FACTS: February 21, 1921, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, was legally married to Petronila Roque
in the city of Manila. For several years prior to their marriage, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, had
sustained illicit relations with Marciana del Basco. In a short time after the marriage, the
defendant, Pedro Pitoc, and his wife left the city of Manila and went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to
reside. Later Pedro Pitoc returned to Manila, leaving his wife at Calumpit, promising to return
March 15, 1921. For his failure to return on March 17, 1921, his wife came to Manila to look for
him. March 17, his wife came to Manila where she found the defendant living in the same house
and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her store and keeping
company with her, under circumstances which strongly tend to show that they had resumed their
former relations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro Pitoc and Marciana del Basco cohabition constitutes the crime of
concubinage.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
HELD:
Yes. The word cohabit has many different meanings, each depending upon the sense in which it
is used. Here, we have a law intended to prohibit a married man from keeping a mistress in his
dwelling or anywhere else under "scandalous circumstances." Hence, the meaning of the word
cohabit here must relate and he confined to the subject matter of the law itself. When used in that
sense, it should be construed to mean "to dwell or live together as husband and wife; to live
together as husband and wife although not legally married; to live together in the same house,
claiming to be married; to live together at bed and board." (Corpus Juris, vol., 11, p. 950.)
Applying the facts to such definition, it is undisputed that before his marriage to Petronila
Roque, the defendant and his coaccused were living together for a number of years in illicit
relations. The defendants, Pedro Pitoc, legally married Petronila Roque in the city of Manila on
February 21, 1921, and together they went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to live. In a short time he left
his wife there and came to Manila, promising to return on March 15, twenty-three days after their
marriage. He never did return. March 17, his wife came to Manila where she found the defendant
living in the same house and under the same roof with his former paramour, staying around her
store and keeping company with her, under circumstances which strongly tend to show that they
had resumed their former relations. It is, indeed, significant that the defendant Pitoc would leave
his wife whom he married on February 21, and return to Manila and go direct to, and obtain a
room in, the same house where his former paramour was living, and violate his promise to return
tho his newly wedded wife on March 15. Petronila Roque testified that she asked her husband if
that woman, meaning his coaccused, was his paramour, and that he answered yes, and that she
asked him what would be her situation and "he answered me that he could not abandon that
woman, referring to Marciana del Basco, and that I could do anything I pleased." This evidence
was not denied by the defendant, Pedro Pitoc. When this is considered with the defendant's
conduct and all the other evidence, surrounding facts and circumstances, the proof is conclusive
that the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, did cohabit "with a woman who is not his wife," and that he is
guilty of the crime charged.
6. Ocampo vs. People, G.R. No. 47756. June 10, 1941
Fact:
Charged with one Igmedia Refe of the crime of concubinage in the Court of First Instance of
Albay, petitioner Luis Ocampo was found guilty and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of
prision correccional, and to the accessories of the law. This judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.

The illicit relations between petitioner Luis Ocampo and his coaccused Igmedia Refe began in
1937. In September of that year, petitioner with Igmedia went to Naga where they dwelt together
as husband and wife in the same house and where often seen together attending shows and
dances. In October of the same year, they went for a thermal bath in Tiwi, Albay, where, in the
first visit, they stayed for three days, and in the second, for four days. During their entire stay,
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
they dwelt together as husband wife in the house of one Alfonsa Toledo, occupying one room
where they slept alone.

The legal question raised in this appeal is whether, on the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner
may properly be held guilty of concubinage.
Under the provisions of article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, concubinage may be committed
in either of the following ways:(1) by keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; (2) by having
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife; and (3)
by cohabiting with such woman in any other place.

We are here concerned only with the third way of committing the offense under which petitioner
was convicted. The term "cohabit" means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife,
for some period of time, as distinguished from occasional, transient interviews for unlawful
intercourse. (People vs. Pitoc, 43 Phil., 758.) And, whether an association, for illicit intercourse,
has been such as to constitute an unlawful assumption of the conjugal relation, is, in every case a
question of fact (74 A. L. R., 1363), and the extent of such association as to constitute a
cohabitation within the meaning of the law, is a matter of court's appreciation.

In the instant case, petitioner's conduct with his coaccused was not confined to isolated
interviews for unlawful intercourse. He and his coaccused dwelt together as husband and wife in
the same house in Naga, Camarines Sur, where they were seen attending shows and dances;
again, in Tiwi, Albay, they dwelt together as husband and wife in the same house for seven days
and nights where they slept together and alone in one room. We are of the opinion and so hold
that such association is sufficient to constitute a cohabitation within the meaning of the law even
disregarding proofs of actual sexual intercourse.

Petitioner maintains that the letter (Exhibit 2) sent to him by complainant in the latter part of
June, 1937, constitutes consent to his illicit relations and is, therefore, a condonation within the
provisions of the second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The letter was
construed by the trial court under the facts and circumstances of the case as not constituting
consent or condonation, and this finding has not been reversed by the Court of Appeals. At this
stage of the proceeding we cannot review the finding which involves questions of fact.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

7. Busuego vs Office of the Ombudsman and Busuego, GR 196842, Oct. 9, 2013

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
FACTS: Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage
under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo. Alfredo
is the Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital. They have 2 children. However, their
marriage turned sour. She saw photographs of, and love letters addressed to Alfredo from, other
women. She confronted her husband but he claimed ignorance of the existence of such letters.
An opportunity to work as nurse in N.Y. USA. Alfredo opposed. Nonetheless, Rosa completed
the requirements. However, before leaving, furious with Rosa’s pressing, Alfredo took his gun
and pointed it at Rosa’s temple. Alfredo was only staved off because Rosa’s mother arrived at
the couple’s house. Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined by her 2 children, Alfred and
Robert. Robert eventually returned to Davao City to study medicine. Sometime in 1997, Rosa
learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their conjugal home. When Rosa asked
Alfredo, he said that Sia, nurse at the Regional Hospital, was just in a sorry plight and was
allegedly raped by Rosa’s brother-in-law so he allowed her to sleep at the maids’ quarters. In
October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-marital relationships. Robert and the
housekeepers executed a joint affidavit to support Rosa’s allegations. Rosa and the other son
Alfred flew to Davao without informing Alfredo. She gathererd and consolidated information of
her husband’s sexual affairs. She also averred that during the course of the marriage, Alfredo
physically and verbally abused her and her family. Alfredo denied all accusations. In their
subsequent exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredo’s culpability, and
naturally, Alfredo claimed innocence. In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa’s
failure to implead Sia and de Leon as respondents cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa’s
complaint ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged concubines as respondents.
Specifically to dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman scheduled a clarificatory hearing where
both Rosa and Alfredo were represented by their respective counsels. The office of the
Ombudsman explained that the position of Alfredo would just prolong the conduct of the
preliminary investigation since Rosa can just re-file her complaint. The doctrine of res judicata
does not apply in the preliminary investigation stage. Hence, the counsel for Rosa was directed
to submit to this Office the addresses of the alleged mistresses so that they could be served with
the Order directing them to file their counter-affidavits. Rosa submitted an Ex-Parte
Manifestation on the last known addresses of Julie de Leon and Emy Sia (alleged mistresses.)

Ombudsman issued a Joint Order 4 impleading Sia and de Leon as party-respondents in the
complaint for Concubinage and directing them to submit their respective counter-affidavits
within a period of time. Sia and de Leon did not submit their respective counter-affidavits.
Alfredo opposed the Ombudsman’s ruling to simply amend the complaint and implead the
alleged mistresses. He filed his Comment to the Provincial Prosecutor praying for the dismissal
of the complaint for failure to implead the two mistresses. Ombudsman issued herein assailed
Resolution, disposing of the procedural issues, which states that the short cut procedure would
delay the proceedings is misplaced, since Rosa could still amend her complaint and re-file the
case for the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. Alfredo filed a Motion for Reconsideration
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
excepting to the Ombudsman’s ruling on the automatic inclusion of Sia as respondent in the
complaint and their indictment for the crime of Concubinage. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman
stood pat on its ruling, declared that the Partial Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time.
Alfredo now comes to us on petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict him and Sia for Concubinage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes. Therefore the Court sustain the Ombudsman’s decision.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why judicial review of the
resolution of the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and prosecute
felonies and/or offenses of public officers is limited to a determination of whether there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not
empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the Ombudsman. By grave abuse of discretion
is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. In this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less
grave abuse, of discretion. The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its Rules of
Procedure. No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbyan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. Notably, Rosa’s
complaint contained not just the Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of Republic
Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the Ombudsman’s perusal, the complaint was supported
by affidavits corroborating Rosa’s accusations. Thus, at that stage, the Ombudsman properly
referred the complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while the Ombudsman found no
reason for outright dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory hearing to discuss the
applicability of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been insisted upon by
Alfredo. Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the complaint to respondent for comment
and thereafter the holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in paragraph b, Section 2 and
paragraphs d and f, Section 4 of Rule II, which the Court have at the outset underscored. The
Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by
Alfredo. The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in
relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of DOJ. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with
other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However,
the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases. In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from
conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws
but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage. Thus, with
the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ
Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct
of their investigations. WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED
Rape
8. Baleros, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 138033, Feb. 22, 2006, Jan. 30, 2007
FACTS: One evening, inside her room, Malou retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of
her bedroom door, her maid slept on a folding bed. Early morning of the following day,
petitioner, clad in t-shirt and shorts, entered the room of Malou through its window. Once inside,
he approached Malou and tightly pressed on her face a piece of cloth soaked with chemical and.
at the same time, pinned her down on the bed. She was awakened thereby and she struggled but
could not move.
She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals
were very tight. Still, Malou continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her
right hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of
his sex organ which she then squeezed. Petitioner let her go and escaped while Malou went
straight to the bedroom door and roused her maid.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape?

HELD: No, he is not. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or
carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or
not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou,
constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce
her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt
to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was
no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason
petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is
anybody’s guess.
9. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006
Facts:
8 informations were filed against Alfredo Bon charging him with rape of AAA and BBB, the
daughters of his brother. The rape allegedly happened many times in the span of 6 years starting
in 1994 were the victims were still minors.
RTC convicted Bon on all 8 counts of rape, denying the alibi presented by Bon. RTC considered
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and Bon.
On appeal on the penalty, CA ruled affirming the 6 counts rape but modified the 2 as attempted
rape. According to the CA, the evidence on the 2 rapes was insufficient to make Bon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. CA then reduced the penalty for the 2 counts of rape from death to
indeterminate penalty of 10 years as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as
maximum for attempted rape.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six
counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces.
(2) Whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two
degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or
reclusion perpetua.

Ruling:
(1) Court affirms. The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2)
counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for
both crimes should be amended.
(2) We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No.
9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to
two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of
death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For
each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period.
Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
10. People vs. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004
Facts:
In September 12, 1996 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, 15-year-old Remilyn Orilla was
sound asleep inside one of the rooms of their house when she was suddenly awakened by a
heavy weight pressing on her body and found her brother, Joseph Orilla on top of her. Remilyn
Orilla noticed that she was naked from waist down. Joseph Orilla continuously pinned down
Remilyn Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled to free herself from appellant but her efforts
proved futile. Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with one hand holding a knife with
his other hand. He then forced Remilyn’s legs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Remilyn felt pain. She also felt some warm matter enter her vagina. Appellant remained on top
of Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same substance enter her vagina.
Joseph Orilla was charged with two (2) counts of Rape, both Information is identical and reads:

xxx the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA,
younger sister of accused, against her will and consent. xxx

The trial court found Joseph Orilla guilty of only one (1) crime of QUALIFIED RAPE and
imposed on him the death penalty because while appellant ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina,
the first and second ejaculations occurred during one single body connection. However, instead
of dismissing the second case, the trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the
purpose of imposing the death penalty.

Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it imposed the death penalty based on the
following grounds:
1) Relationship;
2) Minority;
3) Use of deadly weapon; and
4) Second ejaculation

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Relationship – Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance.
Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The list
of aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive. Based on
a strict interpretation, alternative circumstances are thus not aggravating circumstances per se.
The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating and when it is
aggravating. Jurisprudence considers relationship as an aggravating circumstance in crimes
against chastity. However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a
crime against persons. The determination of whether an alternative circumstance is aggravating
or not to warrant the death penalty cannot be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare
unequivocally an attendant circumstance as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty. The Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed for
crimes defined as heinous by Congress. Any attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime as
heinous must be expressly so prescribed by Congress.

Minority – Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor age. The prosecution’s failure
to allege specifically Remilyn’s minor age prevents the transformation of the crime to its
qualified form. Since the Amended Information failed to inform appellant that the prosecution
was accusing him of qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape and the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death. The information must allege every element of
the offense to enable the accused to prepare properly for his defense. The law assumes that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense

Use of Deadly Weapon – When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty is not death but the range of two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

Second Ejaculation – It is not the number of times that appellant ejaculated but the penetration or
touching that determines the consummation of the sexual act. Thus, appellant committed only
one count of rape. Second ejaculation is not also of one of the qualifying circumstances of Rape.
Therefore, it has no basis in law.

Proper Penalty – To determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code. Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the
commission of rape there is present one aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that
the aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver penalty of
death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Since it is
only relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not an aggravating circumstance
per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

11. People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000
Facts:
Campuhan was a helper in the business of the family of the victim, a 4-year-old girl. One time,
the mother of the victim heard the latter cry, “Ayoko!”, prompting her to rush upstairs. There,
she saw Campuhan kneeling before the victim, whose pajamas and pany were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees. Campuhan was apprehended. Physical examination
of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted.
Her hymen was intact and its orifice was only .5 cm in diameter.
Trial court found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to death.

Issue:

Whether or not Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.

Held: NO.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of woman below 12 as
provided in RPC 335(3). The victim was only 4 years old when the molestation took place, thus
raising the penalty from “reclusion perpetua to death” to the single indivisible penalty of death
under RA 7659 Sec. 11, the offended party being below 7 years old. In concluding that carnal
knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is
the rupture of hymen necessary; the mere touching of external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching
should be understood as inherently part of the entry of penis into the labias of the female organ,
and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum (the part instantly visible within
the surface).
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia
by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not
acts of lasciviousness.
Here, the prosecution failed to discharge its onus of proving that Campuhan’s penis was able to
penetrate the victim’s vagina however slight. Also, there were no external signs of physical
injuries on the victim’s body to conclude that penetration had taken place.

Issue #2: What crime did Campuhan commit?

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Held #2: ATTEMPTED RAPE.

Under RPC 6 in relation to RPC 335, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape are present in this case.
The penalty of attempted rape is 2 degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the
crime of statutory rape of minor below 7 years. Two degrees lower is reclusion temporal, which
is 12 years 1 day to 20 years.
Applying ISLAW, and in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum
penalty shall be medium period of reclusion temporal (14 years 8 months 1 day to 17 years 4
months), while the minimum is the penalty next lower in degree – prision mayor (6 years 1 day
to 12 years).

Issue #3: May there be a crime of frustrated rape?

Held #3: NO.

In People vs Orita, SC finally did away with frustrated rape. Rape was consummated from the
moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim. All elements of the offense were
already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do. Perfect penetration was not
essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient.
For attempted rape, there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
execution were performed or the offender merely commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts.
12. People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011
FACTS
This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of
age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by
Charlie Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her
something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
then took off his shorts and her shorts. He led her to the sofa where he had carnal knowledge of
her.

When AAA reached home, she immediately told her older sister about what happened. Her sister
brought AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
where AAA underwent a medico-legal examination. The result revealed that AAA’s hymen was
intact but “distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cm. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration
by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury.”

The doctor who examined AAA noticed the latter’s disorientation and incoherence, so the former
endorsed her to the NBI Psychiatric Section for evaluation. AAA also underwent a series of
psychological tests at the National Mental Hospital with results showed that she has a mild level
of mental retardation, and that her mental age is that of a child aged from six to seven years.

ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

RULING
Yes. Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will
of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a
female is alleged and shown to be without her consent.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides that
rape is committed –

By a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
Through force, threat or intimidation;
When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of the above Article because a
mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or
intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim.
Rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1,b because the provision refers to a rape of a
female “deprived of reason,” a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or
retardation.
13. People vs. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018
FACTS:
This case is an appeal seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Cebu City, in finding
the accused-appellant Ardin Cuesta Cadampog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crim of
murder. Based on the information filed by the Prosecutor’s Office, Ardin was charged with the
crim of murder based on the accusations that on or about October 31, 2008, said accused, armed
with a handgun, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there shoot Florencio
Leonor Napoles, hitting the latter on his trunk, which caused his death. The RTC ruled in favour
of the prosecution. The trial court gave credence to Alicia's positive identification of Ardin as the
person responsible for the death of Florencio. It found worthy of belief Alicia's testimony that
she saw Ardin running away from the crime scene with a gun; and that she was familiar with
Ardin's build and height. Furthermore, it emphasized that prosecution witnesses Mark and
Margie corroborated Alicia's description of the assailant's outfit on the night Florencio died.
Unconvinced, Ardin filed an appeal before the CA. The appellate court affirmed with
modification the RTC ruling. It held that Alicia's positive and categorical testimony sufficiently
established her identification of Ardin as the one who shot Florencio. The CA also upheld the
RTC's appreciation of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. It observed that the
killing was carried out in a manner that rendered the victim defenseless and unable to retaliate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ardin is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: YES. After a careful evaluation of the records, the Court is convinced that Alicia
positively identified Ardin as the perpetrator. Additionally, two other disinterested witnesses,
Mark and Margie, corroborated Alicia's description of the assailant's attire. Alicia recounted that
Ardin was wearing a dark jacket, short pants, and a bullcap. This matched Mark and Margie's
description of Ardin's attire when they saw the latter on the night Florencio was killed. Ardin
failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were prompted by any ill motive to falsely testify or
accuse him of so grave a crime as murder. Besides, as widow of the victim, it is consistent with
reason that Alicia would desire punishment for the real perpetrator of the crime. It is unnatural
for a victim's relative interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real
culprit. Human nature tells us that the aggrieved relatives would want the real killer punished for
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
their loss and would not accept a mere scapegoat to take the rap for the real malefactor.
Concomitantly, the Court adheres to the established rule that, in the absence of any evidence
showing reason or motive for witnesses to perjure, their testimony and identification of the
assailant should be given full faith and credit. Both the RTC and the CA found that the killing
was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. There is no doubt that the act of Ardin
in shooting the victim through the bamboo slats qualifies the crime with alevosia. Florencio was
having supper when he was shot. He had no suspicion that he was to be assaulted; and the
sudden, swift attack gave him no opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, this Court agrees
with the tribunals a quo that the crime committed was murder.
14. People vs. Caoli, G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Caoili guilty of the crime of Rape by Sexual
Assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. The victim was a minor, fifteen (15) years of age and the
daughter of the herein accused.

Caoili pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

The victim, AAA, testified that on October 23, 2005, at 7:00p.m., her father, Caoili, sexually
molested her at their house located in Barangay JJJ, Municipality of KKK, in the Province of
LLL. Caoili kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth finger of his left
hand into her vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina with such finger for
30 minutes. AAA felt excruciating pain during and after the ordeal. Against her father's harsh
warning not to go out of the house, AAA proceeded to the house of her uncle, BBB, located 20
meters away from their house. When he learned of this, Caoili fetched AAA and dragged her
home. He beat and hit her with a piece of wood, and boxed her on the stomach.[12]

The RTC rendered its Decision[20] declaring Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault. On
September 29, 2008, pursuant to a Commitment Order[22] issued by the RTC on August 27,
2008, provincial jail guards escorted Caoili for his confinement at the Davao Prisons and Penal
Farm, Panabo, Davao del Norte (Davao Penal Colony).[23]

Thereafter, Caoili filed his appeal before the CA.

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the trial court
should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the proper
offense, and after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information. The appellate court
found it "imperative and morally upright" to set the judgment aside and to remand the case for
further proceedings pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110,[26] in relation to Section 19, Rule 119[27]
of the Rules of Court.

Thereafter, Caoili and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective petitions
for review before this Court: G.R. No. 196342 was instituted by the OSG and G.R. No. 196848
was filed by Caoili. These petitions were ordered consolidated by the Court in its Resolution[28]
dated on August 1, 2011.

In G.R. No. 196342, the OSG assails the CA's Decision for not being in accord with the law and
established jurisprudence. Their petition was anchored on the following grounds:[29]

HELD: The petitions lack merit. The prosecution has established rape by sexual assault. Accused
Noel Go Caoili alias Boy Tagalog is guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole.

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed -R.A. No. 8353 or the
"Anti-Rape Law of 1997" amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the RPC, reclassifying
rape as a crime against persons and introducing rape by "sexual assault," as differentiated from
rape through "carnal knowledge" or rape through "sexual intercourse."[31] Thus, rape under the
RPC, as amended, can be committed in two ways.

Through AAA's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that Caoili molested his own
daughter when he inserted his finger into her vagina and thereafter made a push and pull
movement with such finger for 30 minutes,[34] thus, clearly establishing rape by sexual
assault[35] under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. Caoili, however, questions AAA's
credibility, arguing that her testimony lacked veracity since she harbored hatred towards him due
to the latter's strict upbringing.[36]

It is settled that ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible
declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused.[37] AAA
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
was a little over 15 years old when she testified,[38] and she categorically identified Caoili as the
one who defiled her. She positively and consistently declared that Caoili inserted his finger into
her vagina and that she suffered tremendous pain during the insertion. Her account of the
incident, as found by the RTC[39] and the CA,[40] was clear, convincing and straightforward,
devoid of any material or significant inconsistencies.
[T]he "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness
stand; a vantage point denied the appellate courts, and when his findings have been affirmed by
the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."[42]
When a rape victim's testimony on the manner she was molested is straightforward and candid,
and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in this case, the same
is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.[44] In a long line of cases,[45] this Court has given
full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims, considering that their youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Indeed, leeway should be given to
witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.[46]

It is likewise settled that in cases where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's
father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.[47]

Verily, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the crime of rape by sexual assault as defined in
paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC. Caoili, however, cannot be convicted of said crime.

Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse.

Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in
the crime of rape through sexual intercourse.

The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is
different from but necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in Section 4, in relation
to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
By jurisprudence,[49] however, an accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual
intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was
proven during trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape.
[50]

The elements of rape through sexual intercourse are: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force
or intimidation.[51] Rape by sexual intercourse is a crime committed by a man against a woman,
and the central element is carnal knowledge.[52]
On the other hand, the elements of rape by sexual assault are: (1) that the offender commits an
act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or
intimidation, among others.[53]

In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the offender is always a man; (2) the offended
party is always a woman; (3) rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina; and (4)
the penalty is reclusion perpertua.[54]

In the second mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) the offender may be a man or a woman; (2) the
offended party may be a man or a woman; (3) rape is committed by inserting the penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice
of another person; and (4) the penalty is prision mayor.[55]

The Court en banc's categorical pronouncement in People v. Abulon,[56] thus, finds application:
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in
Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty
of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[57]
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353,
provides the elements that substantially differentiate the two forms of rape,i.e., rape by sexual
intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative process that the dichotomy
between these two modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by
eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation
which We cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court
remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as
enacted by the Legislature.

In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No.
8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if
the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be
considered subsumed in the latter.
Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

R.A. No. 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are
children or those "persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition."[65]
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was fourteen (14)
years, one (1) month and ten (10) days old. This calls for the application of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610.[66]

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[67]
The prosecution's evidence has sufficiently established the elements of lascivious conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Caoili's lascivious conduct

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
The evidence confirms that Caoili committed lascivious acts against AAA when he kissed her
lips, touched and mashed her breast, and inserted his finger into her vagina and made a push and
pull movement with such finger for 30 minutes. AAA likewise confirmed on cross
examination[69] that Caoili molested her. She even recounted that her father threatened her not
to tell anybody about the incident. Caoili's acts are clearly covered by the definitions of "sexual
abuse" and "lascivious conduct."

It has been settled that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or
contemporaneous abuse that is different from what is complained of, or that a third person should
act in concert with the accused.[71]

The victim's minority

AAA was a child below 18 years old at the time the lascivious conduct was committed against
her. Her minority was both sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved.

Influence and coercion

"Influence" is the improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will
and substitutes another's objective. On the other hand, "coercion" is the improper use of power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.[72]

It cannot be denied that AAA, who is only a little over 14 years old at the time the offense was
committed, was vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated by an attacker who is not
only a grown man but is also someone exercising parental authority over her. Even absent such
coercion or intimidation, Caoili can still be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 as he evidently used his moral influence and ascendancy as a father in
perpetrating his lascivious acts against AAA. It is doctrinal that moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence and intimidation.[75]

It bears emphasis, too, that consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7610.[76] The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct
with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense
because it is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.[77]
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Clearly, therefore, all the essential elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 have been proved, making Caoili liable for said offense.

Variance doctrine applied

Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the
RPC and R.A. No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense proved, because it is included in rape, the offense
charged.[78] With the aforesaid provisions, the appellant can be held guilty of a lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, which was the offense proved because it is included in rape, the offense
charged.[79]

[5] The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

[6] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. Approved on June 17, 1992.
[7] The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special
Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination. and for Other Purposes;
Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefrom; and for Other
Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children, effective November 5, 2004. (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664
[2011])
[26] Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution.—x x x
xxxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused
shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
[27] Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. — When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and
dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 196848), p. 160.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 196342), pp. 27-28.
[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 196848), pp. 21-22.
[31] People v. Pareja, 724 Phil. 759 (2014).
[35] Rape by sexual assault has the following elements: (1) That the offender commits an act of
sexual assault; (2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means: (a)
By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or (b) By inserting any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; (3) That the act of sexual
assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances: (a) By using force and
intimidation; (b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) By
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or (d) When the woman is under 12
years of age or demented. (People v. Soria, 698 Phil. 676 [2012])
15. People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014
Facts:

Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas, charging him as follows:

On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at her grandmother [CCC]'s
house located on [XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said date, she was at the dirty kitchen
with her aunt [ZZZ] who was then washing clothes. Her aunt asked... her if she had already
taken a bath, she replied in the negative.

Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he volunteered to give [AAA] a

bath. Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.

While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn around. After she complied
with his directive, he blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder what the accused-appellant was
doing so she told him that he was supposed to give her a bath.

Accused-appellant told her that they would play first for a while.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts and underwear. After that, he
sat on a chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised both of her legs.

Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-appellant's penis enter her vagina
which she found painful.

She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant got angry and poked a sharp
instrument on her neck. [AAA] did not report the incident because accused-appellant threatened
to cut her tongue and to kill her and her mother.

[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same house of her paternal
grandparents.

Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998 while [AAA] was again at her paternal
grandparents' house. On the said date, she was alone in the living room on the second floor of
the house when accused-appellant called her. She did not accede to his... bidding because she
was scared of him.

[AAA]'s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her
paternal grandparents' house. She and the accused were incidentally alone in the living room on
the second floor of the house. He asked her to go with him inside... the bedroom of her
grandparents, but she did not get up from her seat. So accused-appellant pulled her toward the
bedroom. She tried to free herself, but he poked a pointed instrument at her.

The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998. At that time, [AAA] was at the
terrace on the second floor of her paternal grandparents' house; and accused-appellant also
happened to be there.

The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11, 2007, finding accused-
appellant Roxas guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed against him.

The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on the
ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to... that
of children between nine to ten years old. The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible, and
found the testimonies of the defense witnesses to be "flimsy."

Issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURT'S DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
TESTIMONY

Ruling:

Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with inconsistencies and
narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature and the natural course of
things.[16] Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that under

Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors fifteen (15) years
old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims that
since he has a mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal... liability
although his chronological age at the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen
years old."

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to
the age as determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, and not the mental age as argued by
accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or... ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.

On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA's testimony and found
ourselves in agreement with the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As
observed by the appellate court:

We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
She recalled the tragic experience and positively identified... accused-appellant as the one who
ravished her on five occasions. Her testimony was unshaken by a grueling cross-examination
and there is no impression whatsoever that the same is a mere fabrication. For her to come out in
the open and publicly describe her harrowing... experience at a trial can only be taken as a badge
of her sincerity and the truth of her claims.

Principles:

In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344[18] is
explicit in providing that:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to

Section 20 of this Act.

A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate... proceedings in
accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

16. People vs. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017
Facts: In an Amended Information, accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape, as
follows: that the accused feloniously, have carnal knowledge with a minor (16 years old) AAA,
whose mental age is only six (6) years old. Said carnal knowledge with the said AAA is
detrimental to her normal growth and development and that accused knew fully well that the said
AAA is suffering from mental disability and/or disorder.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution and also raised the
defense of alibi. He contended that between the hours of 8 o'clock in the morning and 12 o'clock
midnight of May 2, 2007, he busied himself by painting the house of a neighbor, then he went to
GMA Cavite to have his electric fan repaired and, subsequently, had a drinking session with his
friend at the latter's house. He also admitted that he and the victim were residing at the same
place and, at the time of the incident, he has known the victim for one month.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266- A, paragraph 1 (d)
of the RPC.
Ruling: Yes. It is a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate,
with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. In People v. Quintas, the
Supreme Court held that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental
age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not
paragraph l(b), Article 266-A of the RPC.
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission of the
crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution was able to
establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, Clinical Abstract prepared by a medical
doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health, as well as the
testimonies of the said doctor29 and the victim's mother, BBB.
Ratio Decidendi: In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article
266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual
disability is established.
Gist: This is an ordinary appeal filed assailing the Decision of the CA, which affirmed in toto the
Decision of the RTC of San Pedro, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory
rape.
17. People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 243988, August 27, 2020
18. People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020
HomeDigested Case (Evidence)Digest: People vs. Castillo
Digest: People vs. Castillo
AdministratorMay 28, 2020
G.R. No. 186533. August 9, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EFREN CASTILLO, Accused-
Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Facts:

In a Complaint, appellant was charged by AAA, assisted by her mother, BBB, with the crime of
rape.

At the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and the defense failed to make any stipulation of
facts.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the private offended party; Dr. Thessa
Marie Antillon-Malimas (Dr. Antillon-Malimas), the doctor in Gingoog District Hospital who
examined AAA; BBB, the mother of AAA, who was also presented as rebuttal witness; and
Myrna delos Reyes-Villanueva, the Guidance Psychologist at the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center who conducted psychological tests on AAA to determine her mental capacity.

RTC Convicted the appellant and CA affirmed.

Appellant contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that would conclusively show that
AAA was suffering from mental retardation. BBB’s declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does
not sufficiently establish AAA’s mental retardation. Further, the "expert witness qualification" of
the prosecution’s supposed expert witness is highly questionable because she had not acquired
any doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry. More so, the psychological tests
administered by her on AAA were inadequate to establish AAA’s mental capacity.

Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish
AAA’s mental retardation to make him guilty of rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), of the
Revised Penal Code. Appellant concludes that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

Issue(s):

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT [AAA] IS A MENTAL

RETARDATE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE SUCH
MENTAL RETARDATION.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Ruling:

We reject appellant’s position.

In People v. Dalandas, citing People v. Dumanon, this Court held that mental retardation can be
proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and
even the observation by the trial court.
Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Commonly, it is required that the
witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as
to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which
he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion."

The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. Thus, even though the Guidance
Psychologist who examined AAA may not qualify as an expert witness, though the
psychological tests conducted by her on AAA may not be accurate to determine AAA’s mental
capacity, such circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause.

In the same way, though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not be qualified as
an expert witness, her observations, however, as regards the appearance, manner, habits and
behavior of AAA, is also admissible in evidence as an ordinary witness’ testimony. Even before
the Guidance Psychologist administered the psychological tests on AAA, she already noticed
that AAA lacked personal hygiene. While conversing with AAA, she observed that AAA has
low level mental functioning as she has difficulty understanding simple things, has a vague
concept of big numbers and time ─ like days of the week, and has regressed behavior that is not
congruent to her age, i.e., 21 years old at the time of her examination. She also stated that she
was not able to administer the Purdue Non-Language Test, which is an Intelligence Quotient
Test, on AAA due to the latter’s inability to identify the items therein.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
This Court, in People v. Dalandas, clarified that a mental retardate, in general, exhibits a slow
rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity. Further,
the mental retardation of persons and the degrees thereof may be manifested by their overt acts,
appearance, attitude and behavior. The dentition, manner of walking, ability to feed oneself or
attend to personal hygiene, capacity to develop resistance or immunity to infection, dependency
on others for protection and care and inability to achieve intelligible speech may be indicative of
the degree of mental retardation of a person. All these may be testified on by ordinary witnesses
who come in contact with an alleged mental retardate.

It bears stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete;
mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that AAA’s
impaired learning capacity, lack of personal hygiene and difficulty in answering simple
questions, as testified to by her mother and the Guidance Psychologist who had an opportunity to
observe her appearance, manner, habits and behavior, are indicative that she is truly suffering
from some degree of mental retardation.
19. People vs. Pal, G.R. No. 223565, June 18, 2018
Facts:

"AAA" testified that on July 26, 2007 at around 11:00 p.m., she was on her way home when her
neighbors, accused Jonathan Pal (Pal) and Thaniel Magbanta (Magbanta), invited her to join
them celebrate Pal's birthday.
Thereafter, "AAA" averred that Magbanta approached and punched her stomach twice. Pal,
Magbanta, Tatan Cutacte (Cutacte), and appellant held her hands and dragged her to a grassy and
secluded area near Pal's house about 500 meters away. Appellant was then holding and pointing
a knife at "AAA". Feeling weak and numb, "AAA" cried for help but no one heard her.
Magbanta punched her again three times and pushed her to the ground to stop her from shouting.
Magbanta warned "AAA" not to resist or else he would kill her.
"AAA" further narrated that appellant held her legs while Pal and Cutacte acted as lookout.
Magbanta then undressed and raped "AAA". Magbanta laid on top of her and forcibly inserted
his penis inside her vagina. "AAA" recalled that appellant, Pal, and Cutacte were all laughing as
they watched Magbanta insert his penis in side "AAA's" vagina. After raping her, Magbanta
again punched "AAA" in her stomach which caused her to faint.
On March 28, 2012, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 11 rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty as charged.

Issues:
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
whether appellant was guilty of the crime of rape. According to appellant, the RTC erred in
convicting him of rape in view of the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Ruling:

To secure a conviction for rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution
must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished
such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.

In this case, the prosecution had sufficiently established the existence of the elements above. The
testimony of "AAA" established that Magbanta had sexual intercourse with her with the
assistance of appellant, Pal, and Cutacte. "AAA" testified that appellant held her, pointed a knife
at her, and helped his co-accused drag her to a secluded grassy area where Magbanta punched
her and forced her to lie down. Magbanta then undressed her and inserted his penis inside her
vagina while her legs were held by appellant. These circumstances show that Magbanta had
sexual intercourse with "AAA" against her will through force, threat, and intimidation and with
the assistance of appellant and the other accused.

Based on the evidence on record, save as to the amount of damages awarded, the Court finds no
reason to disturb the findings of the CA that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.
20. People vs. YYY, G.R. No. 224626, June 27, 2018
21. People vs. Amarela and Racho, G.R. No. 225642-43, January 17, 2018
FACTS:
[AAA] is single, a housekeeper and a resident of Davao City
[AAA] testified that on February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, she was
watching a beauty contest with her aunt at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put
up. The only lights available were those coming from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the
Maligatong Cooperative near the basketball court. She was not able to reach the comfort room
because Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked and was no
match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day care center. He
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to
resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself
on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement
She shouted for help and then three men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.
The three persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her.
So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. She was brought to the Racho residence and herein
accused Racho was told by his mother to bring her to her aunt’s house instead.
[AAA] said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to
lie down. When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by
kicking him but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself
on top of [AAA]. [Racho] then inserted his penis into [AAA]’s vagina. After consummating the
act, [Racho] left her. So [AAA] went home alone.
The RTC found AAA’s testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be clear,
positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as
these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and
Racho were convicted
The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) different charges of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the identity of the was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Discuss the “women’s honor” doctrine.

22. People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011
FACTS:

In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor with
four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of his minor daughter,
AAA.

AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while her younger brothers were playing
outside the house and her mother was not home. Accusedappellant entered the room. He
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and removed her shorts and panty. She tried to resist by
putting her clothes back on, but her father’s strength prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant
touched and caressed her breasts. He licked her vagina then inserted his finger into it.

In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant raped AAA again in the same manner and
under the same circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that she was raped because accused-
appellant threatened to kill her mother by placing the latter’s body in a drum and have it
cemented if she would report the incidents. She returned to Quezon with her mother before the
end of the Christmas season.

In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-appellant for the third time when he went to
Candelaria, Quezon. In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent the Yuletide season with
accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las Pinas City. In a single day, AAA was raped for the fourth
and fifth time. While spending the afternoon inside her father’s room at the car-wash station, he
removed her shorts and panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina.
Accused-appellant repeated the same sexual assault shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report
these incidents for fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside a drum.

On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain which prompted her mother to
take her to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was transferred to the Quezon Memorial
Hospital in Lucena City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on her a physical examination.
The results revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 o’clock position

on the hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents
of rape committed by accused-appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAA’s mother took her to the Police Headquarters of
Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for rape against accusedappellant. AAA’s mother also took
her to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where she executed a
sworn statement against accused-appellant.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of rape?

HELD: YES.

CRIMINAL LAW: Rape

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the prosecution has indubitably established that
Ireno was the one who sexually assaulted her. AAA categorically narrated that Ireno sexually
abused her on several occasions and even threatened AAA that he would kill her mother if she
would report the incidents.

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape cases, the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct
opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not.
Generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment in this regard,
absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts of
substance or value, or gravely abused its discretion.

It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended parties are young and immature
girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. A young girl would
not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor
tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to
obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held
that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction
23. People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014)
FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her
husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder
for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause
marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.
However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and,
sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested
separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are
you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier.
He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the
floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire
to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist
by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested
his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and
to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their
wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases
in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the
equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape
and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to
marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He
had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s
legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was
raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between
cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence,
exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
R.A. 7610
24. Versoza vs. People, G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019
25. People vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016
26. People vs. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363. March 12, 2019
Facts:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 17, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, which affirmed the Joint Decision[2] dated February 10, 2014 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-
6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to Article 266-
B. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows: That sometime in the
month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength
forcibly laid complainant AAA,[3] a 9-year-old minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA,
against her will and consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to R.A. 7610. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows: That on
or about October 8, 2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-
year-old minor against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against
her will and consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to R.A. 7610.

Upon arraignment, Tulagan pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived
barely five (5) meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the
whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana
leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana
leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's house and
that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. Tulagan, likewise,
claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding with
AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.

After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in
two offenses of rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual assault and statutory
rape was duly established. The trial court relied on the credible and positive declaration of the
victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt [of] the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in
relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of fifty thousand
(Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos,
and to pay the cost of the suit. Likewise, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime of rape defined and penalized
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand (Php30,000.00) pesos;
and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand (Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost
of suit. SO ORDERED.[4]

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and
statutory rape.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated February
10, 2014 is AFFIRMED, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: 1. In Criminal Case No.
SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12
years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
award of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are
likewise granted. 2. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 (Statutory Rape), the awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages are increased to P100,000.00 each. Exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00, too, are granted. 3. All damages awarded are subject to legal interest at
the rate of 6% [per annum] from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Here, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, both the RTC and the CA found AAA's
testimony to be credible, straightforward and unwavering when she testified that Tulagan
forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape,
both the RTC and the CA also found that the elements thereof were present, to wit: (1) accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim, and (2) said act was accomplished when the offended party
is under twelve (12) years of age. Indubitably, the courts a quo found that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt Tulagan's guilt for the crime of rape. We find no reason to
deviate from said findings and conclusions of the courts a quo.

Jurisprudence tells us that a witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies does

not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor
details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they
discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness'
consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same.[8] As correctly held by the CA, the
fact that some of the details testified to by AAA did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does
not mean that the sexual assault did not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of
the sexual assault she suffered in Tulagan's hands. AAA's account of her ordeal being
straightforward and candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician,
as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the perpetrator of the crime, are, thus,
sufficient to support a conviction of rape. As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of
AAA's grandmother, absent any concrete supporting evidence, said allegation will not convince
us that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the victim and her supporting witness was
tainted with arbitrariness or blindness to a fact of consequence. We reiterate the principle that no
young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or through the influence of her
grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation, undergo an invasive medical examination then subject
herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent
desire to seek justice.

We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense, the defense of denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in the instant case, deserves no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses, like
AAA, who testified on affirmative matters. Since AAA testified in a categorical and consistent
manner without any ill motive, her positive identification of Tulagan as the sexual offender must
prevail over his defenses of denial and alibi. Here, the courts a quo did not give credence to
Tulagan's alibi considering that his house was only 50 meters away from AAA's house, thus, he
failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis when the
rape incidents took place. "Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. There
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
must be a demonstration that they were so far away and could not have been physically present
at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. In this regard,
Tulagan failed to prove that there was physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene
when the rape was committed.[11] Thus, his alibi must fail.

Further, although the rape incidents in the instant case were not immediately reported to the
police, such delay does not affect the truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other
circumstances that show the same to be mere concoction or impelled by some ill motive.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to reconcile the provisions
on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-a-vis Sexual Intercourse and Lascivious Conduct
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, to fortify the earlier decisions of the Court and doctrines
laid down on similar issues, and to clarify the nomenclature and the imposable penalties of said
crimes, and damages in line with existing jurisprudence.[13] Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997, acts constituting sexual assault under
paragraph 2,[14] Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as acts of lasciviousness under Article
No. 336[15] of the RPC or Act No. 3815 which took effect on December 8, 1930. For an accused
to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the confluence of the following essential elements must
be proven: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is
done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the
offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party
is under twelve (12) years of age.[

Issues:

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special type of
protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly inferred that the title used
in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is
only applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as
additional offenses, the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the
penalty provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the offenders on
the children concerned. Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is
clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to
speak of that which requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting
the law.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Ruling:

The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the crime, the
penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault,
and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, are
in order. Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique
opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses when placed on the stand. Consequently,
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.

Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special type of
protection for children from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly inferred that the title used
in Article III, Section 5, "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is
only applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as
additional offenses, the absence of the former rendering inapplicable the imposition of the
penalty provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses committed by the offenders on
the children concerned. Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is
clear - it only punishes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to
speak of that which requires statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting
the law.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, We hold that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted for sexual
assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because it
was alleged and proven that AAA was nine (9) years old at the time he inserted his finger into
her vagina. Instead of applying the penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is prision
mayor, the proper penalty should be that provided in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because AAA was below twelve (12)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of inserting his finger
in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct."[129] Hence, the proper
nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall
be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. Hence, Tulagan should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
(10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In Criminal Case No.
SCC-6211 for statutory rape, We affirm that Tulagan should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in accordance with paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated
February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
06679, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan: 1.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in Criminal Case No.
SCC-6210, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) month... and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is ORDERED
to PAY AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. 2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under
Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case
No. SCC-6211, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with modification as
to the award of damages. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages... ation as
to the award of damages. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
27. People vs. Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018
Facts:

One evening in September 2002, AAA, then 12 years old,[7] drank alcoholic beverages with
Udang's children, her neighbors: Betty Udang (Betty) and Bienvinido Udang, Jr. (Bienvinido,
Jr.), at their house in Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City.[8]

Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision in toto

Issues
whether or not accused-appellant, Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla, was correctly convicted of
rape punished under the first paragraph of Article
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Ruling:

The appeal is affirmed with modification

Based on the Informations, Udang was charged with two (2) counts of sexual abuse punished
under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Hence, he could only be convicted of sexual abuse
under the Informations filed in this case and not for rape under the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, upon examination of the evidence presented, this Court finds Udang guilty of two
(2) counts of sexual abuse. Thus, the penalty erroneously imposed on him—reclusion perpetua
for each count of rape—should be reduced accordingly.
Ideally, the same trial judge[57] should preside over all the stages of the proceedings, especially
in cases where the conviction or acquittal of the accused mainly relies on the credibility of the
witnesses. The trial judge enjoys the opportunity to observe, first hand, "the aids for an accurate
determination"[58] of the credibility of a witness "such as the witness' deportment and manner of
testifying, the witness' furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath."[59]
Udang's argument cannot be accepted as this would mean that every case where the judge had to
be replaced pending decision would have to be refiled and retried so that the judge who hears the
witnesses testify and the judge who writes the decision would be the same.[62] What Udang
proposes is impracticable.
cases and judicial proceedings pending decision or sentence under the jurisdiction of the old
courts shall be continued until their final decision.[66] Further, this Court explained that with the
existence of the transcript of records, which are presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of
everything that transpires during the trial,"[67] there is "little reason for asserting that one
qualified person may not be able to reach a just and fair conclusion from [the] record as well as
another
Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision convicting Udang is valid, regardless of the fact
that the judge who heard the witnesses and the judge who wrote the decision are different
However, this Court disagrees with the trial court's ruling that charging Udang with both rape,
under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, would violate his right against double jeopardy. The right against double
jeopardy is provided in Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution:

Moreover, contrary to the trial court's determination, the Informations actually charged Udang
with sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and not with rape, under Article
266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
All the elements of sexual abuse are present in this case.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
As an adult and the father of AAA's friend, Betty, Udang had influence over AAA, which
induced the latter to have drinks and later on have sexual intercourse with him. AAA, born on
May 20, 1990,[103] was 12 and 13 years old when the incidents happened. The following
transcript of stenographic notes shows AAA's "categorical, convincing and consistent"[104]
testimony as to how Udang sexually abused her in September 2002:
Court finds AAA credible not because of the generalization that she was a child of tender years
incapable of fabricating a story of defloration but because of her categorical narration of her
experience and her straightforward explanation that she was intimidated by Betty to have drinks
with her father.
AAA's delay in reporting the incidents did not affect her credibility. Delay is not and should not
be an indication of a fabricated charge because, more often than not, victims of rape and sexual
abuse choose to suffer alone and "bear the ignominy and pain" of their experience.[109] Here,
AAA would not have revealed the incidents had she not been interviewed by the police when she
was arrested for sniffing rugby:
Explaining the difference between "burden of proof” and "burden of evidence,
Unfortunately Udang failed to present evidence sufficient to counter the prosecution's prima
facie case against him
Udang's and Betty's testimonies are "self-serving"[115] and were correctly disregarded by the
trial cour
Court is morally convinced that Udang committed two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, with each count punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua.

28. Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007
Facts:
In the Year 1996, Malto and private respondent AAA started to frequently exchange messages
and calls. Their conversation always started innocently but he had a way of veering the subject to
sex. Soon, they had a "mutual understanding" and became sweethearts. On November 19, 1997,
AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the premises of the college. She was surprised
when he brought her to Queensland Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. Once inside the motel
room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her
blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got
angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, Malto asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private.
He again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off
his shirt, lay down in bed and told her, "halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap." She refused but he
dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
struggled to stop him but he overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and
touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat
up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying, "Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t hurt you." She
refused and said, "Mike, ayoko." Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she
hesitantly replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while commenting "ibibigay mo
rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed. They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either
intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in
other colleges where he taught. On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of
petitioner, BBB filed an administrative complaint in Assumption College against him. She also
lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of
Criminal Case No. 00-0691.

Issue:
Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law can be applied

Held:
Yes. The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a
special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Since the
penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is
covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, he is entitled to
a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).
29. People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998
Facts: Ernesto Larin (accused-appellant) was charged of violating Section 6(b) of RA 7610. The
prosecution, with Carla Lenore Calumpang, the complainant herself as its witness, adduced that
on April 17, 1996, inside the ladies' shower room located at the Baker's Hall, U.P. Los Baños,
Laguna, the accused, by taking advantage of his authority, influence and moral ascendancy and
through moral compulsion, commit lascivious conduct on the complainant by shaving her pubic
hair, performing cunnilingus on her, licking her breasts, forcing her to hold and squeeze his
penis; and forcibly kissing her on the cheeks and lips the day after, against her will and consent,
to her damage and prejudice. Other prosecution’s witnesses Dr. Nectarina Rabor-Fellizar
(physical examiner), Susan Calumpang (the victim's mother), and Elizabeth Ventura (practicing
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
clinical child psychologist), corroborated elements of this claim. The accused-appellant denied
committing these acts. He claims that on the day in question, there were around seven (7) people
in the pool and that Carla was not alone as she was with a classmate until 5:45 p.m. when they
dressed up. And that when the classmate left, the accused even accompanied Carla to the
boarding area in the company of two (2) other girls and a security guard'. The RTC found the
testimony of Carla worthy of full faith and credence, and found the accused guilty as charged. In
appeal to this Court, the accused assails the sufficiency of the evidence adduced against him, and
the rightfulness of the penalty imposed upon him. Issues: 1. Whether or not the lower court erred
in finding the accused-appellant guilty of a violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. 2. Whether
or not the lower court erred in giving weight to the victim’s testimony. 3. Whether or not,
assuming the accused-appellant to be guilty, the lower court erred in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Held: 1. NO. The Court holds that that the law (RA 7610) covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes not
only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other

forms of sexual abuse of children. That appellant sexually abused Carla in violation of RA 7610,
was duly alleged in the Information and proven during the trial through the victim’s testimony. 2.
NO. Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a witness and
his or her testimony is entitled to the highest degree of respect. Unlike appellate magistrates, a
trial judge can observe the demeanor of a witness on the stand and is, thus, in a better position to
assess the truthfulness of the testimony. In the absence of any clear showing that the trial judge
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, this Court will not disturb such finding. The defense failed to present any convincing
argument to justify a deviation from this rule. The victim's testimony, given in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner, is worthy of faith and belief. No proof of ill
motive on her part to falsely accuse and testify against appellant has been offered. We stress that
no young and decent girl like Carla would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to
medical examination and undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she
is not motivated by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her. 3. NO. The
Court holds that the penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, to reclusion perpetua is
imposed by RA 7610 on its provisions. As earlier stated, RA 7610 defines child as a person
below eighteen (18) years of age, or one who is unable to fully take care of or protect from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition. Contrary to appellant's interpretation, the law does not confine its protective mantle
only to children under twelve (12) years of age. Carla, who was fourteen (14) years of age when
the crime was committed, is considered a child for purposes of RA 7610. Her molester,
therefore, may be punished with imprisonment of reclusion temporal in its medium period, to
reclusion perpetua. The law mandates that the "penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed
in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer." Larin's employment at UPLB as
swimming instructor or, as he insists, a lifeguard makes him a part of the civil service and a
public officer. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the trial court imposing upon him the maximum
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Consistent with the express provision of RA 7610, the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification is likewise meted upon appellant.
30. People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 171863, August 20, 2008
Facts:
Gaspar Olayon was charged with 2 counts of violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610 (AntiChild
Abuse Act) for allegedly having sexual intercourse and committing lewd and lascivious acts
upon AAA, then 14 years of age. He was also charged of acts of lasciviousness against the same
victim. 2. He interposed the following as his defense: AAA was his sweetheart; AAA voluntarily
went with Olayon to the house of one Duke Espiritu where the crime was committed; & the
sexual relations with AAA were with her consent. 3. In the joint trial for these 3 offenses, Olayon
was acquitted in the charge for acts of lasciviousness but he was convicted of violation of
Section 10(a) of RA 7610. Trial court ruled that Olayon cannot escape responsibility because
consent is not an accepted defense in this special law. 4. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court’s
decision and acquitted Olayon. REASON: Consensual sexual intercourse with a minor is NOT
classified as child abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610. Moreover, for the act of intercourse
between Olayon to be considered sexual abuse [under Section 5], such intercourse should have
occurred due to coercion or intimidation. However, these elements were absent as AAA freely
consented to the acts.
Issue:
WON CA erred in acquitting Olayon?
Held:
No.  Sexual abuse (as defined under Sec. 5) is a completely distinct and separate offense from
child abuse (as defined under Sec. 10). Sec. 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the
child’s development other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse. On the other hand,
sexual abuse is defined as including the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.  Consensual sexual
intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a minor who is 12 years old or older could
constitute a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. For consensual sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a minor, who is not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the
purview of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of the
child must be present.  If Olayon was charged under Section 5(b), instead of Section 10(a),
Olayon would still be acquitted as there was no allegation that an element of the offense
(coercion or influence or intimidation) attended its commission.
31. Balois vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013
Facts:
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
On separate occasions, Gil Anthony Calianga allegedly raped Iris Kristine Alberto, who was then
a minor. On another incident, it was alleged that respondents abducted Iris through force and
intimidation. Respondents raised the sweetheart defense and consent on the part of Iris. The
Prosecutor dismissed all the charges against respondents, except the charge of
Child Abuse against respondent Gil for having sexual intercourse with Iris by taking advantage
of her minority and his moral influence as a pastor of their church. On appeal, the DOJ
Secretary found probable cause to charge: (a) Gil for Rape, in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610; (b) Gil, Jessebel, Atty. Reyna and Grace for one (1) count each of
Serious Illegal Detention and Rape, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610; and (c)
Gil, Atty. Reyna and Arturo for one (1) count each of Forcible Abduction with Rape.
However, these were revoked by the CA when it granted respondents’ petition for
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether there is probable cause to charge respondents of the crimes
Held:
Yes, as to the crime of rape. No, as to the other crimes. Probable cause does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The DOJ Secretary did not gravely
abuse his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of rape against Gil, Atty.
Reyna and Arturo, as the elements of rape appear to be present. However, the DOJ Secretary
gravely abused his discretion in finding that probable cause exists for the crime of Serious Illegal
Detention as records are bereft of any evidence to support a finding that Iris was illegally
detained or restrained of her movement. The DOJ Secretary likewise committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape as
there was no evidence to prove that Iris was restrained of her liberty. Even if it is assumed that
there was some form of abduction, it has not been shown – nor even sufficiently alleged – that
the taking was done with lewd designs.
Acts of Lasciviousness
32. People vs. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202. April 30, 1964
33. People vs. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013
FACTS:

Accused-appellant Ferdinand Banzuela challenges the present appeal on the Decision of the CA
wherein he was convicted of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. Accused was charged in the RTC
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
of Mandaluyong City when he allegedly consummated the rape of a 6 year old and an attempted
rape of a 7 year old in a cemetery. Notwithstanding that the hymen of the 6 year old was still
intact, he was convicted of Rape by the RTC, ratiocinating that mere touching of the labia
consummates rape. Attempted rape was also proved since the RTC found that the same would
have been consummated if not for the timely arrival of a bystander, which caused the accused to
desist. Upon appeal, the Court affirmed and modified the decision regarding the rape of the 6
year old victim in terms of damages while the attempted rape was not appreciated by the CA in
that it only constituted Acts of Lasciviousness.

ISSUE:

1. WON the crime of statutory rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt. YES.
2. WON the crime of attempted rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt. NO.

HELD:

1. Sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age, whether she consented to it or not, is
punishable as rape under our laws. As such, proof of force, threat, or intimidation is unnecessary
in cases of statutory rape, they, not being elements of the crime. When the complainant is below
12 years old, the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed as the law supposes that a
woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent
consent to the sexual act. In order to successfully convict an accused of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove the following: the age of the complainant; the identity of the accused;
and the carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant. Significantly, as this Court
has held before, the pain that AAA (6 year old victim) suffered is, in itself, an indicator of the
commission of rape. Moreover, AAA’s ordeal was witnessed by BBB, who in fact was the one
who told AAA’s mother about the incident. Thus, contrary to Banzuela’s assertions, this Court is
convinced that the prosecution was able to establish that he had carnal knowledge of AAA,
making him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

2. In the crime of rape, penetration, however slight, is an essential act of execution that produces
such felony. Thus, for Banzuela to be convicted of the crime of attempted rape, he must have
already commenced the act of inserting his sexual organ in the vagina of BBB (7 year old
victim), but due to some cause or accident, excluding his own spontaneous desistance, he wasn’t
able to even slightly penetrate BBB. It has not escaped this Court that rape and acts of
lasciviousness are crimes of the same nature. However, the intent to lie with the woman is the
fundamental difference between the two, as it is present in rape or attempt of it, and absent in
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
acts of lasciviousness. “Attempted rape is committed when the ‘touching’ of the vagina by the
penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness.”
In this case, Banzuela’s acts of laying BBB on the ground, undressing her, and kissing her, “do
not constitute the crime of attempted rape, absent any showing that (Banzuela) actually
commenced to force his penis into (BBB’s) sexual organ.”
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
34. People v. Climaco, 46 O.G. 3186
A buy-bust operation was conducted thereafter arresting one Gomer Climaco.
Trial ensued where a consolidated criminal case was filed against the accused for violation of
Sec. 5 and 11 of RA 9165 which is the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for Illegal
Possession and Illegal Sale of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu".
RTC of Laguna found Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt sentencing him to 12 to 14 years
and to pay fine.
Accused appealed but CA affirmed his conviction declaring that all the elements of the crimes of
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were proven.

ISSUE:

The sole issue in this case is whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of shabu was proven BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

RULING:

Court resolved to acquit Climaco for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Chain of Custody:
1. Seizure/Confiscation > 2. Forensic Lab > 3. Safe Keeping > 4. Court Presentation
Duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs from time of seizure or
confiscation to forensic lab, to safekeeping on to presentation in court SHOULD NOT BE
TAMPERED.
There was a discrepancy of object evidence based on the testimony of accosting officer. The
substances retrieved from Climaco and submitted to the court had the specimen marking of
TR-R & TR-B. But according to the chemistry report however, the plastic sachets submitted for
examination carried the markings GSC-1 & GSC-2.

Therefore the CHAIN OF CUSTODY was broken.

Decision of RTC and CA was SET ASIDE. Appellant Climaco therefore acquitted.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

35. People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75 : October 17, 2003
FACTS:
A consolidated decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10857, 10858 and 10859, finding appellant Florencio Abanilla y Rivera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape committed against his 17-year old daughter,
Lorena Abanilla y Arellano, which resulted in the latter’s pregnancy.
The complainant Lorena testified on three alleged rape incidents. The first was said to have
occurred during the month of June 1999, where Abanilla touched Lorena’s private part and
rubbed his organ unto her until ejaculation. The second and the third rape incidents purportedly
occurred on the second and last weeks of October 1999, respectively where Abanilla was able to
insert his penis into Lorena’s vagina.
All three incidents were committed by means of force, threat or intimidation. Appellant denied
raping his daughter, but the sole evidence he presented was his own testimony denying the
complainant’s accusations against him. Considering that appellant’s conviction was chiefly due
to the complainant’s testimony, the Court is obliged to examine thoroughly the veracity of such
testimony to ensure that it meets the required quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt
necessary to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant Abanilla is guilty of attempted rape in the first rape incident.

RULING:
No, the appellant Abanilla is not guilty of attempted rape in the first rape incident. Jurisprudence
dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the
penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ
or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia
of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape. Without the penetration, the
crime committed is either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. Based on the complainant’s
testimonies as regards the FIRST INCIDENT, the SC opined that nothing prevented appellant
from consummating the act and it would seem that he was already contended with rubbing his
penis against the complainant without actually inserting it into her private part. Thus, appellant
cannot be convicted of attempted rape but only of acts of lasciviousness for the June 1999
incident.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
36. People vs. Balbar, G.R. No. L-20216 and L-20217, Nov. 29, 1967
PEOPLE V. BALBAR November 29, 1967| Makalinta, J. | Acts of Lasciviousness
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines RESPONDENTS: Tiburcio Balbar SUMMARY:
Balbar entered into the classroom of Gonzales while the latter was teacher. He hugged and kissed
Gonzales on her eyes. Gonzales tried to escape, however, he was caught by Balbar who this time
has a dagger in his possession. He tried to hugged Gonzales again. They both fell onto the floor
causing slight physical injuries to Gonzales. Two information were then filed one for direct
assault and the other for lascivious conduct. Balbar move to quash alleging that his knowledge
that Gonzales was a person in authority was not alleged and the other info was a double jeopardy
considering that it is the same act as to the former. Court of First Instance dismissed both info.
Ruling that the crime charged is only unjust vexation which is within the jurisdiction of Justice
of the Peace. On appeal, the Supreme Court said that the information sufficiently charged Balbar
on direct assault because it contained therein that the act was committed while Gonzales was
engaged in her profession. However, for acts of lasciviousness, the Court agreed that it shall be
dismissed because the fact that the acts were committed in front of the students and within the
hearing distance of co-teachers negate lewd purpose. DOCTRINE: Lascivious conduct must be
determined depending on the manner, place and time under which the acts complained were
committed. It is important to draw a line between the lascivious conduct and the action of an
ardent lover.

FACTS: 1. Two information were filed against Balbar. One is direct assault upon person and
authority and one is for acts of lasciviousness. 2. On August 20, 1960, Balbar allegedly entered
into the classroom of Ester Gonzales. After Gonzales finished writing on the board, without
warning, Balbar placed his arms around her and kiss her on the eyes. Gonzales was shocked and
immediately pushed Balbar and attempted to run away. However, she was caught by Balbar who
has a “daga” (dagger) in his arms. He then again tried to hug her. They then fell on to the floor as
a result Gonzales sustainted slight physical injuries. 3. The fiscal filed the said two separate
information. Balbar moved to quash the information alleging that the direct assault information
has failed to allege that Balbar has knowledge that Gonzales was a person in authority (note that
in the info, it was alleged that the crime was committed while
Gonzales is in the performance of her duty). As for the lascivious conduct, it must, likewise, be
quashed because it is of the same act as alleged in the first info which constitutes double
jeopardy. RTC judged dismissed both information ruling that what was charged was unjust
vexation or physical injuries which is in the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace..
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WoN the alleged acts constituted lascivious conduct as embraced in Article 336 of the
RPC
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIED the petition. AFFIRMED the decision of RTC.
RATIO: Direct Assault 1. The Court ruled that RTC erred in dismissing the information. It was
sufficiently alleged in the information that the act was committed while Gonzales was engaged in
her duty (inside her classroom, teaching) 2. The law says that teacher are persons in authority
and if Balbar was not made aware of this he is not excused pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil
Code. 3. Hence, the decision on this information is reversed and remanded for further trial Acts
of Lasciviousness 4. The Court held that the RTC did not err in dismissing the case. Lascivious
conduct must be determined depending on the manner, place and time under which the acts
complained were committed. It is important to draw a line between the lascivious conduct and
the action of an ardent lover. 5. In the case at bar, the hugging and kisses were done in front of
Gonzales students and in a public place—within hearing distance of her co-teachers that negate
lewd or lascivious motive. They are not what Article 336 refers to as lascivious conduct.
37. People vs. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363. March 12, 2019
FACTS:

RTC and CA convicted Salvador Tulagan for the crime of statutory rape (Art. 266-A
of the RPC). During the trial, BBB, aunt of the victim AAA, testified that around 10:30 a.m. of
October 17, 2011, she noticed a man looking at AAA outside their house. When AAA asked her
permission to go to the bathroom located outside their house, the man suddenly went near AAA.
Out of suspicion, BBB walked to approach AAA. As BBB came close to AAA, the man left
suddenly. After AAA returned from the bathroom, BBB asked what the man was doing to her.
AAA did not reply. She then told AAA to get inside the house. She asked AAA to move her
panties down, and examined her genitalia. She noticed that her genitalia was swollen. AAA then
confessed to her about the wrong done to her by appellant whom AAA referred to as Badong or
Salvador Tulagan. AAA cried hard and embraced BBB tightly. AAA asked BBB for her help
and even told her that she wanted Badong to be put in jail. AAA, nine (9) years old, testified that
sometime in September 2011 while she was peeling corn with her cousin who lived adjacent to
her grandmother's house, Tulagan approached her, spread her legs, and inserted his finger into
her private part. She said that it was painful, but Tulagan just pretended as if he was just looking
for something and went home. AAA, likewise, testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of October 8,
2011, while she was playing with her cousin in front of Tulagan's house, he brought her to his
house and told her to keep quiet. He told her to lie down on the floor, and removed her short
pants and panties. He also undressed himself, kissed AAA's cheeks, and inserted his penis into
her vagina. She claimed that it was painful and that she cried because Tulagan held her hands
and pinned them with his. She did not tell anyone about the incident, until her aunt examined her
private part. Upon genital examination by Dr. Brenda Tumacder on AAA, she found a healed
laceration at 6 o'clock position in AAA's hymen, and a dilated or enlarged vaginal opening. She
said that it is not normal for a 9-year-old child to have a dilated vaginal opening and laceration in
the hymen. For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that
he lived barely five (5) meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added
that the whole month of September 2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00 p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the
banana leaves he gathered at the back of their kitchen. He said that he never went to AAA's
house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of September 2011. Tulagan,
likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a misunderstanding
with AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her granddaughter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC

HELD:

No. Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the
victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. In this case, both the RTC
and the CA found AAA's testimony to be credible, straightforward and unwavering when she
testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger in her vagina. Jurisprudence tells us that a
witness' testimony containing inconsistencies or discrepancies does not, by such fact alone,
diminish the credibility of such testimony. In fact, the variance in minor details has the net effect
of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility
of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating
the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused
as the perpetrator of the same. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is
necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out
such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious.
38. People vs. Jagdon, Jr., G.R. No. 242882
Sexual Harassment/Safe Spaces Act
39. Escandor vs. People, G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020,
40. People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019)
FACTS:

That from February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
MATEO A. LEE, JR. a public officer, being the Deputy Executive Director of the National
Council on Disability Affairs, committing the offense in relation to this official functions and
taking advantage of his position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally demand,
request or require sexual favor from Diane Jane M. Paguirigan, an Administrative Aide VI in the
same office and who served directly under the supervision of accused, thus, accused has
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over her, by asking Ms. Paguirigan in several instances,
when they would check in a hotel, sending her flowers, food and messages of endearment and
continuing to do so even after several protests from her, visiting her house and church and
inquiring about her from her family, relatives and friends, and even following her on her way
home, which sexual demand, request or requirement resulted in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment to Ms. Paguirigan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its decision

HELD:

Yes. 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on

or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that
the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 5) The
certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the
certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel.
If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
41. LBC vs. Palco, G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020,
LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Monica C. Palco G.R. No. 217101 | February 12, 2020 FACTS:
Respondent Monica C. Palco filed a complaint for sexual harassment before the Danao City
Prosecutor’s Office, alleging that she was harassed by her supervisor, Arturo Batucan; and that
her employer, petitioner LBC Express-Visayas, failed to take immediate action on the matter.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Palco. The National Labor Relations Commission and the
Court of Appeals likewise ruled in favor of the respondent. In view thereof, LBC filed this
petition, arguing that they should not be liable for constructive dismissal, and that it cannot be
held liable for the sexual acts of Batucan.

ISSUES: Whether or not the sexual harassment done to Monica Palco constitutes to her
constructive dismissal.

RULING: Yes, the sexual harassment done to Palco can be a compelling reason for her to
complain against constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal occurs when an employer makes
and employee’s continued employment impossible, unreasonably or unlikely, or has made an
employee’s working conditions or environment harsh, hostile, and unfavorable, such that the
employee feels obliged to resign from his or her employment. One of the ways by which hostile
or offensive work environment is created is through the sexual harassment of an employee. Palco
posited in this case that her resignation was not voluntary but was borne out of the hostile work
environment brought about by Batucan’s sexual harassment. Thus, this petition was denied by
the Supreme Court.
42. People vs. Sales, A.M. No. P-17-3772, January 10, 2018
43. Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School. Respondent Eduardo
O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.

AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand.
Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and
place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then
touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt
afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident,
testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was
handing AAA a lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three
seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed
him from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act
constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioner’s right to due process, and based on its
finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that
right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with “disgraceful and immoral
conduct and misconduct,” the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved
petitioner’s guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as “Grave
Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment),” different from that specified in the formal charge
which was “Misconduct.” He further argues that the offense of “Misconduct” does not include
the graver offense of “Grave Misconduct.”

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual Harassment

HELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law.

Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or
stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, “It is true that this provision calls for a ‘demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor.’ But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.”
The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of
mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under
Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed “(w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.” AAA even testified that she felt fear at the
time petitioner touched her.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner
cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple misconduct.

He is dismissed from service

Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge
against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he
defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with
precision is of no moment in this administrative case.
Seduction
44. People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
FACTS: In September, 1960 Fe Castro, then a 15yo, was brought by her mother to the house of
the Mariano Fontanilla and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a sister of the complaining
witness' mother, to serve as a helper. From September to shortly before Christmas of December,
1960, Mariano succeeded in having sex with her repeatedly. She testified that she was induced
by his promises of marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation The first sexual
intercourse with her was in September, about a week after her arrival. The accused intruded into
her bedroom, placed himself on top of her and fondled her nipples. She also declared that prior to
this incident, the accused had made amorous overtures and advances toward her. Accused was
also giving her money.

Castro twice daily. The instant case was filed against him upon the malevolent instigation of one
Avelino Gapasin, an uncle of Fe Castro, who wielded strong influence over her, adding that the
complainant herself was envious of his (Fontanilla's) children of the first marriage who received
some salary from their employment. Fe's testimony does not merit credence because it is hazy
and selfcontradictory. If it is true that he repeatedly promised to marry her in order to deceive her
into submitting to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly consent to the continuance of
their illicit liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill his promise to marry her? A
situation like this borders on the incredible and suggests that there was actually no promise of
marriage and consequently there was no resultant carnal relation between him and the
complaining woman.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
This allegation was indirectly corroborated by Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union,
who testified that he endeavored to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay P50 which
was due to Fe Castro as her share in the cultivation of tobacco, but the complaining witness
through Avelino Gapasin refused the offer and the latter then insinuated that the amount of
P2,000 should be paid, which sum he believed would be sufficient reparation for "the honor
destroyed."

In December, her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in flagrante on the kitchen floor.
The following day she returned to her parents, and revealed Magdalena Copio corroborated her
husband's statement. everything to her mother two days later. • They indulged in sexual
intercourse only once a week. • During the three months that Fe Castro stayed with them, there
was no Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted in the justice of the peace court (now unusual
incident or sexual relation between her husband and her niece. municipal court) of San Fernando,
La Union for qualified seduction. • Never caught the accused in a compromising situation with
the offended party. Fontanilla's defense: • She slept regularly from 7:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight,
after which she • Fe Castro actually lived in his house not as a helper, but as their own seldom
could go back to sleep, and that she was easily awakened by the child. slightest noise. • There
was never an occasion during which he could have taken • Her husband slept with her in the
same bed every night. advantage of the chastity of his ward, because at night her room was •

locked and during the day he was out in the farm. MC: He was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. His sexual capabilities had waned considerably as he was already 52 yo. It was impossible
for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with Fe

Fontanilla appealed to the CA which subsequently certified the case to the SC in her sworn
statement: a resolution on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court a quo, inter alia, was A. —
Because I was beginning to like him and enjoy this sexual intercourse. in issue. (5) Granting that
no promise was made , it is nevertheless settled that deceit,
ISSUE: WON Mariano Fontanilla is guilty of qualified seduction although an essential element
of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need
Held:
Yes to be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced (1)
Complainant's testimony, in direct as well as in cross-examination, is by abuse of confidence.
entitled to essential credence. She declared that Fontanilla had carnal When the offender is a
public officer, a priest or minister, a servant, domestic, knowledge of her one night in September,
1960, and that since then up to tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or
keeping of the December of the same year, Fontanilla had sexual intercourse with her offended
woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or repeatedly, sometimes at
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
night. sometimes in the daytime, but always when his deceit may not have been used or, if
employed, has not been proved. wife was asleep or away. Significantly, convincing proof of the
first sexual The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, intercourse
would suffice to affirm the conviction of the appellant without committed by any of the persons
enumerated in art. 337 "is constitutive of the necessity of proving the subsequent instances of
carnal liaison. crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes or even when
such carnal knowledge were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such (2) Fontanilla's
contention that Fe Castro has malevolent and ulterior motives a case, the law takes for granted
the existence of the deceit as an integral for filing this case against him is a flimsy rationalization
which the accused, element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the
significantly, did not even attempt to substantiate. simple seduction ... taking into account the
abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence which implies
deceit or fraud. (3) Gapasin's objection to the proposed compromise does not prove that he
induced the victim to denounce Fontanilla in court. On the contrary, from the (6) It is conceded
that the testimony of Fe Castro suffers from some actuations of Gapasin it can be inferred that he
was just trying to protect the inconsistencies; these, however, could be attributed to her minority
(she was interest of his niece who was offered so meager an amount as settlement for an barely
16 years old at the time of the trial), lack of education (she had reached offense which caused the
latter the irredeemable loss of her virginity. only grade III), perceptibly low intelligence, and to
the understandable partiality of a litigant to her cause. Furthermore, it is on record that prior to
the overtures at settlement, the Fe had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal of La
Union to file charges (7) Re: no occasion against Fontanilla. Aquino himself admitted upon
cross-examination that he had The appellant also admitted that whenever his wife went to market
she would requested Fiscal Crisogono Bautista to postpone the filing of the complaint to be away
for two or three hours. He hastened to add, however, that each time his enable him to settle the
case, and that the proposed compromise was his idea wife left for the market she advised Fe
Castro to stay with their neighbor. and made upon his own initiative. This admission shows that
the filing of the Granting that Fe Castro would really go to their neighbor's place which was only
instant case preceded, and was not due to, the failure of the alleged proposed five meters away
from their house, it is not improbable that Fontanilla would compromise. call her back once his
wife had left. (4) Re: “incredible story” (8) Re: sexual prowess This "unthinkable" situation
pointed out by the appellant was quite reasonably "Day and night." answer of the complainant
cannot be interpreted to mean that explained by the complainant in a frank, albeit embarrassing,
reply contained in they had sexual intercourse twice daily (one in the daytime and another at

night), for said statement was in reply to a question with respect to the time when they engaged
in carnal intercourse and not the frequency of their illicit love making. In the second place, there
is a presumption that an adult male has normal powers of virility and the burden of proving the
contrary rests on the party asserting it. The declarations of Fontanilla and his wife on the former's
alleged weakening potency are not sufficient to rebut this presumption. (9) Dr. Guerrero testified
that the hymen of Fe Castro showed "incomplete healed lacerations at 9 & 3 o'clock positions on
the face of a watch, edges of which are sharp and easily coaptable." He explained that healed
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
lacerations would suggest that the injury happened six months, more or less, prior to the date of
examination. In the case at bar, since per medical findings the hymen of the complainant showed
"incomplete healed lacerations," then this fact would indicate that the injury occurred less than
six months before February 12, 1961, the date of the medical examination of Fe Castro.
Significantly, said period corresponds to the time when Fe Castro stayed as a helper in the house
of the Fontanilla spouses. It is also clear from the doctor's testimony that Fe Castro had
experienced numerous distinct acts of sexual intercourse, a fact which affirms her claim that the
appellant had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly during her three-month stay in his house. There
is no evidence on record that Fe Castro was unchaste prior to her living with the Fontanilla
spouses. Such being the case, her virginity before she was seduced by the appellant must be
presumed. Presumption of a woman's virginity arises whenever it is shown that she is single, and
continues until overthrown by proof to the contrary.8 This is in accord with the presumption of
innocence which "includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of
chastity. DECISION: MC's decision affirmed, modified the md.
45. People vs. Yap, G.R. No. L-25176. February 27, 1968
46. Berba vs. People, G.R. No. L-32267-70 March 26, 1979
Abduction
47. People vs. Caraang [2003]
FACTS: Version of the Prosecution About 11 o’clock on the night of November 10, 1990, the
group of Vanelyn Flores, Lorna Salazar, Angeline Flores, Jona Ampil, Gina Canzon, Froilan
Galamay, Jimmy Pascual and Tirso Ganzon were on their way home to Sitio Abibeg, Gen. Luna,
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. The group had just attended a ‘bangsal-bangsal’ or a pre-nuptial dance
at Barangay Dipaan, Car[r]anglan, Nueva Ecija. The moon [had] just begun to rise, and the road
they were traversing was quite dark. Reaching the boundary of Abibeg and Dipaan, the group
was accosted by two (2) armed men. Brandishing their guns, the men ordered the group to follow
them. The two (2) armed men wore bonnets. However, Vanelyn Flores recognized one of them
as appellant Danilo Caraang, having known him for a long time since they were neighbors in the
same barangay and because of the peculiar way he walked and stood. Jimmy Pascual likewise
recognized the two armed men as appellant Danilo Caraang and Virgilio Canlas.The group was
forced to walk through rice paddies till they reached an uninhabited and grassy place near a creek
or ‘parang,’ approximately 500 meters away from the place where they were waylaid. Upon
reaching the ‘parang,’ the armed men ordered the female members of the group to sit down while
the male members were ordered to lie on the ground face down. Vanelyn Flores was the first
female removed from the group by appellant. She knew that it was appellant who grabbed her
hand and who pulled her to a nearby creek about 50 meters away. There, Vanelyn saw another
man waiting. All of a sudden, appellant poked his gun on Vanelyn’s temple and ordered her to
remove her pants. Vanelyn became terrified and cried. Appellant forced her to lie down on the
ground. He repeated his order that she remove her pants. Vanelyn, however, refused. This
prompted appellant’s companion to grab both of Vanelyn’s hands. As Vanelyn was immobilized,
appellant succeeded in removing her pants and underwear. Thereafter, appellant removed his
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
pants, mounted Vanelyn and had sexual intercourse with her. Vanelyn felt excruciating pain. By
then, the place was wellilluminated by moonlight. The moment appellant removed his bonnet,
Vanelyn saw that her rapist was indeed appellant Danilo Caraang. Vanelyn was sexually abused
by appellant for more than 15 minutes, after which she was returned to their group. After an
hour, Vanelyn was again forcibly brought by appellant to the nearby creek. Vanelyn was made to
lie down by appellant who poked his gun at her. Petrified with fear, Vanelyn could not resist as
appellant’s companion removed her underwear and her pants. Then appellant’s companion
mounted her and sexually abused her. Vanelyn again cried because of terrible pain. After
appellant’s companion had satisfied his lust, appellant returned Vanelyn to the group. He
approached Lorna Salazar and forced her to go with him. Lorna Salazar was first blindfolded and
then brought to a place away from the group. She was turned over to a man who removed the
cover from her eyes. Lorna saw [that] the man [was] wearing a bonnet. The man ordered Lorna
to remove her pants but she fought back. Thus, he kicked Lorna hard in the abdomen which
caused her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, Lorna felt weak and dizzy.

She also saw that she was naked. The man who raped her ordered her to put on her pants.
Thereafter, she was returned back to the group. Subsequently, two other companions of
appellant, who were also armed, took Lorna Salazar away from the group. They also wanted to
rape her. However, as the men were starting to remove her clothes, Lorna cried and pleaded for
mercy. The two men relented. One of them asked Lorna to give him a kiss mark instead. As he
prepared to be kissed, the man removed his bonnet. Lorna was able to identify him as Manny
Belagot. Then she was returned to the group. Around 4 o’clock in the morning, the group was
released at the place where they were abducted. Before departing, the armed men threatened the
group thus ‘pag nagsumbong kayo, papatayin naming kayo lahat.’ Vanelyn Flores and her sister
Angeline, together with Lorna Salazar, arrived at their house crying. They narrated to Vanelyn’s
parents all about the incident. Immediately, Vanelyn was brought by her parents to San Jose
City, where she was examined by Dr. Rolando Valencia. Dr. Valencia. Lorna Salazar was
medically examined by Dr. Restituto Duran. CHARGE: 4 counts of rape with forcible abduction:
1. 2 information for Abduction with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation of
Vanelyn Flores to an uninhabited grassy upland five hundred (500) meters away; 2. 2
information for Abduction with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation of Lorna
Salazar to an uninhabited grassy upland five hundred (500) meters away. The trial court issued a
Warrant of Arrest against all the accused. Appellant and Canlas Jr. were arrested and detained,
but all the others remained at large. On arraignment, the two pleaded not guilty. Since there were
common witnesses and the acts complained of arose from the same incident, the cases were
consolidated and tried jointly. Version of the Defense CARAANG denies the accusations against
him. He maintains that he is innocent and that he was not at the place of the incident and that he
was sick at that time. DECISION OF THE RTC: The RTC convicted Danilo Caraang, together
with Virgilio Canlas Jr., of the complex crime of abduction with rape, two counts of rape and one
count of acts of lasciviousness. They were sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each of the first
three crimes; and imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, one (1) day to six (6) years of
prision correccional for the last. The court a quo found that only one act of abduction had been
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
committed by all the accused. It added that the crafty way in which they made the victims go
with them revealed the lewd intention of the abduction. That the former had intended to have
carnal knowledge of the latter from the very beginning was further held by the lower court. The
rapes were thus complexed with the crime of abduction. However, the RTC held that the
subsequent instances of rape committed were separate and distinct counts thereof. As to the
fourth criminal Complaint, it found appellant guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, since no
carnal knowledge had occurred. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES:

1.

Whether or not the trial court properly charged the accused with complex crime of abduction
with rape, two counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness.
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy. NO
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that there was positive identification of Caraang as
the rapist; NO
Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the existence of other facts and
circumstances which are of weight and substance in favor of the accused-appellant which shows
that there is reasonable doubt; NO
Whether or not the evidence against the accused did not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient for conviction; NO
Whether or not there is double jeopardy. NO
HELD:
1. One Complex Crime Against Each Victim- Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code governs
complex crimes as follows: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. However,
there can be only one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape committed against each
victim. The crime of forcible abduction was necessary only for the first rape. After the complex
crime had already been consummated, the subsequent rape can no longer be considered as a
separate instance thereof. That is, it should be detached from, and considered independently of,
the forcible abduction. Hence, any subsequent rape of the same victim is simply rape and can no
longer be considered as a separate complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Penalty for the
More Serious Crime - As earlier adverted to, the forcible abduction was necessary for the
succeeding rape of each victim. Consequently, for the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, the penalty for the rape -- which is the more serious crime -- shall be imposed in its
maximum period. At the time of the commission of the crime, the applicable penalty for rape
committed by two or more persons was reclusion perpetua to death. Since the rape was
committed by two or more persons -- a fact duly alleged in the Information and proven in court --
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
it should have warranted the imposition of the death penalty. However, appellant committed the
crime of forcible abduction with rape on November 10, 1990 -before the passage of Republic Act
7659 or the Death Penalty Law, which took effect on December 31, 1993. Thus, the trial court
correctly ruled that the penalty that could be imposed was reclusion perpetua. As regards the act
of rape committed against Flores, appellant is likewise sentenced to reclusion perpetua. This
separate act of rape, directly and successively committed against her by his coaccused, was the
only one remaining for which he may be further held liable. All told, three terms of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed upon him. 2.

Proof of Conspiracy - He claims that the RTC erred in finding conspiracy, since the prosecution
had likewise failed to prove that there was prior agreement among the accused.

SC: We disagree. There is no doubt that appellant and his co-accused acted in conspiracy, as
seen through their concerted actions in abducting the victims with lewd design and later on
raping them. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy; which may be inferred from the
acts of the assailants before, during and after the commission of the crime. In a conspiracy, it is
not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually committed all the elements of the crime
charged; what is important is that all of them performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to commit the crime.
Thus, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of them will thereby be deemed equally
guilty of all the crimes committed. It must be shown that each co-accused cooperated in the
commission of the offense -either morally through advice, encouragement or agreement; or
materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the efficacious
perpetration of the crime. In this case, the testimonies of the victims and their witnesses, as well

as all other pieces of evidence presented indubitably established the concerted design of all the
accused to abduct the group forcibly and to rape its female members. The common purpose of
the accused was manifestly shown by the deliberate and methodical manner in which the crimes
were committed. The victims were first tricked into going with appellant. When they arrived at a
secluded place, the women were ordered to line up, while their male companions were told to lie
on their stomachs. According to the victims, more men were already waiting at the place where
the former were brought, a fact that only shows that all the accused indeed knew what was going
to happen. Thereafter the women were brought, one at a time, to the place where the rapes were
to occur. The manner in which the crimes were committed points to no other conclusion than that
all the accused had knowledge of the criminal design. In fact, appellant himself committed the
first act of rape on Flores. Moreover, he was an indispensable participant in the second act
thereof. He was the one who brought her to his companions who took turns in raping her, 76
while he pointed a gun at her. Holding the victim and threatening her with a gun while another
was raping her was more than sufficient to show indubitably a common criminal design. After
appellant had satisfied his own lust and later aided his companion in raping Flores, the evidence
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
indicates that he and his co-accused intended to commit rape again -- which they actually
accomplished -- this time on Salazar. He was also involved in her forcible abduction with rape,
as it was again he who took her away from her group and handed her over to one of his
coaccused. The pattern of the rapes committed and the indispensable role of appellant therein is
clear. Any intimation that he had nothing to do with them would be nothing less than
unbelievable. In view of the presence of conspiracy, all the co-accused bear equal responsibility.
The finding of conspiracy is significant, because it changes the criminal liability of all the
accused and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation in the crime. Their liability becomes collective, with each participant deemed
equally responsible for the acts of the others. To reiterate, conspiracy arises when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It
comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith to pursue it actually. As in this case, conspiracy is proved by concerted acts or
other forms of evidence indicative of actual cooperation -- a common purpose or design, as well
as a concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and to pursue it actually. The two elements
of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are as follows: (1)
taking a woman against her will and (2) doing so with lewd designs. This complex crime occurs
when there is carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under any of the circumstances
mentioned earlier when force or intimidation is used; when the woman is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; and when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. All
told, the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of forcible abduction -- the taking of the
victims against their will with lewd design. As to the first element, although they voluntarily
went with appellant, it was indubitably shown that they did so upon being deceived. According
to their testimonies, he told them that his leader wanted to talk to them, and that no harm would
be done to them. Upon this representation, they went with him. The employment of deception
suffices to constitute forcible abduction. This Court has previously ruled that if the victim’s
consent was obtained through deceit and there was therefore no valid consent, the crime is
forcible abduction, as the deceit may be considered as constructive force. The second element,
lewd design, was established by the actual rapes. Proceeding to the charges, aside from alleging
the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly established that appellant and
his co-accused had conspired, confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal
knowledge of the victims against the latter’s will by means of force and intimidation. 3.

Positive Identification - He alleges that Flores could not have positively identified him as one of
the perpetrators of the crimes, because it was nighttime when the incident occurred. He further
argues that she did not directly testify to having seen him; instead, she merely identified him by
the way he spoke, stood and moved.

SC: We disagree. The testimony of Flores was categorical, convincing and unequivocal.
According to Flores, on the night the incident occurred, the place where they were brought was
brightly illuminated by the moon. Thus, she was able to take a good look at and remember the
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
face of appellant. Visibility is indeed a vital factor in determining whether an eyewitness could
have identified the perpetrator of a crime. It is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of
the malefactor should normally be accepted. In proper situations, illumination produced by a
kerosene or wick lamp, a flashlight, even moonlight or starlight may be considered sufficient to
allow identification of persons. Under such circumstance, any attack on the credibility of
witnesses, based solely on the ground of insufficiency or absence of illumination, becomes
unmeritorious. To be sure, Flores had an unobstructed view of appellant because of their
proximity with each other. Given her familiarity with him, as well as the illumination provided
by the moonlight

on that fateful evening -- reasonably sufficient for the identification of persons -- we doubt if she
could have erred in identifying him. Furthermore, the contention of appellant that Flores did not
directly testify that she had seen him is completely belied by her above-quoted testimony.
Although she did mention that she recognized him by the way he spoke, stood and moved, those
qualities were not her only bases for identifying him; she was also able to see his face during the
incident. Besides, even the witnesses presented by appellant could not exculpate him from
criminal liability. If indeed he had witnesses to prove that he did not leave the house, he should
have presented them, so that they could positively testify that he never left their sight. Instead, he
presented the barangay chair, who admitted that she had been too busy during the dance party to
have kept an eye on him throughout the night; and his sister, whom he did not even mention,
who testified that she had been with him at the time. 4.

A. Discrepancy Between the Sworn and the Court Testimony - He points to alleged
inconsistencies between her court testimony and her sworn affidavit before the police.

SC: Again, we cannot sustain this contention. Appellant’s reliance on the affidavit of Flores in
order to cast doubt on her testimony is futile. The Court has consistently ruled that discrepancies
between the statements in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily
downgrade the latter. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, frequently prepared by
administering officers, and cast in their language and understanding of what affiants have said.
Almost always, the latter would simply sign such documents after being read to them. They are
products sometimes of partial suggestions and at other times of want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the connected
circumstances necessary for accurate recollection. Affidavits are generally subordinate in
importance to open-court declarations, because the former are often executed when the mental
faculties of affiants are not in such state as to afford them a fair opportunity to narrate more
extensively the incidents that have transpired. By its very nature and the manner it is taken, an
affidavit can hardly compare with the weight of a testimony given in open court. Likewise, the
supposed failure of eyewitnesses to include some material facts in their affidavits does not in any
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
way diminish the veracity of their court testimonies. In other words, whenever there is
inconsistency between the two, the latter commands greater weight. We have also repeatedly
held that minor disparities do not detract from the essential credibility of testimonies that are
coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. What is clear is that the responsibility of
appellant for the crime charged was indubitably established by both the sworn statement and the
testimonies.. B. Failure to Immediately File a Complaint with the Police - He cites questionable
circumstances that allegedly create reasonable doubt. He specifically points to the fact that
Flores, instead of immediately filing a complaint with the police, went first to the CAFGU
detachment with her group -- supposedly a sign that she was unsure of the identities of the
culprits. SC: It should be clear that after the crime had been committed against them, they went
home and reported the incident to their parents, then sought medical doctors for physical
examination. Going to the CAFGU detachment was but a logical response of Flores and her
group to the incident that happened. They wanted the culprits to be arrested; because the latter
were members of the local CAFGU, naturally, the former proceeded to that office. Certainly,
there was no delay in the filing of a complaint with the police. When Flores went to the CAFGU
detachment, she was able to identify him positively. To be sure, his assertion that the victims had
to go to the CAFGU detachment because they were unsure of the identities of the culprits was
not only unfounded, but also speculative. 5.

Physical Evidence - He faults the prosecution for failing to present any bloodied panty, pants or
dress belonging to the victim. Such failure was supposedly fatal for its part, because it did not
present any other physical evidence to prove the rape. Though he concedes that these objects are
not essential in proving rape, he invokes our ruling in People v. Godoy, which is supposedly
applicable to the present controversy. In that case, the deliberate non-presentation of the
bloodstained skirt was ruled to have weakened the cause of the prosecution.

SC: Again, this argument fails to convince us. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was
inherently weak, and no other physical evidence was presented by the prosecution to bolster the
charge of rape, except for the medical report which had even negated one of the essential
elements of the crime. Hence, the deliberate non-presentation of the complainant’s bloodstained
skirt was held to "vigorously militate against the prosecution’s cause. In the case before us, the
convincing and unwavering testimonies of not only one victim, but two victims -- taken together
with the similarly credible corroborative testimonies of other witnesses -- leave no room to doubt
appellant’s guilt. Moreover, unlike in Godoy, the medical findings presented in the present case
are sufficient to sustain the charge of rape. The testimony of Dr. Valencia, coupled with the
corresponding Medical Reports, clearly establishes the rape. Thus, the non-presentation of
Flores’ bloodied underwear, skirt and pants is not indispensable to proving the rape.

Neither was it important for the prosecution to prove that appellant was afflicted with a sexually
transmissible disease that he had passed on to Flores. In the crime of rape, all that has to be
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
proven is carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1) when
force, threat or intimidation is used; 2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; 3) when fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority is employed;
or 4) when the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present. At most, in rape, the transmission of a sexually
transmissible disease to the victim is not an element of the crime, but an aggravating/qualifying
circumstance that has to be proven to sustain conviction. When the victim cannot testify on the
actual commission of the rape because she had been rendered unconscious before the act was
committed, the conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence is
admissible, provided that more than one circumstance is duly proven, and that the totality or the
unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical conclusion than that of the
guilt of the accused. Other than this bare, passing statement, absolutely no other evidence was
presented to prove the charge of acts of lasciviousness. Salazar did not even testify on the
surrounding circumstances of this incident. Given the utter lack of evidence, we have no other
option but to dismiss that charge. 6.

No Double Jeopardy

Hence, appellant is guilty of two complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape -- one against
Flores and the other against Salazar. Since there were two victims, the trial court erred in
convicting him of only one count of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. There
can be no violation of the constitutional right of appellant against double jeopardy, because the
decisive issue here is whether he was convicted of a crime charged in the Information. A reading
of the four separate Informations shows that in each one, he was indeed charged with forcible
abduction with rape. Having been sufficiently informed of the accusations against him, he can
thus be convicted of two counts of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as we have
done here based on the evidence presented. Moreover, it is settled that when the accused appeals
from the sentence of the trial court, they waive their right to the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throw the whole case open to review by the appellate court. The latter court
is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate -- whether favorable or
unfavorable to them, and whether the issues it resolves have been assigned as errors or not. Such
an appeal confers upon it full jurisdiction over the case and renders it competent to examine the
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of
the penal law.
48. People v. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002
49. People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012
FACTS: AAA was walking along Dapitan Street in Makati City to fetch her employer’s son
from school when she was suddenly grabbed by Sabadlad, the man who persistently greeted
every time she bought pandesal at a store near her employer’s house. Sabadlad ordered her to go
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
with him with a gun poked at her throat. Two other men joined Sabadlab at that point. They
forced her into the backseat of a parked car where she was blindfolded and after twenty minutes
of travel. Still blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab removed her clothes with
her hands tied behind her back and Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards.
Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his
name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still
tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping
her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with
crumpled newspapers. After the three ravished her again and again, she was taken back to where
she was picked up and sternly warned that they would surely kill her if she told anyone about the
rapes. The noticeable kiss marks on her mark led her to admitting to her employer that she was
raped. She was then brought to the police station and crime laboratory where the findings yielded
condition compatible with recent loss of virginity. Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to
the vicinity where she had usually bought pandesal and there Sabadlad was arrested. RTC
convicted Sabadlab for forcible abduction with rape and CA sustained his conviction. Sabadlab
indicates in his supplemental brief9 that AAA’s version was ambiguous and implausible, and
conflicted with human experience as borne by the following, namely: (a) the State did not
present any torn apparel; (b) no bodily injuries were shown to prove that AAA had resisted the
sexual intercourse; (c) AAA did not cry for help; and (d) AAA did not escape despite several
opportunities to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent testimony of the
witness RULING: The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For
one, the matter of who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling,
because her confusion did not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered
naked. Nor did the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it
being without dispute that the tearing of the victim’s apparel was not necessary in the
commission of the crime charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn
when Sabadlab had forcibly undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not detract from
the commission of the crime did not diminish her credibility. We hardly need to remind that the
task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing their credibility is best
left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives while the witnesses testify
before him. The demeanor on the witness chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial
proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the line between
fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their quivering voices or angry tones,
their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest blushes or guilty blanches - all these can
reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or lying in their teeth. As the final appellate reviewer
in this case, then, we bow to the age-old norm to accord the utmost respect to the findings and
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge on account of his
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his personal access to the
various indicia available but not reflected in the record.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
50. People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971
Facts:

On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias “Boy”,
Eduardo Aquino Alias “Eddie” and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio
Guanzon and Jessie Guion as accomplices, conspired together, confederated with and mutually
helped one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to
forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by
profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and
intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will,
and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape.

Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on the ground that
the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against them, the Motion to Dismiss
filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against them.

(Facts of this case are too descriptive. I’d rather not include much details on the scene of the
crime to protect the complainant’s repute).

Issue:

(a) What kind of rape was committed?

Held:

Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion perpetua to death, under
paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964.
Under the law, rape is committed by having canal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) by using force and intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason and otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be
present. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is
committed the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art 48 of the
RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the
appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity
to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature
of the penalty to be imposed.

However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime,
appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these
crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in
conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complaint to
exhibit to them her complete nakedness for ten minutes before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) the use of
motor vehicle.

Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Cañal), none of them may claim aggravating
circumstances has been offset by the mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should,
however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which
does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that
there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining.

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo
for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to
deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance
with the judgment of the First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

Before the actual promulgation of the decision, the Court received a formal manifestation on the
part of the Solicitor general to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in
prison on December 28, 1970. As a result, the case is dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar
as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de officio.

Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Eduardo P. Aquino are pronounced GUILTY of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, and each and every one of them likewise convicted of three (3) of the
crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death
penalties; all of them shall jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth of
the costs.
51. People vs. Velasquez, G.R. No. 137383-84, November 23, 2000
FACTS: On January 1, 1997, around 6:00 in the morning, while walking home, a girl, 15 years
old, was approached by accused who asked where she was going. Accused then poked a gun to
the side of the girl and held her arms. Accused and the girl rode a taxi which brought them to the
house of the former’s grandmother. There, accused ravished the girl as he held her at gunpoint.
As the accused sexually assaulted the helpless girl a second time, the girl pulled out a
screwdriver she hid in her pocket and stabbed accused on the neck. The accused retaliated by
boxing her. It was later discovered that the weapon used by accused was merely a short toy pellet
gun. While inside the room of accused’s grandmother, the girl found the opportunity to escape
and run towards a neighbor’s house where she reported to a man what accused did to her who
then called the barangay tanods. Accused was apprehended after his voluntary surrender. The
RTC rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erroneously convicted accused of two counts of
simple rape only. HELD: Yes, the trial court erroneously convicted accused of two counts of
simple rape only. RATIO: In sentencing accused, the trial court overlooked the fact that he was
charged with simple rape in Crim. Case No. 97-0035 and forcible abduction with rape in Crim.
Case No. 97-0036 and erroneously convicted accused of two counts of simple rape only.
Considering that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Velasquez
forcibly abducted the minor and raped her twice, he should be convicted of the complex crime of
rape and simple rape. The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime
which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the most serious crime of the two crimes
and is punishable with reclusion perpetua under Art. 335 of the RPC and since it is a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be imposed as is. The subsequent rape committed by Velasquez can
no longer be considered as a separate complex crime of forcible abduction with rape but only as
a separate act of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
52. People vs. Bohos, G.R. No. L-40995 June 25, 1980
53. Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension,
with or without warrant or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court
Appeal by Valdepenas from a decision of CA, affirming that of the CFI Cagayan, convicting him
of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty and to
indemnify Ester Ulsano.
Ester Ulsano, 17yrs old, assisted by her mother filed forcible abduction with rape against
Valdepenas. CFI found him guilty as charged. CA modified to abduction with consent.
Valdepenas filed an MR & MNT on the finding of minority at time of occurrence which was
granted but on retrial the prior CA ruling was affirmed. 2nd MR based on lack of jurisdiction of
CFI was denied so he filed petition for certiorari.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed and the lower
court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent and
had, therefore, no authority to convict him.
Issue: WON CA erred in not reversing CFI for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
and the subject matter of the action for the offense of abduction with consent? NO!
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or
without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, it is not
claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice as early as January 25, 1956, first,
before the then justice of the peace court of Piat, then before the CFI of Cagayan, later before the
CA, thereafter back to CFI, and then, again, before the CA, never, within the period of six (6)
years had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts over his person. He
is deemed waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and,
hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. His behaviour and every single one
of the steps taken by him before said courts — particularly the motions therein filed by him —
implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority thereof over his person.
Abduction with consent - jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular
court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense.
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the
complaint and going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this
case, before several courts, for the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for
forcible abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is included
in the former.
This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus
leading to the presumption that she is a virgin. She was taken by force from their dwelling when
her mother was away and brought to a secluded area and raped.
CA and CFI affirmed. Cost against Valdepenas.
54. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838 November 29, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of the crime of consented abduction. He was later
acquitted on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruling that he committed seduction and not abduction.
Subsequently, private complainant filed another criminal complaint against him for qualified
seduction.

ISSUE(S):
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Whether or not the filing of a subsequent information arising from the same facts would place
petitioner in double jeopardy.

HELD:
NO. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as
to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other
R.A. No. 9262
55. Araza vs. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020;
Facts:
Complainant testified that she and Accused were married on October 5, 1989 at Malate Catholic
Church. She had no marital issues with Accused until he went to Zamboanga City for their
networking business. Accused was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino Worker but
decided to stop in 1993 to join complainant in her business.

One day, she received a text message informing her that her accused-husband is having an affair
with their best friend. At first, she did not believe them. However, that information brought
complainant to Zamboanga to see for her herself whether it was true. Indeed she was able to
confirm that her husband was living with another woman.

She instituted a complaint against the accused and his alleged mistress for Concubinage at the
Philippine National Police. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed
an Agreement whereby accused and mistress committed themselves never to see each other
again.

After the case was settled accused lived with complainant. However, it was only for a short time.
Without saying a word, accused left complainant. She was looking for the accused and out of
desperation, she sought the help of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, the accused had
returned to live with his mistress again.

The complainant went emotionally depressed and anxious She was suffering from insomnia and
asthma. Allegedly, she is still hurting and crying. She is took anti-depressant and sleeping pills to
cope with her severe emotional and psychological turmoil brought about by the accused marital
infidelity and having children with his mistress.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

A case was filed against the accused for Violence Against Women and their Children on
Psychological Violence caused by his infidelity. RTC found accused guilty of the said offense.
Accused appeal the case to the CA to which it affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA
by committing marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental
suffering.

Held:
Yes, Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due
to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional
anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering,
jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party.

In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts, is necessary.

The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he
committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s
testimony was strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another
woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of
AAA’s emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.
56. XXX vs. People, G.R. No. 243049, October 05, 2020
57. Melgar vs. People, G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018
Facts:
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA
9262... the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate
intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,[6]] and her minor
son, [BBB] (12 years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA
entered into a compromise agreement[8] on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval
of the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June 24, 2011, the
prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal action, on
the ground that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the
support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence.

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which
resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of
BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs
showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour as the latter
had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped
giving support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This
notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of
P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family.

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment[13] dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB,
when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed to answer
for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[19] dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction.

Issues:

whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA
9262.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship,
resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had
failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not
supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which was
supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of
support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB
any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section
5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the variance doctrine
which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but
necessarily included in the crime charged[33] - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even
without the additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized
therein.
58. Dinamling v. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015
Facts:
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Ricky Dinamling, a policeman, was in a 5-year relationship with AAA. They had 2 common
children, aged 4 and 2. One night, he went to AAA’s boarding house with a friend after a
drinking session. As AAA was putting the children to bed, he started to evict her for the reason
that she was using the place as a “whore house” wherein she “brought her partners.” She did not
want to leave but he threw a baby’s feeding bottle outside. She went to BBB’s house and
requested to fetch her children. However, Dinamling already left the boarding house with the
older child and only the baby was left.
In the past, he would hit AAA’s head, pull her hair, and kick her When AAA went to the police,
she was merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over.

6 days after the incident, AAA was at CCC’s house when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and
counted down for AAA to come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear,
which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she already
had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was “good-for-nothing.” AAA
left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she
fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at
her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted
her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle. AAA stayed at her friend's
home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and
about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she
was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days.
Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.

Dinamling was charged with (2) criminal Informations in the RTC for violation of Section 5(i),
in relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262.

His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the town’s police station at the
time that the offenses were committed.

RTC found Dinamling gulty of both charges. CA affirmed but modified the penalty by applying
ISLaw.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi as well as in
discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Held:
No.

On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's
evidence. In particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the
charges was clear, categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence.

AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third child with
Dinamling. She also testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the sound of
his motorcycle as that signalled that she or her children would be abused. She previously filed
with the police a complaint for physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later, she learned from
Dinamling that he had been discharged as a policeman.

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was “like a
corpse” because of Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her
daughter, including the times that she saw her with “bluish spots” and when AAA had a
miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking that she had received from Dinamling. She knew
that Dinamling was a married man when he had his relationship with AAA and she knew for a
fact that Dinamling did not live with AAA and the children because he always went home to his
own wife.

As for the first case filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been proven and duly
established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year
ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two
common children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal
abuse.

As for the second case, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to the first two
elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender, the prosecution
was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public ridicule or
humiliation. AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put
fear in her.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as
such experiences are personal to this party. All of this was complied with in the case at bar.

In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense
of denial and alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at
XXX Police Station. He denied seeing AAA on those dates. However, on cross examination, he
admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station to AAA's boarding
house.

Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as
inherently weak and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail
over the positive declarations of the victim.

Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from the mauling,
including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is charged. Such
injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him. Therefore, the testimony of
Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not indispensable
to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of
the crime that petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking,
unnecessary.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done
by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section
5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by
the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such
acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of
causing mental or emotional suffering. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly
punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of
physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven
that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress.

For his crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances
which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent
evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.

59. AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
FACTS:

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced 2
children. In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired
permanent resident status in September 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to
be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were
married until March 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents’ house in
Pasig City.

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support,
and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs
to augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse,
BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with
whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when
AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their
kids. As can be gathered from earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of
abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA
mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.

A warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to evade arrest.
Consequently, the case was archived. However, on November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance
as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold
Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. The motion to quash was
granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction (acts complained of had occurred in Singapore).

AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied so she sought direct recourse to the Supreme
Court via petition for review under Rule 45 on pure question of law. In the main, AAA argues
that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB,
which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-
marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of
the case. In support of her theory, AAA specifically cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and
Section 4 on liberal construction of the law to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.

In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that
only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party, and that
the petition should be dismissed for having been brought before the Court by AAA instead of the
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB
also asserts that the petition is belatedly filed.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE PETITION FILED BY AAA
INSTEAD OF THE OSG AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE ON PURE QUESTION
OF LAW
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE
UNDER R.A. 9262 WHEN COMMITTED THROUGH MARITAL INFIDELITY AND THE
ALLEGED LILLICIT RELATIONSHIP TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES

RULING:

PETITION ENTERTAINED DESPITE BEING FILED BY PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN

THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

AAA’s motion for extension to file the petition was timely filed. Thus, considering its timeliness,
she was granted an additional period to file a petition for review. In her motion for extension of
time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG’s response to her Letter, requesting for
representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for assistance in filing the intended
petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own name before the lapse of the extension given
her by this Court.

The Court found that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served
by entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In
Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et al., where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which
raised only a question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG’s
participation, the Court allowed it in the interest of substantial justice.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Dismissal vs. Acquittal

Morillo, also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide
the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding,
either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show
that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word
dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after
the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the
court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the
case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an
acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court
of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.

The grant of BBB’s motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in
limited instances may only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing
grave abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.

Indubitably, “the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved.” “There is a question of law when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the
truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of
the law and jurisprudence on the matter.”

The question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of
R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law.

In Morillo, the Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments
of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at
the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involved a proper interpretation of the rules and
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it
deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.

“We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB,
much less weigh the evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial
on the merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence
on a given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial
jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed
through marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.

PHILIPPINE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE

UNDER R.A. NO. 9262 BECAUSE WHAT THE LAW PUNISHES IS THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, NOT THE MARITAL INFIDELITY PER SE

There is merit in the petition.

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or Information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262
is crucial. In Dinamling v. People, this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of
psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a
common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;
The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as
such experiences are personal to this party.

R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the
wife, NOT marital infidelity per se. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the
circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of
the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on
the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not
even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional
suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People, the Court explained that the
place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Section 7, R.A. 9262 “Venue” pertains to jurisdiction.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime
or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological
violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the
offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to
the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable
element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as
show in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the
institution of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit
and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be
transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
that a person charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense
is in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in
another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.

Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur
in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein the
any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try
the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (c) was
committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is
committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely
beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
60. Go-Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008
Facts:

Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married... two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen Denis... barely six years into the marriage,
petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6]
against Steven and her parents-in-law,... Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents)
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses
upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as... the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."

RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss... contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their
persons since, as... parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

petitioner... arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal
interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of... violence.

RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents... alterius... expressio unius
est exclusio alterius."[13]

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-

LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF

2004"

Ruling:

Resolution[1
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC... the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the
RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section
47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which
by their... nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law[24] and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the
intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best... ensure the attainment of the object
of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children.

the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here

Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the
Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary
parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.

instant petition is GRANTED

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536... and the RTC Resolution[2] dated July 11, 2005
which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen
Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005,... barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6] against Steven and her
parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged... that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as... the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9] granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,[10] contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as... parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents' Motion to

Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation
thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of... violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law

"expressio unius est exclusio alterius."[13]

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration[14] contending that
the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial
justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged... victim
was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the
coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-

LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF

2004".[17]

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of
the
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community
of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing
and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her... verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or
necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section
3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a
former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the... conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for
review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since
their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal,... considering the non-
inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with...
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,... assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should... specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as
the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did... not contain any provision
that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the

"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to
define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In Yu v. People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment

under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
"Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an... express provision on subsidiary
imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision
therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their...
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes...
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[23]
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another,
thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:... x x x

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against
her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include... individuals other than the offending
husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. - x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or

through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety
of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law[24] and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the
intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best... ensure the attainment of the object
of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius"
finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of
statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it... conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter... which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be
determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.[26] It is thus premature
for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is... centered only on the
determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005
and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the... dismissal of the
petition against respondents is concerned.

Principles:
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with...
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,... assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
61. Ang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
Facts: Rustan Ang and Irish Sagud were on-and- off sweethearts, when the latter learned
afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he gotten pregnant, Irish
broke up with him. Prior to the marriage of Rustan, he got in touch with Irish and tried to
convince her to elope with him. Irish rejected the proposal and changed her cellphone number
but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages, using the following
numbers: 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask
him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia
message (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed
on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of
the numbers Rustan used. Rustan boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures and threatened to spread the picture through the internet. One of the
messages he sent to Irish was: “Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring
send sa lahat ng chatter.” Irish sought the help of Vice Mayor Maria Aurora who referred her to
the police. Under the police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he
used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan if he could meet her at
Lorentess Resort. Rustan came with a motorcycle and was arrested by the police upon walking
towards Irish. The police searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several
SIM cards. Irish filed a case in violation of Sec 5 (h) of Republic Act 9262. The RTC found
Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. Thus the
RTC found Rustan guilty of the said crime. Rustan appealed but denied, then raised the case to
the higher court. Issues: Whether or not the accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the
picture pasted with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262. The
subordinate issues are: 1) Whether or not a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined in RA 9262 2) Whether or not a single act of harassment, like
sending the nude picture in this case, constitutes a violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262 3) Whether
or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and 4) Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case

Held: 1) Yes. Dating relationship as defined in Section 3 “refers to a situation wherein the parties
live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or
ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. 2) Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes
violence against women.This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing
only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. 3) No. Prosecution did
 TITLE XI –CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from
him at the time of the arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C
for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was
used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during pre-trial conference. Moreover, Rustan
admitted having sent the malicious text message to Irish. 4) The objection is too late since he
should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in
evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the
rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

The court AFFIRMED the decision of RTC