Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil.

252 Facts: Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home

Gandionco vs Penaranda Case Digest

Gandionco vs. Pearanda G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987 Facts: Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge Pearanda ordered the payment of support pendente lite. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.

Issue: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage. Ruling: Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-3047. May 16, 1951.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees. First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles, for appellant. Francisco M. Ramos and Moises Sevilla Ocampo, for appellee Dalmacio Bondoc. Hernandez & Laquian, for appellee Guadalupe Zapata. SYLLABUS 1. ADULTERY EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A CRIME. Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Courts of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). 2. ID.; ID.; LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS ACTS. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person the offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community presented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remains unchanged, the nexus undissolved, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED; REASON. A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, otherwise the adultery by the made defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. 4. ID.; ADULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE OF UNITY OF CRIMINAL INTENT OR PURPOSE. The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of appeal provision infringed upon violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united ion one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In adultery, the last unity does not exist, because the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. 5. ID.; PARDON BY HUSBAND. Even if the husband pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent, adulterous acts (Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard, 2nd ed., Vol. 5, pp. 57-58). DECISION PADILLA, J p: In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the order sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed. The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and "that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that 'No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.'" Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Caln, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person the offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Caln, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provisional release during the pendency of the case in which they were later on convicted, had

sexual intercourse up to the time when they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them (S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210). Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts (Viada [5th ed.] Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard [2nd ed.] Vol. 5, pp. 57-58). The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and the trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the appellees. Feria, Pablo, Tuason, and Jugo, JJ., concur. Pars, C. J., Bengzon, and Montemayor, JJ., concur in the result. Paras, C.J., Mr. Justice Reyes voted for the reversal.