1) Spouses Young purchased a cargo truck but failed to pay installments, so IFC filed a complaint. Young failed to respond on time and was declared in default.
2) The case was transferred between courts due to leaves of absence and reorganizations. At a hearing in 1985, IFC failed to appear and the case was dismissed.
3) IFC filed a motion a year later to set aside the dismissal, but the Supreme Court ruled the dismissal order had become final. Once a party is declared in default or non-suited, the rules do not allow a second pre-trial hearing.
1) Spouses Young purchased a cargo truck but failed to pay installments, so IFC filed a complaint. Young failed to respond on time and was declared in default.
2) The case was transferred between courts due to leaves of absence and reorganizations. At a hearing in 1985, IFC failed to appear and the case was dismissed.
3) IFC filed a motion a year later to set aside the dismissal, but the Supreme Court ruled the dismissal order had become final. Once a party is declared in default or non-suited, the rules do not allow a second pre-trial hearing.
1) Spouses Young purchased a cargo truck but failed to pay installments, so IFC filed a complaint. Young failed to respond on time and was declared in default.
2) The case was transferred between courts due to leaves of absence and reorganizations. At a hearing in 1985, IFC failed to appear and the case was dismissed.
3) IFC filed a motion a year later to set aside the dismissal, but the Supreme Court ruled the dismissal order had become final. Once a party is declared in default or non-suited, the rules do not allow a second pre-trial hearing.
1) Spouses Young purchased a cargo truck but failed to pay installments, so IFC filed a complaint. Young failed to respond on time and was declared in default.
2) The case was transferred between courts due to leaves of absence and reorganizations. At a hearing in 1985, IFC failed to appear and the case was dismissed.
3) IFC filed a motion a year later to set aside the dismissal, but the Supreme Court ruled the dismissal order had become final. Once a party is declared in default or non-suited, the rules do not allow a second pre-trial hearing.
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Petitioner: NELSON L.
YOUNG and VIOLETA YOUNG
Respondents: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION (IFC) Facts: >Spouses Young purchases cargo truck on installment basis from Baroq Motor Sales because of which they executed a promissory note. The deed of sale with chattel mortgage and the promissory note was later on assigned to IFC. Spouses Young failed to pay, IFC filed a complaint for sum of money with RTC Rizal. >Spouses Young failed to file their Answer within the reglementary period, they were declared in default. IFC allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Young filed its Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Admit Third-Party Complaint against Worldwide Insurance Co.,Inc. (WICI) which the trial court granted. >The trial court set the case for pre-trial conference. Young and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference (March 29, 1982). They were declared in default allowing IFC to present evidence ex-parte and rested its case. >Young filed a motion to reconsider the order declaring them in default and dismissing third-party complaint praying that the order be lifted and that the case be set for pre-trial conference. The court granted the motion. >RTC Pasig set the case for hearing but the hearing was re-set a couple of times due the leave of absence of the judge and reorganization of the judiciary. The case was subsequently transferred to RTC Makati. RTC Makati issued a Notice of Hearing/Pre-Trial Conference setting the hearing of the case on June 24, 1983; however, WICI failed to appear, it reset again the hearing. >IFC and its counsel and WICI failed to appear despite due notice. The complaint was dismissed (September 2, 1983). >IFC filed a motion for reconsideration and manifestation and motion praying its order dismissing the complaint be reconsidered and set aside, the case be submitted for decision based on the evidence presented by the IFC and that petitioners right to present their evidence be considered to have been waived (September 27, 1984). Petitioners on the other hand assert that they were not furnished with copies of the manifestation and motion and of the order of the court. >Again, IFC filed a manifestation and motion reiterating its prayer that the case be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence it had presented (February 14, 1985). Reacting, petitioners again claim that neither they nor their counsel received a copy thereof. > Makati court issued an Order (February 25, 1985) directing the court stenographer who took down the stenographic notes of the proceedings in the case before the Pasig court to submit the transcripts thereof within ten (10) days from notice, after which the instant case will be deemed submitted for decision. >RTC Makati ruled in favor of IFC (May 3, 1985). CA dismissed IFCs complaint. Issue: Whether or not the Makati courts order of 2 September 1983 dismissing IFCs complaint for failure to appear on said date had long become final such that it was error for the former to issue its order of 25 February 1985 granting IFCs 27 September 1984 motion (to set aside said order of 2 September 1983 and to decide the case on the basis of the evidence it earlier presented exparte pursuant to the default order of 29 March 1982).
Ruling: RTC Makatis Order of September 2, 1983 had long become final and it correctly dismissed the complaint. IFC accepted the notice of pre-trial for 24 June 1983 and agreed to its re-setting, it is now estopped from claiming that the Makati court should not have set the case for pre-trial since one had already been had on 29 March 1982. RTC Makati did not provide in its order of 2 September 1983 that the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. Hence, it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. It was received by IFC on 20 September 1983. IFC knew that it was an order issued in connection
with the 2 September 1983 pre-trial conference or hearing on the merits if it forgot the agreement it entered into with the adverse party on 24 June 1983. Its counsel knew, or was supposed to know, that it had only fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof within which to either move for its reconsideration or appeal therefrom. Yet, it did nothing until 27 September 1984, when it filed a manifestation and motion to set aside the order and decide the case on the basis of the evidence it had presented on 30 March 1982. SC ruled that IFC slept on its rights. It did nothingabsolutely nothingfor more than a year after receipt of the dismissal order of 2 September 1983. It slept too long on whatever right it had. Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not to those who sleep on their rights. The parties in this case had voluntarily agreed that the case be set anew for pre-trial. And the Makati court, by its order, yielded, in effect, to the agreement of the parties. No one can question the soundness and wisdom of the doctrine that the pretrial stage is completed after a party had been ordered non-suited or declared as in default, as the case may be, and that an order lifting it does not revert the action to its pre-trial stage, or authorize, much less, a second pre-trial. However, neither the Rules nor the doctrine bars the parties from agreeing, after such lifting, to hold a pre-trial and to effectively accomplish its objectives which could not have been done at the first pre-trial because of the absence of the plaintiff, resulting in his non-suit, or the absence of the defendant, resulting in his being declared as in default. SC ruled also that if IFCs counsel neglected his duties, appropriate action under the Code of Professional Responsibility may be taken against him. --------------*Applicable provisions of Rules of Court Rule 18 Section 4. Appearance of parties. It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The nonappearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. (n) Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (2a, R20) -----------Other doctrines: > there is nothing in the Rules that empowers or authorizes the court to call a second pre-trial hearing after it has called a first pre-trial duly attended by the parties, and lacking such authority, the court perforce lacks authority to declare a failure to prosecute on the part of the plaintiff for failing to attend such second pre-trial; it also lacks the authority to declare the defendant as in default by reason of the latters failure to be present at the said second pre-trial. >Both client and counsel must appear at the pre-trial. This is mandatory. Failure of the client to appear is a ground for dismissal. >Lifting of the order of default did not revert the action to the pre-trial stage or authorize much less render mandatory a second pre-trial
