VOL.

212, AUGUST 12, 1992 547

People vs. Damaso

*
G.R. No. 93516. August 12, 1992.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. BASILIO DAMASO @ Bernardo/BERNIE MENDOZA @
KA DADO, accused-appellant.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence; Whether objected

to or not cannot be given credence.—It is true that the lack of
objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as
evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking that since
these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have
probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not,
cannot be given credence.
Same; Same; Same; To give probative value to hearsay
statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone would be
to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.—
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as
witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as the lessee and
owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have
exercised his constitutional right to confront the witnesses and to
cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records
do not show any other evidence which could have identified the
appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the
subversive items. To give probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone would be
to render his constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the
Constitution.—The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2).
The purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private security
in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of
the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted.
Same; Same; Right not absolute; Instances when a
warrantless search and seizure becomes valid.—However, such
right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless
search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to
an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Damaso

Same; Same; The constitutional immunity from unreasonable

searches and seizures being a personal one cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.—The
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except
the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65
Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it
(TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We find no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant’s
helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant
had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The
prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an
authority. Without this evidence, the authorities’ intrusion into
the appellant’s dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
Same; Same; While the power to search and seize is necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens.—
While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v.
Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search
conducted by the authorities was illegal.
Criminal Law; Illegal possession of firearms; Evidence; In
crimes of illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the
burden to prove the existence of the firearm and that the accused
who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the
corresponding license for it.—In crimes of illegal possession of
firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove
the existence of the firearm and that the accused who possessed
or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for
it. Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun
described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the
substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been
committed) has not been fully established.
Same; Same; Subversion; Court takes exception to the
argument that the crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of or incident to or in
connection with the crime

549

VOL. 212, AUGUST 12, 1992 549

People vs. Damaso

of subversion.—But even as We find for the accused-appellant,

We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense that the
crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of
firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with the
crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is
facing a separate charge of subversion. The defense submits that
the trial court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in
view of the subversion charge.
Same; Same; Same; Subversion distinguished from Rebellion.
—‘Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more
commonly called, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion.
The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking
up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified
in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-
Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or
membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In
rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking of arms
against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the
taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization
against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the
penalty to be imposed upon the offender. (Italics supplied)

APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Dagupan City, Br. 44.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

      The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally

charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of subversion, together with
Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y
Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric,
Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y
Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz
(Records, p. 3). Such information was later amended to
exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the
accused-appellant from the criminal charge. The amended
information reads:
550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Damaso

“That on or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of

Dagupan, Philippines, and within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio
DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ KA DADO, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935
with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled case
for Violation of Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive
Order No. 276.
“Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866.” (Records, p.
20)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not

guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered
its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-
appellant interposed his objections to the admissibility of
the prosecution’s evidence on grounds of its being hearsay,
immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search
warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he
was not presenting any evidence for the accused (TSN,
December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial
court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias

Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number
1866, and considering that the Violation is in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree
Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
“The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live
ammunition and all the articles and/or items seized on June 19,
1988 in connection with this case and marked and submitted in
court as evidence are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine
Constabulary Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 31)

Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment

of
551

VOL. 212, AUGUST 12, 1992 551

People vs. Damaso

errors:

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING

ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR
INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE
WOEFULLY INADEQUATE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBVERSION WAS NOT
PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS DOCUMENTS
AND ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER
THEY WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH
FINALITY BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE
 SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE
THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BECAUSE THE SEPARATE
CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM
ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN
FURTHERANCE OR OF INCIDENT TO, OR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF
SUBVERSION.” (pp. 55-66, Rollo)

The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General

in his Brief, as follows:

“On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine

Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at
Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify
the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang,
Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina
Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse
at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating
with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to
the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a
radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn,
October 23, 1989).
“After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City,
and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested.
They

552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Damaso

interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie

Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza,
herein appellant. She guided the group to the house rented by
appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it
had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was
hesitant to give the new address of Bernie Mendoza, the group
looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him
to point out the new house rented by appellant. The group again
required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house,
the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they
already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At
first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the
group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group,
as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets
entitled ‘Ang Bayan,’ xerox copiers and a computer machine. They
also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric
Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the
persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for
subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines,
Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They
confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters
for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in
the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons
revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the
items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10,
31, tsn, October 31, 1989).” (p. 5, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91,
Rollo)

While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies

in their drive against lawless elements in our society, We
must, however, stress that the latter’s efforts to this end
must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case
at bar, not only did We find that there are serious flaws in
the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence
against the accused-appellant but also that the evidence as
presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant
was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and
credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is
allegedly the same person as the
553

VOL. 212, AUGUST 12, 1992 553

People vs. Damaso

lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other

subversive items were found or the owner of the said items.
The prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to
this fact, thus:

“Lieutenant Candito Quijardo

Fiscal“
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one
renting the house?
“A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz
(Tanciangco) who mentioned the name Bernie
Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at
the same time claiming that it was Bernie Mendoza
who owns the said items.” (TSN of October 31, 1989, p.
40)
“x x x.
“Q I am showing you another picture which we request to
be marked as Exhibit ‘K-2,’ tell us if it has any
connection to the house?
“A The same house, sir.
“Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly
occupied the house at Bonuan Gueset, by the name of
Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer,
did you find out the identity?
“A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of
Bernie de Guzman.
“Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person
who could tell the true identity of Bernie Mendoza?
“A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
“Q Can you name these officers?
“A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt.
Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-55)
“M/Sgt. Artemio Gomez
“Q That underground house, do you know who was the
principal occupant of that house?
“x x x.
“A During our conversation with the occupants, they
revealed that a certain Ka Bernie is the one occupying
the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
“x x x. (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)

Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because

the witnesses testified on matters not on their own
personal knowledge. The Solicitor General, however,
argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the
same are admissible because of
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Damaso

the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.

It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay
testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But,
one should not be misled into thinking that since these
testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have
probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, cannot be given credence. In People v. Valero, We
emphatically declared that:

“The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of

incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that
violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the
striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence
admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not has no probative value.” (L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112
SCRA 675, italics supplied)

It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as

witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as the lessee
and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant
could have exercised his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness.
Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which
could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the
house and the owner of the subversive items. To give
probative value to these hearsay statements and convict
the appellant on this basis alone would be to render his
constitutional rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him
still will not prosper, the reason being that the law
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid
search and seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of
the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted (see Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute. There
are instances when a warrant-
555
 VOL. 212, AUGUST 12, 1992 555
People vs. Damaso

less search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search

incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view (Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267,
276). None of these exceptions is present in this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that
the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant’s house
upon invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda
Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier
machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
radio set and more subversive items; that technically
speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily
shown the articles used in subversion; that besides, a
search may be validly conducted without a search warrant
with the consent of the person searched as in this case,
appellant’s helper and Luz Tanciangco allowed them to
enter and to look around the appellant’s house; and that
since the evidence seized was in plain view of the
authorities, the same may be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose
rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do
so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689,
695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant
was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to
enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We find no evidence
that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed
the appellant’s helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open
his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to
show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without
this evidence, the authorities’ intrusion into the appellant’s
dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the
power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235).
As a consequence, the search conducted by the

556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Damaso

authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the

situation here demanded urgency which could have
prompted the authorities to dispense with a search
warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that
they came to the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh.
J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go
inside his house. In Alih v. Castro, We ruled that:

“The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid

because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the
petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could
have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should
disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner’s
premises with all the menace of a military invasion.” (G.R. No.
69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279, 286)

Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case

against the accused-appellant is in the identification of the
gun which he was charged to have illegally possessed. In
the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was
described as an M-14 rifle with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the
gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number
thus:

“FISCAL:
Q Will you kindly restate again the items that you found
inside the house?
Lt. Quijardo:
A When she opened the doors of the rooms that we
requested for, we immediately saw different kinds of
books of which we believed to be used for subversive
orientation and the M-14 rifle.
Q In what portion of the house did you find this M-14 rifle
which you mentioned?
A In the same room of which the subversive documents
were placed.
Q If this firearm would be shown to you would you be able
to identify the same?
A Yes, sir.
 557

VOL. 212, AUGUST 12, 1992 557

People vs. Damaso

Q I am showing to you a rifle bearing a serial number

1249985 which for purposes of identification, may we
request your Honor, that this rifle be marked as Exhibit
‘D.’
“COURT:
  Mark it.
“FISCAL:
Q Kindly examine the said firearm and tell the Honorable
Court the relation of that firearm to the firearm which
according to you you found inside the room allegedly
occupied by one Bernie Mendoza?
A This is the same rifle which was discovered during our
raid in the same house.” (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 36-
38, italics supplied).

The Solicitor General contends that the discrepancy is

merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the
substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it could
spell the difference between freedom and incarceration of
the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case,
the prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of the
firearm and that the accused who possessed or owned the
firearm does not have the corresponding license for it.
Since the gun as identified at the trial differs from the gun
described in the amended information, the corpus delicti
(the substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has
actually been committed) has not been fully established.
This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of
appellant’s connection to the house (where the gun was
found) have totally emasculated the prosecution’s case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take
exception to the argument raised by the defense that the
crime of subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection
with the crime of subversion. It appears that the accused-
appellant is facing a separate charge of subversion. The
defense submits that the trial court should have
peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the subversion
charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., We
set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such
argument. We quote:
558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Damaso

“If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and
violence are the very essence of subversion, then it loses its
distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683,
1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480 [1976]), the Court categorically
distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:

‘Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly

called, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of
rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the
Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700)
punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as
defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking
of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of
arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government
is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the
offender.’ (Italics supplied)

“Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission

(G.R. 58284, 109 SCRA 289 [1981]), this Court said that
subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security,
while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising publicly and
taking arms against the Government is the very element of the
crime of rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to
outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), other
similar associations and its successors because their existence and
activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national
security.
“The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is
an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only
by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. This is a recognition that subversive acts do not
only constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of
private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One
may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive
materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or
indispensable.”
“Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v.
Panga impliedly ruled that if an accused is simultaneously
charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine
of absorption of common crimes as applied in rebellion would have
found application therein. The respondents relied on the opinion
of this Court when it said:

559

VOL. 212, AUGUST 12, 1992 559

People vs. Damaso

‘x x x in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the

qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez
find no application in this case.’

“This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court

upheld the validity of the charge under the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the
Hernandez case is not applicable in that case, considering that
the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses:
(1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D.
1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms
against the Government (R.A. 1700). ‘The practical result of this
may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in
instances similar to those that obtain in the present case, but the
wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to
enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . .”
(G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992).

Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict

the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession of
firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection
with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no
option, but to acquit the accused on reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs
de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

     Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

          Cruz, J., I concur, subject to my reservations in
Baylosis v. Chavez, 202 SCRA 405.

Decision reversed.
 Note.—The search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute rule (People vs. Castiller,
188 SCRA 376).

——o0o——

560

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