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VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000 655

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. No. 109376. January 20, 2000.

PANFILO O. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. THE

SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal Law; Prescription.·In resolving the issue of

prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2)
the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time
the prescriptive period was interrupted.
Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; The
applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period for
violation of special laws is Section 2 of Act No. 3326.·The Anti-
Graft and Cor-

________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

rupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive
period. Section 11 thereof reads: „All offenses punishable under this

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Act shall prescribe in ten years.‰ This was later amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which increased
the prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of
the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended.
Same; Same; Same; The counting of the prescriptive period in
regard to allegedly anomalous transactions which could only have
been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution, when one of the
original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted
from office, would commence from the date of the discovery of the
offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the
EDSA Revolution and the date when the initiatory complaint was
filed.·In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the
government, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations
committed at the time the questioned transactions were made
because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in
conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against the government. The alleged
anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the
February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents,
then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to
said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or
propriety of those transactions. Hence, the counting of the
prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of
the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the
EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint
was filed.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Motions to Quash; Pleadings and
Practice; The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash
on the ground that the facts averred in the information do not
amount to an offense is whether the facts asseverated would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law.·The
fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts averred in the information do not amount to
an offense is whether the facts asseverated would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are not considered. As a general
proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of
the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense
for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

veracity are hypothetically admitted. The informations need only

state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during
the trial.
Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements of the
Offense Under Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019.·The elements of
the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused
is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts
during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to
his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to
any party, whether the government or a private party; (4) that such
undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officer has
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; The right of an accused to a
speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same
shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity
of fairly indicting criminals.·The concept of speedy disposition of
cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether
that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay. The right of an accused to a speedy
trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same shall
not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of
fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does
not preclude the rights of public justice.

Criminal Procedure; Injunctions; Writs of injunction or

prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the
reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be
immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.

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·It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing doctrine

that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to restrain a
criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires
that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for
the protection of society. The writ may issue only in specified cases,
among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive

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658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.

Such exceptions do not obtain in this case.

PARDO, J., Dissenting:

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Criminal

Procedure; Motion to Quash; Quashal is proper where the facts
stated in the information are incomplete and do not convey the
elements of the crime; The facts charged against petitioner do not
constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act 3019,
as amended.·The information fails to allege specifically the third
element of the offense charged of causing undue injury or damage to
the government by acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence causing actual injury or damage. As
bank president, it was actually petitionerÊs duty to make a
recommendation on the bank clientÊs application for letter of credit
as a business decision. The information does not allege that
petitionerÊs act of „facilitating‰ or „making possible‰ or
„recommending‰ the PNB boardÊs approval of CBCPÊs application for
a US$40 million letter of credit was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and
caused actual damage to the bank or the government, and in what
amount. On the contrary, „good faith is always presumed‰ to use the
words of the ponente in a precedent case. Quashal is proper where
the facts stated in the information are incomplete and do not convey
the elements of the crime. Consequently, the facts charged against
petitioner do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3 (e),

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Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes & Bausa for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order

659

VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000 659

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner Panfilo O.

Domingo 1 (hereafter DOMINGO) seeks to nullify the
resolution of 15 March 1993 of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the
information against him for violation of Section 3(e) in
relation to Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
The records show that on 26 May 1987, the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former
Deputy Presidential Assistant.
2
The complaint was docketed
as TBP Case No. 87-02391.
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor
Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from the complaint
Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and
therefore outside the criminal jurisdiction of the
Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary
investigation against the other respondents. In the same

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order, it was also directed that a subpoena be issued to

DOMINGO, the President of PNB at the time of the
questioned transactions, it appearing from the
3
evidence on
record that he was involved in the case. However, the
subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at PNB, Escolta,
Manila, his last known address, was returned „unserved,‰
since he was no longer
4
connected with the said bank at the
time it was served.
On 8 June 1988,
5
in line with the ruling in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
issued Administrative Order No. 1 addressed to the Office
of the Special Prosecutor and Deputized Tanodbayan
Prosecu-

________________

1 Per Atienza, N., J., with Escareal, R. and Amores, A., JJ.,
concurring. Rollo, 32-34.
2 Rollo, 35-44.
3 Id., 69.
4 Id., 70.
5 160 SCRA 843 (1988).

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660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

tors authorizing them to continue the preliminary

investigation of cases6 pending as of 27 April 1988 until the
same are terminated.
On 6 February 1992, after a finding of probable cause to
implead DOMINGO in the case, Special Prosecution Officer
(SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued
7
an order directing
him to submit a counter-affidavit. DOMINGO submitted
on 9 March 1992 his 8
counter-affidavit with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.
On 9 July 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution
recommending that DOMINGO and Rodolfo M. Cuenca be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section
4(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, but that the
complaint be dismissed as against Ferdinand E. Marcos for

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being moot and academic by reason of his death,

9
and as
against Joaquin T. Venus for lack of merit. This was
approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and the
corresponding information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on 30 July 1992. The 10case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 17847. The information
reads as follows:

That on or about the month of July 1980, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of the Philippine
National Bank, a government financial institution, and hence a
public officer, while in the performance of his official functions,
committing the offense in relation to his office and conspiring and
confederating with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and with
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Construction and
Development Company of the Philippines (CDCP), a corporation
duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philip-

________________

6 Rollo, 71-72.
7 Id., 73.
8 Id., 74-90.
9 Rollo, 107-113.
10 Id., 114-116.

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

pines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with

evident bad faith and manifest partiality cause undue injury to the
Philippine National Bank and grant unwarranted benefits to CDCP
in the following manner: accused RODOLFO M. CUENCA,
capitalizing and exploiting his close personal association with the
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to obtain favorable loan
accommodations for CDCP, requested the latterÊs assistance and

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intervention in securing the approval by the Philippine National

Bank Board of Directors of the application of the CDCP for a U.S.
$40 Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing the collateral
requirements of CDCP, as a result of which accused Panfilo O.
Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by President Marcos in
relation to accused CuencaÊs requests, facilitated and made possible
the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Board Resolution No.
144 whereby the U.S. $40 Million Standby Letter of Credit applied
for by CDCP to secure the principal and interest on its loan with the
Republic National Bank of Dallas was approved, notwithstanding a
collateral deficiency by CDCP on its previous accounts with PNB,
and again subsequently recommended to the PNB Board of
Directors the approval of Board Resolution No. 180 amending Board
Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use its loan proceeds
secured by the aforementioned letter of credit for its other
international projects and thereafter allowed CDCP to forego its
collateral requirements, which act of the accused inflicted undue
injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume
CDCPÊs obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the
latter had defaulted in the payment thereof, amounting to U.S. $29
Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP
in the same amount.

On 11 August11 1992, DOMINGO filed a petition for

reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan. The latter
directed the prosecution to treat the petition as a motion
12
for reconsideration of the 9 July 1992 resolution. The
motion was, however, denied by 13
the Office of the Special
Prosecutor on 14 January 1993.
On 19 February 1993, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information against
him on the

_________________

11 Id., 117-125.
12 Id., 141-143.
13 Rollo, 144-146.

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

grounds that (1) the criminal action or liability has been

extinguished by prescription,
14
and (2) the facts charged do
not constitute an offense. In its Resolution of 15 15 March
1993 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.
Not satisfied, DOMINGO filed the instant petition
alleging that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it denied his motion to quash the information.
Meanwhile, on 17 August 1993, during his arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 17847, DOMINGO refused to enter a
plea; hence, the Sandiganbayan
16
ordered that a plea of „not
guilty‰ be entered for him.
We shall first take up the issue of prescription.
DOMINGO contends that his alleged criminal liability
has already been extinguished by prescription. In support
thereof he claims that the prescriptive period commenced
to run in July 1980 when the crime was allegedly
committed, and was only tolled on 6 February 1992, when
he was impleaded as party-respondent by Prosecutor Diaz-
Baldos. The filing of the complaint with the Tanodbayan on
26 May 1987 produced no legal effect and could never be
deemed to have validly interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period, considering that effective 2 February
1987, the Tanodbayan was divested of its authority to
conduct preliminary investigation unless duly authorized
by the Ombudsman.
We are not persuaded.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense
charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period
of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11
thereof

________________

14 Id., 147-153.
15 Id., 32-34.

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16 Id., 242.

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reads: „All offenses punishable under this Act shall

prescribe in ten years.‰ This was later amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which
increased the prescriptive period of the crime from ten
years to fifteen years.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in
the computation17
of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

This simply means that if the commission of the crime is

known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on
the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation
of the special law is not known at the time of its
commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery
18
of the unlawful nature of
the constitutive act or acts.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the
government, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations committed at the time the questioned
transactions were made because both parties to the
transactions were allegedly in 19conspiracy to perpetrate
fraud against the government. The alleged anomalous
transactions could only have been discov-

________________

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17 An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized

by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run.
18 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 130140, 25 October 1999, 317 SCRA 272, citing People
v. Duque, 212 SCRA 607 (1992).
19 Supra note 18.

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ered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the

original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos,
was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would
have dared to20
question the legality or propriety of those
transactions. Hence, the counting of the prescriptive
period would commence from the date of discovery of the
offense, which could have been between February 1986
after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the
initiatory complaint was filed.
As to when the period of prescription is interrupted, the
second paragraph of Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended,
provides that it is „when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person.‰ Whether the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled on 1 September 1987, when DOMINGO
was impleaded as an accused, or on 30 July 1992, when the
information against him was filed with the Sandiganbayan,
is immaterial; for only about one or six years, respectively,
has elapsed from the date of the discovery of the alleged
offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as
provided in R.A. No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided in
the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed. The motion to
quash on the ground of prescription was, therefore,
correctly denied.
We now come to the question of whether the facts
charged in the information constitute an offense.
The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the
facts asseverated would establish the essential elements of

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21
the crime defined in the law.
22
In this examination, matters
aliunde are not considered.
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the
ground that the allegations of the information do not
constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that
matter, should be

________________

20 Id.
21 Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563, 573 (1997).
22 Id.

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose 23

truth
and veracity are hypothetically admitted. The
informations need only state the ultimate24facts; the reasons
therefor could be proved during the trial.
DOMINGO, together with Rodolfo Cuenca, was charged
with violation of Section 3(e), in relation to Section 4(a), of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. These provisions read:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.·In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
...
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
...
SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals.·(a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation

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with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of

such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government,
in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall
include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the
third civil degree. The word „close personal relation‰ shall include
close personal relationship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures
free access to such public officer.

_______________

23 People v. De la Rosa, 98 SCRA 190, 196 (1980); Lopez v.

Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 281, 289 (1995).
24 Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, 115 SCRA 793 (1982).

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The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the

following: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a
private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2)
that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts
during the performance of his or her official duties or in
relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she
causes undue injury to any party, whether the government
or a private party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and (5) that the public officer has acted with
manifest partiality,
25
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
The information specifically stated as follows:

(1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the

president of PNB, a government financial
institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private
individual, then Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the CDCP, who conspired and confederated with

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DOMINGO, capitalizing and exploiting his close

personal association with then President Marcos to
obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP;
(2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation
to his office and while in the performance of his
official functions;
(3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage
by the PNB Board of Directors of Resolution No.
144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudice to
PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCPÊs
obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas
after the CDCP defaulted in the payment of the
loan amounting to US$29 Million;

_______________

25 Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116, 128 [1994]; Ingco v.

Sandiganbayan, supra note 32; Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 287
SCRA 382, 398 [1998].

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

(4) That such undue injury was caused by his

facilitation of the approval of the Letter of Credit
and the waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby
granting unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the
same amount; and
(5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality.

Clearly, the facts alleged in the information constitute a

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Hence, the motion to quash must fail.
Finally, DOMINGO avers that the long and inordinate
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
and the filing of the information violated his right to
speedy trial, invoking
26
the ruling enunciated in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan.

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The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative

term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the
doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that
right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such
delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right
27
by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The right
of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the
Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized to deprive
the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting
criminals. It secures rights to an accused,
28
but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice.
A review of the records show that his right has not been
violated. The Office of the Special Prosecutor, 29in its
Comment/ Opposition to the Motion to Quash, has
adequately explained the reason for the said delay, to wit:

_______________

26 159 SCRA 70 (1988).

27 Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55, 63-64 (1993).
28 People v. Gines, et al., 197 SCRA 481, 488 (1991).
29 Rollo, 126-130.

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

The records show that accused Domingo filed his counter affidavit
on March 3, 1992, and the case was resolved on July 9, 1992. There
was no undue delay in the resolution of this case despite the
gargantuan volume of cases filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
There [might have been] a delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation but which is not undue and intended as
they were brought about by unforseen peculiar circumstances.
Sometime in 1987, when this case was in its initial stage of
preliminary investigation, the authority of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and file cases with
the Sandiganbayan was questioned and was subsequently nullified
by the Supreme Court in the cases of Zaldivar vs. Gonzales and

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Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (supra). This necessitated the issuance

of Administrative Order No. 1 (supra) in order that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor will continue to function as part of the
Ombudsman. Following this event was the retirement of the
assigned Prosecutor, Juan T. Templonuevo, in the early part of
1989. When RA 6770 was enacted in November 1989, the OSP was
reorganized by the Ombudsman. After its reorganization in 1990,
the present case was assigned to SPO III Teresita Diaz-Baldos. The
said SPO instead of resolving the case, considering that the
respondents have already been subpoenaed, gave another
opportunity for the accused herein to file their counter affidavits.
She forthwith issued subpoena for the accused to file their counter-
affidavits. Accused-movant, Domingo filed his counter-affidavit in
30
March 199[2]. Hence, the Resolution.

Perforce, DOMINGO cannot validly claim that he was

denied due process of law considering that one of the
principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him
the opportunity to submit his counter-affidavit since the
first subpoena was returned unserved. After DOMINGO
filed his counter-affidavit on 9 March 1992, the
corresponding information was in due time filed on 30 July
1992. The delay, if any, was actually more beneficial, rather
than prejudicial, to petitioner in that it was intended to
afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made
against him.

________________

30 Petition, Annex „K‰; Rollo, 128-129.

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing

doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie
to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public
interest requires that criminal acts be immediately
investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
The writ may issue only in specified cases, among which

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are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an

oppressive and vindictive manner,31 and to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights. Such exceptions do not
obtain in this case.
Thus, there being no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Sandiganbayan, the Resolution denying DOMINGOÊs
Motion to Quash must be, and is hereby, AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby
DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to try and
decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., I join Justice Pardo in his dissenting
opinion.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion
attached.

DISSENTING OPINION

PARDO, J.:

I am constrained to dissent.
Let me review the facts.

_______________

31 Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 (1992).

670

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

On May 26, 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed

a complaint with the Tanodbayan against the following:
Ferdinand 1E. Marcos, Rodolfo M. Cuenca and Joaquin T.
Venus, Jr. Petitioner was not one of the respondents

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2
therein.
On September 1, 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T.
TemploNuevo issued a subpoena to petitioner upon the
ground that on the basis of the evidence on record, 3
petitioner, along with others, is involved in the case. The
subpoena, however, was not served upon petitioner since he
was no longer connected with PNB, Escolta, Manila, the
address indicated in the subpoena.
On June 8, 1988, Ombudsman Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez (ret.) issued Administrative Order No. 1 addressed
to the Office of the Special Prosecutor and Deputized
Tanodbayan Prosecutors authorizing them to continue the
preliminary investigation of cases pending
4
as of April 27,
1988, until the same are terminated.
On February 6, 1992, almost five (5) years after the
complaint had been filed, Special Prosecution Officer (SPO)
III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, issued an order directing
petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, holding 5
that
there is probable cause to implead him in the case.
On March 9, 1992, petitioner submitted 6his counter-
affidavit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
On July 9, 1992, SPO III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued
a resolution recommending that petitioner be prosecuted
for

________________

1 Docketed as TBP Case No. 87-02391. Respondents were former

president Ferdinand E. Marcos, Construction and Development
Company of the Philippines (CDCP) president and Marcos crony Rodolfo
M. Cuenca, and former presidential assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.
2 Petition, Annex „B,‰ Rollo, pp. 35-43.
3 Petition, Annex „D,‰ Rollo, p. 70.
4 Petition, Annex „E,‰ Rollo, pp. 71-72.
5 Petition, Annex „F,‰ Rollo, p. 73.
6 Petition, Annex „G,‰ Rollo, pp. 74-90.

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Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

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violation of Section 3(e) in7 relation to Section 4(a), of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
Without giving petitioner a chance to seek a
reconsideration/review of the resolution, on July 30, 1992,
Prosecutor Baldos filed directly with the Sandiganbayan an
information charging petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo and
Rodolfo M. Cuenca, with violation of Section 3(e) in relation
to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
dropping two (2) of the original respondents, 8
namely,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.
On August 11, 1992, petitioner filed 9
with the
Sandiganbayan a petition for reinvestigation.
On October 28, 1992, the Sandiganbayan partially
granted the petition for reinvestigation in the sense that it
directed the prosecution to consider the petition for
reinvestigation as 10a motion for reconsideration of the July
9, 1992 resolution.
On January 14, 1993, the Special 11Prosecutor denied
petitionerÊs motion for reconsideration. On February 19,
1993, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
quash the information against him upon the grounds that
(1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription,
12
and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
On March 10, 1993, respondent People of the Philippines
filed with
13
the Sandiganbayan an opposition with motion to
admit.
On March 15, 1993, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
resolution denying the motion to quash ruling that if 14the
facts alleged were true, the offense had been committed.

________________

7 Petition, Annex „H,‰ Rollo, pp. 107-113.

8 Petition, Annex „I,‰ Rollo, pp. 114-116.
9 Petition, Annex „J,‰ Rollo, pp. 117-125.
10 Petition, Annex „M,‰ Rollo, pp. 141-143.
11 Petition, Annex „N,‰ Rollo, pp. 145-146.
12 Petition, Annex „O,‰ Rollo, pp. 147-153.
13 Petition, Annex „P,‰ Rollo, pp. 154-157.
14 Petition, Annex „A,‰ Rollo, pp. 32-34.

672

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672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

15
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense. I agree.
Parenthetically, the prosecution itself dismissed or
dropped the case against former president Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Joaquin T. Venus, without stating the reason
why. And more, the prosecution did not include in the
information the members of the board of directors of the
Philippine National Bank who approved the application for
letter of credit.
The charge is for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. The elements of this offense are as
follows:

„(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person

charged in conspiracy with the former;
„(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts
during the performance of his or her official duties
or in relation to his or her public positions;
„(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party;
„(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;
and
„(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident
16
bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.

In a later case, the Court clarified that the third element of

causing 17undue injury could only mean actual injury or
damage.

________________

15 Petition filed on April 1, 1993, Rollo, pp. 2-30.

16 Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116, 128 (1994); Llorente, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382, 398 (1998); Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan,
272 SCRA 563, 574 (1997).

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17 People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 125534, October 13, 1999, 316
SCRA 751; Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.

673

VOL. 322, JANUARY 20, 2000 673

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

The „Information‰ against petitioner reads as follows:

„x x x xxx
„Accused Rodolfo M. Cuenca, capitalizing and exploiting his close
personal association with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
to obtain favorable loan accommodations for CDCP, requested the
latterÊs assistance and intervention in securing the approval by the
Philippine National Bank Board of Directors of the application of
the CDCP for a U.S. $40 Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing
the collateral requirements of CDCP, as a result of which accused
Panfilo O. Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by President
Marcos in relation to accused CuencaÊs requests, facilitated and
made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Board
Resolution No. 144 whereby the U.S. $40 Million Standby Letter of
Credit applied for by CDCP to secure the principal and interest on
its loan with the Republic National Bank of Dallas was approved,
notwithstanding a collateral deficiency by CDCP on its previous
accounts with PNB, and again subsequently recommended to the
PNB Board of Directors the approval of Board Resolution No. 180
amending Board Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use
its loan proceeds secured by the aforementioned Letter of Credit for
its other international projects and thereafter allowed CDCP to
forego its collateral requirements, which act of the accused inflicted
undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to
assume CDCPÊs obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas
after the latter had defaulted in the payment thereof, amounting to
U.S. $29 Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted benefits
18
to CDCP in the same amount. x x x
„x x x xxx x x x‰

In my view, the information fails to allege specifically the

third element of the offense charged of causing undue
injury or damage to the government by acts of manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence

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19
causing actual injury or damage. As bank president, it
was actually petitionerÊs duty to make a recommendation
on the bank

________________

18 Petition, Annex „I,‰ Rollo, pp. 114-115.

19 Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
supra, on pp. 398-399.

674

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

clientÊs application for letter of credit as a business

decision. The information does not allege that petitionerÊs
act of „facilitating‰ or „making possible‰ or „recommending‰
the PNB boardÊs approval of CBCPÊs application for a
US$40 million letter of credit was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
and caused actual damage to the bank or the government,
and in what amount. On the contrary, „good faith is always
presumed‰
20
to use the words of the ponente in a precedent
case. Quashal is proper where the facts stated in the
information are 21
incomplete and do not convey the elements
of the crime. Consequently, the facts charged against
petitioner do not constitute the offense of violation
22
of
Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to grant the petition and to
quash the information in Criminal Case No. 17847 of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petition dismissed, Sandiganbayan ordered to try and
decide case with dispatch.

Note.·Where a search warrant is issued by one court

and the criminal action based on the results of the search is
afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule
that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things
thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court
·such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the
issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is

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pending. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400

[1998])

··o0o··

________________

20 Venus vs. Desierto, 298 SCRA 196, 217 (1998).

21 People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978); People vs. Asuncion, 161
SCRA 490 (1988).
22 Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan,
supra, on p. 131; Venus vs. Desierto, supra, citing Fernando vs.
Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680, 687-688 (1992); Enrile vs. Salazar, 186
SCRA 217 (1990); Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994).

675

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