SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190022. February 15, 2012.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, JAPHET
ESTRANAS and BEN SAGA , petitioners, vs . PURIFICACION VIZCARA,
MARIVIC VIZCARA, CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD, HECTOR VIZCARA,
JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO , respondents.
DECISION
REYES , J : p
Nature of the Petition
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated July 21, 2009
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021, which a rmed with modi cation
the Decision 2 dated March 20, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan
City, and Resolution 3 dated October 26, 2009, which denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
On May 14, 2004, at about three o'clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo)
was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel
Natividad (Samuel), Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While
crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train,
then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and
rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of
Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel,
sustained serious physical injuries. 4 DCcHIS
At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad
crossing. Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The
"Stop" signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another
signboard. 5
On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together
with the heirs of the deceased victims, namely, Puri cacion Vizcara, Marivic Vizcara,
Cresencia Natividad and Hector Vizcara, filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas
and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City. The case
was ra ed to Branch 40 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 0365-P. In their complaint,
the respondents alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical
injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioners' gross negligence in
not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and properties. They
pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident happened, there
was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the
existence of the track and of the approaching train. They concluded their complaint with a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
prayer for actual, moral and compensatory damages, as well as attorney's fees. 6
For their part, the petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating
the train and monitoring its roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the collision,
Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. Four hundred (400) meters away from
the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching
train. When the train was only fty (50) meters away from the intersection, respondent
Estranas noticed that all vehicles on both sides of the track were already at a full stop.
Thus, he carefully proceeded at a speed of twenty- ve (25) kilometers per hour, still
blowing the train's horn. However, when the train was already ten (10) meters away from
the intersection, the passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly crossed the
tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to
the sheer weight of the train, it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the jeepney
was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision. 7
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 8 dated March 20, 2007,
ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants Philippine National Railways Corporation (PNR), Japhet Estranas and
Ben Saga to, jointly and severally pay the following amounts to: DcTSHa
1. a) PURIFICACION VIZCARA:
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Reynaldo Vizcara;
2) P35,000.00, for funeral expenses;
3) P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses;
4) P40,000.00 for wake/interment expenses;
5) P300,000.00 as reimbursement for the value of the jeepney with
license plate no. DTW-387;
6) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
7) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
8) P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees.
b) MARIVIC VIZCARA:
1) P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Cresencio Vizcara;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees.
c) HECTOR VIZCARA:
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Samuel Vizcara;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees.
d) CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD:
1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Crispin Natividad;
2) P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees. CDHAcI
e) JOEL VIZCARA
1) P9,870.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorney's fees.
f) DOMINADOR ANTONIO
1) P63,427.00 as reimbursement for his actual expenses;
2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P10,000.00 for Attorney's fees.
and
2. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 9
The Ruling of the CA
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Subsequently, on
July 21, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, a rming the RTC decision with
modi cation with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the respondents. The CA
disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE , instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED . The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION , as follows:
(1) The award of P5,000.00 for re-embalming expenses and
P40,000.00 for wake/interment expenses to PURIFICACION VIZCARA is deleted. In
lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded ;
(2) T h e award of moral damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA,
MARIVIC VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby
reduced from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 each while moral damages awarded
to JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced from
P50,000.00 to P25,000.00 ; DAaHET
(3) The award of exemplary damages to PURIFICACION VIZCARA,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
MARIVIC VIZCARA, HECTOR VIZCARA and CRESENCIA NATIVIDAD is hereby
reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 each while exemplary damages
awarded to JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO are likewise reduced
from P25,000.00 to P12,500.00 ; and
(4) The award for attorney's fees in favor of the Appellees as well as
the award of P300,000.00 to Appellee PURIFICACION as reimbursement for the
value of the jeepney is DELETED .
SO ORDERED . 1 0
In the assailed decision, the CA a rmed the RTC's nding of negligence on the part
of the petitioners. It concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure
to install su cient safety devices in the area, such as agbars or safety railroad bars and
signage, was the proximate cause of the accident. Nonetheless, in order to conform with
established jurisprudence, it modi ed the monetary awards to the victims and the heirs of
those who perished due to the collision.
The petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration 1 1 of the decision of the CA.
However, in a Resolution 1 2 dated October 26, 2009, the CA denied the same.
Aggrieved, the petitioners led the present petition for review on certiorari, raising
the following grounds:
I
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PETITIONERS;
II
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE;
III
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONERS OR ERRED IN NOT FINDING AT THE LEAST,
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENTS. 1 3
DHSCEc
The petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. They argue that as a professional
driver, Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with tra c rules and regulations, including the
right of way accorded to trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary measures to
observe in traversing the same. However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by
PNR trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track
and thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to maintain a
safe distance between the jeepney he was driving and the truck ahead of the same
prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed along the crossing. 1 4
In their Comment, 1 5 the respondents reiterate the ndings of the RTC and the CA
that the petitioners' negligence in maintaining adequate and necessary public safety
devices in the area of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap. They
asseverate that if there was only a level crossing bar, warning light or sound, or agman in
the intersection, the accident would not have happened. Thus, there is no other party to
blame but the petitioners for their failure to ensure that adequate warning devices are
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
installed along the railroad crossing. 1 6
This Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by
a person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence. It states:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
I n Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 1 7 negligence was de ned as the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 1 8 To
determine the existence of negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that. 1 9 SHcDAI
In the instant petition, this Court is called upon to determine whose negligence
occasioned the ill-fated incident. The records however reveal that this issue had been
rigorously discussed by both the RTC and the CA. To emphasize, the RTC ruled that it was
the petitioners' failure to install adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing which
proximately caused the collision. This nding was a rmed by the CA in its July 21, 2009
Decision. It is a well-established rule that factual ndings by the CA are conclusive on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to great weight and respect,
even nality, especially when, as in this case, the CA a rmed the factual ndings arrived at
by the trial court. 2 0
Furthermore, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put
into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. 2 1 To distinguish one from the other, a
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain
state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. 2 2 Certainly, the nding of negligence by the RTC, which was
a rmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as this would
entail going into the factual matters on which the negligence was based. 2 3 Moreover, it
was not shown that the present case falls under any of the recognized exceptions 2 4 to the
oft repeated principle according great weight and respect to the factual ndings of the
trial court and the CA.
At any rate, the records bear out that the factual circumstances of the case were
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
meticulously scrutinized by both the RTC and the CA before arriving at the same nding of
negligence on the part of the petitioners, and we found no compelling reason to disturb the
same. Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking
into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In
particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from
crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of
a crossing bar, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage installed in the area was poorly
maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable
signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage, is
needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use
reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligence. 2 5 Having established the fact of negligence on the part of the
petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages.
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.
As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents, this
court rule in the negative. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. 2 6 Here, we cannot see
how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not even aware
of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the jeepney carrying the
respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to ve meters
ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the driver of the
jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe to
proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision
did not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. To begin with, the truck
they were trailing was able to safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to
prevent them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the
approaching peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no
reason to anticipate the impending danger. 2 7 He proceeded to cross the track and, all of a
sudden, his jeepney was rammed by the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then,
the circumstances before the collision negate the imputation of contributory negligence
on the part of the respondents. What clearly appears is that the accident would not have
happened had the petitioners installed reliable and adequate safety devices along the
crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the same. SEACTH
At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to exert serious efforts to
catch up with the trend, including the contemporary standards in railroad safety. As an
institution established to alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of the PNR to
promote the safety and security of the general riding public and provide for their
convenience, which to a considerable degree may be accomplished by the installation of
precautionary warning devices. Every railroad crossing must be installed with barriers on
each side of the track to block the full width of the road until after the train runs past the
crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be equipped with a
device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify the danger or risk of crossing.
It is similarly bene cial to mount advance warning signs at the railroad crossing, such as a
re ectorized crossbuck sign to inform motorists of the existence of the track, and a stop,
look and listen signage to prompt the public to take caution. These warning signs must be
erected in a place where they will have ample lighting and unobstructed visibility both day
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
and night. If only these safety devices were installed at the Tiaong railroad crossing and
the accident nevertheless occurred, we could have reached a different disposition in the
extent of the petitioner's liability.
The exacting nature of the responsibility of railroad companies to secure public
safety by the installation of warning devices was emphasized in Philippine National
Railways v. Court of Appeals, 2 8 thus: HAICcD
[I]t may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty
of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property
at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to
the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or
operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway
crosses any public road, good, su cient, and safe crossings, and erect at such
points, at su cient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of
vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give
notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of
looking out for trains. The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light,
agman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of
the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. 2 9
The responsibility of the PNR to secure public safety does not end with the
installation of safety equipment and signages but, with equal measure of accountability,
with the upkeep and repair of the same. Thus, in Cusi v. Philippine National Railways, 3 0 we
held:
Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad
crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put
them on their guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the
tracks. A need, therefore, exists for the railroad company to use reasonable care to
keep such devices in good condition and in working order, or to give notice that
they are not operating, since if such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace.
Thus, it has been held that if a railroad company maintains a signalling device at
a crossing to give warning of the approach of a train, the failure of the device to
operate is generally held to be evidence of negligence, which maybe considered
with all the circumstances of the case in determining whether the railroad
company was negligent as a matter of fact. 3 1
The maintenance of safety equipment and warning signals at railroad crossings is
equally important as their installation since poorly maintained safety warning devices court
as much danger as when none was installed at all. The presence of safety warning signals
at railroad crossing carries with it the presumption that they are in good working condition
and that the public may depend on them for assistance. If they happen to be neglected and
inoperative, the public may be misled into relying on the impression of safety they normally
convey and eventually bring injury to themselves in doing so.
The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable
in the instant case. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does
not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who
had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. 3 2
To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners' negligence in
ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The
unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the
occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any
overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on
the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied. DaEATc
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is DENIED . The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Villarama, Jr., * Perez and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No. 1195
dated February 15, 2012.
1.Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos and Magdangal De Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-46.
2.Id. at 81-97.
3.Id. at 52-54.
4.Id. at 82.
5.Id. at 38-39.
6.Id. at 81-83.
7.Id. at 8-9.
8.Supra note 2.
9.Id. at 95-97.
10.Id. at 44-45.
11.Id. at 47-51.
12.Supra note 3.
13.Id. at 12.
14.Id. at 13-14.
15.Id. at 68-80.
16.Id. at 79.
17.249 Phil. 363 (1988).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
18.Id. at 373, citing Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930; Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition,
Vol. 3, 265.
19.Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, 813 (1918).
20.Cebu Shipyard & Eng'g Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc. , 366 Phil. 439, 451 (1999), citing
Meneses v. Court of Appeals , 316 Phil. 210, 222 (1995); Tay Chun Suy v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 93640, January 7, 1994, 229 SCRA 151, 156; First Philippine
International Bank v. CA , 322 Phil. 280, 319 (1996); Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corp. v. CA ,
335 Phil. 315, 330 (1997).
21.Id. at 452.
22.Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr. , G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011, citing
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550, 561 (2004).
23.Philippine National Railways v. Brunty , G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006, 506 SCRA 685,
697, citing Estacion v. Bernardo , 518 Phil. 388, 398 (2006); Lambert v. Heirs of Ray
Castillon, 492 Phil. 384, 389 (2005); Pestaño v. Sps. Sumayang , 400 Phil. 740, 748
(2000).
24.Instances when the ndings of fact of the trial court and/or Court of Appeals may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court are: (1) when the conclusion is a nding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
ndings of fact are con icting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) the ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of speci c
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the
nding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record. (Misa v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 97291,
August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 217, 221-222)
25.Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 147, 155.
26.See National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Noble Casionan , G.R. No. 165969, November 27,
2008, 572 SCRA 71, 81-82, citing Estacion v. Bernardo , 518 Phil. 388, 401 (2006); Ma-ao
Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990, 189 SCRA
88, 93.
27.See Cusi v. Philippine National Railways, 179 Phil. 284, 294 (1979).
28.Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007, 536
SCRA 147.
29.Id. at 155-156, citing Philippine National Railways v. Brunty , G.R. No. 169891, November 2,
2006, 506 SCRA 685, 699.
30.Cusi v. Philippine National Railways, 179 Phil. 284, 294 (1979).
31.Id. at 292, citing 74 C.J.S., 1347, 1348 and 44 Am Jur. 766, pp. 8-9.
32.Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 315, 324 (2000), citing Philippine Bank of Commerce v.
CA, 336 Phil. 667, 680 (1997), citing LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA , 311 Phil. 715, 722-724
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
(1995); Picart v. Smith , 37 Phil. 809, 814 (1915); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa ,
258-A Phil. 975, 980 (1989); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 255 Phil. 447 (1989).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com