Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil.
621
FACTS:
The case at bar a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the first
branch of the municipal court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an
accused person to avail himself of the services of an agent or friend, not a licensed
attorney-at-law, to aid him in the litigation.
It appears from the pleadings that Catalino Salas was charged in the
municipal court of the City of Manila with the crime of damage to property
through reckless imprudence.
Thereupon, Salas authorized Crispiniano V. Laput to represent him in the
case.
Laput, is a law student and, accordingly, not a recognized member of the
Philippine Bar.
The written appointment of Laput was duly presented in court, but the
respondent judge before whom the case was to be tried refused to allow
Laput to act as the counsel of Salas.
Hence, this petition for a writ of mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Laput is an applicable agent to represent the litigant despite
not being a member of the Philippine Bar.
Whether the Manila Municipal Court qualifies as a “court of a justice of the
peace” under § 34 of the Code, thereby allowing representation by a non-attorney
agent.
HELD:
While the question appears simple, in order to resolve it properly there must be
before us a chronological statement of the applicable law:
Judiciary Act No. 136 (1901): Maintained the existing Justice of the Peace (JP)
courts in Manila with their full jurisdiction until a law created new inferior
civil/criminal tribunals.
Manila Charter, Act No. 183 (1901): Created municipal courts (criminal
jurisdiction) and JP courts (civil jurisdiction). The Charter mandated that
municipal courts follow judiciary rules applicable across the Islands.
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, 1901) Sec. 34: Allowed parties in JP
courts to litigate personally or with an agent or friend (non-attorney), while in
“any other court” appearances required a lawyer.
Act No. 3107 (1923): Abolished JP courts in Manila, consolidating their civil
and criminal jurisdiction into a Municipal Court with branches, retaining “the
same jurisdiction…and incidental powers” of the old JP courts. Section 2476
(JP courts) was repealed.
Since Sec. 34 applied to JP courts at the time of enactment—and Municipal
Court inherited JP courts’ civil jurisdiction and powers—Sec. 34 should
logically continue to apply to the Municipal Court in those respects.
Formal distinctions would be “unduly technical”: Although Municipal Courts
have broader jurisdiction (criminal and civil), they belong to the same tier of
judicial hierarchy (only courts recognized by the Organic Act are Supreme
Court, Courts of First Instance, and Municipal Courts). The Court noted even
criminal cases may have civil components (e.g. damage assessment).
Accordingly, Section 34 applied, and denial of Laput’s representation was
erroneous. The writ was granted without costs.