Canon 9 Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M.

Ladaga
(A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001)

Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as
counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
“Falsification of Public Documents” before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that the respondent
appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his
Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel for his cousin-client NarcisaLadaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as
she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and
high regard for her.  This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like
a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his
Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he
has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is
not the head of the Department contemplated by law. 

Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO 

Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A
similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys
from engaging in the private practice of their profession.  THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs.
Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative
of engagement in the private practice of law. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the “private
practice” of the law profession contemplated by law. 

DECISION: Reprimanded. 

Canon 9

Donna Marie S. Aguirre vs. Edwin L. Rana

(B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003) 

Facts: Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However,
the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against
him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to
now. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan"). In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance"
to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer
but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or
represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading. 

Issue: Whether respondent is engaged in unauthorized practice of law. 

Held: Yes, We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserveadmission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath
as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel forBunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer's oath. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license todo so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he
was not a memberof the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.  

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of
good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer
is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.  

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

A.C. No. 7056 February 11, 2009

PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent
NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, finding respondent guilty of
gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.

To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:

On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of herein
complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de
Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez
and Maria Esguerra, who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that
respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was
elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land.
Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and
misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several
motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves
out as his partners/associates in the law firm.

The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two
years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on
the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, appealing to the Court to take a
second look at his case and praying that the penalty of suspension of two years be reduced to mere reprimand or
admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients he was defending.

Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he took were not meant
to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious
study, research and experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his
clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory
designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al.3 He stresses that he was not the original
lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to
them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what the
tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse,
continuous and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing
of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject
property. He avers that he merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled
under the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary
eviction by the complainant.4 He posits that he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good
father would be protective of his own family,5 and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro
bono.

Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, he humbly submits that
there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same or did he fail to dispute this, contrary to the findings of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the
cooperative Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his office in this cooperative, together
with Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late Alfredo Caloico and Marciano Villavert. He signed the
retainer agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyer-client relationship, and the complainants were
fully aware of such arrangement.

Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action he took in behalf of his
clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind consideration, pardon and forgiveness. He reiterates that
he does not deserve the penalty of two years’ suspension, considering that the complaint fails to show him wanting
in character, honesty, and probity; in fact, he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as former
president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City handling detention prisoners and
pro bono cases, and is also a member of the Couples for Christ, and has had strict training in the law school he
graduated from and the law offices he worked with. He is the sole breadwinner in the family with a wife who is
jobless, four (4) children who are in school, a mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support. The family’s
only source of income is respondent’s private practice of law, a work he has been engaged in for more than twenty-
five (25) years up to the present.

On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from respondent, requesting that he be
issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial commission. Respondent stated therein that he was aware of the
pendency of the administrative cases against him, but pointed out that said cases had not yet been resolved with
finality. Respondent sought consideration and compassion for the issuance of the clearance -- considering present
economic/financial difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that he was the sole breadwinner in the family.

It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s
devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for
the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to
succeed.12 In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the
respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the
interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in
defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but
respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. We stress what we have
stated in our decision that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and
justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.

Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must have realized with the sanction
he received from this Court. However, the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to
refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s
length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent’s advanced age, among other things, which have
varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. Thus, after a careful consideration of
herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration and humble acknowledgment of his misfeasance, we are persuaded
to extend a degree of leniency towards him.16 We find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law
sufficient in this case
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED. Respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolution within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on
the Court Administrator, who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty.
Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the
defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case
for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself
as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284
nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and
notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with
this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente
alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting
herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged
that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by
Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was
not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-
CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of
her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings
of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only excuse
was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach
him.

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging Macasieb’s
failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did
not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb
withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working at
Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she
signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005,
which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without
his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation that his
signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI
despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May
2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation
of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente’s suspension to six months.

Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the signature in the
Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not
written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors
denied Busmente’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice
of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the IBP.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as
a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that
holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.6
The Court explained:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as
Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or
directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue
with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed
out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to
represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD
noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.

We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order8
of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa
was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil
Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in
the case, considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in
Busmente’s office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report
stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted
by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the
NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other
documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of
Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as
well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by
Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.

Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the
case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-
Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and
LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before
Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that
ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court records as our legal
counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are
made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client
of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in
connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real
lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask
her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty.
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal
assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he
allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was
guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the
IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law
for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.1âwphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED.