Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Cases
Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Cases
MONSOD turn over the proceeds, saying that the money was used to pay court fees and the remaining are
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the his as attorney’s fees.
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for Mercado filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera for infidelity in the custody and handling
at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a client’s funds. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines sanctioned Atty. De Vera with a suspension of
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural- practice for one (1) year. Following this, Atty. De Vera filed baseless lawsuits against most of the
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of members of the Mercado Family under different jurisdictions. He also filed cases against IBP
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in governors who recommended his suspension.
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Mercado contents that Atty. De Vera is exploiting their personal family problems just to pursue
unwarranted cases. She also alleged that Atty. De Vera is guilty of forum shopping and harassment
Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in for the filing of baseless charges.
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. De Vera contends that he is only exhausting all the available legal remedies, and that the
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not charges filed against members of the Mercado family were done in good faith.
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and Issue: Whether or not Atty. De Vera violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by instituting
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, baseless and unwarranted suits that are only aimed to harass Mercado and her family.
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial Held: Atty. De Vera was found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency Responsibility for raising unfounded lawsuits against the Mercado family and several IBP board
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship members who recommended his suspension.
have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Such act is deemed retaliatory and is unbecoming of a member of the bar who should uphold the
integrity, honesty and dignity of the legal profession. Atty. De Vera was disbarred permanently
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in from practice.
the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of 3. BURBE v. MAGULTA
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner
is DISMISSED. paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
2. ALCANTARA v. DE VERA A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of
Facts: Rosario Mercado won in a civil case with Atty. Eduardo De Vera as her legal counsel. Upon his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to
execution of the decision and collection of bank deposits for Mercado, Atty. De Vera refused to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice
Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s
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office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that “when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to ceased to engage in private law practice.” Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining
see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed. the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December
17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay
was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that ISSUE:
he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice of
purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) law.
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively. RULING:
No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or friend of
Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred. the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of
as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such, there could be
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San
to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of
member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Thus,
misappropriation of said funds.” the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
4. PEOPLE v. VILLANUEVA permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the
FACTS OF THE CASE case at bar who is a relative. Decision affirmed.
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said 5. IN RE: SYCIP, SALAZAR, ET AL.
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The FACTS:
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, Two separate petitions were filed before this Court; 1)by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Sycip, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, praying that they be allowed to
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not
receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor
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Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: 1) A partnership is not prohibited from The above-mentioned cases arose when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner as under Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
Art. 1840 of the Civil Code; 2) In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as
to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 3) The Canons of Professional Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his
Ethics transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
law partnership. Canon 33: The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when member of the Bar.
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use; 4) No possibility of imposition or deception because the In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
circulation for several days; 5) No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because
name in a professional firm name; 6) Continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of
of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by US Courts. Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the
same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the
ISSUE: acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
Whether or not the firms may continue to use the partnership name despite the death of a
partner. As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
RULING:
Issues:
No. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages (1) Whether or not the non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him constitute
and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have dishonesty
to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, (2) Whether or not he can use the appellation “Atty.”
can initially ride on that old firm’s reputations established by deceased partners.
Ruling:
Secondly, Art. 1840 of the Civil Code treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership. First Issue:
Yes. The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
In the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased former Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or
partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body,
more creative and/or more senior partners or members of the law firm. or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration
6. IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR CANDIDATE HARON S. MELING required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His
Facts: deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three pending criminal cases before the MTCC, Cotabato City, namely: The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him answerable under
two Grave Oral Defamation, and for Less Serious Physical Injuries. Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable
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for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his penalties and formula computing them, which Amparo justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out
application for admission to the bar. of his pocket as he tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an investigation ensued.
Penalty: the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the
until further orders from the Court. respective examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five examiners having re-evaluated or
re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant.
7. IN RE AMPARO
FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a piece of paper As investigator conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang was charged with the crime
during the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the paper until the head of slight physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same University. Confronted with
watcher threatened to report him to the authorities. The paper contains the list of duration of this information, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
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It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar 1953……………………..72%
Examinations, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in V+BF
Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s 1954……………………..73%
statement of assets and liabilities were not taken up during the investigation but were examined
as parts of the records of the court. 1955……………………..74%
ISSUES: Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam
notebook. Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
pending case. computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
RULING: ISSUE:
1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to individually re-
examine the grades of Galang to help him pass even without the authority of the Court. Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his RULING:
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971;
and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title
had no pending criminal case in court. That the concealment of an attorney of the fact that he had of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, in his application to take the Bar Exam is a examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
ground for revocation of his license to practice law as well-settled. He is therefore unworthy of down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
becoming a member of the noble profession of law. jurisprudence are not stationary.
9. IN RE CUNANAN As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
FACTS: 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of
the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
1955.” inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
1946-1951………………70% admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
1952 …………………….71%
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minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation. petition for relief (from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare Iloilo, praying that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on
it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke the merits, and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission trial was excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his
to the practice of law. departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
might be delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he called
10. JAVELLANA v. LUTERO (full text ra ang available) at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him of
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425) dismissing a the desired postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that
petition for relief directed against the judgment rendered by the municipal court of Iloilo City in its he exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a telegram
civil case 7220. to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the
municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed
On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a decision against the
Elpidio Javellana with the municipal court of Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted
hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure of the defendant to that his client has a good and substantial defense, which is, that the complainant had given his
receive summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was thereafter client an option to buy the premises subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening
postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and finally to August 27, all at the behest of the defendant's of the case would cause the private respondent no real injury.
Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not finished his business transactions in Manila"
and that "he hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was granted by the municipal court This petition was given due course, the respondents were required to file their answers, and a
with the warning that no further postponement would be entertained. cease-and-desist order was issued as prayed for. On February 22, 1964, after due hearing, the
Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the petition.1äwphï1.ñët
When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty.
Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Peña who was present in court verbally moved for the Hence the present recourse.
postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business
transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and From the perspective of the environmental circumstances obtaining in this case, the present
his counsel were well aware of the court's previous admonition that no further postponement of appeal is palpably devoid of merit.
the case would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the
plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date. The verbal motion for postponement was A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with
denied and the plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the presentation of the due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with
plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such
postponement of the hearing. The trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the
evidence, the court on the same date rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
defendant. The latter's counsel received a copy of the decision on September 9, 1963. On the
following September 11, he filed a motion to set aside judgment and for new trial. This motion was The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The
denied on September 26; a copy of the order of denial was received by him on the same date. last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the judgment
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that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on August assesses treble costs against the petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by his
27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to so adjust his counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea.
schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and his calendar of
hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on 11. DE ROY v. CA
the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening occurrence which FACTS:
unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from appearing in court. In A Motion for Extension of time to file a Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners with the
Court of Appeals, the CA denied the same contending that the 15-day period for appealing or for
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give filing a Motion for Reconsideration cannot be extended (HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES INC., VS.
preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere JAPZON, 136 SCRA 46)
marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals
more than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the above case should not be made to apply to
them owing to the non-publication of the HABALUYAS decision in the Official Gazette as of the
Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the appearance in court on August 27 of another time the subject decision of the CA was promulgated.
attorney who verbally moved for postponement nor by his telegram received by the municipal
judge on the same date asking for continuance. These circumstances, upon the contrary, ISSUE:
emphasize his presumptuousness vis-a-vis the municipal judge. Is the petitioner's contention meritorious?
It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition that the petitioner-appellant was not HELD:
deprived of his day in court, and that the respondent municipal judge did not err in proceeding Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions
with the trial, allowing the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and thereafter in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It
rendering decision for the plaintiff-appellee. It follows that the petitioner was not entitled to the is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decision of the
remedy of a petition for relief. Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published
in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Moreover, after the denial of his motion to set aside judgment and for new trial, the appellant had Courts Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals
ample time to appeal; instead he allowed the judgment to become final and executory. His
argument that an appeal would have been futile as there was no evidence upon which such appeal 12. EDQUIBAL v. FERRER
could be based, merits scant consideration. An appeal from the decision of a municipal court to the Facts
Court of First Instance has the effect of vacating the decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of Court; Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his mother Ursula
sec. 9, Rule 40, of the old Rules), and the action is to be tried de novo without regard to the proof Edquibal in cases she filed against his sister Delia Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real property
presented in the municipal court or the conclusions reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable judgments in four (4) out of the five (5)
56 Phil. 344, 351; Lizo vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). cases handled by respondent. However, in Civil Case No. RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional Trial
To grant the appellant's petition for relief would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother.
had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa vs. Yatco, etc., et al., L- Respondent then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of Appeals and that the cost involved
16435, Jan. 31, 1963, and the cases therein cited). This in law cannot be done. is P4,000.00. When complainant informed respondent that he does not have enough money, the
latter said P2,000.00 would be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. As this appeal is patently frivolous and complainant, respondent told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
dilatory, this Court, under the authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, hereby CV No. 65019.
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client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and
When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to the Court of confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.
Appeals to follow-up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure
of the appellant to file the required appellant's brief. Same; Same; Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence; It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal
In his comment2 dated June 2, 2003, respondent denied that he filed an appeal, on behalf of diligence to the cause of the client.—Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a
complainant's mother, with the Court of Appeals or received P2,000.00. What happened was that given situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with diligence by
complainant told him that there is someone in the Court of Appeals who can help him regarding adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion
his appeal. Respondent claimed that he "did his best" for complainant's mother and did not even to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the
ask for attorney's fees. exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld
from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the
On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Same; Same; Practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or
In his Report and Recommendation dated March 19, 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, IBP that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
Commissioner, made the following findings: use for securing and preserving their rights; All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or
that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias.—The practice of law does not require
"It is clear from the records of this case that per the records of CA G-R. CV No. 65019, Respondent extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that “extreme measure of care and caution
is the counsel of record of defendants-appellants therein (including Complainant's mother). In the which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their
Resolution dated 31 August 000, it was explicitly noted that '(N)otice sent to counsel for rights.” All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a
defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondent’s failure to attend to his client’s
thereof was received by him on March 16, 2000 . 'If it is true that Respondent never agreed to appeal is clearly wanting.
handle the appeal, upon receipt of said notice, Respondent should have immediately manifested
to the Court of Appeals that he is not handling the appeal on behalf of said defendants-appellants. Same; Same; An attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence.—In
Thus, Section 2, Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that '[T]he counsel and People v. Cawili, we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary
guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr. characterized a lawyer’s
counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals. 'By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals, we held that
had every reason to assume that he was likewise representing defendants-appellants in the the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the
appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required appellants' brief resulted in the dismissal court. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban reiterated Ford v. Daitol and In re: Santiago F.
of the appeal. Marcos in holding that an attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence
Concepts
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence; There 13. EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. v. DIONEDA
is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.— FACTS:
It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a On 29 September 1997 ECTHA and respondent Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s Agreement
need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A wherein respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr.
Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a Complaint-in-Intervention, for P20,000.00 as
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attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing. It was further agreed that his client’s interests render respondent liable. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
respondent lawyer would update the complaint and work on the development of the case. attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons
of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter
nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHA’s entrusted to him by failing to file the Complaint-in-Intervention he undertook to handle, thus
intended Complaint-in-Intervention. Due to the insistence of the members of the Association, Mr. making him liable under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18. Thus, respondent Atty. Michael Dioneda is
Fernando Garcia, ECTHA President, was compelled to check the records of the case in the RTC, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, which shall take effect from the date of
secured a certification from the Branch Clerk of Court that there was no motion for intervention notice of receipt of the finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that repetition of the same or
filed in the case. On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for respondent to similar acts will merit a more severe penalty, and is ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Emiliano
return the amount of P20,000.00 because he did not do anything to protect the rights and Court Townhouses Homeowners Association the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
interests of the Association. with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Decision
until the full amount as directed, is returned.
Respondent Dioneda only made oral promises to pay, and in August 1999 he could no longer be
contacted and the personnel in his office simply made excuses to Mr. Garcia. After receiving the 14. LICUDAN v. CA
demand letter of ECTHA respondent immediately called up the residence of Mr. Garcia and Facts:
informed him that he could get the money and the records of the case at his office. However, The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to review
respondent informed ECTHA that a portion of the amount to be returned would be deducted as a and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer
reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. According to respondent, no representative of the and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by
complainant showed up at his law office. The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him
Philippines for investigation. Hearings were set on at least five (5) separate dates. Despite due attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and confidence of the highest
notice, respondent never attended the IBP administrative hearings. level reposed on him considering the close blood and affilial relationship between him and his
clients. The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won
ISSUE: the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be
Did Atty. Dioneda violate Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5
square meters of the subject lot, the respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the
RULING: remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to attorney's fees since the said portion
YES. Respondent’s lamentable attitude towards his client’s case is clearly evident from his pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.
apparent disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence
in his defense. He disregarded all notices sent to him by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Issue:
which were personally served at his office address. He never appeared before the Commission Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of
despite several opportunities to do so and explain his side. It is reasonable to conclude that under contingent fees?
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards. The
act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the case of complainant Held:
ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and subsequently failing to render such The instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of September 12, 1989 is hereby
service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of
that. The acts of inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him and disloyalty to his P20,000.00.
client constitute major breaches of respondent’s oath as a lawyer. These acts that are inimical to
Page 9 of 19
Ratio Decidendi: The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against City, to which the case shall be raffled, is hereby designated as the court that will fully implement
the charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when engaged as the restorative directives of this Decision with respect to the execution of the final judgment,
counsel. Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair return of properties wrongfully executed, or the payment of the value of properties that cannot
and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer fees are fair and reasonable, Rule longer be restored, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The parties are
20-01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the said issue. A directed to address the implementation of this part of the Decision to the sala to which the case
similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly will be raffled.
states that:Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the It agrees on the payment for the services of Atty. Pena on the amount of P 3,000,000.00. Under
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for services the legal principle against unjust enrichment. In which there has no contract of agency exists
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or between Atty. Pena and urban Bank. Where the former shall be paid accordingly.
unreasonable.
DECISION OF SUPREME COURT
15. URBAN BANK v. PENA The Urban Bank is entitled to complete restoration and return of the properties levied on
FACTS execution considering the absolute reversal of the award of damages, upon the payment of the
It was in 1994 that Isabel Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold the land to Urban Bank Inc.(UBI). The cost of the judgment debt herein amounting to PhP4,500,000, with interest as indicated in the dispositive
land is P 240 million. Since the land was occupied by illegal tenants, the ISCI’ lawyer, Atty. portion. With respect to individual petitioners, they are entitled to the absolute restitution of their
Magdaleno Pena had to make some effort in negotiating with the illegal tenants just to executed properties, except when restitution has become impossible, in which case Peña shall be
vacate the land. But the illegal tenants will not vacate since they know that the new owner liable for the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest. Whether Urban
was the Urban Bank and not the ISCI. So the ISCI ask Urban Bank to make a document authorizing Bank and the bank officers and directors are entitled to any claim for damages against Peña and his
Atty. Magdaleno to negotiate with them. But Atty. Magdaleno through their indemnity bond is best ventilated before the trial court, as prescribed under the procedural rules
conversation in the phone with Teodoro Borlongan, President of Union Bank, told him that it is not on execution pending appeal.
easy to negotiate with the illegal tenants since the local cops are in their side. So Atty. Magdaleno,
in order for him to negotiate under Urban Bank, is asking for a 10% of the total price of the land It was therefore denies the petition of Atty. Magdaleno and affirms with modification the Court of
sold and to be put in writing. It was then agreed by Toedoro Borlongan through phone Appeals. While the RTC of Bago City gravely abused its discretion in awarding unconscionable
conversation. But the authorization made by Teodora Borlongan of Urban Bank did not include damages against Urban Bank, Inc., and its officers. Therefore the decision of RTC is vacated.
the 10% fee of Atty. Pena. Meanwhile, Atty. Pena settled the illegal tenants but he give the illegal
tenants 1,500,000.00 and he also paid for the security guards which cost for about P ISSUE:
3,000,000.00. But Urban Bank refuses to pay so Atty. Pena filed a complaint against the recovery of Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Peña is entitled to receive the P28 million.
the costs he spend just to relocate the illegal tenants. He also asking for the 10% attorney’s fee as
what they have agreed through telephone conversation. HELD:
No. Atty. Magdaleno is not entitled to receive the P28 million but he is entitled only for the
DECISION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS payment of compensation for his services rendered as agent of Urban Bank. On the basis of
The trial court agrees on the payment for the services of Atty. Pena on the amount of P the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Since there is no supporting evidence to
28,500,000.00 In the eyes of trial court, it should believed the testimony of Atty. Pena and present, Atty. Pena cannot insist the 10% attorney’s fee since the amount is already
President of Urban Bank thru telephone conversation in which it was agreed that the latter will pay unconscionable. In the absence of such agreements, the principle of quantum meruit is applied.
for the 10% of the value of the property worth P 240,000,000.00.The Regional Trial Court of Makati He is entitled only to receive the merit of his services, and for the reimbursement of his expenses
Page 10 of 19
in securing the property and relocating the illegal tenants. For a total of P 4.5 million. It must be in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
put in mind that lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
service, not money, is the primary consideration. voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established. Section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty “to
16. HILADO v. DAVID maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
FACTS client.” Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In
Attorney Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client,
Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado matters that might only further prejudice the complainant’s cause. We conclude therefore that the
approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which motion for disqualification should be allowed.
Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his
disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information was relayed to him by 17. GENATO v. SILAPAN
Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not FACTS:
win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; In July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainant’s
that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to
was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant’s retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the
left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a legal opinion letter where it building and made him handle some of complainant’s cases. Hence, the start of the legal
was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign relationship between complainant and respondent. The conflict between the parties started
the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a when respondent borrowed P200,000.00 from complainant which he intended to use as down
letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case. Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated
was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed because all Hilado check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He
brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its
already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City
court for four months in the said case. Register of Deeds. With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car.
However, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainant’s name and financed
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco. through City Trust Company. In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a
certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to borrow money from complainant.
ISSUE: Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned
Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case. commission in the amount ofP52,289.90.Complainant used the commission to pay
respondent’s arrears with the car financing firm. Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the
HELD: amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant
Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. tried to encash respondent’s postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as
Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent. As ruled respondent’s account therein was already closed. Respondent failed to heed complainant’s
by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, mortgage. In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to
Page 11 of 19
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On Counsel, informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the
August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon. On April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action
investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City for violation of Articles
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children by indicating in said Certificates of Live
ISSUE: Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in truth, she is legally married
Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to to Ruben G. Mercado. Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government using any other name than “Rosa F. Mercado.” She claims that, in filing the criminal case for
officials in connection with a pending case. falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred. In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000,theCourt
RULING: referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The privilege against investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two
disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a Rosalina R. Datiles granted respondent’s motion to file his memorandum, and the case was
lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties. On June 21, 2003, the
Respondent’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding
pleadings fails to satisfy the court. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney
they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. On August
it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation and 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation,
respondent’s professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the
lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith and fairness. Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds ISSUE:
that respondent’s allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of Whether or nor respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. However, the and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former
recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension of respondent from the practice of law client.
seems to be disproportionate to his breach of duty considering that a review of the records of
this Court reveals that this is the first administrative complaint against him. RULING:
The Supreme Court explained that in engaging the services of an attorney, the client
Wherefore, Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of lawfor a period reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and
of six (6) months. highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential
nature that is required by necessity and public interest. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve
18. MERCADO v. VITRIOLO his client’s secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,
FACTS: and continues even after the client’s death. The factors essential to establish the existence of the
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, privilege are:
1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant. On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Page 12 of 19
1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, ISSUE:
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client and
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2.The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the HELD:
communication to be confidential. YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.
3.The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. The RATIO:
communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the
obligations. lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
The Court held that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant’s allegations. confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations.
The Court noted that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence
disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there
specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will.
instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal Without meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is
complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each
did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the
personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy
Wherefore, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is DISMISSED for lack of merit. in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent
was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent
19. HADJULA v. MADIANDA to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
FACTS:
[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the 20. ENRIQUEZ v. GIMENEZ
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice FACTS:
and further alleged that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor of Bauan, Batangas wrote a letter to Julio Enriquez, Sr.
confidential she disclosed personal secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that she (petitioner) engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against
(respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. This is after the fact that the provincial fiscal of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets. the municipality declined to represent such in an action to be brought againt NWSA to test the
validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it. On 28 June 1956 the petitioner accepted the
[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about offer and filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Petitioner
the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the requested a reimbursement of P40.00 for docket fee and P500.00 as initial attorney’s fee. On 24
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact June 1957 the Auditor General, herein respondent, disallowed in audit the petitioner’s claim for
matters of common knowledge in the BFP. initial attorney’s fee but offered no objection to the refund of docket fee.
Page 13 of 19
ISSUE: the deed, Rufina went to ask Barrios to enforce it he admits Rufina went to see him by filing a
WON the Auditor General erred in disallowing the reimbursement of the initial attorney’s fee. complaint against Rovero, strongly corroborates Rufina's testimony that she had actually engaged
his services to draft the partition. Indeed, when she asked him to file the complaint, and he
RULING: refused, he did not tell her that lie had been engaged by Rovero to draft the partition. He merely
No. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the told her she had no case, and that he was reluctant "to take up a lost cause."
conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse
for inhibition or disqualification. And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline On this issue of fact, the Solicitor-General finds against respondent. And we agree with said official.
employment, a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his action and functions on grounds not
provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among other, “that he will Furthermore, even supposing that, as claimed by Atty. Barrios, he was employed by both Rovero
well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which and the Bautista brothers to draft the partition, it is doubtful whether he could appear for one as
he is about to enter….” against the other in a subsequent litigation. At most, if he could appear for one client, it should be
for him who seeks to enforce the partition as drafted. Yet he appeared for Rovero who sought to
21. BAUTISTA v. BARRIOS (full text lang since it is short anyway) avoid compliance with it, asserting that it did not, contain all the terms of the agreement, that it
Rufina Bautista complains that Atty. Barrios committed malpractice in that having drafted a deed was subject to certain modifications, etc. Moreover, in his defense of Rovero, he raised issues
of partition at her request, and as her attorney, he afterwards, in a suit to enforce it, refused to which obviously violated Rufina's confidence, because he alleged in behalf of Rovero that the
appear for her, and what is, worse, he appeared instead as counsel for the other party to the deed undisclosed modifications were known to Rufina at the time of the execution of the partition.
of partition and opposed her rights thereunder.
The inconsistent positions taken by the respondent coupled with some flimsy arguments he has
The evidence shows that in August 1955, Rufina Bautista engaged the services of respondent Atty. advanced: [1], do not favorably impress this Court with his alleged good faith in the matter.
Barrios to draft an extra-judicial partition between Rufina Bautista and her brothers and sisters on
one side and Federico Rovero on the other. The deed distributed the conjugal properties of Rovero Corrective measures are called for, and, in accordance with the Solicitor-General's
and his deceased wife Maria Bautista, who was a sister of the Bautistas and who died intestate in recommendation, Atty. Barrios is hereby suspended from the practice of his profession for a period
1952. The deed was prepared by said Barrios and was accordingly signed. Thereafter, in September of two years from the time this decision becomes final.
of the same year, because Rovero refused to comply with the terms of the deed, Rufina Bautista
sued him (Civil Case No. K-689, Capiz Court of First Instance) to deliver the properties awarded to SO ORDERED.
her in the said extra-judicial partition. She asked respondent Barrios to represent her; but upon his
refusal, Rufina was compelled to, and did engage the services of Atty. Artemio S. Arrieta. 22. PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Thereafter, Atty. Barrios appeared for Federico Rovero, and opposed the demand of Rufina FACTS
Bautista. In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
In an attempt to clear himself, respondent Barrios declared that it was not Rufina Bautista who had causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
solicited his services in the preparation of the deed of partition, but that it was Federico Rovero. loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
As against the contrary assertions of Rufina Bautista, this defense of Atty. Barrios cannot prevail, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets
for the reason that he himself in his answer to the complaint in this Court, admitted that he had was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
prepared the deed "upon the joint request of Federico Rovero, Rufina Bautista and Francisco filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s
Bautista." Furthermore, the circumstance that upon refusal of Rovero to comply with the terms of liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
Page 14 of 19
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of
properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to
Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting,
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing
which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the
as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.” once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in
HELD such office or employ.”
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza,
it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he
exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who
bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in
of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of
Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to 23. ULEP v. LEGAL CLINIC INC.
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or FACTS:
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A'
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
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advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the caseof John R. Bates and
Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United States Supreme Court on
Annex A June 7, 1977.
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage. Issue:
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
ANNULMENT. VISA. constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
Please call: 521-0767, advertisements herein complained of.
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm Held:
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
Annex B defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
GUAM DIVORCE the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent.
DON PARKINSON It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. connected with thelaw." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
US/Foreign description of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave. installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767 general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
herein before quoted. may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds,
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice,
Page 16 of 19
contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its Notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public, and
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof Was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory offices He also pointed out that older practitioners in Nueva Ecija also do what he did – they do not
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed indicate affiants’ residence certificates on documents they notarized, or have entries in the
in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of notarial register for these documents.
his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise
his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription o As to his alleged failure to comply with Sec.3 Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure: as
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental counsel to the affiants, he had the option not comply or not with the certification.
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity o As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of CPR: lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients “on
to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice.”
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A Santiago charged Rafanan’s clients with attempted murder. Rafanan said that since his clients were
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. in his house duringthe alleged crime, that’s why he said his testimony is very essential.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda. o He also contends that the case filed by Santiago was only to harass Rafanan since he is the
counsel of the parties who filed cases against him before the ombudsman (Brgy. Capt. Ernesto
24. SANTIAGO v. RAFANAN Ramos and BJMP)
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by BJMP employee Jonar Santiago against Atty. Edison Rafanan. ISSUES: Whether or not Rafanan is guilty in violating the Notarial Law.
Santiago, in his complaint, alleged among others that Rafanan, in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: Whether or not a lawyer (in this case, Rafanan) can stand as witness infavor of his clients.
o Make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants (*one
making the affidavit); HELD
o Enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; Yes, he violated the Notarial Law for not making the proper notation and entering the details of
o Make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he the notarized documents.
notarized
Yes, a lawyer can stand as witness of a client.
Santiago also alleged that Rafanan executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered it as
evidence (Rafanan stood as counsel and as witness of his client) and Rafanan, as alleged by RATIO DECIDENDI: On Issue No. 1
Santiago, waited for him together with his “men” and disarmed Santiago and uttered insulting The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. And these
words at him. formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. They are required to certify that
the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
ATTY. RAFANAN’S CONTENTIONS: residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
o Admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached and the date as part of such certification.
to the Complaint of Santiago. But Rafanan believed that the non-notation of their Residence
Certificates in the Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits were allowed because:
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They are also required to keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by Issue: Whether Respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
them; etc. As to Rafanan’s defense that it’s a common practice in Nueva Ecija, SC says: It is
appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly Held:
because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an Yes, the court agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP
acceptable justification for breaking the law. Board of Governors. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
On Issue No. 2 prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer
A lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, except only in certain cases pertaining to for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only
privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship. Reason: The difficulty entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relationship to their clients as witnesses from utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness
that as an advocate(Note: A witness must only say what happened. Only the truth. As and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is
compared with the task of a lawyer who will use all the available remedies and actions to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
in his arsenal for his client to win the case.) It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of Professional Responsibility which a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The preference is for lawyers to REFRAIN from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely “The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case. In the case at opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.” The prohibition
bar: also applies even if the “lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
o Atty. Rafanan cannot be administratively liable because: It’s a duty of the lawyer to assert every lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client.(Remember, confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
there is a criminal case of attempted murder against his client which will deprive his client of his wholly unrelated.”
life and liberty, if they fail to display a good defense.)On the Side Issues: There is no harassment
of the part of Rafanan against Santiago because there were no pieces of evidence presented. To be held accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
Mere allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability. whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
RULING: Atty. Rafanan is GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the CPR. He is fined fidelity to both clients.” Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation
P3,000.00 with a warning that similar infractions will be dealt more severely. of the above rule is present in a given case. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for
an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
25. ANINON v. SABITSANA client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing
Facts: In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the for the other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interests is
legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of
over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband Brigido Caneja, Jr.. Respondent undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
The complainant accused Respondent of using the confidential information he obtained from her connection or previous employment. On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find
in filing the civil case. substantial evidence to support Respondent’s violation of the above rule, as established by the
following circumstances on record:
Page 18 of 19
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a
certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Respondent, the Deed of Sale
over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor.
Two Respondent met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property
subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Respondent already had knowledge that Zenaida
Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Respondent
accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.
Four, Respondent’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was
demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida
Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he
filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for
the complainant.
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