B. M. No.
1036 June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
Edwin Lana was among those who passed the 2000 BAR Examination.
On May 21, 2001, one day before the scheduled oath-taking of the bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
filed a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
On May 22, 2001, the Court allowed the Respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar at the Philippine International Convention Center. However,
the Respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys for the pending resolution of
the charges against him.
It was alleged that Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in May 2001 Elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate.
It was further alleged that the Respondent filed pleadings (Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor) before MBEC and signed the pleadings as counsel for
George Bunan dated May 19, 2001. In addition, it was alleged that the
respondent is not allowed by law to act as a counsel for a client in any court or
in any administrative body since he is a Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate, Government Employee.
On the other hand, the Respondent admitted, in his comment, that Bunan
sought his “specific assistance” to represent him before the MBEC. He claimed
that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Thus, he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as a lawyer.
Furthermore, he claimed that he submitted his resignation on May 11,
2001 which was accepted on the same date. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of
Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Edwin Lana engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agreed with the findings and recommendations of the
Office of the Bar Confidant, “OBC”, that the Respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law and does not deserve admission to the Philippine
Bar.
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even
before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and
his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
Clearly, he engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the
Philippine Bar. It was true that the Respondent passed the 2000 BAR
Examination and took his lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorney’s that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in
the Roll of Attorneys.
In Cayetano vs Monson, the Court held that “practice of law” means any
activity, in or out, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
In Beltran, Jr., vs Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but
had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under
Sec. 3(e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practiced of law is liable for indirect contempt of the court.
WHEREFORE, Respondent is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
In a Letter dated August 31, 1998, Atty. Misael Ladaga requested the
Office of the Court Administrator for authority to appear as counsel pro bono for
his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending
before Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On the other hand, while the
respondent’s letter request was pending in action, the Private complaint sent a
letter to Office of the Court Administrator dated September 2, 1998 requesting
for a certification with regard to respondent’s authority to appear for the
accused.
Respondent, in his comment, admitted that he appeared in the pending
Criminal Case without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the
defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of
a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member
of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he
rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office
nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In
any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved
by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's
request for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the
Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the Court.
On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Atty. Lagada violated Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.
2.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent violated Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found
under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession,
specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain
to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a
lawyer.
In People vs Villanueva, Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative
engagement in the private practice of law.
It is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the
"private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. L-8320 December 20, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SIM BEN, Defendant-Appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Sim Ben appealed to Supreme Court the judgment rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violation paragraph 3, Article 201
of the RPC, for having exhibited cinematographic films of indecent or immoral
scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view
in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the
information without the aid of counsel.
On January 31, 1953, when this case was called for trial, Sim Ben was
informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid
of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to
have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His
answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to
him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He
was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as
provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The
Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir."
At this juncture, the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed
upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and
1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine
does render the sentence of the court void.
COURT’S RULING:
No. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon
the appellant seems to bear out his claim; But such recommendation or one of
leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged
against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not
render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out
to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the Appellant.
G.R. No. L-16731 March 30, 1960
FELIPE ECO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., Respondents-Appellees
BARRERA, J.
FACTS:
On, April 30, 1958, the court rendered judgment finding, inter alia that on
January 17, 1956, Petitioner Eco obtained from the Bureau of Forestry a
certificate of private woodland registration under Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on the strength of a possessory information title covering
700 hectares but which was made to appear later on a sketch to contain 290
hectares of forest land, 99 hectares of new logged area and 811 hectares
cultivated area.
TigMan Lumber Co., another timber licensee, protested against this
registration and filed a petition for reconsideration which was apparently granted
because the Director of Forestry suspended the operation of Eco’s certificate.
Thereafter, it was found that portions of the area released from the forest zone
were under occupancy by some 80 oppositors. After a series of protests and
counter-protests, objections and counter-objections between the parties, the
Director of Forestry recommended cancellation of Eco’s certificate of private
woodland and the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources approved the
recommendation.
Upon the appeal of Eco, the Secretary reopened the case and ordered a
formal investigation of the whole controversy to give the parties "ample
opportunity to formally present their respective sides of the controversy and be
given their ‘day in court’". Petitioner Eco refused to submit to this reinvestigation,
insisting that it was not necessary; that in the face of this attitude of Eco, the
Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources issued a decision, dismissing the
appeal of Eco and hereby authorized Tigman Lumber Co. to continue their
operation inside the land in question.
A copy of decision was received by counsel for the petitioner on May 5,
1958. On June 3, on the same year, petitioner filed motion for reconsideration of
the decision, which was denied on June 14, for lack of merit. On June 21,
petitioner filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond. Respondents opposed the
notice of appeal and appeal bond was made out of time. Sustaining this
allegation, the Court disapproved the notice of appeal and appeal bond.
On September 6, 1958, Petitioner filed a motion for relief under Rule 38,
praying for the setting aside of the decision on the ground of excusable
negligence. The alleged negligence consisted of the erroneous computation by
counsel’s clerk of the period within which an appeal may be made, said clerk
being of the impression that the prescriptive period to appeal in certiorari cases
is also 30 days like in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days as provided in
Section 17 of Rule 41.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the petitioner’s ground for excusable negligence is valid
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
COURT’S RULING:
No. Evidently, what was delegated by petitioner’s counsel to his clerk was
the computation itself of the period within which the appropriate pleading may
be filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise. As the lower court aptly said: "the
duty to compute the period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the
attorney which he cannot and should not delegate into an employee
because it concerns a question of study of the law and its application,
and this Court considers this to be a delicate matter that should not be
delegated." The negligence here cannot, therefore, be considered excusable.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed order denying petitioner's
motion for relief.
G.R. No. L-5346 January 3, 1911
W. W. Robinson, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO VILLAFUERTE Y RAÑOLA., Defendant-appellant.
TORRES, J.
FACTS:
On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola. He alleged that the
respondent executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion empowering him to mortgage, pledge, or to dispose any of his
properties by acknowledging and confessing that he owed the plaintiff the net
sum of PHP 3,852.50 which is payable by installments. That the defendant
voluntarily executed a special mortgage upon the properties of his absolute
ownership and control of his properties.
It was stated further that the default of payment of any of the installments
would entitle the plaintiff to institute foreclosure of all the mortgage properties.
Then, the plaintiff prayed that an order be issued directing the delivery of the
properties enumerated in the instrument as mortgage properties.
However, on the other hand, the defendant denied the allegation of the
plaintiff. He contended that he did not execute, consent to, nor authorize the
execution of power of attorney of any kind in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion. The defendant received no sum from the plaintiff nor was he in the
latter's debt for the amount claimed by the plaintiff.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the intervention by one not an authorized practicing law is
valid.
COURT’S RULING:
No. The Supreme Court said that relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being
permitted to address questions to some of the witnesses during the hearing of
the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who
represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the intervention of the said law
clerk and employee of the plaintiff's attorney in this suit was improperly
admitted.
It was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said
Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer
admitted under oath to practice his profession before the courts of
these Islands. Therefore, the judge should have sustained and not permitted
him to address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact
that Attorney Agustin Alvares was present.
Even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's witnesses
and the presentation of documents of various kinds exhibited at the trial be
stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who was neither a
party to the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason,
based upon any positive prohibition of the law, to authorize the striking out to
the answers given by the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said
answers may have been evoked by questions addressed by a person not
authorized by law, and there is much less reason for rejecting the cross-
questions addressed to the same witnesses by the defendant's attorney, and the
answers thereto.
