CASE 51-58

1. Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, G.R. No. 109853

2. Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377
3. Rep vs. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
4. Paraga vs. CA, 254 SCRA 606
5. Sabello vs. DECS, 180 SCRA 623, December 26, 1989
6. Bunye vs. SB, G. R. No. 91927 and companion case, January 13, 1992
7. The SEC vs. CGH Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 210316, November 20, 2016
8. San Miguel Properties vs. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2014
CASE NUMBER 51
G.R. No. 109853 October 11, 2000

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S. AMATONG,

petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
PARDO, J.

FACTS:
Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed before the RTC a complaint against (ZANECO) for "Illegal
Collection Of Power Bills And Preliminary Injunction With Restraining Order. Petitioner alleged that as
per electric bills issued by ZANECO, respondent increased the Fuel Compensating Charge (FCC) and
Interim Adjustment.
Petitioner claimed that the increase was arbitrary and illegal, and that the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) did not sanction the collections.
Further, petitioner alleged that ZANECO cannot increase the bills since the power rate increase from the
(NPC) of P0.17 per kilowatt hour was not implemented yet due to a restraining order issued by the
Supreme Court.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent to desist from imposing,
charging, billing and collecting the FCC and other additional charges upon its end-users.
The petition of the Province of Zamboanga for restraining order was granted.
However, CA rendered its decision reversing that of the trial court and ordered the dismissal filed by the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the issue in this case is not the compensation of the cost of diesel fuel used
to feed the generating set in Mindanao. Precisely, the complaint was for "Illegal Collection of Power
Bills."
Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper body to investigate the
case is the NEA. The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain
within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration. NEA,is empowered to issue orders,
rules and regulations.
Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative may file a complaint with the NEA
as it is empowered to conduct hearings and investigations and issue such orders on the rates that may be
charged. Consequently, the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ERB.
In case a party feels aggrieved by any order, ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of
Appeals
CASE NUMBER 52
G.R. No. L-12944 March 30, 1959

MARIA NATIVIDAD VDA. DE TAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION, respondent-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Tan is the widow of the late Lt. Tan, a Chinese national, and a bona fide member of the 1st Regiment,
United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines who died in the service.
Tan filed with the CFI a verified petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the Veterans Back
Pay Commission to declare deceased Lt. Tan, entitled to backpay rights, privileges, and prerogatives and
to issue to her the corresponding backpay certificate of indebtedness. Stipulation of facts show that after
due liberation respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens are not entitled to.
Commission unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition. The trial court rendered decision in favor of
Tan.
Upon appeal, the respondent contends that the petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.
HELD:
No. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule, considering that in its reiterating its
obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the
Executive Department.
The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be
accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse,
thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted
by the Commission.
CASE NUMBER 53
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J.,

FACTS:

The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published Invitation to Bid, respondent submitted the
lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. After ascertaining the
completeness of the project, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and
Final Acceptance. Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the project.

However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of COA disapproved
the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time
of the execution of the contract.

Respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.

OSG, filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds of no cause of action and that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of
the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.

RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent and ordered DPWH to pay the actual amount in the
contract plus interest. Upon appeal, the CA sustain the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court explained that whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the
execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It
does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.

The Court holds that, in view of exceptions, that the complaint for specific performance and damages was
not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed.
Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law
CASE NUMBER 54

G.R. No. 96882 March 12, 1996

EUTIQUIANO PAGARA, et al
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE C. PADERANGA, OSCAR REMULLA,
ROMMEL GEORGE PADERANGA, HILDA GENER PADERANGA and GOERING GEORGE C.
PADERANGA,

FACTS:

The Department of Agrarian Reform, sent a telegram to private respondent Paderanga informing him that
the several parcels had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer of the Land Reform Program of
the government. Forthwith, the parcels were adjudicated to private petitioners and corresponding OLT
certificates were issued to them.

Private respondents thereupon filed their complaint with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform contesting
the issuance of the OLT certificates. When no action received, private respondents filed a complaint
against petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint allegedly due to
the failure of private respondents "to (first) refer the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform. Upon
appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action taken by private
respondents against petitioners.

HELD:

Yes.

The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable
(1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal
or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of
the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.

The foregoing jurisprudence when applied to the case at bar will point out that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable. First, the issue of tenancy involves legal questions as "tenancy
is not purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenants does upon the land, but it is also a
legal relationship"
Second, one of the principal respondents herein is the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who acts as the alter
ego of the President, and whose act of issuing land transfer certificate is the subject matter of this case.

Third, plaintiffs' claims of denial of due process in the issuance of the land transfer certificates finds merit
in this case for it was only after the certificates were issued that they were able to protest.

Finally, there is an exhaustive presentation of evidence that plaintiffs availed of the administrative
processes, that fourteen years had already elapsed, and the Department Secretary had not yet resolved
plaintiffs' protest leaving plaintiffs with no other recourse but to seek the relief of this Court as there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

CASE NUMBER 55

G.R. No. 87687 December 26, 1989

ISABELO T. SABELLO, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

 Petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both
were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein
petitioner appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila. The Court of appeals modified the decision
by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the
amount being involved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to
proceed to the highest court of the land.
 Petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied
for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position after the President’s absolute
pardon

HELD:

Yes, the Supreme Court explained that as a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should
be reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the
circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully his, the
discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.

In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the service as a classroom
teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.

As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate
that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere
classroom teacher.
CASE NUMBER 56

Ignacio Bunye, Et Al., vs. Sandiganbayan, Et Al., G. R. No. 91927: January 13, 1992 and companion
case.
Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS:

These cases have been consolidated because they are closely linked with each other as to factual
antecedents.

The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa entered into a contract with the KBMBPM for the latter’s
management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. Following the assumption into office of
the new Mayor Bunye, urged appropriate legal steps be taken for the recession of the contract.

Mayor Bunye, broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve upon petitioners the
Order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same, by taking over and assuming
the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of directors for that purpose and
excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful
functions as such.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid.

HELD:

NO. The Order was not valid.

There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives under the
KBMBPM and Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23. It is likewise manifest that the right to
due process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said
provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated
unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof.  These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
CASE NUMBER 57

THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) CHAIRPERSON et al

vs
CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND CJH SUITES CORPORATION, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
ALFREDO R. YÑIGUEZ III
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

CJH Development Corporation (CJHDC) is a duly organized domestic corporation, Respondent CJH
Suites Corporation (CJHSC), on the other hand, is a wholly owned subsidiary of CJHDC.

The BCDA and the CJHDC entered into an agreement. Thus, pursuant to this agreement, CJHDC
transferred ownership of, among others, sixteen (16) units from "The Manor" and ten (10) units from
"The Suites" to the BCDA via dacion en pago.

The BCDA acquired information regarding CJHDC and CJHSC's scheme of selling "The Manor" and
"The Suites" units through "leaseback" or "money-back" terms. Thus, SEC conducted investigation and
field visit. Subsequently, the SEC's Corporation Finance Department (CFD) issued a Memorandum
indicating its opinion that the "leaseback" arrangements offered by respondents to the public are
investment contracts.

The EPD filed a Motion for Issuance of Cease and Desist Order with SEC En Banc against CJHDC and
CJHSC. The latter then filed a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the CA questioning the above CDO and praying that
the same be reversed and set aside. The CA granted the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
which enjoins the SEC from enforcing its questioned CDO for a period of sixty (60) days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SEC has the primary jurisdiction over the case and respondents failed to exhaust all the
administrative remedies under the law to challenge the provisional order.

HELD:

The Supreme Court explained instead of filing an appeal with the CA, respondents should have filed a
motion to lift the assailed CDO. Since the law and the SEC Rules require that this motion be heard by the
SEC, it is during this hearing that respondents could have presented evidence in support of their
contentions. However, they chose not to file the said motion.
The courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. It is true that there are
certain exceptions.

The main issue, as to whether or not the sale of "The Manor" or "The Suites" units to the general public
under the "leaseback" or "money-back" scheme is a form of investment contract or sale of securities, is
not a pure question of law. On the contrary, it involves a question of fact that falls under the primary
jurisdiction of the SEC.

CASE NUMBER 58

G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, et al
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc., represented by Att. Orendain,
130 residential lots in its subdivision in BF Homes Parañaque. However, 20 TCTs (out of 40) were
withheld delivery by BF Homes since Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the
time of the transactions. BF Homes refused to deliver the TCTs despite demands. Because of this, SMP
filed a complaint-affidavit charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of
titles. Simultaneously, SMP sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel
BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint on the ground that there existed a prejudicial question
necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF
Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB. Upon elevation of the case to the CA
via Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, however, the CA dismissed SMP’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not HLURB Case presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the
criminal action.

HELD:

No. Even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’
posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question
that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

The action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This
situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of
administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of
controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their
resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts
and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function
exercisable only by the regular courts.

A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact,
relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the
doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the
matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.