G.R. No.

201716: JANUARY 08, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.

FACTS:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national
and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal
mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby,
however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election
and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-
2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the
May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the
formers disqualification to run.

The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010
elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC
en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

RULING:

No, Abundo has consecutively served for three terms. The facts of the case clearly point to
an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.

On this core issue, the Court find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what
otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively
broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually
served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of
service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
Additional Inputs:

The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption
of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation,
intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. 69 When the Constitution and
the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the
service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a
hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes
the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or
resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up
or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected
official is entitled to.

This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the
favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent
since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat.
In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or
during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen
warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having
the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact
that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact,
had no legal right to said position.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. 

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

xxxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and
Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for
any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His
full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because
the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).