Calalas v Court of Appeals & Eliza Sunga this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger

, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In

case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
Facts: carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code.
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial
seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the vehicle. that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
end, she gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In
driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga. contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of (2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
the truck. exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of
the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated
that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict. in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers
were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows
decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought
carriage and not on quasi-delict. to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in
Hence, this appeal from Calalas. our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater
risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention
Issues: that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
Held: should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters
into the highway.
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver
and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to (3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated
that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided
his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual the contract of carriage.
obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be NOTES:
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it s the basis of
the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier failed
to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

Doctrine of Proximate Cause

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions
involving breach of contract.

Presumption of Negligence
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it
becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in
the care of his passengers.

Bad faith
The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver failed to assist the injured
passenger in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.

The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common carriers remain basically unchanged

even when the contract is breached by tort although noncontradictory principles on quasi-
delict may then be assimilated as also forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian
World Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996])

Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic, common sense,

policy and precedent, is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occured. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 641 SCRA 326 [2000])

While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be liable in case of collision, the driver
of a moving vehicle who had no opportunity to avoid the collision due to his own making is not
relieved of liability, such as when his negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the
collision. (Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 [2000])
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. vs. HEIRS OF BATTUNG to himself, as well as his co-passengers, unless there is something that will indicate that a
more stringent inspection should be made.
DOCTRINE
Common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the passengers they
take in will not brig anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-
passengers, unless there is something that will indicate that a more stringent inspection
should be made.

FACTS
Respondent alleged that Battung boarded petitioner’s bus bound to Manila. When the bus
driver stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires, a man who was seated at the fourth
row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus
conductor notified the driver of the incident and thereafter brought Battung at the hospital, but
the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. Hence, respondents filed a complaint for damages
based on a breach of contract of carriage against petitioner before the RTC. Respondents
contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the passengers; and in case of injuries and/or
death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault. Petitioner maintained that
they had exercised extraordinary diligence and they claimed that a common carrier is not an
absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung’s death should be properly deemed a
fortuitous event. The RTC found that the petitioner were unable to rebut the presumed liability
of common carriers in case of injuries/death to its passenger due to their failure to show that
they implemented the proper security measures to prevent passengers from carrying deadly
weapons inside the bus which resulted to the killing of Battung. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
Decision in toto.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner liable for
damages to respondent arising from culpa contractual.

HELD
The complaint should be dismissed. Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the
passenger was in no way due (1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common carrier’s employees with
respect to the foregoing – such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by
strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent – there would be
no issue regarding the common carrier’s negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable
care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business, as such, the
presumption of fault or negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not
apply.Battung’s death was neither caused by any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful acts of petitioners. Instead, the case
involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger who
hurriedly alighted from the vehicle. Common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in
assuming that the passengers they take in will not brig anything that would prove dangerous
Facts: despite the fact that the space available was not big enough therefor, in view of which the
Caguimbal who was a paying pasenger of Batangas Transportation Company (BTCO) bus Biñan bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa.
died when the bus
of the Biñan Transportation Company (Binan) which was coming from the opposite direction Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule that extraordinary diligence must be
and a calesa managed by Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Biñan bus met an exercised by the driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his passengers.
accident.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, the BTCO bus driver
A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO to stop as he was going to alight, and when drove partly to the right
he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and
right in order to stop; at this juncture, a calesa, then driven by Makahiya was at a distance of should have seen to it — had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" — that his bus was
several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the
time the Biñan bus was about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus
direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Biñan bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed driver slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have
his light; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite known, therefore, that the Biñan bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the
directions, the Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted
between the BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy portions of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus new Civil Code). By the
(70) kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and contract of carriage.
the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and
then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped. Perez was
seriously injured and the horse was killed; that the second and all other posts supporting the thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers. This
top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall to the is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved. was reckless in not doing
left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged so. and. but.and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the Biñan bus to go through.
portion.As a consequence of this occurrence, Caguimbal and Tolentino died, apart from make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver. In an action based on a
others who were injured. contract of carriage. and. and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil
The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in Code . the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Biñan and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. hence.
Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Biñan and he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike the BTCO bus
Ilagan. driver whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. the
carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely
CFI dismissed the complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances. and any
right to sue Biñan and Ilagan. CA reversed said decision and rendered judgment for injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
Caguimbal. BTCO appealed to SC. negligence of the carrier (Article 1756.

Issue:
Whether BTCO is liable to pay damages for failure to exercise extraordinary diligence?

Held:
YES. BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part.

The recklessness of the driver of Binan was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of
the accident which
resultedin the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Biñan bus, he overtook
Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the same and the BTCO bus