CALALAS

vs. SUNGA

G.R. No. 122039, May 1, 2000

FACTS: 1. Petitioner: Vicente Calalas

2. Respondents: Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and Francisco Salva

3. Action: -Sunga filed a complaint dor damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage by the former in filing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier.

-Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco

4. –Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by

-Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the
rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of
the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period
of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.

5. RTC (CFI): The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.

6. CA: The ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.
The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-
appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:

(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

(5) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

7. Contention of petitioner: - contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise
would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the
safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of
the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso
fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral
damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported
by evidence.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and
Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case.

2. Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of

3. Whether moral damages should be awarded.

HELD: 1. The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
 action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the
Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

2. We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's
driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The
fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable
to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin
to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not
be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention
that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury
to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with
its body protruding two meters into the highway.

3. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art.
2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in
which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is
guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis
for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court
that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.