The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. its nature.

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or

GR 101949, 238 SCRA 524 [Dec 1, 1994] an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The ultimate test to determine to whether the act is jure
imperii or jure gestionis: whether the state is engaged in In the case at bench, .the Holy See did not buy and sell
the activity in the regular course of business. If not and it the lot in the ordinary course of a real estate business.
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity or an incident thereof, Lot 5-A was in fact donated to it for constructing thereon
then it is an act jure imperii. the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio [which
is necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
Where the plea of immunity is affirmed by the executive diplomatic mission]. In subsequently selling the lot, no
branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so profit was intended.
as not to embarrass the executive arm of the govt in
conducting the country’s foreign relation. Moreover, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this
case was sufficiently established by the Certification of
Facts the DFA. Where the plea of immunity is recognized and
The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the
land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of Paranaque. courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D executive arm of the govt. in conducting the country’s
registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corp. The foreign relation.
three lots were sold to Licup through an agent. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to respondent
Starbright Enterprises (Starbright). In view of the refusal
of the squatters to vacate said lots, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Thereafter, the Holy See
(a foreign state exercising sovereignty over the Vatican
City) through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, sold Lot
5-A to a third person (Tropicana Corp.). Lot 5-A was
previously acquired by the Holy See by donation from
the Archdiocese of Manila for constructing thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. In
subsequently selling the lot, no profit was intended. The
Holy See merely wanted to dispose of the same
because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for them to use it.

Starbright filed a complaint against the Holy See who

pled sovereign/diplomatic immunity. Starbright insists
that the doctrine of non- suability does not apply for the
Holy See has divested itself of such cloak when, of its
own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for
the sale of parcel of land located in the Phils. The trial
court upheld Starbright. Hence this petition. Meanwhile,
the DFA moved to intervene in behalf of the Holy See,
and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See
is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of
the Phils exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all
the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission or embassy in this country.

Issue
Is the Holy See entitled to sovereign immunity?

Held
Yes. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test [as to
whether it is acting jure imperii or jure gestionis]. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged
in the activity in the regular course of business. If not,
the particular act or transaction must then be tested by
 G.R. No. 185572 February 7, 2012 issued an Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29
CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR D. March 2006, CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for
SANTAMARIA Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145 could
rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12
Facts April 2006, arguing that the trial court did not have
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the
Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and
represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered (b) the subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North product of an executive agreement.
Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by
its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order
feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and setting the
San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project). case for summary hearing to determine whether the
injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued. CNMEG
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
(EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for
Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or
extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.
government to finance the Northrail Project. The
Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the
lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for
agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, Resolution dated 5 December 2008.
with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per
annum. Issue
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the from being sued before a local court. - NO
Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter
to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) Ruling
informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
Contractor for the Northrail Project. immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According
Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
was pegged at USD 421,050,000. acts or acts jure gestionis.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it
EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved
agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA – whether the entity claiming immunity performs
04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The
EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the when the proceedings arise out of commercial
Philippine government in order to finance the transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project. activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of the exercise of its sovereign functions.
Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the
Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was
Budget and Management, the National Economic conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or
Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese
government but was plainly a business strategy
employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this
commercial enterprise.

The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to

CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and
its assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply
that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance
of the latter’s sovereign functions. To imply otherwise
would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese
corporations owned by the state would be automatically
considered as performing governmental activities, even
if they are clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary
pursuits.

Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs

governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. This view finds
support in Malong v. Philippine National Railways, in
which this Court held that “immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized.”

In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG

cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that
it performs governmental functions. Its designation as
the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no
precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether
GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to
be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under
Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in
Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
government-owned and -controlled corporation without
an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue
and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.

An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may

be construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.

In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state
immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed
as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although
there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is a
reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in
this case.
 United States of America v. Ruiz
G. R. No. L-35645, 136 SCRA 487 [May 22, 1985]

Restrictive Application of State immunity is now the rule

– State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii as
against jure gestionis.

Facts
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United
States invited the submission of bids for a couple of
repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US
two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals
and for the name of its bonding company. The company
construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they
complied with the requests. The company received a
letter which was signed by William I. Collins of
Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of
the petitioners herein informing that the company did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects because of
its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs,
and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For
this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by
him against the US.

Issue
Is the U.S. immune from suit?

Held
Yes. The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule, limiting it to proceedings that arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case, the projects—the repair of
wharves or shoreline—are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the U.S.
and the Phils., indisputably a function of the gov’t of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
 GR No. 108813, 15 December 1994 complaint. Considering that the United States has not
JUSMAG Philippines v. NLRC waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot prosper.
DOCTRINES:
A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally
Government, and in the absence of any waiver or accepted principles of international law as part of the law
consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these
JUSMAG cannot prosper universally recognized principles. In international law,
“immunity” is commonly understood as the exemption of
Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of
recognized principles of international law that the another state. This is anchored on the principle of the
Philippines recognizes and adopts as part of the law of sovereign equality of states under which one state
the land cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has
FACTS: no power over an equal)
Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the
respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03- 02092-92, existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that
reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local
and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the courts. The complexity of relationships between
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO sovereign states, brought about by their increasing
SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner. commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive
application of the doctrine. Thus, in United States of
Private respondent was one of the seventy four (74) America vs. Ruiz, we clarified that our pronouncement in
security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at Harry Lyons, supra, with respect to the waiver of State
JUSMAG Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from immunity, was obiter and “has no value as an imperative
December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, authority.” As it stands now, the application of the
1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The
PHILIPPINESFILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to
ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. His services were terminated allegedly due
to the abolition of his position. He was also advised that
he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992,
although the same was not charged against his leave.

On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint

with the Department of Labor and Employment on the
ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
from service by JUSMAG. He asked for his
reinstatement. JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss
invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the
United States. It further alleged lack of employer-
employee relationship and that it has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued.

ISSUE:
Whether JUSMAG was immune from suit as an agency
of the United States.

HELD
YES, from the foregoing, it is apparent that when
JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the
United States pursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with
petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United
States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the
 US vs. Reyes Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to
G.R. No. 79253, March 1, 1993 dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action
FACTS: is necessary so that Court would be able to render a
Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
identification checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause
at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations
(JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City, filed a in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the
complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this
citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already
activity exchange, for damages due to the oppressive brought this petition to the SC.
and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess
of her authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when
Bradford searched Montoya’s body and belongings while Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec.
the latter was already in the parking area after buying 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to
some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
purchasing privileges. To support the motion, the allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties
petitioners claimed that checking of purchases is a since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act
routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This
protect and safeguard merchandise, cash, and will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has
equipment pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of not be formally impleaded. But this is not all
NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7. Therefore, encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public
Bradford’s order to check all employee purchases was official is made to account in his capacity as such for
done in the exercise of her duties as Manager of the acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State
NEX-JUSMAG. authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against
officials by one whose rights have been violated by such
ISSUE: acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of
Whether or not Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
HELD: perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be
No. Under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance invoked where the public official is being sued in his
Agreement creating the JUSMAG, “only the Chief of the private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This
Military Adviser Group and not more than six other usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority
senior members thereof designated under by him will be or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official
accorded diplomatic immunity”. The court also ruled that is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the
Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also,
Relations provided an exception; stating that even USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with
diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in
perform any professional or commercial activity outside the Philippines merely because they have acted as
his official functions. Therefore, since Bradford works as agents of the US in the discharge of their official
NEX-JUSMAG’s Manager, she is not among those functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her
officers granted diplomatic immunity. private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the
scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in
ADDITIONAL INFO the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the
Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic
asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance
case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even
but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they
deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31,
appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
to RTC’s jurisdiction.

2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in

denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO
 Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990) and denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition.
Facts
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and Issue:
married to an American who is a member of the United Where the respondent who are officials of the another
States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of state is Immune from suit
Guidance Counselor, in the Base Education Office at
Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. By Held:
reason of her non-selection to the position, petitioner No, While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
Loida Q. Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
complaint against private respondents, for alleged to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
discrimination against the former by reason of her allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
nationality and sex. On or about October 1976, the duties.
position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, became
vacant in the Base Education Office, Clark Air Base. On The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
November 11, 1976, the application of Loida Q. Shauf require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
was referred to Mr. Persi and after review of the satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
applications of Loida Q. Shauf, Mr. Persi felt that her amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
application was quite complete except for a reply to an them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
inquiry form attached to the application. This inquiry form itself although it has been formally impleaded. It must be
stated that the National Personnel Records Center, St. noted, however, that the rule is not also all-
Louis, Missouri, was unable to find an official personnel encompassing as to be applicable under all
folder for Loida Q. Shauf. Mr. Persi said that as a result circumstances.
of the National Personnel Records Center, GSA, not
being able to find any records on Loida Q. Shauf, this It is a different matter where the public official is made to
raised some questions in his mind as to the validity of account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
her work experience. As a result of his reservations on and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the
Loida Q. Shauf’s work experience and his conclusions State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
that the two other applications listed minimum unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are
qualifications, Mr. Persi decided to solicit additional not acts of the State, and an action against the officials
names for consideration. Mr. Persi was informed by or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
CORRO, through the Civilian Personnel Office in their violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is
December 15, 1976 message that a Mr. Edward B. not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of
Isakson from Loring AFB, Maine, was selected for the the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
position. Mr. Persi stated, when informed of CORRO’s that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
selection, that he had heard of Mr. Isakson and, from officer or the director of a State department on the
what he had heard, Mr. Isakson was highly qualified for ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he
the position; therefore, he wished to have the selection violates or invades the personal and property rights of
stand. This statement was denied by Mr. Persi. Mr. the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a
January 24, 1977. suit against the State within the constitutional provision
that the State may not be sued without its consent.
Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf
was never appointed to the position. Feeling aggrieved
by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded
her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil
Service Commission questioning the qualifications of
Edward Isakson. petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a
complaint for damages, against private respondents Don
Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial
Court, for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein
private respondents in maliciously denying her
application for the position.

Thereafter, on March 8, 1988, the trial court rendered

judgment in favor of herein petitioner Loida Q. Shauf,
Both parties appealed from the aforecited decision to
respondent Court of Appeals who reversed the decision
of the trial court, dismissed herein petitioners’complaint
 G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990 GR # 89331- the IRRI case
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION
COMMISSION vs CALLEJA The International Rice Research Institute was a fruit of
memorandum of understanding between the Philippine
DOCTRINE: government and the Ford and Rochefeller Foundations.
The immunity granted being "from every form of legal It was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic tax-
process except in so far as in any particular case they free, non-profit, non stock organization designed to carry
have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to out the principal objective of conducting “ basic research
state that a certification election is beyond the scope of on the rice plant.”
that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against
ICMC. It was organized and registered with the SEC as a
private corporation subject to all laws and regulations.
A certification election cannot be viewed as an However, by virtue of P.D no. 1620, IRRI was granted
independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an
series of events in the collective bargaining process international organization.
together with related incidents and/or concerted
activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the The Kapisanan filed a petition for direct certification
"legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and election with regional office of the Department of Labor
administrative proceedings." and Employment. IRRI opposed the petition invoking
Pres. Decree no.1620 conferring upon it the status of an
FACTS: international organization and granting it immunity from
all civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings under
GR # 85750- the Catholic Migration Commission Philippine laws. The Med-Arbiter upheld the opposition
(ICMC) case on the basis of PD 1620 and dismissed the petition for
direct certification.
ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine
government to operate the refugee processing center in On appeal by BLR Director, set aside the med-arbiter’s
Morong, Bataan. That comes from an argument between decision and contends that immunities and privileges
the Philippine government and the United Nations High granted to IRRI do not include exemption from coverage
Commissioner for refugees for eventual resettlement to of our labor laws.
other countries was to be established in Bataan.
ISSUE:
ICMC was duly registered with the United Nations 1. GR # 85750- the ICMC case: Whether or not the
Economic and Social Council and enjoys consultative grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC
status. As an international organization rendering extends to immunity from the application of Philippine
voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, labor laws?
its activities are parallel to those of the international
committee for migration and the international of the red 2. GR no. 89331- the IRRI case: Whether or not the
cross. Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petition for certification election filed by
On July 14,1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Kapisanan?
Allied for certification with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election among RULING:
the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter Both ICMC and IRRI are outside the coverage of Labor
opposed the petition on the ground that it is an Relations law.
international organization registered with the United
Nations and hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to
ICMC extends to immunity from the application of
The Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly necessitated
petition for each of jurisdiction. On appeal by TUPAS, by their international character and respective purposes
Director Calleja, reversed the Med-arbiter’s decision and which is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference
ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. by the host country in their internal workings.
ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the
TUPAS petition for certification election involving the Employees are not without recourse whenever there are
immunity expressly granted but the same was denied. disputes to be settled because each specialized agency
With intervention of department of foreign affairs who shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement
was legal interest in the outcome of this case, the of disputes out of contracts or other disputes of private
second division gave due to the ICMC petition and character to which the specialized agency is a party.
required the submittal of memoranda by the parties. Moreover, pursuant to article IV of memorandum of
abuse of privilege by ICMC, the government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to

respondent secretary of labor in his assumption of
appellate jurisdiction, contrary to Kapisanan’s allegation,
hence, any party to an election may appeal the order or
results of the elections as determined by the med-arbiter
directly to the secretary of labor and employment on the
ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof
established by the secretary of labor and employment for
the conduct of the election have been violated.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under

our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea
of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting
under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled
principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction
. . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is
accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action of the
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

BASIS:
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the
Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC
shall have a status “similar to that of a specialized
agency.”

Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their

property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form
of legal process except in so far as in any particular case
they have expressly waived their immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall
extend to any measure of execution.