Herma Shipping and Transport Corp. (HSTC), et al. vs. Cordero, G.R.

No. 244210, January 27, 2020-08-19

Facts:

HSCT, engaged in hauling, shipping, transporting oil and petroleum

products in Philippine waters, hired Cordero as a Helmsman or a duty look-out
during vessel navigation and part of the complement of M/Tkr Angat, Sometime
in 2015, HSTC discovered significant losses of the oil and petroleum products
transported by M/Tkr Angat during its past 12 voyages. As part of the
investigation, HSTC sent Notice to Explain/ Show-Cause Memo to 5 crew
members including Cordero and placed them on preventive suspension. Cordero
denied the allegations against him and blamed his poor eyesigth for not noticing
anything unusual during the voyages. HSTC found Cordero’s explanation
insufficient and terminated him through a Notice of Termination. Thus, Cordero
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other money claims against petitioners.
The Labor Arbiter found Cordero’s employment to have been validly terminated
due to Misconduct and Willful Breach of Trust and Confidence when he
perpetrated a serious infraction amounting to theft of property entrusted to him.
The NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling. The CA modified the ruling by ordering
petitioners to pay Cordero separation pay because dismissal was too harsh. Both
appealed.

Issue/s:

WON Cordero is entitled to separation pay.

Ruling:

Considering that questions of fact are generally proscribed in a Rule 45

petition, and that although there are jurisprudentially recognized exceptions to
this rule, none exists in the present case. The correctness of the labor tribunals'
factual finding that he had, in fact, participated in the oil pilferage while navigating
at sea, which resulted in losses for HSTC, as affirmed by the CA, is upheld.

Factual findings of quasi judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by

substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more
so when they coincide with those of the LA, as in this case. 

Accordingly, in view of the existence of a just cause for termination,

Cordero's dismissal was valid.As a general rule, an employee who has been
dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor
Code is not entitled to a separation pay.In exceptional cases, however, the Court
has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social
justice" or on "equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required that the
dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral
character of the employee.

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the

award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the
effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity
under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private
respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record
prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of
benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse,
betrayal of the company. If an employee's length of service is to be regarded as a
justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually
become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.

Comscentre Phils., Inc. (CPI), et al vs. Rocio, G.R. No. 222212,

January 22, 2020

Facts:

CPI hired Rocio as a Network Engineer. When she informed petitioners of her
intention to resign, the local Human Resource Managers informed her that which
employment comes with an employment bond in the amount of P80,000.00 if she
will terminate her employment within a period of 24 months from her start date.
Thus, she emailed petitioner’s Australian Human Resource Manager for
clarification regarding the employment bond. The following day, the local
managers issued her a show-cause letter placing her under preventive
suspension and advising her of an administrative hearing. Rocio submitted her
explanation. A hearing was also conducted. However, on she was thereafter
suspended without pay. Thus, Rocio filed a case for unfair labor practice, illegal
suspension, illegal deduction, underpayment of salaries and other money claims.
The Labor Arbiter found Rocio’s preventive suspension unjustified and ordered
CPI to pay her wages during the illegal suspension, proportionate 13 th month
pay, moral and exemplary damages. The NLRC partly affirmed the LA’s ruling
and modified the amount of monetary award and deducted the employment bodn
from the total monetary award. Rocio filed a MR, but it was denied. Thus, an
entry of judgment was issued in favor of petitioners. Meanwhile, Rocio filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA nullified the NLRC's directive to deduct
the Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) "employment bond" from the total
monetary award due to respondent. It ruled that petitioners' claim for payment of
" employment bond" is within the exclusive jurisdiction of regular courts
Issue/s:

WON the CA erred when it ruled that petitioners' claim for payment of
"employment bond" fell within the jurisdiction of regular courts? 

Ruling:

It is clear that petitioners' claim for payment is inseparably intertwined with

the parties' employer-employee relationship. For it was respondent's act of
prematurely severing her employment with the company which gave rise to the
latter's cause of action for payment of "employment bond." As aptly found by the
NLRC, petitioners' claim was "an offshoot of the resignation of [respondent] and
the complications arising therefrom and which eventually led to the filing of the
case before the Labor Arbiter." Verily , petitioners' claim falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor tribunals. 

The SC sustain the NLRC ' s finding that respondent is liable for payment
of "employment bond" pursuant to her undertaking in the employment contract.
She herself has not disputed this liability arising as it did from her breach of the
minimum employment period clause.[29] Notably, she committed to abide thereby
in exchange for the expenses incurred by the company for her training as
Network Engineer. Surely, while petitioners are liable to respondent for her illegal
suspension and unpaid money claims , respondent, too, is liable to petitioners for
payment of the "employment bond." As such, the NLRC correctly ordered the
offsetting of their respective money claims against each other. To rule otherwise
would be "to sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly
administration of justice."

Al-Masiya Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. et al. vs. Viernes, G.R.

No. 216132, January 22, 2020.

Facts:

Viernes filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against petitioners.

Petitioner deployed Viernes to Kuwait in November 2010 as a domestic helper
with a US$400 monthly pay for a period of 2 years. However, Viernes’
employment with first and second employers did not proceed due to
disagreement in working conditions. Her third employer also failed because it
failed to obtain a working visa for her. Thus, complainant went to the Philippine
Embassy and related her employment problems to the Labor Attache in Kuwait.
In January 2011, complainant was offered a job at a chocolate factory which
turned out to be non-existent. Employees of Al Rekabi , an employment agency
offered her a job. However, they confiscated her phone when she tried to contact
the labor attache. The manager made her sign a written admission that her
employers treated her well. She was offered a job at a restaurant but instead of
going to the restaurant, she was was taken to a flat where she was told to apply
make up and wear sexy clothes. Hours thereafter, she was able to leave at
around 11:00PM.
In February 2011, espondent was asked to affix her signature on a letter
that she copied purportedly showing that she admitted having preterminated her
contract of employment and that she no longer had any demandable claim as
she was treated well. Respondent's execution of this letter of resignation was
made as a precondition to the release of her passport and plane ticket which
were in the possession of petitioners.

Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss alleging that espondent executed an Affidavit

of Quitclaim and Desistance, Sworn Statement, and Receipt and Quitclaim
before Ofelia M. Castro-Hudson, Assistant Labor Attaché in Kuwait, where she
allegedly stated that she voluntarily agreed to release Al-Masiya and Saad
Mutlaq, et al., from all her claims arising from her employment abroad. They also
presented her handwritten statement where she expressed that her cause for
terminating her employment was her own personal reasons. The Labor Arbiter
denied the motion and ruled in favor of complainant and awarded her salary
differentials, salary for the unexpired portion of the contract and damages. The
NLRC denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the LA’s ruling. Petitioners
appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the assailed decision.

Issue/s:

WON respondent was constructively dismissed.

Ruling:

Notably, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA all ruled against the validity,
regularity, and due execution of the subject resignation letter, Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Desistance, and the final settlement. The Court finds no reason to
deviate from their findings. In any case, within the context of a termination
dispute, the rule is that quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with
disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and
ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights. The reason for
this rule is that the employer and the employee do not stand on the same footing,
such that quitclaims usually take the form of contracts of adherence, not of
choice.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that findings of fact of administrative

agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality. [Unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion
or where it is clearly shown that the factual findings were reached arbitrarily or in
utter disregard of the evidence on record, they are binding upon the Court. [55] In
this case, the Court finds no such showing of arbitrariness or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the LA and the NLRC. 

On the contrary, the finding that respondent was constructively dismissed

is amply supported by the evidence on record. 

ggIn cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility, unreasonableness,

or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee with no other viable
recourse but to terminate his or her employment.An employee is considered to
be constructively dismissed from service if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbea[r]able to the
employee as to leave him or her with no option but to forego his or her continued
employment. From this definition, it can be inferred that various situations,
whereby the employer intentionally places the employee in a situation which will
result in the latter's being coerced into severing his ties with the former, can
result in constructive dismissal.

Gemudiano, Jr. vs. Naess Shipping Phils., Inc., et al., G. R. No.

223825, January 20, 2020

Facts:

In December 2012, Gemudiano, Jr., applied as a seaman with Naess

Shipping, completed his training and underwent pre-employment medical
examination (PEME) where he was declared fit for sea service. Then, he signed
an Embarkation order and and executed a Contract of Employment for Marine
Crew on Board Domestic Vessel with Naess Shipping, in behalf of Royal Dragon.
He was engaged as a Second Officer on board the vessel “M/V Meiling 11, an
inter-island cargo carrier, for a period of 6 months with a gross monthly salary of
P30,000.00. The contract shall take effect on March 12, 2013 and that the
employment relationship between them shall commence once the Master of the
Vessel Issues a boarding confirmation to the petitioner. However, in March 2013,
Royal Dragon cancelled the embarkation order. Thus, he filed a complaint for
breach of contract against respondents with the RAB.
Petitioner alleged that respondents ' unilateral and unreasonable failure to
deploy him despite the perfected contract of employment constitutes breach and
gives rise to a liability to pay actual damages.  Respondents, on the other hand,
argued that: 1) petitioner's employment did not commence because his
deployment was withheld by reason of misrepresentation because he not
disclose the fact that HE is suffering from diabetes mellitus and asthma which
render him unfit for sea service; 2) the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
petitioner's complaint for breach of contract , invoking the absence of employer-
employee relationship. 
 The LA declared that upon perfection of the employment contract on
February 18, 2013, the rights and obligations of the parties had already arisen.
Thus, when respondents failed to deploy petitioner in accordance with their
perfected contract, they became liable to pay him actual damages in the amount
of P180,000.00. THE NLRC affirmed the LA’s Decision but with modification as to
damages. It awarded petitioner moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the recoverable amount, and refund of
the cost of the PEME. It held that even without petitioner's actual deployment, the
perfected contract already gave rise to respondents' obligations under the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract.

However, the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the NLRC. It
declared that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner's complaint
because of the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties; emphasized that the perfected contract of employment did not
commence since petitioner's deployment to his vessel of assignment did not
materialize abd that petitioner does not fall within the definition of " migrant
worker " or " seafarer " under R . A. No. 8042 because his services were
engaged for local employment.

Issue/s:

WON there exist an employer-employee relationship to clothe the LA of

jurisdiction

Ruling:

The SC ruled that the condition set forth in the contract (on the
Addendum) is one that is imposed not on the birth of the contract of employment
since the contract has already been perfected, but only on the fulfillment or
performance of their respective obligations, i.e., for petitioner to render services
on board the ship and for respondents to pay him the agreed compensation for
such services. A purely potestative imposition, such as the one in the Addendum,
must be obliterated from the face of the contract without affecting the rest of the
stipulations considering that the condition relates to the fulfillment of an already
existing obligation and not to its inception.Moreover, the condition imposed for
the commencement of the employment relations offends the principle of mutuality
of contracts ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil Code which states that contracts
must bind both contracting parties , and its validity or compliance cannot be left
to the will of one of them. The Court is thus constrained to treat the condition as
void and of no effect, and declare the respective obligations of the parties as
unconditional. Consequently , the employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondents should be deemed to have arisen as of the agreed
effectivity date of the contract of employment, or on March 12, 2013. 

Also, Under Art. 224, now 217 of the Labor Code, Labor Arbiters have
jurisdiction over Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations. While there are cases which hold
that the existence of an employer-employee relationship does not negate the civil
jurisdiction of the trial courts,[16] in this particular case, we find that jurisdiction
properly lies with the Labor Arbiter.  The determination of propriety of petitioner's
non-deployment necessarily involves the interpretation and application of labor
laws, which are within the expertise of labor tribunals. The question of whether
respondents are justified in cancelling the deployment of petitioner requires
determination of whether a subsequent advice from the same medical provider
as to the health of petitioner could validly supersede its initial finding during the
required PEME that petitioner is fit to work. 

Tan, et al, vs Dagpin, G. R. No. 212111, January 15, 2020

Facts:
Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision holding them liable for
illegal dismissal of respondent and directing them to pay separation pay,
backwages, SIL pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. However, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to attached
the required Certification of Non-Forum shopping. Petitioners appealed to the CA
which issued a TRO against the enforcement of the LA’s decision.

Meantime, Entry of Judgment was issued on the NLRC Resolution on

January 17, 2005. In March 2005, respondent filed with the Executive Labor
Arbiter a Motion to Admit Computation and Issuance of Writ of Execution and
Issuance of Writ of Execution where her claims sum up to more than one million
pesos. Petitioners opposed. After the TRO expired, the ELA ordered the release
of petitioner’s cash bond and granted respondent’s Motion. The writ was fully
satisfied in October 2005.

Then, petitioner’s Petition of Certiorari filed with the CA was dismissed.

They appealed to the SC which denied them in a Resolution dated June 23, 2008
which became final and executory in 2008.

Thus, respondent filed another Motion for Approval of Computation and

Issuance of Writ of Execution seeking additional increments to her monetary
award. This time, the ELA denied respondent’s Motion. Respondent appealed
but the NLRC denied it for failure to file the appeal timely. The Court of Appeals
reversed the NLRLC findings and ruled that the service of the February 19, 2009
Order on respondent herself, The Court of Appeals, ordered the LA to recompute
the monetary awards due respondent and to deduct therefrom the amount of
P1,005,146.83 which respondent had already received sometime in 2004. It
further imposed a twelve percent (12%) legal interest on the remaining monetary
awards from finality of judgment on August 21, 2008 until fully paid.

Issue/s:

WON respondent’s appeal to the NLRC was timely filed?

WON respondent is entitled to a recomputation and an increase in the
monetary award already given and paid her during the execution of the LA’
decision.

Ruling:

The SC ruled that the appeal was timely filed. Where a party appears by
attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices must be
served on the attorney of record.Service of the court's order on any person other
than the counsel of record is not legally effective, nay, binding on the party; nor
may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent procedural
steps which may be taken by the attorney.This rule is founded on considerations
of fair play. A party engages a counsel precisely because he or she does not feel
competent to deal with the intricacies of law and procedure. When the
notice/order is directly served on the party, he or she would have to communicate
with his or her attorney and turn over the notice/order to the latter, thereby
shortening the remaining period for taking the proper steps to protect the party's
interest.

In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the

court will rightly assume that the counsel of record continues to represent his
client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the
reglementary period.[2

As it was, however, copy of the ELA Order dated February 19, 2009 was
served not on Atty. Rosal but directly on respondent herself who received it on
March 19, 2009. This is not the proper service contemplated by law.
Consequently, the reglementary period for appeal was not deemed to have
commenced from respondent's receipt of the ELA Order.

The SC also ruled that respondents are not entitled to a recomputation or

increase of the monetary award. It was undisputed that the NLRC Resolution
dated July 29, 2004 which affirmed the fact of respondent's illegal dismissal and
monetary award became final and executory on January 10, 2005. As soon as an
entry of judgment thereon was issued on January 17, 2005, the corresponding
writ of execution got implemented and satisfied in full.
 Although petitioners formally opposed respondent's claims all the way up
to this Court, they, nonetheless, yielded to the execution of judgment sought by
respondent way back in 2005 at the ELA's level. Inasmuch as petitioners had
already satisfied the final monetary benefits awarded to respondent, the latter
may not ask for another round of execution, lest, it violates the principle against
unjust enrichment. Clearly, there is no additional increment which accrued to
respondent by reason of the Court's Resolution dated June 23, 2008 which did
not modify, let alone, alter the long executed judgment of the NLRC.

Papertech, Inc. vs. Katando, G.R. No. 236020, January 8, 2020

Facts:

Petitioner hired Katando as a machine operator in 1996. In 2007, Katando

and other employees of petitioner filed a Petition for Certification Election and
picketed in the company. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike
against the participants and prayed that the respondents be declared to have lost
their employment. The LA ruled in favor of bpetitioners but the NLRC reversed
said ruling and ordered the reinstatement of the workers. The NLRC ruling was
affirmed by the CA and the SC. Upon motion, the LA issued a writ of execution
on April 17, 2013 and ordered the workers’ reinstatement.

However, in May 2013, petitioner sent notice to Katando and other

workers ordering them to report to various posts in CDO, Cebu City, Iloilo City,
and Pangasinan, under pain of removal in case of non-compliance. The workers
filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Cite Papertech in Contempt and to
Order Payment of their Salaries which the LA denied. Thus, the workers filed a
verified petition for extraordinary remedies before the NLRC. The NLRC ordered
the LA to resolve the issues on salaries and to proceed with the execution.
Papertech appealed this ruling to the CA.

On December 14, 2013, petitioner received a memorandum from

petitioner stating that she will be transferred to Makati office under the same
employment terms. Three days later, she received a show cause memorandum
for her refusal to heed the earlier memorandum. Then petitioner sent Katando a
memorandum imposing on her a seven-day suspension for disrespectful
behaviour. Katando served her suspension but she was suspended yet again for
one week for her disobedience and refusal to transfer as directed. Then, she filed
a complaint for illegal suspension. The LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal
and ordered petitioners backwages and separation pay. The NLRC affirmed the
LA’s ruling.
 Meanwhile, on November 2015, the CA, in the certification case,  directed
Katando and her co-respondents to report back to work in the place designated
by Papertech per notice of job assignments dated May 4, 2013, or if they
obstinately refuse such assignment, ordered Papertech to pay them separation
pay. This was affirmed by the SC and became final and executory.

Thus, Katando appealed the NLRC ruling for payment of separation pay.
The CA granted Katando's petition and ordered Papertech to immediately
reinstate her to her previous position without loss of seniority rights in addition to
the award of backwages. Thus, Papertech appealed to SC.

Issue/s:

WON the CA erred in ordering Katando’s reinstatement instead of granting

her separation apy.

Ruling:

The SC granted the petition.

Although Katando does not occupy a position of trust and confidence as a

machine operator, the circumstances of this case nonetheless calls for the
application of the doctrine of strained relations. It is true that litigation between
the parties per se should not bar the reinstatement of an employee. However, as
observed by the NLRC, this is not the only case involving Papertech and
Katando. They have been in conflict since 2008, or for 11 years now.

The SC reiterated that the length of time from the occurrence of the
incident to its resolution and the demonstrated litigiousness of the parties showed
that their relationship is strained. Similarly, the protracted litigation between the
parties here sufficiently demonstrate that their relationship is strained. It is
notable that Papertech has not even bothered to appeal the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter, and even stated that "in order not to prolong the proceedings, and for
both parties to peacefully move on from this unwanted situation, Papertech is
willing to pay the judgment award of separation pay."Clearly, Papertech does not
want Katando back as its employee.