14. Advan Motor, Inc. v. Veneracion, G.R. No.
190944, December 13, 2017
Facts:
Records show that respondent Veneracion started working sometime in 1999
in petitioner Advan Motor, Inc. Company’s business of selling and repairing cars
manufactured by General Motors Automotive Phils., as Sales Consultant. In a letter,
he was informed of the termination of his services "effective May 2, 2001 for the
reason of repeated AWOL violations for more than six consecutive days and
management's loss of trust and confidence in you for your repeated abandonment
of your office duties and responsibilities."
Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for constructive. The complaint was
subsequently amended by changing respondent's causes of action into actual
illegal dismissal and including underpayment of salaries.
In ruling, the Labor Arbiter observed that respondent's termination from his
employment was based on AWOL amounting to a violation of company rules and
regulations and on attendance for repeated abandonment of office duties and
responsibilities and management loss of trust and confidence in him.
On January 14, 2002, the respondent filed an amended complaint for
actual illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries/wages with damages,
attorney's fees, and a prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages.
In 2004, Labor Arbiter declared complainant's dismissal from his
employment as illegal.
In 2007, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.
Both parties filed their respective MRs, but the NLRC denied both motions
for lack of merit.
On May 29, 2008, the respondent, by way of a Petition
for Certiorari 12 submitted the Resolution of the NLRC to the Court of Appeals
for judicial review after which the appellate court partially granted the petition
of the respondent and ordered the company to reinstate the respondent to his
former position and to pay the latter his backwages.
The CA affirmed the NLRC decision with modifications granting
reinstatement, payment of backwages and the award of Ten [percent] (10%)
Attorney's fees.
In 2009 petitioner an MPR, but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner came to this Court seeking the reversal of the
questioned decision and resolution of the appellate court.
Issues:
(1) W/N the honorable court of appeals committed palpable error when it
ordered the reinstatement of respondent veneracion to his former
position.
(2) W/N the honorable court of appeals committed palpable error when it
ordered the award of backwages.
Ruling:
(1) No. We find that the Court of Appeals did not committed error in favor of
reinstatement.
The respondent is a mere car sales agent/sales consultant whose function is
precisely to sell cars for the company. Said position is clearly not vested with
complete trust and confidence from the employer as compared to, for example, a
managerial employee. In Dimabayao v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
doctrine on strained is explained: Strained relationship may be invoked only
against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose
differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude
reinstatement. In the instant case, however, the relationship between petitioner,
an ordinary employee, and management was clearly on an impersonal level.
To prevent deprivation of employment without just cause, the
implementation of the said doctrine must be supplemented by the rule that the
existence of a strained relationship is for the employer to clearly establish and
prove in the manner it is called upon to prove the existence of a just cause; the
degree of hostility attendant to a litigation is not, by itself, sufficient proof of the
existence of strained relations that would rule out the possibility of
reinstatement.
Thus, reinstatement is proper in this case under Article 294 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 294. Security of tenure…An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis ours.)
(2) No, the CA did not commit palpable error in deciding that backwages be
paid to respondent.
Since there was a conclusive finding that respondent was unjustly dismissed
from work, we thus likewise affirm the award of backwages, which are awarded to
allow the employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of
wages as a result of his dismissal.
The two reliefs of reinstatement and backwages have been discussed
in Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc : backwages and reinstatement are
separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee in order to
alleviate the economic damage brought about by the employee's dismissal.
"Reinstatement is a restoration to a state from which one has been removed or
separated" while "the payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the
income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal." Therefore, the award
of one does not bar the other.
The payment of backwages is generally granted on the ground of equity. It is
a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful
dismissal; the grant thereof is intended to restore the earnings that would have
accrued to the dismissed employee during the period of dismissal until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause. It is not private
compensation or damages but is awarded in furtherance and effectuation of the
public objective of the Labor Code. Nor is it a redress of a private right but rather in
the nature of a command to the employer to make public reparation for dismissing
an employee either due to the former's unlawful act or bad faith.
The award of backwages is not conditioned on the employee's ability or
inability to, in the interim, earn any income. Hence, the decision of the CA is
affirmed.
15. Lisondra v. Megacraft International Corp., G.R. No. 204275, December 9,
2015
Facts:
The petition stems from a case for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner
against Megacraft International Corporation (Megacraft) and Spouses Melecio
and Rosemarie Oamil (Spouses Oamil) before the NLRC.
In 2010, the LA rendered a Decision declaring the constructive dismissal
of complainant.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC which later dismissed it. Then,
respondents filed an MR which later made as basis declaring that complainant
was not constructively dismissed herself from employment. Consequently, there
is no basis for the grant of separation pay, backwages, moral damages and
attorney's fees.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied. Petitioner then
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 7 before the Court of Appeals.
The CA dismissed the petition because it suffered from the following
"congenital infirmities": there was no proper proof of service among others.
Petitioner filed an MR, but was denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition filed by petitioner for failure
to comply with the requirement on proper proof of service.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the petition. The present petition is
granted.
The Court finds that there is sufficient ground in this case for leniency in
applying the rules of procedure, considering the opposing decisions of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC relaxing the rules "in order to give full
meaning to the constitutional mandate of affording full protection to
labor. What is at stake in this case is petitioner's livelihood itself. Thus,
there is a need to apply such leniency in this case in order to serve the
ends of justice.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "while petitioner filed her
Affidavit of Service, and incorporated the registry receipts, petitioner still failed
to comply with the requirement on proper proof of service."
In this case, the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the petition
was accompanied by the affidavit of service and registry receipts.
In Province of Leyte v. Energy Development Corporation, the Court explained
the purpose for the rule:
Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise such party of the
pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already
been notified of the same and had even participated in the
proceedings, such purpose would have already been served.
In this case, respondents were informed and even filed their
Comment to the petition. Thus, the purpose of the rule had been
achieved. It would have been "more prudent for the Court [of Appeals] to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a substantive review of the case
in order to attain the ends of justice than to dismiss the same on mere
technicalities."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CA’s resolutions
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals-
Cebu City for disposition on the merits.
16. One Shipping Corp. v. Peñafiel, G.R. No. 192406, [January 21, 2015], 751
PHIL 204-217
Facts:
Petitioner One Shipping Corp., for and in behalf of its principal One Shipping
Kabushiki Kaisha/Japan, hired the late Ildefonso S. Peñafiel as Second Engineer on
board the vessel MV/ACX Magnolia for a duration of twelve (12) months. Peñafiel
boarded the vessel on August 29, 2004 and died on July 2, 2005. His wife then filed
for monetary claims arising from his death. Respondent alleged that when
Ildefonso disembarked from the vessel on May 21, 2005, he was already
complaining to his superior as well as to the petitioner manning agency about chest
pains. However, he was allegedly required to undergo pre-employment medical
examinations for his next deployment rather than be sent for post medical
examination. It was during these medical examinations that Ildefonso collapsed
and later died.
The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Respondent filed her appeal with NLRC which the affirmed LA’s decision.
On appeal, the CA granted her petition. Petitioner filed an MR, but was
denied.
Issues:
(1) W/N the CA erred in reviewing the resolutions in the LA and NLRC for being
already final and executory.
(2) W/N the death of respondent's spouse was work related.
Ruling:
(1) No, the CA did not err in reviewing the Resolutions in the LA and NLRC
though said resolutions are already final and executory.
The present petition falls under the exception due to the different
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. moreover, the case
is nunc pro tunc entry as the Resolution dated March 31, 2008 has become
final and executory on June 16, 2008 is belatedly dated June 10, 2009. In that
regard, the NLRC committed a mistake.
In Aliviado v. Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. 8 this Court has extensively
discussed the finality of a judgment, thus:
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final
and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land,
as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or
execution of the judgment.
In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, 10 we held that:
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final
judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and (3) void judgments.
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of
something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of
the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the
court, but to supply an omission in the record of action really had,
but omitted through inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs.
Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672)
Based on the records, since the petition of herein respondent was filed
before the expiration of the period within which to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, the CA, therefore, committed no error in not dismissing and eventually
deciding the case. Necessarily, if the mode of appeal is that of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 65, its reglementary period must be the one followed.
(2) No, the death of respondent's spouse was not work related.
From the above findings and circumstance, it is clear that at the time of
Ildefonso's repatriation, the employer-employee relationship between
Ildefonso and the petitioners had already been terminated.
In Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., this Court declared that in order to
avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the
effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of
employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation
benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his
employment contract, the employer is liable. In the present case, Ildefonso died
after he pre-terminated the contract of employment. That alone would have
sufficed for his heirs not to be entitled for death compensation benefits.
As found by the Labor in this case, there are no indications that
Ildefonso was already suffering from an ailment at the time he pre-
terminated his employment contract with petitioners. No proof was
presented to substantiate complainant's claim that her husband suffered
chest pain and difficulty in breathing. There was no report of any illness
suffered by complainant's husband while on board the MV "ACX Magnolia".
Also, upon his arrival in the Philippines on May 21, 2005, or at any time within
three working days from the date of his return, there is no showing that the
deceased required any medical treatment nor did he report to petitioners any
ailment being suffered by him. Instead, he immediately signed up for another
tour of duty, thereby indicating that he was physically fit to take on another
assignment. Thus, the death of Ildefonso Peñafiel was not compensable under the
aforequoted provisions of the POEA Contract of Employment.
Therefore, this Court finds no substantial evidence to prove that Ildefonso's
illness which caused his death was aggravated during the term of his contract. The
death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not
necessarily mean that: (a) the seaman died of the same illness; (b) his working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and
(c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support
otherwise.
The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer — there may be cases where
the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management
but never should the scale be so tilted as to result in an injustice to the
employer.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the CA’s
Decision and Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter, which was affirmed by the NLRC is hereby REINSTATED.
