SPL Islaw & PL

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997]
SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR, Complainants, v. JUDGE SALVADOR P.

DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition by way of complaint, dated 11 April 1994, petitioner-spouses Jose and
Trinidad Bacar pray for the dismissal from the service of respondent Judge Salvador P.
de Guzman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, on
the grounds of: 1) gross ignorance of the law, and; 2) rendering an unjust judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 for homicide and attempted homicide
respectively, both entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial".
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 30 March 1989, an information for homicide (for the death of one Maximo Bacar,
son of herein petitioner-spouses) was filed by 2nd Assistant Fiscal Domingo A. Israel
against Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
142, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1360.
On 7 June 1989, another information (this time for attempted homicide committed
against one Edgar Mabuyo) was filed by the aforesaid Fiscal Israel against the same
Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the same court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-
2878.
On 13 May 1992, after trial on the merits, a Joint Judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-
1360 and 89-2878 was rendered by respondent judge, finding the accused Gerardo
Marcial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive part of
the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Gerardo Marcial
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 89-1360
and of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 89-2878. No
modifying circumstances having attended the commission of said crimes, the accused is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal with respect to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 and to suffer
imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor as regards Criminal Case No. 89-
2878.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Maximo Bacar in the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the amount of P33,572.00 as
actual damages and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, May 13, 1992."
On 13 August 1992, the accused, Gerardo Marcial, filed a motion for

reconsideration of the joint judgment, alleging among others, that the court erred
in imposing the penalties without considering at least two (2) mitigating
circumstances, namely: sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party which immediately preceded the act, and; that the accused had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
On 28 October 1992, herein petitioners filed an opposition to said motion.

However, on 13 November 1992, the lower court granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the accused. After reassessing the facts of the case on
the basis of said motion, respondent judge took into account the mitigating
circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient
provocation which immediately preceded the act and accordingly, reduced the
penalty in Criminal Case No. 89-1360 to six (6) years of prision mayor, while
retaining the penalty in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, i.e., imprisonment of thirty (30)
days of arresto menor.
The lower court justified its order thus:
"It appearing upon a re-examination of the evidence on record that the encounter
between the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that of the victims Maximo
Bacar and Edgar Mabuyo precipitated a 'free for all fight', that in such a melee,
confusion broke loose and was expected to ensue as a matter of course; that the
participation in the melee of each of the members of the respective groups of the
victims and the accused was unexpected and unpremeditated; that the victim
Edgar Mabuyo admitted that prior to the incident, there was heckling which came
from him directed to the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that it was he
who started it out, that accused Gerardo Marcial confined himself to giving a
single thrust with an icepick on the right arm of Edgar Mabuyo and at the back of
Maximo Bacar from which it can be safely inferred that the accused had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong, for otherwise, he would have persisted in
attacking the victims to the point of finishing them off; the Court resolves to
accord the accused Gerardo Marcial the benefit of the mitigating circumstances
of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which
immediately preceded the act in accordance with Article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4
of the Revised Penal Code and hereby reconsiders the Decision dated May 13,
1992 in the foregoing respect."1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 December 1992 and 16 April 1993, respectively, the prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration and an addendum to said motion. On 25 May 1993, the
accused filed his comment and/or opposition to the prosecution' s motion for
reconsideration. On 9 December 1993, respondent judge issued an order denying
the prosecution' s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. On 4 January
1994, the prosecution filed another motion for reconsideration and clarification
which respondent judge denied anew on 21 January 1994.
On 11 April 1994, the spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar, parents of the deceased
victim Maximo Bacar in Criminal Case No. 89-1360, filed the present petition
praying for the dismissal of respondent judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.,
presiding judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 142, for gross ignorance of the law
and for rendering an unjust judgment in said consolidated cases.
On the first issue, petitioners allege that respondent judge committed gross
ignorance of the law when he accorded the accused the mitigating circumstances
of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which
immediately preceded the act in accordance with Art. 13, pars. 3 and 4 of the
Revised Penal Code because these cited provisions are not applicable in either or
both criminal cases. They contend that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
cannot apply in Criminal Case No. 89-2878 where the accused was found guilty of
slight physical injuries because lack of intention to kill is not mitigating in crimes
against persons, citing the case of People v. Dalacgac 2 where it was held that in
crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the absence of
the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does not
constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par.
3.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Additionally, said mitigating circumstances cannot apply to Criminal Case No. 89-
1360 (for Homicide) for when the accused stabbed the unarmed and defenseless
Maximo Bacar at his back with an icepick, it is crystal clear, so petitioners
contend, that the intention of the accused Gerardo Marcial at that particular
moment when he executed or committed the stabbing was to kill and finish off
Maximo Bacar and not to harm him only.4 Petitioners cite the case of People v.
Boyles, et al.,5 to wit:
"Article 13, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of
the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal
act; not to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case
under review, the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the
resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of
robbery with homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
cannot be rightly granted. The unforgettable fact remains that when they ganged
up on their victim, they employed deadly weapons and inflicted on him, mortal
wounds in his neck. At that precise moment, they did intend to kill their victim,
and that was the moment to which Art. 13, par. 3
refers."6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, petitioners contend

that this is not applicable to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 (for Homicide) for while
Edgardo Mabuyo, the victim in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, admitted that prior to
the incident, there was heckling which came from him directed at the group of the
accused Gerardo Marcial and that he was the one who started the heckling, and
that the heckling triggered the "free for all fight", there was however, no iota of
evidence that the deceased Maximo Bacar made any provocation. It is further
argued by petitioners that under said Article 13, par. 4, RPC, the provocation to
be considered mitigating must originate from the offended party. Therefore, said
mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated in the case involving the
deceased Maximo Bacar as it is undisputed that he himself never gave or caused
any provocation.
Petitioners contend that instead of according the accused Gerardo Marcial the
aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge should have considered
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength under Art. 14, par.
15, of the Revised Penal Code and treachery under Art. 14, par. 16, of the same
Code.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On rendering an unjust judgment, petitioners allege that in imposing a straight

penalty of six (6) years imprisonment for homicide, after taking into consideration
the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge has rendered an unjust
judgment in Criminal Case No. 89-1360. It is contended that under the graduation
and application of penalties, the penalty that should be imposed can in no case
be justified to only six (6) years "flat".8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present complaint was referred to respondent judge for comment by then
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad in his First (1st) Indorsement dated
27 May 1994. In reply thereto, respondent judge filed a motion, dated 3 June 1994,
requesting for an extension of twenty (20) days within which to file his comment
for the reason that he needed to borrow the records of said Criminal Cases Nos.
89-1360 and 89-2878 from the Makati Regional Trial Court so that he may be able
to file an intelligible comment. He also explained that per his recollection, when
accused Marcial filed his motion for reconsideration of the joint judgment,
respondent judge, to be sure that he would not commit an error, sought a second
opinion from one Judge Nemesio Felix who allegedly opined that the said
accused should have been given the benefit of homicide in a "tumultuous affray"
with no intent to commit the crime, and of self-defense, and suggested a reducted
straight penalty of anywhere from two (2) years to six (6) years. Respondent's
request for extension was granted by then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad per his letter dated 20 June 1994.
However, as his comment was not forthcoming, tracer letters, dated 8 November
1994 and 10 October 1995, were sent to respondent judge by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA, for brevity), reiterating the directive for him to file his
comment on the complaint against him.
Meanwhile, complainants filed a letter with the OCA dated 20 October 1995
reiterating the charges against respondent judge and particularly assailing his
order of 13 November 1992 imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years so as to
enable the accused to avail of the benefits of probation and prayed that judgment
be imposed by this Court on the accused to vindicate the death of their son. They
also took exception to the statement of respondent judge in the assailed order
that their motion for reconsideration dated 10 December 1992 was filed out of
time.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Since respondent judge continually failed to file his comment, this Court issued a
Resolution, dated 1 July 1996, requiring respondent judge to 1) show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comment on the complaint, and; 2) file the required comment on the complaint. In
the same Resolution, the complainants were advised that their prayer to impose
the correct penalty in the criminal charges cannot be granted since the present
proceedings involve only the administrative liability, if any, of respondent judge.
On 6 August 1996, respondent judge finally filed his comment. He explained

therein why he took into consideration the aforesaid mitigating circumstances
and contends that in doing so, he merely exercised his discretion and judgment.
As to why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for failure
to file comment, respondent judge set forth the following reasons:
"1. In the belief that the complaint for ignorance of the law (for appreciating the
two (2) mitigating circumstances) was unquestionably, obviously and completely
baseless because they were acts of judicial discretion in the appreciation of
evidence, respondent did not give the matter the priority that it deserved.
2. The Bacar spouses assured respondent during a visit to him in the Pasay City
RTC that they were going to withdraw their complaint.
3. Respondent had been under severe stress since the first week of November
1995 to the present when he discovered that Judge Salvador Abad Santos,
executive judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, x x x initiated an
administrative complaint against him x x x"10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 August 1996, respondent judge filed an urgent ex-parte motion for second

(2nd) extension of time to file his explanation, and; on 28 August 1996,
respondent finally filed his explanation on why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt of court for his failure to file a comment.
After evaluating the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator made
the following findings:
1. Respondent cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by

considering in favor of the accused the two (2) mitigating circumstances. Under
the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become
final or appeal has been perfected. Moreover, errors in the application of the law
and the appreciation of the evidence are judicial in nature. The remedy therefore
of the complainants should likewise be judicial.
2. However, respondent may be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for
imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years of imprisonment on the accused in his
modified judgment in the case for homicide. The application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment would exceed one (1)
year.11 And in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed
minimum and maximum.12 In this case, what was imposed was a straight penalty
which is erroneous.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We agree with aforesaid findings of the Office of the Court Administrator on both
points.
Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him
liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short
of harassment and would make his position unbearable. For no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot be faulted for modifying his decision
after considering the two (2) mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit
so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act,
set forth in the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused. Under the law, a
judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal
has been perfected.
The fact that respondent judge' s appreciation of the evidence differed from that
of petitioners which could be biased, does not warrant the conclusion that said
judge has rendered an unjust judgment nor that he is ignorant of the law. In the
absence of any indication 1) that the trial court's conclusion is based entirely on
speculations; 2) that there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) that the court, in
making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee, or; that the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts, or; that the presiding judge is blatantly biased, the
general rule that the trial court' s findings of fact should be given great weight
still stands.
However, respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a
straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused in his modified
judgment in the case for homicide. It is basic law that, as stated above, the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment
exceeds one (1) year,15 except only in the following cases:
"a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit

treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134),

sedition (Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla,

L-28547, Feb. 22, 1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits
of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v.
Clareon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same (Art.
159). (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year, the accused
cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is
based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not
upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the Court.
(People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law."16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and
to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted
from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate
sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special
laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper
within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be
deemed mandatory.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions
of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been
enacted.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rules and provisions which must be applied to determine the maximum term
of the indeterminate penalty are those provided in Articles 46, 48, 50 to 57, 61, 62
(except paragraph 5), 64, 65, 68, 69, and 71.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, the aforesaid rules and provisions in those articles, particularly Arts. 50
to 57, 62, 64 and 65, are not applicable in fixing the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty. The Court has unqualified discretion to fix the term of the
minimum.20 The only limitation is that it is within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense committed, without regard to
its three (3) periods.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Take the present case, for example, of homicide in which two (2) mitigating
circumstances attended its commission. The penalty for homicide prescribed by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Since two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the offense, said penalty shall be lowered by one degree pursuant
to Article 64 paragraph 5 of the same Code, which in this case is prision mayor.
This penalty shall be imposed in its medium period considering that no other
modifying circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the two (2)
mitigating circumstances having been already taken into account in reducing the
penalty by one (1) degree lower (Basan v. People, L-39483, 29 November 1974, 61
SCRA 275). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision correccional and the maximum of which shall be within the range of the
medium period of prision mayor.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Since respondent judge imposed the straight penalty of six (6) years which is
erroneous, he is therefore liable for gross ignorance of the law. This Court has
held that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 23 Likewise, that unawareness of
and unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
duration and graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action, from reprimand to
removal.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent judge cannot shirk responsibility for imposing said erroneous
penalty by saying, as he did in his motion for extension dated 3 June 1994, 25 that
he in fact sought and adopted the opinion of one Judge Nemesio Felix. A judge
should have moral and intellectual courage and independence of mind in the
discharge of his duties for only in that way can he merit his judicial position and
the support and confidence of the people in him.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the
law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot
justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal
principles.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed his
comment on this present petition more than two (2) years from the time the Office
of the Court Administrator through then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito
Bernad, issued a directive for him to do so. As a judge, respondent ought to know
that all directives coming from the Office of the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of administrative supervision of courts and
their personnel, hence, they should be respected. His excuses that the complaint
was unquestionably, obviously, and completely baseless; that complainants were
going to withdraw their complaint, and; that he was under severe stress are not
enough for him to ignore said Office's directives. It took a resolution of the Court
itself for respondent judge to finally file his comment. Even then, respondent
judge had to ask for several extensions before complying with this Court's
orders.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court, resolving to hold respondent Judge Salvador P. de

Guzman, Jr. administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, imposes on
him a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) WITH A STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Additionally,
he is hereby ADMONISHED for failure to file promptly his comment as directed by
the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 92020 October 19, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON, HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON and
JOHN DOE, alias "ROLLY", accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalookan City, in Criminal Case No. C-27858, promulgated on 2 February 1989, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused ELISEO MARTINADO y

AGUILLON and HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as defined
and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. There being no appreciable aggravating nor (sic)
mitigating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences each of the
accused to suffer imprisonment under the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The two accused are also directed to indemnify the heirs of Juan Matias
jointly and severally the (sic) amount of P30,000.00; to return the money
and the pieces of jewelry, subject matter of the robbery, and if unable to
do so, to pay the entire value thereof in the total amount of P5,100.00 to
the legal heirs of the victim and to pay the costs.
The accused HERMOGENES MARTINADO shall be credited in the

service of his sentence with the full time that he has undergone preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code provided
the conditions prescribed thereon have been complied with.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, this Court, has to resolve the propriety of the interposed appeal insofar as
accused Eliseo Martinado is concerned.
The promulgation of the decision on 22 February 1989 was made in his absence
because he had earlier escaped on 6 August 1988, 2 exactly five (5) days after the
defense rested its case, from the Kalookan City Jail. The escape, however, was
reported to the trial court only on 8 August 1988. 3 Consequently, the trial court issued a
warrant for his arrest on 10 February 1988 4 which was returned unserved on 28
February 1989 because "per information gathered from the resident (sic) thereat
revealed that accused cannot (sic) be seen for long (sic) period of time." 5
It was only on 10 April 1989 that Eliseo was re-arrested in Palo, Leyte by a Special
Action Team of the Kalookan Police Station. 6
On March 1989, Atty. Domingo M. Ballon, counsel of record for Hermogenes and
Eliseo, filed a notice of appeal for both accused. It reads:
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Accused, by their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court hereby

gives (sic) notice that they are appealing the decision of this Honorable
Court, dated February 2, 1989, and promulgated on Feb. 22, 1989,
convicting the accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua, to the Supreme Court, for the reason that said
decision is contrary to law and evidence. 7
In view of such appeal, the trial court issued on the same date an order directing the
transmittal to this Court of the records of the case together with the transcripts of
stenographic notes and exhibits. 8
In promulgating judgment in absentia with respect to Eliseo, and in giving due course to

the appeal of both accused, the trial court must have had in mind the third paragraph of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present
at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear
thereat the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in
the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused
or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to
appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the
arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the decision to him or his counsel. (6a).
Indeed, no cause for non-appearance during promulgation is more justified than the
escape of the accused from the city jail where he was confined during the trial of the
case. However, in the recent case of People vs. Mapalao, 9 decided on 14 may 1991,
this Court, applying by analogy Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules, of Criminal
Procedure, held that an accused who had escaped from confinement during trial on the
merits and who merits at large at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction
loses his right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court or is otherwise arrested within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment. The
reason therefor is that an accused who escapes from detention, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country loses his standing in court; unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom.
This Court then took the opportunity to suggest a modification of the last sentence of the
aforequoted third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120. Thus:
To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence

of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides:
If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to

appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further
order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his
counsel.
It should provide instead that it upon promulgation of the judgment, the

accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to
him, his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived
his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal
he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested, then he may
avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at

large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted
any other relief by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is
arrested. 10
If We were to apply this ruling to the case of Eliseo, his appeal should not be given due
course. Considering, however, that Mapalao announces a new doctrine by making the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its motion, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
apply by analogy to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120,
and that application thereof to Eliseo would be prejudicial to him, this Court, guided by
the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided 11 and
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
our legal system 12 and, further taking into account the principle that once a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof, 13 hereby declares that the rule enunciated
in Mapalao should not be applied to Eliseo. Thus, his appeal is hereby given due
course.
Having cleared the way for the appeal of both accused, We shall now take up the
appeal proper.
Accused Hermogenes Martinado and Eliseo Martinado, together with a certain John
Doe alias "Rolly" who remains to be at large, were originally charged with the crime of
murder in an Information prepared and filed by Assistant City Fiscal Arturo A. Rojas on
17 November 1986. 14 The information fails to mention anything about robbery.
Consequently, a motion for reinvestigation was filed by the offended party. On 4 March
1987, an Amended Information 15 was filed by 1st Assistant City Fiscal Rogelio M. de
Leon charging the accused with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. This was further
amended on 10 March 1987 by a 2nd Amended Information, 16 the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1986 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one
another, with intent of (sic) gain and with intent to kill, by means of
violence and intimidation employed upon the person of JUAN MATIAS y
REYES that is by attacking and stabbing the latter with a sharp pointed
instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob
and carry away the following articles, to wit:
1. Seiko men's watch (5) worth — P 800.00
2. Men's ring worth — P1,800.00
3. Wallet containing cash in the amount of — P2,500.00
Total — P5,100.00
all belonging to the said Juan Matias y Reyes, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned total amount of P5,100.00;
and as a result thereof, Juan Matias sustained serious physical injuries,
which injuries caused his death (DOA) at the Quezon City General
Hospital.
Contrary to Law.
Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were arraigned with the assistance of counsel on 22
September 1987; 17 both entered pleas of "Not Guilty". The other accused, John Doe @
Rolly, has not been formally identified and is still at large. Immediately after
arraignment, a motion for bail was heard by the trial court; the same was eventually
denied. 18
Trial subsequently ensued with the prosecution presenting Margarita Padrinao,

Elizabeth C. Carillo, Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. (Medico-Legal Officer), Nicanor Matias,
Angel Nieto, Gerardo Arellano, P/Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra and David Nerza; for the
defense, both accused were presented.
On 22 February 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision based on the
prosecution's version of the incident summarized as follows:
The following is the version as shown by the evidence adduced by the

Prosecution:
At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986, Margarita

Padrinao, a maid, was watching television at the house of her master,
Juan Matias. She then entered the sari-sari store of her master which is
three arms' length away from the place where she was watching television
in order to feed the pigs. She saw Juan Matias tending the sari-sari store.
She also saw two customers drinking softdrinks outside the window grills
of the store. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 6-7). She identified
them as Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado.
At about this time, Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government

employee (sic), passed by the same sari-sari store on her way to make a
phone call at a house located at nearby Villa Maria Subdivision. She saw
Juan Matias attending to three customers drinking softdrinks at the sari-
sari store. She identified them as Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes
Martinado and "Rolly". (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 6-8).
A short while later, Margarita who had just feed the pigs heard a loud
snore coming from the store. She hurriedly went back to the store she saw
Eliseo and Hermogenes helping one another in stabbing Juan Matias.
(TSN, Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padriano, pp. 8; 32). Each of these accused was
armed with pointed, thin instruments which each used in the stabbing. The
stabbing took place inside the store near the place where rice was being
kept. Margarita then shouted in a loud voice, "Tulungan ninyo po kami."
The two accused then fled thru the gate at the fence of the house. After
she shouted, some people approached the store but Hermogenes and
Eliseo Martinado had already fled. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987 M. Padrinao, pp.
9-10). She then approached Juan Matias who lay on the flooring of the
store. Mrs. Dominga Matias, the wife of Juan, likewise approached Juan
Matias whom they found to be bloodied with several stab wounds at (sic)
the neck, breast and abdomen. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 11).
In the meantime, Elizabeth Carillo had to pass the said store on her way
back to her residence, having failed to contact a friend thru the phone.
She heard somebody shouting "saklolo" and she saw three persons
running from the sari-sari store of Juan Matias. These were the same
three persons she previously saw drinking softdrinks. "Rolly" was running
ahead of the other two, Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado. The she saw
Rolly stop and retrace his steps to pick up a watch near the gate of the
fence surrounding the house of Juan Matias before resuming his flight.
The two brothers continued to run away. Eliseo was seen holding
something in his bloodied hand and Hermogenes was also seen holding
something in his hand which was bloodied. Elizabeth then entered the
sari-sari store and she saw Juan Matias lying down, face upward, inside
the sari-sari store and had (sic) stab wounds on (sic) his bloodied neck.
He was still snorting, so Elizabeth called for help to bring Juan to the
hospital. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 8-11). Juan was brought to
the Quezon City General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.
At about the same time, Angel Nieto, the Tanod executive officer of the
Barangay, was at the house of his brother also at Deparo street when he
heard people shouting "Harangin, harangin." He went out of the house into
the street and he was able to see three men coming from the direction of
the house of Juan Matias and being chased by the residents. He was able
to observe two of the said three men. These two men had bloodied hands
and bloodied clothes. He then asked the residents why they were chasing
the three men and they replied that these men had just stabbed Juan
Matias. (TSN-Dec. 22, 1987, A. Nieto, pp. 4-5)
Gerardo Arellano, a Barangay tanod of the place where the incident

occurred, also heard the aforesaid shouting from his house which is
located also at Deparo street. He came to know Elizabeth Carillo and
Margarita Padrinao that Juan Matias was stabbed to death. Together with
other tanods and residents of the place, they began looking for Eliseo
Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado and Rolly as these were the suspects
mentioned by Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao. (TSN-Feb. 9,
1988, G. Arellano, pp. 5-6).
Gerardo Arellano and his companions proceeded to the house of "Rolly"

at the Sterling compound and after they were granted permission by the
wife of "Rolly" they enter. They found Hermogenes Martinado under a
lavatory trembling. Then they went to the Visayan Motors and after
obtaining permission from the owner thereof, they went inside the
premises and found Eliseo Martinado who was packing his clothes ready
to leave. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, Arellano, pp. 9-13). Eliseo and Hermogenes
Martinado were invited to go to the house of Juan Matias and both were
identified by Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao as two of the
persons (sic) who barged into the house of Juan Matias. (TSN-Feb. 9,
1988, Arellano, p. 14). The two suspects were then brought to the Urduja
Police Sub-Station and were then turned over to Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra
of the Caloocan City Police Station. They were later brought to the
Caloocan City Police Headquarters by Sgt. Buenaobra. (TSN-Feb. 15,
1988, M. Buenaobra, p.8).
During the investigation conducted at the house of Juan Matias by the

police on November 14, 1986, Margarita Padrinao discovered that the
Seiko V watch worn everyday by Juan Matias was no longer in his wrist.
She also found that the wallet which Juan Matias kept at the back pocket
of his pants was missing. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 16-17).
This robbery was reported by Dominga Matias, the widow of the victim, to
the Caloocan City Police Headquarters on November 16, 1986. (TSN-Feb.
15, 1988, M. Buenaobra, p. 16). (See Police Blotter, page 188 of the
Caloocan City Police Station dated November 16, 1986, EXHIBIT "J").
Mrs. Dominga Matias listed the articles found missing from their store at
Deparo street, Caloocan City, after the death of Juan Matias, as follows:
Seiko wristwatch –– P 800.00

Gold ring –– P1,800.00
Cash contained in missing wallet –– P2,500.00
Nicolas Matias, a son of Juan Matias, corroborated the loss of the above
articles and estimated their value in his testimony of December 21, 1987.
He discovered the loss on the night of November 14, 1986, after reaching
the Quezon City General Hospital where his mother told him that these
articles could no longer be found in the body of the victim. When he
returned to his father's residence at Deparo street, Caloocan City, also on
the evening of November 14, 1986, he verified after a search of the sari-
sari store and the house that those articles were indeed missing. (TSN.
Dec. 21, 1987, N. Matias, pp. 4-6). 19
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that Juan Matias, 70 years old, died on November 14,

1986. The cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds,
neck and chest. (EXHIBIT "E"). Dr. Mariano Cueva, NBI Medico-Legal
Officer, stated that he found contusions on the front portion of the neck of
the victim; 4 incised wounds, one on the left arm and three on the left
forearm; four stab wounds, one over left front of the neck and three at the
left front chest. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, Dr. Cueva, pp. 7-8). (EXHIBITS "F"
and "G"). The most mortal of the wounds was that found over the left front
chest. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, pp. 8-9). 20
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Cueva narrated that the incised wounds found on the body of the
victim could have been brought about by contact with a sharp cutting edge
like the edge of a knife or sharp metal object. He also said that the stab
wounds could have been produced by a pointed, single-edged or single-
bladed instrument like a kitchen knife or dagger. He added that the
number of wounds inflicted on the victim does not preclude the fact that
there was more than one assailant using similar instruments. (TSN. Nov.
20, 1987, pp. 9-10; 20). 21
The trial court concluded that the prosecution established convincingly that Juan Matias
was robbed at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 November 1986 by the accused
Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado who conspired with each other and with Rolly. Under
the circumstances above narrated, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code was committed.
The motive of the accused was to rob Juan Matias.
As earlier adverted to, the accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 March
1989. Despite the trial court's order to forward the records of the case to this Court, the
clerk of court of the court a quo erroneously transmitted the same to the Court of
Appeals on 19 February 1990. 22 The latter subsequently forwarded the records to this
Court on 22 February 1990. 23
In a Resolution dated 12 March 1990, We accepted the appeal interposed by the

accused. 24
The accused filed their Appellants' Brief on 20 December 1990 25 while the Office of the
Solicitor General filed the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee on 30 January 1991. 26
The appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED

HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO ARE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO
CONSPIRED WITH A CERTAIN "ROLLY" TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. 27
In discussing the first error, appellants focus on the arguments that proof of robbery is
wanting that their guilt for the homicide has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the first, the appellants underscore the fact that it was only two (2) days after the
alleged killing that the loss of the victim's personal belongings was reported to the police
authorities. They then suggest that "[t]he wristwatch and the money contained in the
wallet could have been stolen when the cadaver was already in the Hospital or probably
in the Morgue;" 28 that Elizabeth Carillo's declaration on the witness stand that she saw
a certain "Rolly" return and pick up a watch as he, together with the accused, were
fleeing from the victim's house, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that a robbery
was committed as the watch could have been Rolly's; and that the loss of money was
not proven and the witness who claims to have seen the alleged killing, Margarita
Padrinao, did not testify on the actual taking of property.
We have closely perused through the entire records of the case and are convinced that
the crime of robbery was not proven to have been committed. No conclusive evidence
proving the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused themselves was
presented by the prosecution. 29 This Court takes note of the fact that the original
information filed three (3) days after the incident in question was for Murder and no hint
whatsoever of robbery was made therein. The evidence further discloses that it was
only at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 16 November 1986 that the widow of
Juan Matias reported to the Investigation Division of the Kalookan City Police Station
that "they found out that the Seiko wristwatch worth P800.00; GOLD ring worth
P1,800.00 and the amount of P2,500.00 contained in the wallet of his (sic) slain
husband, JUAN MATIAS were missing presumably (sic) taken by suspects (sic)." 30
It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it
is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential
element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only be
simple homicide or murder, depending on the absence or presence of qualifying
circumstances. 31
The trial court based its finding of the existence of robbery on Margarita Padrinao's and
Elizabeth Carillo's respective testimonies. There is also the testimony of the victim's
son, Nicanor Matias, a substantial part of which is hearsay as he constantly alluded to
the information his mother had given him. While Padrinao gave the following statements
during her direct examination:
FISCAL SILVERIO:
x x x x x x x x x
Q And what did the police find out during the investigation, if
any?
A Things were missing, sir.
Q Did you come to know what were those missing things?
A Watches (sic), wallet.
Q How did you come to know that?
A Because he was not wearing his wristwatch and his wallet

was missing.
Q Whose wallet was missing?
A Juan Matias, sir.
Q Do you know what kind of watch is owned or being worn

by Juan Matias?
A Seiko V, sir.
Q How did you come to know that?
A I used to see that watch because I have been staying

there for a long time.
Q You said that wallets (sic) was missing, do you know if

there are (sic) money contained in that wallet?
x x x x x x x x x
COURT:
How did you know that a wallet was missing?
A Because the wallet was no longer at the back pocket of his

pants.32
Carillo declared that:
FISCAL SILVERIO:
Q When you said that you saw Rolly, Eliseo and
Hermogenes Martinado running out from the sari-sari store,
what happened next, if nay?
A I saw Rolly returned (sic) and picked (sic) up something,

sir.
Q Did you see what Rolly picked up at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A A watch, sir.
Q Could you describe the watch picked up by Rolly at that

time?
A I cannot describe the make, sir, the trademark but it is a

watch. 33
It is at once apparent that nobody was able to observe that immediately before the
incident, Juan Matias was wearing a wristwatch and a gold ring and had a wallet in his
pocket which contained money; moreover, nobody witnessed the actual taking by the
accused of Juan Matias' personal belongings. While Margarita Padrinao saw Matias
being repeatedly stabbed, she failed to notice the latter being actually divested of his
personal effects. Further scrutiny of Padrinao's testimony reveals that at the time she
declared that "things were missing," the victim was no longer in front of her for she had
likewise testified that latter was rushed to the hospital soon after the stabbing. The
investigation during which she uttered such statements was conducted by police
authorities who arrived at the crime scene long after the victim had been removed. It
would thus be highly doubtful that Padrinao could credibly assert right then and there
that the said items were missing as, presumably, she was not able to get a clear
glimpse of the victim as he was being brought to the hospital. In fact, if there was any
person who could have testified about the missing items, it would have been Elizabeth
Carillo. Together with a neighbor, the victim's wife and brother, she brought Juan Matias
to the hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. 34
With respect to Carillo's testimony, the fact that Rolly returned and picked up a watch is
no proof at all that the watch belonged to the victim for unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to elicit from her any information about the precise place where the watch was
picked up in relation to the place where Juan Matias was stabbed, or the person
possessing the same before it was picked up. In short, she did not testify that the said
watch belonged to and was taken from the victim. Absent such proof, it is highly
possible that the watch could have been, as suggested by the accused Rolly's.
The testimony of Nicanor Matias, on the other hand, merely recounts his own discovery
that certain items were missing when he arrived at his parents' house after the incident;
he also described these missing items and estimated their respective values. As earlier
observed, much of the information he volunteered was based on what his mother had
told him, thus making the same objectionable on the ground of hearsay.
As basis for the assertion that the crime of homicide has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, both accused emphasize that "the contradiction between the
statement of Ms. Margarita Padrinao in her Affidavit to the effect that "Rolly" was the
last person to leave the sari-sari store and was in fact seen by her "INANG" holding a
knife, and that of her testimony in Court to the effect that she did not see "Rolly"
anymore for she immediately went outside the store shouting for help, had created a
semblance of falsehood." 35
The suggested flaw, more apparent than real, betrays strained and tenuous reasoning.
Padrinao's aforesaid statement does not at all clash with her testimony during cross-
examination. All that she declared during the latter was that:
ATTY. BALLON:
Q I am going to quote your answer: "Oho, ito hong dalawang

ito (affiant pointing to the persons inside the Investigation
Office, who gave their names as Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon
alias ELISEO, 20 years old, single, helper, native of Dagami,
Leyte, resident of Visayan Auto Repair Shop, Deparo,
Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES MARTINADO y
Aguillon, 23 years old, single, laborer, native of Dagami,
Leyte, resident of Sterling Subd., Caloocan City) at isa pa na
magbobote ang pangalan ay Rolly", did you give that
answer?
A Yes, sir, because they were three but I did not see the
third man because I only reached (sic) inside the store the
two (referring to the two accused).
Q Now, could you say now, Miss Padrinao, that there were
three inside the store?
x x x x x x x x x
Q Was this Rolly inside the store when you saw him?
A I did not see him inside the store but the ones I reached
(sic) inside the store were Eliseo and Hermogenes
Martinado, because right after I saw it (sic) I immediately
went out and shouted.
Q And so it is clear that you did not see the actual stabbing
of Mang Juan, during the stabbing of Mang Juan you did not
see this Rolly?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this Rolly was not inside the store before Mang Juan
was stabbed?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
COURT:
Why did you mention in your affidavit that the three who
killed Juan Matias were Eliseo, Hermogenes and this Rolly
who was magbobote (sic)?
A I did not see that Rolly anymore because as I have said

when I saw the two (referring to Eliseo and Hermogenes)
helping one another in stabbing Mang Juan, I ran away and
shouted for help.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. BALLON:
Q While (sic) ago, during your direct testimony and even on

the cross examination by this representation you stated
categorically that you only saw two people drinking
softdrinks in the store of Mang Juan on November 14, 1986,
at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon and in your statement
Exhibit "A" you stated that also a certain Rolly magbobote
who (sic) was with the two drinking softdrinks, which of them
is now correct? There seems to be a conflict.
A I only saw the two of them drinking softdrinks, that is what

I saw. 36
Padrinao's failure to notice Rolly inside the store could be explained by the fact that she
immediately left upon seeing Juan Matias being stabbed by the two (2) accused. 37 It is
very likely that this third person, Rolly, could have just been hidden or covered by the
other two. Thus, it was only when the stabbing was consummated that she saw all three
because they naturally had to leave the scene of the crime. It is to be observed that
Rolly's presence was confirmed by two (2) other witnesses, namely Elizabeth
Carillo 38 and Angel Nieto. 39
Besides, such a minor contradiction does not effect the credibility of a witness.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant
details cannot destroy their credibility. In fact, such minor inconsistencies guarantee
sincere and candid evidence of what actually transpired. 40 Discrepancies in minor
details do not impair the credibility of a witness. In the course of a prolonged direct
examination, more so during cross-examination, the witness is usually subjected to
unfriendly questioning. As a result thereof, it is usually the case that the witness,
uncomfortable and fidgety in a courtroom scene, may often fall into lapses. It is not
infrequent for a witness to commit minor mistakes in his narration of the facts. 41 Rather
than effect the credibility of the witnesses, they are badges of truthfulness and
candor. 42
Margarita Padrinao's narration of the incident is coherent in its essential parts and
intrinsically believable; hence, it must be accorded due deference. 43
In any event, even if We are to give weight to the implication suggested by the said
discrepancy, only Rolly's liability would be put in doubt as it is only as to his participation
that there would exist any reservation or question. As to the accused-appellants,
Padrinao was firm in her identification of them.
Coming to the second assigned error, this Court is hard put at giving the same any
credence. For one, counsel for the accused harps once again on the alleged
inconsistencies that supposedly plague the testimonies of the witnesses; this issue has
already been resolved and needs no further elaboration.
Furthermore, the accused capitalize on the Medico-Legal Officer's statement that "the
wounds would have been inflicted by one person because of the nature of the
wounds." 44 The accused would attempt to mislead this Court by such conclusion
because they deliberately omitted the phrase immediately preceding the quoted
declaration — "It is possible . . ." 45 Thus, all that the said witness did was
to suggest that there could have been one (1) assailant. It was only the accused who
made the categorical declaration to that effect.
Finally, the accused suggest that the evidence necessary to prove conspiracy was not
established because "at the time the Martinado Brothers were accounted for,
Hermogenes Martinado was at the house of Aling Espie, while Eliseo was at Visayan
Auto Repair Shop at Reparo (sic) Street, Kalookan City." 46
We have time and again ruled that alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of
fabrication. 47 It cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution
witness. 48 For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he must also demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. 49
As found by the trial court, both accused were apprehended in the vicinity of the crime
scene shortly after the felony was committed. While Hermogenes was found trembling
under the lavatory in Rolly's house, Eliseo was accosted in the premises of the Visayan
Auto Repair Shop in the act of packing his clothes. Such deportment on the part of the
two accused displays guilty consciences. On the part of Eliseo Martinado, such a
conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that the escape from the Kalookan City Jail on 6
August 1988.50 Flight of the accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. 51
As to conspiracy, the trial court correctly declared that:
The conspiracy was shown by the fact that the two accused were seen
buying and drinking softdrinks together with "Rolly" at the store of the
victim and by the fact that they fled together. (People vs. Ramos, 122
SCRA 139). The Prosecution has also established that the same two
accused and "Rolly" helped each other in stabbing the accused (sic), each
using a pointed and bladed instrument in stabbing the same victim to
death. 52
This Court hereby adopts the aforequoted exposition. These facts prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had a common purpose and were united in its
execution. There is conspiracy when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 53 Conspiracy to exists
does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it
exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution. 54 Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, 55 or inferred from acts of the accused themselves
when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. 56 Conspiracy having been adequately established by the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, all the conspirators — the accused herein — are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective individual
participation for in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 57
As We have earlier declared, however, the finding that robbery was committed on the
occasion of the killing cannot be sustained. Hence, the accused are liable only for
homicide. This Court, nevertheless, appreciates against both accused the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength 58 which although not alleged in
the second amended information, was duly proven by the prosecution and may
therefore be properly taken into consideration. 59 The victim, Juan Matias, a
septuagenarian, was unarmed at the time he was assaulted; Eliseo Martinado was
about 21 years old 60 while Hermogenes Martinado was only 28 years old. 61 They both
ganged up on the old man who never had the slightest inkling that the accused, who
pretended to be his customers, would attack him simultaneously with bladed
instruments. It is obvious that they took advantage of their individual and collective
strength. The penalty then for the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code must be imposed in its maximum period pursuant to the third paragraph of
Article 64 of said Code.
Conformably with the policy of this Court enunciated in several cases, the indemnity for
the death of Juan Matias should be increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
in Criminal Case No. C-27858 finding both accused Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon and
Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code is hereby modified. As modified, the two accused are found guilty
of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and the absence of any
mitigating circumstance to offset it, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement. 62 Accordingly, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum.
The indemnity for the death of the deceased Juan Matias is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014
MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: through

falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver
felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus
fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled.
In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds
malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.
The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated
on August 16, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the consolidated decision
rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La
Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651, inclusive, 2 finding Manolito Gil Z.
Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in
Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts of malversation of
public funds through falsification of public documents. 3
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:
Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his
duties was toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official
receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer
while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.
Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections
(MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of
taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC
with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional
Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the
duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the real
property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued
ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary
stamp tax paid.
On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria
Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the central office of
the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the appellant.
Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the
Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs
submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance Division
of the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued
to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). A
comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to 18
RORs with the same serial number, i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, (c) 1513718, (d)
1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) 2023438, (j) 2023837,
(k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) 3096955, (p) 3097386, (q)
3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax
paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of particular concern to the audit team
were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in appellant’s MRCs and the attached RORs
compared to the amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s RORs.
The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos.
1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and 2023438 totalled Php114,887.78,
while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum of the
taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of Php114,660.78. ROR Nos.
2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued to taxpayers and for which
taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled receipts.
Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837,
2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and 4534412,
show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet,
appellant’s MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a
difference of Php499,491.15.
The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly
Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). The MRA contains, among others,
the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as
well as those issued by him for a certain month.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in
the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is Ph₱615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00
was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to
COA and in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to
appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93.
Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for
malversation of public funds through falsification of public document against him." 4
On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:
Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue
Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments from
taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin
and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the corresponding RORs.
To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who testified that when he paid
capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam Fernando, La Union, it was a female
BIR employee who received the payment and issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise,
Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to 1994, testified that when he made the
payments to the same BIR office, it was not appellant who received the payments nor
issued the corresponding receipts but another unidentified BIR employee." 5
Decision of the RTC
On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the
petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents,6 decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is
charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 months and
1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special
disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccionalas minimum up to 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay
a fine of ₱11,309.20;
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay
a fine of ₱9,736.86;
of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special
9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer perpetual special
10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special
penalty of 10 years and 1 one day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4
disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76;
disqualification; and to pay fine of ₱45,330.18; 18) Criminal Case No. 4651and
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of
prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a
fine of ₱37,842.05;
And to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows:
I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC

FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BASED ON THE
PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL DUTIES.
II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE AND

PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO COULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMMITTED THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED ARE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED ON

REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction
of the petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC, 8 observing that he had
committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had
tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and COA;9 that he was presumed to be the forger
by virtue of his being in the possession of such public documents; 10 and that he had
certified to the MRAs and had actually issued the tampered receipts. 11
Anent the malversation, the CA opined:
All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the Revenue
Collection Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated collection clerks, hecollected
taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax payments made by taxpayers. He
was accountable for the proper and authorized use and application of the blank RORs
issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for the tax payments received in the
performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his remittances of the taxes
collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even in the absence of direct
proof of misappropriation, made him liable for malversation. The audit team’s demand
letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie presumption that he put
to his personal use the missing funds.12
The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that it
had been his assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and issued the RORs, he
was nonetheless liable,13 because his duty as an accountable officer had been to strictly
supervise his assistants;14 and that by failing to strictly supervise them he was
responsible for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance of the actual amounts
collected.15
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution 16 promulgated on
January 11, 2007, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner claims that the CA erred:
I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE WAS

CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS].
II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A
COMPLEX CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several
counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents on the
basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as
Revenue District Officer;18 that the acts imputed to him did not constitute negligence;
and that he could not be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation through
negligence at the same time.19
Ruling
We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit.
The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz:
The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based her
examination to determine the discrepancies in the Official Receipts listed by the
accused therein, bore only the typewritten name of the accused without any signature.
However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed that those individual pages
were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a particular month, and she
showed that the last pages of the related reports were duly signed by the accused.
Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages of the questioned monthly
reports and demonstrated to the Court the sequence of the pagination and the last
pages ofthe monthly reports bearing the signature of accused Zafra x x x. By these the
prosecution demonstrated that the individual pages of the Monthly Collection Report
which listed receipts for lesser amounts were part of official reports regularly submitted
by the accused in his capacity as Collection Agent of the BIR in San Fernando City, La
Union. While counsel for accused called attention to the absence of accused (sic)
signatures on Exhibit "A", accused did not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits as
he chose to remain silent.
In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of
Accountabilities (Exhibit "D") which the accused, as Collection Officer submits on the
first week of the following month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria
Domagas establishes that the questionable receipts were within the series of receipts
accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The testimony of State Auditor
Domagas established the link of accused accountable receipts, with the receipts
numbers reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the receipts issued to
the taxpayers. Thereby prosecution showed that while the receipts issued to the
taxpayer were not signed by the accused, these receipts were his accountable forms.
Such that the use thereof is presumed to be sourced from him. Even the defense
witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the office of the accused.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24
issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number appearing in the
Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the accused in the
official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from taxpayers
concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the
auditors."20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was
correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial
court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding
and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution sufficiently
established that the petitioner had beenthe forger of the falsified and tampered public
documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had been necessary to
committhe malversations of the collected taxes.
Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the
taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly
ruminated:
x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were done
by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by the
accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this presumption,
accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss. 21 (Italics supplied)
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that
he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is grossly
misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had
beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse on the
legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was notthe basis for
finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert
attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that
the RTC did not give any weight to his position.
Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same
tenor as that of the RTC’s,22 and later on even went to the extent of opining that the
petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence. 23 But such opinion
on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for the intentional
felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. As can
be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are
nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our attention any fact or circumstance
that either lower court had not properly appreciated and considered and which, if so
considered, could alter the outcome in his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed
that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through
negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional
crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because
his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is
axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would
ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the
terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was
duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, 24 the
penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed in
its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized
with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. 25 Prision mayor has a duration of
six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the penalty for
malversation ranges from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua depending on the
amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to
the total value of the property embezzled, to wit:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. —

Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand
pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion temporalin its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is
less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its
medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is morethan twelve
thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporalin its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal
tothe total value of the property embezzled. x x x x
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the petitioner,
therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering
that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Codeare not
composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed should be
divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to
Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty
properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for
falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. The tabulation of the
periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code follows,
to wit:
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176317.pdf]]
TABLE 1
Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum

Misappropriated prescribed Medium
Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years,
₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 days
medium and to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to to 6 years.
maximum 6 months 4 years,
periods and 20 days 9 months
and 10
days
More than ₱200 Prision 6 years and 6 years and 7 years, 8 years,
pesos but not mayorin its 1 day to 10 1 day to 4 months 8 months
exceeding minimum years 7 years and and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 4 months to 8 years to 10 years
periods and 8
Months
More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years,
₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month
less than maximum to 14 years to 11 years, and 21 and 11 days
₱12,000.00 period to and 6 months days to to 14 years
reclusion 8 months and 20 days 13 years, and
temporal in 1 month 8 months
its minimum and
period 10 days
More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,
₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11 days
and to 20 years to 16 years, to
maximum 5 months 18 years,
periods. and 10 days 2 months
and
20 days
18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days
to 20 years/td>
More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion
₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
its maximum and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
period to to to 18 years to 20 years
reclusion reclusion and
perpetua perpetua 8 months
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is

imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. 28 The
maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense
committed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which the
imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a complex
crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty for each
count is the maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for the count dealt with
in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for
which the corresponding penalty for malversation as stated in Table 1 was prision
mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, because such penalty for
malversation was lower than the penalty of prision mayor imposable on falsification of a
public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the penalty of prision
mayor in its maximum period that was applicable.
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should come
from the penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower is prision
correccional in its full range, to wit:
TABLE 2
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term

prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 217
Prision Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and
correccional in its maximum 4 months
its medium and period to prision
maximum periods correccional in
its minimum
period
Prision mayor in Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years
its correccional in
minimum and its medium and
medium maximum
period periods
Prision mayor in Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years

its its minimum and
maximum period medium periods
to
reclusion
temporal in
its minimum
period
Reclusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and
temporal in its maximum 8 months
its medium and period to
maximum reclusion
periods. temporal in its
minimum period
Reclusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable
temporal in penalty to be imposed upon the accused in already reclusion
its maximum perpetua
period to
reclusion
perpetua
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term
prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 171
Prision mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
correccional
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused
totaling ₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed
for malversation of public funds, the more serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the
maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code.
It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite

the maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one
completely incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable in Criminal
Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its being the higher penalty.
The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
TABLE 3
Amount Indeterminate sentence

misappropriated Minimum term Maximum term
₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
prision mayor of reclusion temporal
₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of
correccional prision mayor29
₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
mayor of reclusion temporal
₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
mayor prision mayor
₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
mayor prision mayor
₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua
One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to
their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally
misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each
count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the
CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in Bacolod
v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when
convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused,
unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of
its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was
of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived."
Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as
tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of
such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering
justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to
do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.31
In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the

accused in each count shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of
this decision until full payment by the accused.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by
the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated in
this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on

February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is
charged in:
penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 18
years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to
pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
penalty from two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay a fine of
₱5,000.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate

penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13
years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to
years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;

penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as m inimum, to 18
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60;
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66;
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76;
In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of ₱614,268.73,
plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment, by way of his civil liability.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA,
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments
raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we
find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these
matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals
judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D.
Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned;
the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the
probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by
petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson
(collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February
2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the
criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict
against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified
the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of
the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide. 3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-
G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona),
Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano
(Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below
is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined
and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in
G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present
case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy,
Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded
to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael
Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the
initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days.
After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards
the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical
blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan
"initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to
run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the
neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or
ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their
pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to
neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their
arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege
Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize
and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer,
they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically.
The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the
first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon
and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the
carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings,
as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was
really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes
and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.
On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993,
Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then
passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,

Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) –
were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.
They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000
as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000
and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied
the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial
court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration 7 in connection with
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the
accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable
period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the
time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again
emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years
from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents
attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She
then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused
Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor
the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the
mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it
contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo)
pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature
and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross
that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as
one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the
initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the
lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their
acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No.
15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like
their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also
participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the
CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the
crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result,
they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against
them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
Applications for Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that
Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 12 and, upon their completion
of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003. 13
To support their claims, respondents attached 14 certified true copies of their respective
Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging
them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus,
they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality,
insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for
probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to
that for intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their
probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated
the cases against them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal
assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and passed
uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We
emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy
trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of
their right against double jeopardy. 16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of
the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes
"a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive
the court of its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s
arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny
the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with
respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the
earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained
of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on
account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a
felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
(Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate
malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on
the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x
The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the
law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus –
is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does
not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of
the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the
other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the
requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be
done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident,
natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or
criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there
must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim
of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required
animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act
does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal
Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,

from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of
an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.
In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast,
simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which
an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here,
the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness,
the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there
are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual,
"from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence
of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for
committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we
cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for
intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the nature
of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable
penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies
committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn
between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or
negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261
(Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the
commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We
have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et
al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents
Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not

bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding
them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their
respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom.
Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. 22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan
v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no longer be reversed
or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former
had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is
analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for
certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the matter
is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once
the accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of

the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially
or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from
the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a
criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the
judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It
is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state
appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase
criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying
for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our
explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating: 28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred

because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the
criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final
judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s
already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where
the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does
not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule
120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already
explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this
rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court
that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in
Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done
in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is
per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court
that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other
words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered
decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the
exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the
shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and
gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan may have
created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the
accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere
motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for
certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While
in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime
charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in
excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a
petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of
the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a
Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be
that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal
judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the
accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial annulment of
the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC

Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and
parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of
the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That power
and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance with
law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of

Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the
court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally
rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the
Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced
Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the
Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in
their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that
would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous
case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was
made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion,
Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications
with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as
the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch
130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court
in which the criminal action has been properly instituted. 37 If a party appeals the trial
court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The
execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is
concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment
the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of
origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the
moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the
power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the
appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any
subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed
except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the
accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions
among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused
waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the
sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused
applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is
entered in the book of entries of judgments. 43 If the case was previously appealed to the
CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original
record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal
was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for
appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of
the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof, 45 including the
convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction
over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications
for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective
applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA 48 and
the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al.
had filed their applications with the trial court. 50 In September 2002, or almost a month
before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the
probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for
Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments
by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002. 54 We noted the
petition and then required respondents to file a comment thereon. 55 After their
submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file
their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until
they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the
probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-
upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this Court
cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for
it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders
who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of
their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a
chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo
rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help
offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting
individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an
act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 59 this
Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by

others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of
the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be
permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights
or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and
no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
(Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et
al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the
RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a

fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have
appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 62 this Court
was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the
trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers
the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial
court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which
was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation
after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and
21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the
accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and
does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing,
are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in
Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of
probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a
result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989
case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had
appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to
slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made
the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have
nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of
authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al.
and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and
void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman
v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and
all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et

al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination
of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his
argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this

Code. (Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally
speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of
the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings,
respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we
find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to
"suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to replace the original sentence with
another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a

suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.

In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified

our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their
conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect
abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all: 69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.
But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will
not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed
on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a
lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has
been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo
ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip).
Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this
case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not
in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty
will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right
to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on
him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two
years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the
right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed
himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed
his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the
right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is,
unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases
supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et
al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in
its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its
medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule
that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was
convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted
the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have
fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial
court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in resolving
whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the terms,
conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the

minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to
discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as
follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next
lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth
sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional,
as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory
penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding

accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal
penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. 71 The applicable accessory penalty is
determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the
prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL. 72 This determination is made
in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must
be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically
allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence" 74 set by a court.
We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two
distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense. 75 The two penalties are only
relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which
the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term. 76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion
tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned
range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et
al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión
correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE
43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans
the ISL; that is, for four years and two months 81 or until they have served their sentence
in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment
of conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they
shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall
forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for
any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office. 83 Any
public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly
remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of

probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point
in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We
held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed
in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda,

Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED.
In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications
for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all
orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY
that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent
Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our
recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines, 88 without prejudice to their
remaining civil liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated

1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth
sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional,
as maximum."
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019
LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as
personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason to suspect
that a person is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based
on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by Larry Sabuco Manibog
(Manibog) assailing the Court of Appeals July 31, 2013 Decision 2 and January 29, 2014
Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34482. The Court of Appeals upheld the Regional Trial
Court August 25, 2011 Judgment4 finding him guilty of violating the Omnibus Election
Code (Gun Ban).
On March 17, 2010, Manibog was charged with violation of Section 1 of Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 8714, in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, and
Sections 261(q) and 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
(Gun Ban).5 The accusatory portion of the Information read:cralawred
That on or about 10:20 o'clock (sic) in the morning of March 17, 2010, at Brgy.
Madamba, municipality of Dingras, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry in a public place, and outside of his
residence a caliber [.]45 pistol ARMSCOR Model 1911 bearing Serial Number
1167503 with one (1) magazine loaded with eight (8) ammunitions during the
election period from Jan. 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010 without first securing the
written authority or permit from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis in the original)
On arraignment, Manibog pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 7
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that on March 17, 2010, police officers arrested
Manibog and seized his firearm for not having a permit from the Commission on
Elections to carry it. The issue was later narrowed down to whether an illegal search
and seizure attended Manibog's apprehension and confiscation of his gun. 8
In the morning of March 17, 2010, Police Chief Inspector Randolph Beniat (Chief
Inspector Beniat) received information from a police asset that Manibog was standing
outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked in his
waistband.9
To verify this information, Chief Inspector Beniat immediately organized a team.

Together, they proceeded to the Municipal Tourism Office located around 20 meters
from the police station.10
About five (5) to eight (8) meters away from the Municipal Tourism Office, Chief
Inspector Beniat saw Manibog standing outside the building. The team slowly
approached him for fear that he might fight back. As he moved closer, Chief Inspector
Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer deduced to be a gun
due to its distinct contour.11
Chief Inspector Beniat went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object on his waist, and
confirmed that there was a gun tucked in Manibog's waistband. He disarmed Manibog
of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster, after which he arrested him for violating the
election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding. 12
Police Officer Rodel 2 Caraballa (PO2 Caraballa) testified that he was part of the team
organized by Chief Inspector Beniat to verify a tip they received concerning Manibog.
He narrated that as he walked up to Manibog with the team during their operation, he
noticed what appeared to be a gun-shaped bulge on Manibog's waist. 13
PO2 Caraballa testified that Chief Inspector Beniat handed him the gun after it had been
confiscated from Manibog. Later at the police station, he marked the gun with his initials
"RC."14
For the defense, Manibog did not deny that he was carrying a gun when the police
officers arrested him. However, he claimed that while Chief Inspector Beniat was
frisking him, the police officer whispered an apology, explaining that he had to do it or
he would get in trouble with the police provincial director. 15
Manibog further testified that at the police station, Chief Inspector Beniat asked him to
relay his apologies to Dingras Mayor Marinette Gamboa 16 (Mayor Gamboa) since
Manibog had worked closely with her. He also stated that he did not hold a grudge
against Chief Inspector Beniat.17
In its August 25, 2011 Judgment,18 the Regional Trial Court found Manibog guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the election offense with which he was charged. It ruled
that the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest because there
was probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him. 19
The Regional Trial Court also noted that People v. Tudtud,20 which reversed People v.

Ayangao,21 instructed that to justify a warrantless arrest, it was not enough that the
police officers were armed with reliable information. Such reliable information must be
combined with an accused's overt act indicating that he or she has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime.22 Here, the trial court found that the police
officers arrested Manibog not only because of "a very specific" 23 tip, but also because
they personally observed a distinct bulge on his waistline, which they suspected to be a
gun due to its contour and their experience as police officers. 24
The Regional Trial Court likewise brushed off the defense's assertions that the police
officers' failure to obtain a warrant invalidated Manibog's search and arrest. It declared
that the police officers merely acted befitting the urgency of the situation; they would
have been remiss in their duty if they did not immediately act on the information they
had received.25
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Judgment read:cralawred
WHEREFORE, the accused LARRY MANIBOG y SABUCO is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the election offense of violation of Section 32 of Republic Act No.
7166 in relation to Comelec Resolution No. 8714 and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months as
minimum to two (2) years as maximum. He shall also suffer DISQUALIFICATION to
hold public office and DEPRIVATION of the right to suffrage. The subject firearm is
CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.26
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
Manibog appealed27 the Judgment, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July
31, 2013 Decision.28
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that the warrantless search made
on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest, since the police officers had probable
cause to believe that he was committing a crime when he was arrested. It noted that
Manibog had been caught in flagrante delicto and failed to show a permit allowing him
to carry his firearm.29 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals July 31, 2013
Decision read:cralawred
FOR THE STATED REASONS, the appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.30 (Emphasis in the original)
Manibog moved for reconsideration, but his Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals
January 29, 2014 Resolution.31
In his Petition for Review on Certiorari,32 Manibog urges this Court to reverse the Court
of Appeals Decision validating the police officers' warrantless search and arrest. 33
Petitioner claims that he was not arrested in flagrante delicto because he was only
standing in front of the Municipal Tourism Office when the police officers descended
upon and searched him. He maintains that the search came prior to his arrest,
rendering any evidence obtained from him tainted and inadmissible. 34
Petitioner asserts that at the time of his arrest, the police officers could not have seen
the contour or bulge of his gun, as it was tucked in his waistband below his navel and
could not be seen from a distance. He emphasizes that the police officer who frisked
him first patted his back before finding the gun in his waist. This indicates that the police
officer was unsure if he actually had a gun on him. 35
Petitioner also imputes malice on the police officers, who had earlier received orders to
dismantle Mayor Gamboa's private army. As part of her security, he claims that he was
singled out and illegally searched and arrested despite merely standing outside a
building at that time.36
In its Comment,37 respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, insists that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming petitioner's
conviction.38 It posits that the warrantless search was done incidental to a lawful arrest
as petitioner was arrested while he was committing a crime. 39
Respondent maintains that the police officers had probable cause to arrest petitioner. It
explains that aside from the tip that petitioner was carrying a gun outside the Municipal
Tourism Office, the police officers' simple visual inspection confirmed that he had a gun
tucked in his waist, which suitably fell under the plain view doctrine. 40
In his Comment and Opposition,41 petitioner insists that there was no probable cause for
his warrantless arrest, as he was not committing a crime at that time. 42 He also refutes
respondent's assertion that the gun seized from him fell under the plain view doctrine. 43
The lone issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the warrantless search made
upon petitioner Larry Sabuco Manibog was unlawful, and, consequently, whether the
gun confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence.
The Petition must fail.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures:cralawred
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and. seizure violates the Constitution. Any evidence
resulting from it "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." 44
However, the constitutional proscription only covers unreasonable searches and

seizures. Jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable warrantless searches
and seizures, which are:cralawred
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.45 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
Two (2) of these exceptions to a search warrant—a warrantless search incidental to a

lawful arrest and "stop and frisk"—are often confused with each other. Malacat v. Court
of Appeals46 explained that they "differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope." 47
For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued or there
was a lawful warrantless arrest as provided for in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court:cralawred
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:cralawred
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the
arresting officer must have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section
5(b), the arresting officer must have had probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested committed an offense.48 Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the
lawful arrest generally precedes,49 or is substantially contemporaneous,50 with the
search.
In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk
searches are conducted to deter crime.51People v. Cogaed52 underscored that they are
necessary for law enforcement, though never at the expense of violating a citizen's right
to privacy:cralawred
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to
discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer,
with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of
an illicit act.53
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
Posadas v. Court of Appeals54 saw this Court uphold the warrantless search and
seizure done as a valid stop and frisk search. There, the accused's suspicious actions,
coupled with his attempt to flee when the police officers introduced themselves to him,
amounted to a reasonable suspicion that he was concealing something illegal in his buri
bag.55 However, Posadas failed to elaborate on or describe what the police officers
observed as the suspicious act that led them to search the accused's buri bag.
In comparison, the police officers in Manalili v. Court of Appeals56 responded to a report

that drug addicts were roaming in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. There, they saw
a man with bloodshot eyes who had trouble walking straight. 57 This Court upheld the
validity of the warrantless arrest as a stop and frisk search, since the police officers'
observation and assessment led them to believe that the man was high on drugs and
compelled them to investigate and search him.
Similarly, in People v. Solayao,58 police officers were investigating reports that a group

of armed men was roaming the barangay at night. As they patrolled the streets, they
saw seemingly drunk men, among them Solayao in a camouflage uniform. The men fled
upon seeing the police, but Solayao was caught and found with an unlicensed
firearm.59 This Court upheld the validity of the warrantless search and seizure
conducted as a stop and frisk search, since the unfolding events did not leave the police
officers enough time to procure a search warrant. 60
Manalili and Solayao upheld the warrantless searches conducted because "the police

officers[,] using their senses[,] observed facts that led to the suspicion." 61 Furthermore,
the totality of the circumstances in each case provided sufficient and genuine reason for
them to suspect that something illicit was afoot.
For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal
knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit
act. Cogaed emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal
observation of a suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of
the "basic right to security of one's person and effects." 62
Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere suspicion is not
enough; there should be a genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to
warrant a belief that the person searched was carrying a weapon. In short, the totality of
circumstances should result in a genuine reason to justify a stop and frisk search.
In Esquillo v. People,63 the police officer approached and searched the accused after
seeing her put a clear plastic sachet in her cigarette case and try to flee from him. 64 This
Court upheld the validity of the stop and frisk search conducted, since the police
officer's experience led him to reasonably suspect that the plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance in the cigarette case was a dangerous drug. 65
In his dissent in Esquillo, however, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Lucas
Bersamin (Chief Justice Bersamin) pointed out how the police officer admitted that only
his curiosity upon seeing the accused put a plastic sachet in her cigarette case
prompted him to approach her. This was despite not seeing what was in it, as he was
standing three (3) meters away from her at that time. 66 The dissent read:cralawred
For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of
reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the
circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent police officer. Yet, the
totality of the circumstances described by PO1 Cruzin did not suffice to engender any
reasonable suspicion in his mind. The petitioner's act, without more, was an innocuous
movement, absolutely not one to give rise in the mind of an experienced officer to any
belief that she had any weapon concealed about her, or that she was probably
committing a crime in the presence of the officer. Neither should her act and the
surrounding circumstances engender any reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer
that a criminal activity was afoot. We should bear in mind that the Court has frequently
struck down the arrest of individuals whose overt acts did not transgress the penal laws,
or were wholly innocent.67 (Citation omitted)
Chief Justice Bersamin cautioned against warrantless searches based on just one (1)
suspicious circumstance. There should have been "more than one seemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity" 68 to
uphold the validity of a stop and frisk search.
Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should
have personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of
which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the
arresting officer to investigate further.
Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was
conducted on petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what transpired was a stop and frisk search.
Chief Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner, whom he knew as a

kagawad and security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun outside the Municipal
Tourism Office during an election gun ban. With a few other police officers, he went
there and spotted petitioner right in front of the building with a suspicious-looking bulge
protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police officer deduced this to be a
firearm based on the object's size and contour. He testified:cralawred
Court
Q The question is, how far was the accused from you when you first saw him at the
vicinity of Municipal Tourism Office?
A About 5 to 8 meters, your Honor.

[Prosecutor] Felipe
Q And when you saw Brgy. Kagawad Larry Manibog, what did you do?
A I usually checked the subject, sir while still approaching and I saw that his waist is
bulging in a manner that suggested he is carrying that getting (sic) firearm, sir.

Q How far were you actually to accused (sic) Larry Manibog when you said you
noticed something that is bulging presumptive to you to be a firearm?
A About two to three meters, sir.

Q What made you say that what was bulging on his waistline, what was your word
again? In a manner suggested that is a firearm?
A There is a distinct peculiar of a contour firearm when tucked on his waist.

Q What gave you the idea of determining contour of the firearm at a certain distance?
A Based on my experience I saw my colleagues and other agents that [tuck] their
gun on their waist so that now I know that is a gun I can distinguish a firearm or
other items that are [tucked] on the waist, sir. 69
Even on cross-examination, Chief Inspector Beniat did not waver from his testimony
that petitioner had a gun tucked in his waistband. 70 His testimony was corroborated by
PO2 Caraballa, who was part of the team that investigated the report on
petitioner:cralawred
[Prosecutor Garcia]
Q And what did you find out when you went to verify the report in front of the Dingras
Tourism Office?
A Upon the description by our Chief of Police, we saw Larry Manibog that there is
something bulging on his waistline, sir.

Q And so when you saw Brgy. [K]agawad Larry Manibog having a bulging waistline . .
.

Court -
Q What did you mean bulging [waistline]?
A We observe, your Honor, that there was as if a gun bulging on the waistline of
Brgy. Kagawad Larry Manibog, we could determine, as a police that it is a gun,
your Honor.

[Prosecutor] Garcia -
May we make it of record that the witness has been tapping his waistline while
testifying that there was something bulging on his waistline, your Honor. 71
The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner
had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he
was carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not
synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect
a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the search
conducted on petitioner fell under the established exception of a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine
reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner. Hence,
the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of the warrantless search on
petitioner:cralawred
In the present case, the Dingras policemen searched the accused not only because of a
tip - a very specific one - that he was at that moment standing in front of the nearby
Municipal Tourism Office with a gun on his waist. More importantly, PCI Beniat testified
that at a distance of about two to three meters from the accused, he saw the latter's
bulging waistline indicating the "distinct peculiar contour" of a firearm tucked on his
waist. Citing his experience as a police officer, PCI Beniat testified that he could
distinguish a firearm from any other object tucked on the waist of a person. In the
language of Justice Panganiban's separate opinion in People v. Montilla, the Court finds
that the bulging waistline of herein accused constituted "an outward indication" that
clearly suggested he was then carrying a firearm.
It should be noted that the firearm recovered from the accused was an ARMSCOR full-
size 1911 pistol (GI series) with an overall length of 8.5 inches and a barrel length of 5
inches. Not being a compact pistol, its size made it difficult to conceal. Conceivably, it
could be concealed under appropriate clothes like a jacket or an additional piece of
clothing. In this case, however, PO1 Caravalla (sic) testified that the accused was at the
time of his apprehension merely wearing a white shirt depicted in his photograph at the
police station. In other words, the accused was not wearing a jacket or any additional
garment that could have masked the contour of a full-sized pistol. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that the size of the pistol and the absence of any other
clothing worn by the accused during his apprehension support the testimony of PCI
Beniat that his (the accused Larry Manibog's) waistline was then bulging in a manner
suggestive of the presence of a firearm.72 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Finally, the Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly found
petitioner guilty of committing an election offense. It imposed the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months as minimum, and two (2) years as
maximum, which finds basis in Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code:cralawred
SECTION 264. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any election offense under this
Code shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than
six years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be
enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be
sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed
upon such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their corresponding
officials have been found guilty. . . .
In case of prisoner or prisoners illegally released from any penitentiary or jail during the
prohibited period as provided in Section 261, paragraph (n) of this Code, the director of
prisons, provincial warden, keeper of the jail or prison, or persons who are required by
law to keep said prisoner in their custody shall, if convicted by a competent court, be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period if the prisoner or
prisoners so illegally released commit any act of intimidation, terrorism of interference in
the election. . . .
Any person found guilty of the offense of failure to register or failure to vote shall, upon
conviction, be fined one hundred pesos. In addition, he shall suffer disqualification to
run for public office in the next succeeding election following his conviction or be
appointed to a public office for a period of one year following his conviction. (Emphasis
supplied)
Nonetheless, as petitioner is legally disqualified to apply for probation under Section

264 of the Omnibus Election Code, the penalty should be modified to reflect this.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Petitioner Larry Sabuco

Manibog is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year
and six (6) months as minimum to two (2) years as maximum, and
is DISQUALIFIED from applying for probation. He is further DISQUALIFIED from
holding public office and DEPRIVED of the right to suffrage. The subject firearm
is CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Morlando J. Gonzaga for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition to review by certiorari the order dated December 21, 1981 of
respondent Pacito G. Mutia, 1 then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court (now
Municipal Trial Court) of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, which imposed as a condition in
granting probation to petitioner Florentina L. Baclayon that she refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by
the then Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent
Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words
against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) and the appellate
court, taking into account the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact that the crime was
committed in the office of the complainant in the public school building of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
during office hours, increased the penalty imposed by respondent judge and sentenced
petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum period to 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On the same date petitioner
applied for probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation
Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting of
petitioner's probation for a period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's

probation, but modified the Probation Officer's recommendation by increasing the period
of probation to five (5) years and by imposing the following conditions: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) To present herself to the jprobation officer designated to undertake her

supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within seventy-
two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) To report to the Probation Office or any specified place designated by

the Probation Officer at least once a month in person;
(c) To reside at the premise approved by the Probation Officer and not
change her residence without prior written approval;
(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her house and place of work or
an authorized Social Worker;
(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to excess;
(f) To pay the cost;
(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the

defendant and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her
freedom of conscience; and
(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching profession.
Petitioner's plea for deletion of the last condition was rejected by respondent judge.
Hence, the petition at bar alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of the said
condition that petitioner should "refrain from continuing her teaching profession." The
petitioner submits that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights
but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objectives and benefits of the probation
law and prays that the said condition be deleted from the order granting her probation.
On petitioner's motion, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent judge from enforcing the said questioned condition.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into
general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions,
enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that the probationer should (a)
present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and (b)
report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified
by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed
in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose
on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The
enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character 2 and
enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer's
constitutional rights are not jeopardized. 3 There are innumerable conditions which may
be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific
individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special or discretionary
conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer
develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual Conditions should be
interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own
merits — on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. 4 The
very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate
instead unrealistic terms.
Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only profession she knows and as such she
possesses special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as District
Guidance Coordinator and always designated as District-in-Charge whenever the
District Supervisor is out of town. She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her study of Child Study and
Development. It also appears that she is an outstanding member of the Misamis
Occidental Girl Scout Council, having served as Physical Education & Girl Scout Field
Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District Girl Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of
the Distinct Federated Girl Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource person
in District and Division Level Girl Scout encampments and re-elected Board Member of
the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from
teaching would deprive the students and the school in general the benefits that may be
derived from her training and expertise. While it is true that probation is a mere privilege
and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. 5 Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest must
be observed. 6 In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and
profession of petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and
occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would
practically prevent her from complying with the terms of the probation.
Respondents contend that petitioner's final conviction carries with it the accessory
penalties in addition to the principal penalty of imprisonment; and since petitioner was
sentenced to arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, she must likewise suffer the accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. This cannot apply to petitioner, however,
because she was granted probation. The imposition of her sentence of imprisonment
was thereby suspended and necessarily, the imposition of the accessory penalties was
likewise thereby suspended.
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a

suspension of the imposition of sentence. 7 It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. 8
In view of all the foregoing, the Court grants the petition and hereby orders that
paragraph (h) of the questioned order granting probation which requires that petitioner
refrain from continuing with her teaching profession be deleted. The temporary
restraining order is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123936. March 4, 1999.]
RONALD SORIANO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. RODOLFO V.

TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Third
Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, Third Judicial
Region, Iba, Zambales; Ms. NELDA DA MAYCONG, Supervising Parole and
Probation Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Zambales Parole and Probation Office;
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. SP No. 35550, 1 which upheld the trial court’s orders holding petitioner in
contempt and revoking his probation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting
to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993. 2
His application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and
conditions imposed by the trial court were the following: 3
"x x x
7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment
without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular
study or vocational training.
x x x
11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of
P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court.
x x x"
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel
petitioner’s probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the
victim, and a supplemental motion alleging petitioner’s commission of another crime for
which at that time he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation
Office filed a comment recommending that petitioner be allowed to continue with his
probation and that he be required instead to submit a program of payment of his civil
liability.
On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutor’s motion and directed petitioner
to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information that petitioner’s

father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received
P16,500.00 as insurance payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of
Daluyong and Da Maycong considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the
probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial court praying that petitioner be
made to explain his non-compliance with the court’s order of June 20, 1994, or that he
be cited for contempt for such non-compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner
be made to submit a program of payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted
her prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was once again ordered to
submit his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a motion for reconsideration
explaining that he did not receive any notice of the order dated June 20, 1994. His
counsel received a copy of said order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner.
Thus, the latter failed to comply with said order.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of
court for his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The
court likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be
arrested to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court,
among the violations committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to
(1) meet his responsibilities to his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3)
cooperate with his program of supervision.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. He
claimed that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of, or in excess of, jurisdiction in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his
probation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that petitioner’s
"stubborn unwillingness" to comply with the orders of the trial court "shows his refusal to
reform himself and to correct a wrong." 4
According to the Court of Appeals:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where probation was approved and probationer has proven to be unrepentant and
disrespectful and even showed clear defiance to two lawful court orders, as in the case
of herein petitioner, the court is not barred from revoking the same." 5
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review, in which petitioner makes the following assignment of
errors: 6
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was deliberate refusal on the part of
petitioner to comply with his orders dated June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994 and
subsequently declaring petitioner in contempt.
grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier issued in favor of
petitioner on the ground that petitioner failed to satisfy the award of civil indemnity for
the heirs of the accident victim.
grave abuse of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier issued in favor of
petitioner on the ground that the latter violated the conditions of his probation three
times.
Petitioner asserts that he had no intention to ignore the orders of the trial court. The
court’s order of June 20, 1994 was received by his counsel who, however, did not notify
petitioner. Petitioner says that his "former counsel’s irresponsible delay (in informing him
of the order) should not prejudice him." 7
He explains that his non-compliance with the order to submit a program of payment of
his civil liability is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He only relies on his
parents for support. He claims that it is impossible for him to formulate a payment
program because, in the first place, he is in no position to comply with the
same.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to avail
of the benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription against unequal
protection of the law. He says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from
probation if satisfaction of civil liability is made condition.
Petitioner contends that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on
the satisfaction of his civil liability. He invokes the separate opinion of Justice Isagani A.
Cruz in Salgado v. Court of Appeals, 8 particularly Justice Cruz’ reservation about the
validity of imposing satisfaction of civil liability as a condition for probation. Based on
this opinion, petitioner claims that such an imposition is in the nature of an amendment
of the decision of the trial court in the criminal case against him, which cannot be
allowed since the decision is already final and executory. He further invokes the majority
decision in Salgado and asserts that "any program of payment of civil liability must take
into consideration the needs and capacity of petitioner." 9
Petitioner claims that his failure to meet his responsibilities to his family and to engage
in gainful employment is not deliberate but is due to his poverty. He adds that his being
unskilled, with a criminal record to his name, does not exactly enhance his chances for
employment.
Finally, petitioner cites our decision in Baclayon v. Mutia: 10
". . . Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case
should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity
of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial
courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms." 11
In his comment, the Solicitor General asks for the dismissal of the petition. The only
issue to be resolved according to him is whether or not petitioner has violated the terms
and conditions of his probation as to warrant its revocation. The Solicitor General
argues that petitioner has committed violations, thus justifying the trial court’s revocation
of the grant of probation. He further points out that our ruling in Salgado is inapplicable
to the case of petitioner since what was involved in Salgado was a program of payment
already imposed upon petitioner therein. In this case, however, it is petitioner who is
being asked to submit his own program of payment and he had not submitted any such
program.
The only issue for us to resolve in this case is whether or not the revocation of
petitioner’s probation is lawful and proper.
Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court requiring him
to submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his refusal to comply
with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders,
although the notice of the order of June 20, 1994 came belatedly. He has, up to this
point, refused to comply with the trial court’s directive, by questioning instead the
constitutionality of the requirement imposed and harping on his alleged poverty as the
reason for his failure to comply.
Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a condition
precedent to probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioner’s
assertion that only moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this case,
however, petitioner’s application for probation had already been granted. Satisfaction of
his civil liability was not made a requirement before he could avail of probation, but was
a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same.
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a
condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but
one required by law. It is a consequence of petitioner’s having been convicted of a
crime, 12 and petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not
he is placed under probation.
We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court
with a program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is
precisely the reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program
of payment. Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to formulate a
program of payment that fits his needs and capacity.
Petitioner blames his former counsel’s "irresponsible delay" in informing him of the trial
court’s order to come up with a program of payment for his failure to make such a
program. Petitioner wants to take exception to the rule that notice to counsel is notice to
client.
We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioner’s counsel has not been
shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner’s rights. 13
Moreover, we note that petitioner later on discovered that such a court order was
received by his counsel. He could have endeavored to comply with the order then. In
the June 20, 1994 order, he was given 10 days from receipt of the order within which to
comply. The same period was given him in the order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner
does not claim that he failed to receive notice of the latter order. In fact, he submitted a
motion for reconsideration of said order, but still without the required program of
payment.
No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial
court could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with its
orders. Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are in
full agreement with respondent appellate court’s decision as well.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Moreover, petitioner’s continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his
prayer for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation
order, creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability.
This he cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a
program of payment.
Petitioner’s reliance on Salgado is misplaced. In that case, the trial court itself
formulated the manner by which Salgado was to satisfy his civil liability. He was able to
comply for a few months. When he started skipping his payments, his victim sought the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce full payment of the civil liability. The trial court
granted this motion and it was sustained by the Court of Appeals which ruled that the
program of payment amounted to an amendment of the decision of the trial court
ordering payment of civil liability but without a program of payment. Since the trial
court’s decision had already become final, it can no longer be amended by imposing a
program of payment, in installments, of the civil liability.
We held in Salgado that the program of payment is not an amendment of the decision of
the trial court because it does not increase or decrease the liability and the obligation to
pay is to be fulfilled during the period of probation.
Unlike in Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of payment.
But he failed to do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of payment to speak
of, because of petitioner’s stubborn refusal and delay as well as failure to abide by the
trial court’s orders.
Petitioner’s reliance on Baclayon is likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being
assailed as an unrealistic condition was the trial court’s requirement that petitioner
therein, a teacher convicted of Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her
profession. This condition was deemed unreasonable because teaching was the only
profession she knew and it appeared that she excelled in teaching. No unrealistic
condition similar to the one in Baclayon has been imposed upon petitioner herein.
As regards the other violations committed by petitioner, the question of whether or not
petitioner has, indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is evidently a
factual one which had already been passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight, more so when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 14 as
in this case.
Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only
depends on his parents for support. He can barely support his family. 15 Petitioner
ought to be reminded of what is incumbent on a probationer, including those
requirements that the trial court may set.
As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 10. Conditions of Probation. — . . .
The court may also require the probationer to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) Meet his family responsibilities;

(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without
the prior written approval of the probation officer;
x x x
(e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
x x x" 16
Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down
by statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose
and the petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these
conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the
correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized
treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which
might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence. 16a Failure to comply will
result in the revocation of the order granting probation, pursuant to the Probation
Law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect upon
its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences
thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed
in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty
imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation." 16b (Emphasis
supplied.)
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the
discretion of the trial court. 17 Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that
may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that
the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.
Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation,
petitioner cannot now assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has
squandered the opportunity granted him by the trial court to remain outside prison bars,
and must now suffer the consequences of those aforecited violations.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 35550 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990
MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer, Manila Probation Office No.
4, respondents.
Coronet Law Office for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984
of the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila,
Branch XX. 1 The decretal portion of the assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss and/or strike
out motion to revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru counsel, should be, as
it is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria
Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport,
with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document.
On January 3, 1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case
No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The dispositive
portion of the judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Manuel Bala
y Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public
or official document defined and penalized under article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of not less than ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE
(3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision
correccional, to pay a fine of Pl,800.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P8.00 for each day, and to pay the cost. He shall be
credited with the period of preventive imprisonment that he may have undergone
in accordance with law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980,
affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, 2 the
petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order
dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of
one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation
officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life
Subdivision in Las Piñas specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally
granted the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10,
1983, 3 one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final
discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet
submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City
Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the
petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over
by the respondent judge. 4
The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his
probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that
he was no longer under probation, 5 his probation period having terminated on August
10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the
same, he contended.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's
probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to
terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on
supervision dated January 5, 1984. 6 The same motion, however, became the subject of
a "Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was
not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting
a supplemental report 7 which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of
new facts, information, and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke
probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his
probation period had already expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically
transferred the venue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of
the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las
Piñas the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which
provides
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of

another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the,
Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case a copy of the probation
order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to
said Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over
the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was
previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which amends section 4
of P.D. 968, clearly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990, which went in force
on January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial
to the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the motion to
dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the
issue of the petitioner's transfer of residence. The motion did not touch on the issue of
the timeliness to revoke probation. The respondent judge has not yet heard and
received evidence, much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor General
submits that the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final discharge
of the probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon

consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court
may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed
terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of
the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be
issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the
probationer be deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed the
period set in the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer.
In the instant case, a review of the records compels a revocation of the probation
without the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after all, would only be
an exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow the petitioner to
further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible society.
Precisely he was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main
stream, to give him hope — hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has
continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has
not reformed.
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because
he (probation officer) is in the best position to report all information relative to the
conduct and mental and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and
the existing institutional and community resources that he may avail himself of when
necessary. Indeed, it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes the supervision
and reform of the probationer through a personalized, individualized, and community-
based rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On the basis of his final
report, the court can determine whether or not the probationer may be released from
probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had neglected to submit
his report and recommendation. For, as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial
court could not issue the order of final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order
of final discharge which would restore the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the
absence of the order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist, unless
otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are going to do. We are
revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be emancipated
from the yoke if not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the
conditions of his probation, among which are:
xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;
xxx
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation that will
be prescribed by the Probation Officer. 9
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-compliance
has defeated the very purposes of the probation law, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might
be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 10
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the probation

program. Instead of utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate himself
as a productive, law abiding, and socially responsible member of society, he continued
in his wayward ways — falsifying public or official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons,
Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and Efren Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public
and/or official documents (U.S. Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171,
of the Revised Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal Cases Nos.
29100, 29101, 29102, 29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each of them in
all five (5) cases a prison term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
four (4) years also of prison correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the
accessory penalties thereof, and to pay the costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification by granting restitution of the
amounts they collected from the offended private parties. The judgment has since
become final. As a matter of fact, for failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of
judgment despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala on July 10,
1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 and this warrant has
not yet been implemented because Bala absconded. These facts are evident and
constitute violations of the conditions of his probation. Thus, the revocation of his
probation is compelling.
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a
probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer,
once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a
hearing which may be informal and summary, of the violation charged. ... If the
violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and
modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to
serve the sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation
or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable. 11
(Emphasis supplied.)
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so
that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation
period of one year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we
stressed earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from
the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of
imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on "probation" is not a
"sentence," but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a
final judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order
placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to
be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated." 13
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred

by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special
enjoyment of a good or exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law
to some persons. 14 Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion
of the court. This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 15 If the probationer has
proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred from
revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if
probation is not revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of residence
automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial
Court to the same court in his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. 16 Such being the case, the Manila
RTC would not be deprived of its ,jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the
petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant
probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused
applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas as he is
up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved
from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Piñas. 17 On the
other hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic would
mean that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI
was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Piñas.
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change
of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC
of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las
Piñas is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial Region
(Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in
Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region. 19 Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts
of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal
courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the
court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or
judge. 20 Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the
probation, has not lost control and supervision over the probation of the petitioner.
The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence
from his probation officer.1âwphi1 This would not suffice the law is very explicit in its
requirement of a prior court approval in writing. Section 10 of PD 968 categorically
decrees that the probationer must
xxx
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence
without its prior written approval;
xxx
Further, such written approval is required by the 21 probation order of August 11, 1982
as one of the conditions of probation, to wit:
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said address nor leave
the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four (24) hours
without first securing prior written approval of his Probation Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of
justice, we revoke the probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his
probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court and having the parties start all
over again in needless protracted proceedings. 22
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is hereby
REVOKED. Further, the trial court is ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner and for him to serve the sentence originally imposed without any deduction.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997]

SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR, Complainants, v. JUDGE SALVADOR P.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Makati, Metro Manila, May 13, 1992."

On 13 August 1992, the accused, Gerardo Marcial, filed a motion for

On 28 October 1992, herein petitioners filed an opposition to said motion.

The lower court justified its order thus:

As for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, petitioners contend

On rendering an unjust judgment, petitioners allege that in imposing a straight

On 6 August 1996, respondent judge finally filed his comment. He explained

On 14 August 1996, respondent judge filed an urgent ex-parte motion for second

1. Respondent cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by

"a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.

b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit

c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134),

d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).

Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla,

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.

WHEREFORE, the Court, resolving to hold respondent Judge Salvador P. de

G.R. No. 92020 October 19, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused ELISEO MARTINADO y

The accused HERMOGENES MARTINADO shall be credited in the

Accused, by their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court hereby

In promulgating judgment in absentia with respect to Eliseo, and in giving due course to

xxx xxx xxx

To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence

If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to

It should provide instead that it upon promulgation of the judgment, the

By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. —

xxx xxx xxx

1. Seiko men's watch (5) worth — P 800.00

2. Men's ring worth — P1,800.00

3. Wallet containing cash in the amount of — P2,500.00

Trial subsequently ensued with the prosecution presenting Margarita Padrinao,

The following is the version as shown by the evidence adduced by the

At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986, Margarita

At about this time, Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government

Gerardo Arellano, a Barangay tanod of the place where the incident

Gerardo Arellano and his companions proceeded to the house of "Rolly"

During the investigation conducted at the house of Juan Matias by the

Seiko wristwatch –– P 800.00

xxx xxx xxx

It is undisputed that Juan Matias, 70 years old, died on November 14,

xxx xxx xxx

In a Resolution dated 12 March 1990, We accepted the appeal interposed by the

The appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED

A Things were missing, sir.

Q Did you come to know what were those missing things?

A Watches (sic), wallet.

Q How did you come to know that?

A Because he was not wearing his wristwatch and his wallet

Q Whose wallet was missing?

A Juan Matias, sir.