A. Book VII, Administrative Procedure, Secs.

1-26, Administrative Code of 1987

See also Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)
Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law

B. In Rule-Making, price, wage, or rate fixing

C. In Adjudication of Cases

1. Rules of Procedure
2. Due Process

a. Cardinal primary rights

Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261

HELD: No. The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of
justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review
of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that
he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of
the CA.

American Inter-Fashion Corp. v. Office of the President, 197 SCRA 409

HELD:

1. NO. The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private

respondent Glorious, the Office of the President “had unwittingly made itself
a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a decision which had become final and
executory more than three years earlier. The petitioner asseverates resolution
dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res judicata on the matter.

The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to be a
bar to a subsequent case is that it must be a judgment on the merits. A
judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to
the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or
state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the
right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objection or contentions.

Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a

judgment on the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact,
when the court heard the parties during the oral arguments, GTEB was not
able to present any showing of misdeclaration of imports.
The motion to withdraw the petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co
that not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by the
martial law regime. The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was based
solely on the notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal of
the petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits
of the petition.

Hence, it cannot constitute res judicata.

2. NO. The Petitioner contends that Glorious Sun was not denied due process.
Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose to
Glorious vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that
Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent
disclosure in 1987, where relevant documents were given to Glorious and that
the latter was given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect.

This contention by AIFC, the court holds, is misleading. The SC recognized

that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the GTEB.

AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence used
by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution.

The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed
to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious.

Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced

the charge that the former was denied due process.

Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the Chairman
of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to look for ways and
means to remove the quotas from Glorious. AIFC claims that it is an
inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to it and
also, none of the members of the committee would agree that there was any
pressure or instruction from Minister Ongpin.

The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not agree
that there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno was not telling
the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He did not state that the
members of the investigating panel were pressured. Mr. Puno was the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his
position he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every reason
to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip
it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their administration had
already been made.
 The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be
disregarded if they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are
initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead
to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or
when grave abuse of discretion arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.

Contrary to the petitioner's posture, the record clearly manifests that in

canceling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the
private respondent’s constitutional right to due process. Before the
cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been enjoying export quotas granted to it
since 1977. In effect, the private respondent’s export quota allocation which
initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which
should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to
hurriedly confer it on another.

Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 256

HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national
teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents
did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these
committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings
undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal.
It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues:
Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are
members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said
teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative
to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot
be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD
807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law,
unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

b. Requisites of Administrative Due Process

Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil 635

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union Inc, was deprived of due
process

RULING:
YES. The SC concluded that the Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
The SC had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it
to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
Further the SC enumerated the requisites of administrative due process
embodied as primary rights:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. the evidence must be "substantial"
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected
6. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The Court held that the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive
all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth here in above.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. COA, 840 SCRA 163

b.1 Administrative Due Process cannot be equated with due process in

its strict sense

Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Puedan, Jr., 816 SCRA 243

2. No, NPI was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain its
side. The observance offairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the
very heart of procedural due process. The essenceof due process is to be
heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair
andreasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action orruling complained of.
As held in Ledesma v. CA, “Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when
a person is notified of the charge againsthim and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself.”
In this case, NPI essentially claims that it was deprived of its right to due
process when it was not notified of the proceedings before the LA and did not
receive copies and issuances from the other parties and the LA, respectively.
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, NPI was furnished via a courier
of a copy of the amended complaint filed by the respondents against it as
shown by LBC Receipt No.125158910840. It is also apparent that NPI was
also furnished with the respondents’ Position Paper, Reply and Rejoinder.
Verily, NPI was indeed accorded due process, but as the LA mentioned, the
former chose not to file any position paper or appear in the scheduled
 conferences. Assuming arguendo that NPI was somehow deprived of due
process by either of the labor tribunals, such defect was cured by: (a) NPI’s
filing of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC; (b)the NLRC’s
subsequent issuance of its Resolution wherein the tribunal considered all of
NPI’s arguments as contained in its motion; and (c) NPI’s subsequent
elevation of the case to the CA. In Autencio v. Mañara, it was held that
defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has been
afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of

Sibayan v. Alda, 852 SCRA 102

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules
on evidence, the same does not hold true for administrative bodies; technical
rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not exact replicas of those in
administrative investigations. (Sibayan vs. Alda, G.R. No. 233395, Jan. 17,
2018)

b.2 Rules of evidence not strictly observed

The Heritage Hotel, Manila v. Sio, 906 SCRA 167

Issue: Whether Sio’s suspension is valid and legal.
Held: Yes.
It is axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of
management imposition. What should not be overlooked is the prerogative of
an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary
for the proper conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary
measures in order to implement said rules to assure that the same would be
complied with. An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of
discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to
instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal,
upon erring employees.
Sio’s suspensions were imposed by Heritage not solely on the basis of
Bumatay’s report/complaint on the first incident or Mendoza’s complaint on
the second incident. Rather, Sio was allowed to explain in writing, and
administrative hearings were conducted to afford her an opportunity to rebut
the charges against her. Other witnesses attended the hearing as shown by the
minutes of the conference meeting attached to the Petition. The evidence
likewise shows that Sio, instead of refuting the charges, apologized to the
complainants. In other words, other pieces of evidence were presented by
Heritage to prove the validity of Sio’ s suspension.

c. Notice and Hearing

1. When required
 Commissioner of Immigration v. Fernandez, 11 SCRA 184
Whether the claim of petitioner Commissioner of Immigration that failure to notify Teban
Caoili of the hearing and bring him to the jurisdiction of the new Board of
Commissioners was due to his elusiveness, is another question of fact. It was admitted
that no notice of the exclusion proceedings was given to Teban Caoili, because he
allegedly went into hiding and his whereabouts were unknown to the Commissioner. In
the face of the disclosure that Teban Caoili had been all along working in the Avenue
Electrical Supply Co. (Avesco), located at No. 653 Rizal Avenue, Manila, until his arrest,
and the documentary evidence showing that he had been issued a Philippine Passport;
had regularly paid his Residence Tax Certificates (A & B), and filed Income Tax Returns,
a finding of fact is necessary whether the Commissioner really had intended to notify
Teban Caoili of the exclusion proceedings the Board had conducted in his absence. While
it may be true that the proceedings is purely administrative in nature, such a circumstance
did not excuse the serving of notice. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of administrative character, the first of which is the right to
a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. (Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635). The right
of Teban Caoili to Philippine citizenship had already been passed upon by a Board of
equally and duly constituted Commissioners. Petitioner at least, could have notified
Teban Caoili or exerted efforts to cause his presence, by or through the instrumentalities
and agencies that the Government has at its command. Except mere bare statements,
there is nothing which would indicate that even the ordinary effort was employed within
two years, to locate him. There was unusual hurry in the disposition of the case by the
new Board of Commissioners. The review took place on June 23, 1962, a decision was
rendered and a Warrant of Exclusion was issued on the same date. Since the proceedings
affected Caoili's status and liberty, notice should have been given. And in the light of the
actuations of the new Board of Commissioners, there is now a necessity of determining
whether the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry and the old Board of Commissioners
are correct or not. This calls for an examination of the evidence, and, the law on the
matter.

Obviously, therefore, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal and to issue the Order complained of. Considering all the facts before them,
respondents Associate Justices were of the opinion that release on bail was proper. This is
not abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Even if We grant
for purposes of argument, that respondents made an erroneous conclusion of fact or of
law, still their actuations cannot be the subject of certiorari or prohibition. The appeal was
one on a decision denying a petition for Habeas Corpus, presented by a person who had
been already a Filipino citizen, not an ordinary person who is an alien applying for
admission for Philippine citizenship. This being the case, We leave the resolution of the
applicability of the Cloribel case (supra), in the case at bar, to the respondent court.

Bautista v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 121

1. The claim of the petitioner that her deceased husband was deprived of due process by the
respondent Commission's hearing officer is meritorious.
The September 29, 1975 order of dismissal of the hearing officer which charged claimant and
his counsel of "repeated non-appearance" was precipitated by their failure to appear in the
scheduled hearings of August 6, 1975, August 20, 1975 and September 9,1975.

In his October 16, 1975 motion for reconsideration, counsel for claimant contended that his
failure to appear at the aforesaid scheduled September 9, 1975 hearing was excusable;
because he received the notice of hearing by ordinary mail two (2) day after the scheduled
date. Despite this explanation of counsel for claimant, the factual allegations of which were
not disputed by the respondent employer which was furnished a copy of the motion, the
hearing officer refused to reconsider its order of dismissal. Further more, the WCC record
does not show that indeed counsel for claimant received notice of hearing prior to the
aforesaid scheduled date of hearing.

With respect to the August 6, 1975 scheduled hearing, the claim of claimant's counsel that he
was not notified thereof is not disputed; nor do the records show that he was ever furnished a
notice thereof..

Relative to the August 20, 1975 scheduled hearing, the counsel for claimant was not again
notified of the same; although his client, claimant Andres Bautista, was sent a notice; the
same was received by his representative only on August 25, 1975, or five (5) days after the
scheduled hearing, at which date Andres Bautista had already died (see p. 47, WCC rec.).

In the light of the foregoing facts, We rule that the respondent Commission gravely abused
its discretion in ignoring and in not passing upon the issue of denial of due process squarely
presented by claimant's counsel. The very rules of the Commission require the giving of
reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by
registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented
by a counsel, through the latter (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Revised rules of the WCC, 1973), so as to
ensure observance and protection of an interested party's right to a hearing (Sec. 1, Rule 15,
Revised Rules of the WCC Patent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe
these rules. Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court.
Consequently, the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counsel's "repeated
non-appearance" at the aforestated hearings cannot stand.

2. In passing, We noted that hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of the employer and
to the prejudice of the laborer, the late claimant Andres Bautista, as demonstrated by his
obdurate handling of claimant's excusable non-appearances at scheduled hearings, on one
hand, and his mild treatment of respondent employer's repeated failure to appear at scheduled
hearings and its motions for postponement, on the other. The records clearly show that while
respondent had asked for and was granted at least five (5) postponements; claimant, on the
other hand, only moved for postponement once and that was even on a joint motion with
respondent employer (pp. 16, 20, 21, 27, 28, 31, 44, 52, 53, & 54, WCC rec). This posture of
the hearing officer unabated by the respondent Commission is a foul blow to the social
justice clause of the Constitution and its injunction for the State to afford protection to labor.
Indeed We have repeatedly reminded agencies of the government, especially labor agencies,
 that they are under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless pattern."

2. When not required

Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 833

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be accorded notice and hearing prior the
cancellation of his passport?

Decision: Petition denied. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason
for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where
the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to
evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically
or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested
with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law
clause of the Constitution

De Bisschop v. Galang, 8 SCRA 244

3. NO.

Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. The writ should issue with caution, and only in cases of
extreme necessity — which condition does not obtain in this case. Moreover, it will issue only if
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (Section 2, Rule 67, Rules of Court). This
Court has already ruled that “the use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens’ confinement
and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice” (Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre,
81 Phil. 682, 683). This is because habeas corpus, aside from being thorough and complete,
affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under all circumstances. It
reaches the facts affecting jurisdiction, or want of power, by the most direct method, and at once
releases the applicant from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized (cf. People ex rel.
Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383; 79 N.E. 330). And it has already been held by a long line of
American decisions that the existence of this adequate remedy by habeas corpus will bar the
issuance of a writ of prohibition.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. Board of

Transportation, 117 SCRA 597
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged
Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or
data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should
first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents
from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open
to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend
it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak
of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply
to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also
generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public
specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday
in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence
of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.