NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR, G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G. MARUHOM,
BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM,
ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G. MARUHOM,
SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted
an action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession
of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.

In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of
land. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’
knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and
constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered
sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by
NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the latter’s Acting Assistant Project
Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake
Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR.

Respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to
construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his
request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives
and property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and
vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay
damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has
endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic
activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety
and shock thereby entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the
public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages.

Disputing respondents’ claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the
material allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely
that (1) there is a failure to state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the sub-
terrain portion when they were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents have no cause of
action because they failed to show proof that they were the owners of the property, and (3) the
tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such
easement as may be necessary for the same.

Ibrahim, joined by his co-heirs, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending
Appeal. On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a
vigorous opposition to the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal with a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision.

NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing its Notice of Appeal purposely to give
way to the hearing of its motion for reconsideration.

The RTC issued an Order granting execution pending appeal and denying NAPOCOR’s motion
for reconsideration.
NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal by registered mail which was denied by the RTC on the
ground of having been filed out of time. Meanwhile, the Decision of the RTC was executed
pending appeal and funds of NAPOCOR were garnished by respondents Ibrahim and his co-heirs.

The RTC granted the petition and rendered a modified judgment.

Subsequently, both respondent Ibrahim and NAPOCOR appealed to the CA.

The CA set aside the modified judgment and reinstated the original decision amending it further
by deleting the award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals and attorney’s fees,

Issue:
Whether respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area
occupied by petitioner.

Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels were constructed
does not belong to respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents owned the
property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable
them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property can normally give. In any case,
petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the subject property even with the
existence of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G.
Maruhom, had established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner concludes that the
underground tunnels 115 meters below respondents’ property could not have caused damage or
prejudice to respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely conjectural and
speculative.

The contention lacks merit.

In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the
application of the exceptions to the above rule. Consequently, the CA’s findings which upheld
those of the trial court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata
was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed.
Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the
property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil
Code which provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of
the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. In Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, this principle was applied to show that rights over lands
are indivisible and, consequently, require a definitive and categorical classification, thus:

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the
surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural.

Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and possession of their properties in the
event the latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are characteristically
indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are entitled to just compensation under
the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized
deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the
construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents,
therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated
the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the
RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents’ enjoyment of their property and
deprived them of its full use and enjoyment.

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the
property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in
which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of
respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper
expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of
eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents’ property as this power encompasses
not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but
likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property.
Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is
for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law.

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents’ ownership of the sub-terrain
portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It
must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground
tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and
deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to
the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-
terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for
land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of
its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are
entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to
make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.
NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY
656 SCRA 60
G.R. No. 165828
August 24, 2011

TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric

Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of
several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River
to the hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer
for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable
to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled
that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an
actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable
taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT

SANGKAY, NAMELY: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, ET AL., ALL SURNAMED
MACABANGKIT, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the
Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River
Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for
Mindanao. The project included the construction of several underground tunnels
to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric
plants.

On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of land with an area of
221,573 square meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for
the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the
payment of just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered
that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the
Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and
Agus VII traversed their land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty.
Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had
rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground
tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims
Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the
withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from
developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah
Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land
as collateral because of the presence of the underground tunnel; that the
underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent;
that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become
an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing
through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and
their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit
had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under
which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of
action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the
tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being
an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such easement
prescribed in five years.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit).

Earlier, on August 18, 1999, the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal. The RTC granted the motion and issued a
writ of execution, prompting NPC to assail the writ by petition for certiorari in the
CA. On September 15, 1999, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
enjoin the RTC from implementing its decision.The Heirs of Macabangkit elevated
the ruling of the CA (G.R. No. 141447), but the Court upheld the CA on May 4,
2006.

On October 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the CA and the RTC erred in holding that there was an underground
tunnel traversing the Heirs of Macabangkits land constructed by NPC; and

2) Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had

prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under
Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.

HELD: We uphold the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation.

REMEDIAL LAW: factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding

The existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit,
being a factual matter, cannot now be properly reviewed by the Court, for
questions of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review on certiorari.
Moreover,the factual findings and determinations by the RTC as the trial court
are generally binding on the Court, particularly after the CA affirmed them.
Bearing these doctrines in mind, the Court should rightly dismiss NPCs appeal.

NPC argues, however, that this appeal should not be dismissed because the Heirs
of Macabangkit essentially failed to prove the existence of the underground
tunnel. It insists that the topographic survey map and the right-of-way map
presented by the Heirs of Macabangkit did not at all establish the presence of any
underground tunnel.
NPC still fails to convince.

Even assuming, for now, that the Court may review the factual findings of the CA
and the RTC, for NPC to insist that the evidence on the existence of the tunnel
was not adequate and incompetent remains futile. On the contrary, the evidence
on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey map
and the sketch map (as indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel
construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong, as the CA
correctly projected in its assailed decision,viz:

Among the pieces of documentary evidence presented showing the existence of

the said tunnel beneath the subject property is the topographic survey map. The
topographic survey map is one conducted to know about the location and
elevation of the land and all existing structures above and underneath it. Another
is the Sketch Map which shows the location and extent of the land traversed or
affected by the said tunnel.These two (2) pieces of documentary evidence readily
point the extent and presence of the tunnel construction coming from the power
cavern near the small man-made lake which is the inlet and approach tunnel, or
at a distance of about two (2) kilometers away from the land of the plaintiffs-
appellees, and then traversing the entire and the whole length of the plaintiffs-
appellees property, and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another small man-
made lake.This is a sub-terrain construction, and considering that both inlet and
outlet are bodies of water, the tunnel can hardly be noticed. All constructions
done were beneath the surface of the plaintiffs-appellees property. This explains
why they could never obtain any knowledge of the existence of such tunnel
during the period that the same was constructed and installed beneath their
property.

The power cavern and the inlet and outlet channels established the presence of
the underground tunnel, based on the declaration in the RTC by Sacedon, a
former employee of the NPC. It is worthy to note that NPC did not deny the
existence of the power cavern, and of the inlet and outlet channels adverted to
and as depicted in the topographic survey map and the sketch map. The CA
cannot be faulted for crediting the testimony of Sacedon despite the effort of
NPC to discount his credit due to his not being an expert witness, simply because
Sacedon had personal knowledge based on his being NPCs principal engineer and
supervisor tasked at one time to lay out the tunnels and transmission lines
specifically for the hydroelectric projects, and to supervise the construction of
the Agus 1 Hydroelectric Plant itself from 1978 until his retirement from NPC.
Besides, he declared that he personally experienced the vibrations caused by the
rushing currents in the tunnel, particularly near the outlet channel. Under any
circumstances, Sacedon was a credible and competent witness.

The ocular inspection actually confirmed the existence of the tunnel underneath
the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit.

More so, the Ocular inspection conducted on July 23, 1998 further bolstered such
claim of the existence and extent of such tunnel. This was conducted by a team
composed of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
01, Lanao del Norte, herself and the respective lawyers of both of the parties and
found that, among others, said underground tunnel was constructed beneath the
subject property.

It bears noting that NPC did not raise any issue against or tender any contrary
comment on the ocular inspection report.

POLITICAL LAW: five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act
No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation

Without necessarily adopting the reasoning of the CA, we uphold its conclusion
that prescription did not bar the present action to recover just compensation.

Section 3 (i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the cited law, relevantly provides:

Section 3.Powers and General Functions of the Corporation. The powers,

functions, rights and activities of the Corporation shall be the following: xxx

(i) To construct works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch,
flume, street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the
location of said works may require:Provided, That said works be constructed in
such a manner as not to endanger life or property; And provided, further, That
the stream, watercourse, canal ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway
so crossed or intersected be restored as near as possible to their former state, or
in a manner not to impair unnecessarily their usefulness. Every person or entity
whose right of way or property is lawfully crossed or intersected by said works
shall not obstruct any such crossings or intersection and shall grant the Board or
its representative, the proper authority for the execution of such work. The
Corporation is hereby given the right of way to locate, construct and maintain
such works over and throughout the lands owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its branches and political subdivisions. The Corporation or its
representative may also enter upon private property in the lawful performance
or prosecution of its business and purposes, including the construction of the
transmission lines thereon;Provided,that the owner of such property shall be
indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby;Provided, further,That said
action for damages is filed within five years after the rights of way, transmission
lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been established;Provided,
finally, That after said period, no suit shall be brought to question the said rights
of way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities;

A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of works across,
or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue,
highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works
may require. It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those
enumerated after the termworks. Accordingly, we consider the term works as
embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other developments that can
enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power
expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3.The CAs restrictive construal
of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the
provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the
surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such
interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, so must we not. Moreover, when the
language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the
meaning that the Congress intended to convey.

Even so, we still cannot side with NPC.

We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act
No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an
action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot
thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation
for their land.

POLITICAL LAW: just compensation

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating
agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse
condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by
the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.Just compensation is
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The word
just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action
seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a
manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like
provisions on human relations in the Civil Code,and the exercise results to the
damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held
responsible.

The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to
recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for
damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from
the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property
for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact
that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change
the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not
based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property
without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language
of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property
taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first
moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary
tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case,
NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the
land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the
fair market value of such property at the time of the taking, thusly:

(h)To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber and
otherwise dispose of property incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to
carry out the purposes for which the Corporation was created:Provided, That in
case a right of way is necessary for its transmission lines, easement of right of
way shall only be sought:Provided, however,That in case the property itself shall
be acquired by purchase, the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the
time of the taking of such property.
POLITICAL LAW: NPCs construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land,
and entitled owners to just compensation

The Court held in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim that NPC was liable to
pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land
traversed by the underground tunnels,viz:

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of

the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater
liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of
the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose
limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and
deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are
clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.Notwithstanding the fact
that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely
an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in
this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its
normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owner of the property thus
expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more
nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property.

Here, like in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim,NPC constructed a tunnel

underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal
expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least
informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely
affected the owners rights and interests because the subterranean intervention
by NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and
from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.

We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of
NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually
dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be
compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the
expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or
occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or
of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner
be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property
is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. In that regard,
the RTC pegged just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its finding
on what the prevailing market value of the property was at the time of the filing
of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.

POLITICAL LAW: reckoning point of just compensation on the value at the time
the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely
warranted.

We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on
the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it
completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound
the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the
intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge
and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due
process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse
condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to
prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due
process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary
fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time
the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely
warranted.

In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, a case that involved the

similar construction of an underground tunnel by NPC without the prior consent
and knowledge of the owners, and in which we held that the basis in fixing just
compensation when the initiation of the action preceded the entry into the
property was the time of the filing of the complaint, not the time of taking, we
pointed out that there was no taking when the entry by NPC was made without
intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority.

CIVIL LAW: awards for rentals, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees are deleted for insufficiency of factual and legal bases

We also reverse and set aside the decree of the RTC for NPC to pay to the Heirs
of Macabangkit the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded, as
attorneys fees, and to pay the cost. The body of the decision did not state the
factual and legal reasons why NPC was liable for attorney's fees. The terse
statement found at the end of the body of the RTCs decision,stating: xxx The
contingent attorney's fee is hereby reduced from 20% to only 15% of the total
amount of the claim that may be awarded to plaintiffs, without more, did not
indicate or explain why and how the substantial liability of NPC for attorneys fees
could have arisen and been determined.

In assessing attorney's fees against NPC and in favor of the respondents, the RTC
casually disregarded the fundamental distinction between the two concepts of
attorneys fees the ordinary and the extraordinary.These concepts were aptly
distinguished in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, thus
wise:

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called
ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he
has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages

ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this
is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those
authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.

By referring to the award as contingency fees, and reducing the award from 20%
to 15%, the RTC was really referring to supposed agreement on attorneys fees
between the Heirs of Macabangkit and their counsel. As such, the concept of
attorneys fees involved was the ordinary.Yet, the inclusion of the attorneys fees
in the judgment among the liabilities of NPC converted the fees to extraordinary.
We have to disagree with the RTC thereon, and we express our discomfort that
the CA did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.

An award of attorneys fees has always been the exception rather than the rule.
To start with, attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit.
Nor should an adverse decision ipso facto justify an award of attorney's fees to
the winning party. The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed
on the right to litigate.Too, such fees, as part of damages, are assessed only in
the instances specified in Art. 2208,Civil Code. Indeed,attorneys fees are in the
nature of actual damages.But even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney's fees may still
be withheld where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a
party's persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause. And,lastly, the trial court must make express findings
of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception. What this demands is
that the factual, legal or equitable justification for the award must be set forth
not only in the fallo but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award should
be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.

CIVIL LAW: attorneys fees under quantum meruit principle are fixed at 10% of
the judgment award; quantum meruit; guidelines in determining the proper
attorneys fees

Based on the pending motions of Atty. Macarupung Dibaratun and Atty. Manuel
D. Ballelos to assert their respective rights to attorneys fees, both contending
that they represented the Heirs of Macabangkit in this case, a conflict would
ensue from the finality of the judgment against NPC.

Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos posited that their entitlement to
attorney's fees was contingent. Yet, a contract for a contingent fees is an
agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a fixed percentage of what may
be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success in the effort to
enforce or defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express
contract, without which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum
meruit.With neither Atty. Dibaratun nor Atty. Ballelos presenting a written
agreement bearing upon their supposed contingent fees, the only way to
determine their right to appropriate attorney's fees is to apply the principle of
quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for

determining an attorney's professional fees in the absence of an express
agreement. The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a
device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of
the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust
enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause,
taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for
determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to wit: 
Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees: 
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved;
c) The important of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his
client, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires
that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of
the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative
thereof.Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorneys fees on
quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will
be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorneys fees of both attorneys in
order that the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, as Justice
Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC,
would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the
accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the
records.

In fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to Atty. Dibaratun as the
counsel de parte of the Heirs of Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in
the prosecution of the clients cause to its successful end. It is he, not Atty.
Ballelos, who was entitled to the full amount of attorneys fees that the clients
ought to pay to their attorney. Given the amount and quality of his legal work, his
diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his prosecution of
the clients cause, he deserves the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the
clients might appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a
favorable judgment.

Atty. Ballelos may claim only from Cebu, Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and
Edgar, the only parties who engaged him. The Court considers his work in the
case as very minimal. His compensation under the quantum meruit principle is
fixed at P5,000.00, and only the Heirs of Macabangkit earlier named are liable to
him.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 5, 2004

by the Court of Appeals, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(a)Interest at the rate of 12%per annum is IMPOSED on the principal amount of

P113,532,500.00 as just compensation, reckoned from the filing of the
complaint on November 21, 1997 until the full liability is paid;

(b)The awards of P30,000.00 as rental fee,P200,000.00 as moral damages, and

P200,000.00 as exemplary damages are DELETED; and

(c) The award of 15% attorneys fees decreed to be paid by National Power
Corporation to the Heirs of Macabangkit is DELETED.

The Court PARTLY GRANTED the motion to register attorney's lien filed by Atty.
Macarupung Dibaratun, and FIXES Atty. Dibaratun's attorney's fees on the basis
of quantum meruit at 10% of the principal award of P113,532,500.00.

The motion to register attorney's lien of Atty. Manuel D.Ballelos is PARTLY

GRANTED, and Atty. Ballelos is DECLARED ENTITLED TO RECOVER from Cebu,
Batowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta and Edgar, all surnamed Macabangkit, the
amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. TARCELO

FACTS: In 2000, petitioner NPC filed a Complaint for Expropriation of a portion

measuring 1,595.91 square meters of the lands owned by respondents Felicisimo
Tarcelo and the heirs of Comia Santos with the total measure of 4,404 and 2,611 square
meters respectively, which are both situated in Brgy. Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas
City. The expropriated land will be used for the construction and maintenance of the
NPC’s Ilian Natural Gas Project.

RTC fixed the just compensation for the lands at P1,000/sq.m despite the submission of
the NPC’s commissioners that the value should only be P475/sq.m.

CA fixed the just compensation at P797.50 upon appeal of the NPC.

In 2009, a Notice of Garnishment was served on the manager of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, NPC branch, for the satisfaction of the amount of P5,594,462.50 which
represents the just compensation for the whole of respondents’ lots, and not merely the
supposedly affected portions thereof as NPC originally sought to acquire.

NPC alleged that the RTC erred in issuing the Notice of Garnishment for the whole of the
two lots, instead of 1,595 square meters only. RTC ruled that the construction of the
underground pipeline inevitably affected the whole properties, not just the portion
thereof claimed by NPC. Further, it ruled that when a property suffered permanent
injury as a result of the expropriation, he is entitled to compensation of the whole
property, not just a portion of it. It ruled that the measure of just compensation is not
the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

NPC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was likewise denied, upholding
the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NPC should be held liable for the just compensation of the two
properties, not just the portion affected by the construction.

HELD:

The Court grants the Petition

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest
proceedings known to the law. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in
favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent
to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the
statute in which the grant is contained.

Upon payment of just compensation to the defendants, subject to the deductions of the
sums due the Government for unpaid real estate taxes and other imposts, the plaintiff
shall have a lawful right to enter, take possession and acquire easement of right-of-way
over the portions of the properties together with the improvements sought to be
expropriated for the purpose stated, free from any and all liens and encumbrances.
It is not declared that NPC should pay for the entire area of respondent’s properties, but
rather, pay the full and fair market value of the property and not merely pay a 10%
easement fee. Stated simply, the NPC should pay for the full per-square meter value of
the affected portions, and not just the fraction thereof.

The reason why the respondents are entitled to the full market value of the affected
portions of their lands is that the construction of underground pipeline is a simple case
of mere passage of gas pipeline. It will surely cause damage and prejudice to the
agricultural potentials of appellees’ property. Deep excavation will have to be done
whereby plants and trees will be uprooted. A possible leakage could certainly do harm
and adversely restrict the agricultural and economic activity of the land. This is not to
mention that it will create an environmental health hazard dangerous to the occupant’s
life and limb.

In sum, Petitioner National Power Corporation is adjudged liable to PAY JUST

COMPENSATION to respondents Felicisimo Tarcelo and the Heirs of Comia Santos for
the affected portions of their respective properties totaling 1,595.91 square meters, at
P797.50 per square meter.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES INT’L. PTY. LTD., WMC
PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.
G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006

FACTS:
A Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, (Columbio FTAA) was executed by the
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC
Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) for large scale exploration, development,
and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387
hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North
Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No.
63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining
Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in
accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the
Tampakan Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July
1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option
Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the
Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in
the mining claims covering the area subject of the agreement.
In 2001, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Shares of Stocks. The DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA. The
petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the
President on several grounds. One of which is that it violates Section 40 of the Mining Act (RA
No. 7942). The petition was dismissed. The appeal before the CA was also dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof
requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical
assistance agreements should have a retroactive application to the Columbio FTAA.

HELD:
NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the established legal
doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the
contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in the law.

In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply
retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively, in
view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively,
unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.

RE: Query of Mr. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc.
FACTS: Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote the
Supreme Court requesting for exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent
litigants. He pointed out that Good Shepherd works with and for the most Indigent persons such
as “the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who
never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for
common prescriptions, to broken families who returned to a normal life”. 

ISSUE: 

Can the Courts grant to Good Shepherd who works for indigent and underprivileged people,
from payment of legal fees? 

RULING:

No. The Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same
exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are
working for indigent and underprivileged people.

The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec.
11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3,  Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141,  Rules of
Court, which respectively state thus:

Sec. 21.  Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an  ex parte  application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)
Sec. 19.    Indigent litigants  exempt from payment of legal fees.  Indigent litigants (a) whose gross
income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value
as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00)
pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he
and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any
real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested
person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit.  The current tax declaration, if any, shall
be attached to the litigants affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss
the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever
criminal liability may have been incurred. 

The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of
Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the
exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is
of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a
person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.

DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES (2000)

Argued: April 19, 2000Decided: June 26, 2000

FACTS: In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, in which the Court held that certain
warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could
be admitted in evidence, id., at 479, Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. §3501, which in essence makes
the admissibility of such statements turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily.
Petitioner, under indictment for bank robbery and related federal crimes, moved to suppress a
statement he had made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the ground he had not
received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion,
and the Government took an interlocutory appeal. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings, but held that §3501’s was satisfied because
his statement was voluntary. It concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and
that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the final say on the admissibility question.
HELD: Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during
custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Pp. 2-14.

(a) Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an
Act of Congress. Given §3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of
admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and its instruction for trial courts to
consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, this Court
agrees with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended §3501 to overrule Miranda. The law is
clear as to whether Congress has constitutional authority to do so. This Court has supervisory
authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of evidence and procedure. Carlisle
v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 426. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside
any such rules that are not constitutionally required, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S.
343, 345-348, it may not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution, see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517-521. That Miranda announced
a constitutional rule is demonstrated, first and foremost, by the fact that both Miranda and two
of its companion cases applied its rule to proceedings in state courts, and that the Court has
consistently done so ever since. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318 (per curiam). The
Court does not hold supervisory power over the state courts, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S.
209, 221, as to which its authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the Constitution, e.g.,
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U. S. 415, 422. The conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is
also supported by the fact that that case is replete with statements indicating that the majority
thought it was announcing a constitutional rule, see, e.g., 384 U. S., at 445. Although Miranda
invited legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, it
stated that any legislative alternative must be "at least as effective in appraising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Id., at
467.

A contrary conclusion is not required by the fact that the Court has subsequently made
exceptions from the Miranda rule, see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649. No
constitutional rule is immutable, and the sort of refinements made by such cases are merely a
normal part of constitutional law. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306--in which the Court, in
refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases, stated
that Miranda's exclusionary rule serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than
that Amendment itself--does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply
recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from
unwarned interrogation under the Fifth. Finally, although the Court agrees with the court-
appointed amicus curiae that there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than
there were when Miranda was decided--e.g., a suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U. S. 388--it does not agree that such additional measures supplement §3501's protections
sufficiently to create an adequate substitute for the Miranda warnings. Miranda requires
procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and assure him that
the exercise of that right will be honored, see, e.g., 384 U. S., at 467, while §3501 explicitly
eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the
administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a
suspect's confession. Section 3501, therefore, cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the
law. Pp. 2-12.

(b) This Court declines to overrule Miranda. Whether or not this Court would agree with
Miranda's reasoning and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against
overruling it now. Even in constitutional cases, stare decisis carries such persuasive force that
the Court has always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special
justification. E.g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp, 517 U. S. 843, 856.
There is no such justification here. Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to
the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. See Mitchell v. United
States, 526 U. S. 314, 331-332. While the Court has overruled its precedents when subsequent
cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, that has not happened to Miranda. If
anything, subsequent cases have reduced Miranda's impact on legitimate law enforcement
while reaffirming the decision's core ruling. The rule's disadvantage is that it may result in a
guilty defendant going free. But experience suggests that §3501's totality-of-the-circumstances
test is more difficult than Miranda for officers to conform to, and for courts to apply
consistently. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515. The requirement that Miranda
warnings be given does not dispense with the voluntariness inquiry, but cases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was compelled
despite officers' adherence to Miranda are rare. Pp. 12-14.

Facts of the Case

Charles Dickerson was indicted for a list of charges associated with bank robbery. At trial, his
attorney argued that the statement he made to officers in an FBI field office was inadmissible in
court under Miranda v. Arizona. Dickerson claimed that he had not received Miranda warnings
before FBI interrogation. The FBI agents and local officers who had been present at the
interrogation said that he had received the warnings.
The dispute rose to the District Court, then to the U.S. Court of Appeals. The U.S. Court of
Appeals found Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but that they were not necessary
in his particular case. They referenced Section 3501 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which Congress
had passed two years after Miranda v. Arizona in 1968. This legislation required that statements
be made voluntarily in order for them to be used in a court of law, but did not require that
Miranda warnings be read. According to the Court of Appeals, Dickerson’s statement was
voluntary, and thus should not be suppressed.

The Court of Appeals also found that, because Miranda was not a question of constitutionality,
Congress had the power to decide what types of warnings were required to make a statement
admissible. The Supreme Court took on the case through a writ of certiorari.

Constitutional Issues

Can Congress create a new statute that (1) overrules Miranda v. Arizona and (2) establishes
different guidelines for the admissibility of statements made during interrogation? Was the
Miranda v. Arizona ruling based on a constitutional question?

The case asked the Court to reevaluate its role in overseeing questions of admissibility. Such
questions typically fall to Congress, but Congress may not “legislatively supersede” Supreme
Court decisions when those decisions analyze a constitutional rule.

The Arguments

The U.S. government argued that Dickerson was made aware of his Miranda rights before the
interrogation at the FBI field office, despite the fact that these warnings were not necessary.
Like the Court of Appeals, they referenced section 3501 of U.S.C. Title 18 to argue that a
confession only has to be voluntary to be admissible in court, and that the confessor does not
need to be notified of his Fifth Amendment rights prior to interrogation. They pointed out that
the reading of the Miranda rights is only one of the factors, under section 3501, that points to
the voluntariness of the confessor's statement. Additionally, attorneys on behalf of the U.S.
government argued that Congress, not the Supreme Court, has the ultimate say on the rules
that govern admissibility.

Dickerson’s attorney argued that the FBI agents and local law enforcement violated Dickerson’s
right against self-incrimination when they failed to notify him of his Miranda rights (per Miranda
v. Arizona). The intent of the court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona was to protect citizens from
situations that increased the likelihood of false confessions. According to Dickerson's attorney,
Dickerson should have been notified of his rights to alleviate the pressure of interrogation,
regardless of whether his ultimate statement to officers was voluntary or not.

Majority Opinion

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the 7-2 decision. In the decision, the Court found
that Miranda v. Arizona was based on a constitutional question, meaning that the Supreme
Court had the final say over its interpretation, and Congress did not have the right to establish
different guidelines for the admissibility of evidence.

The majority looked to the text of the Miranda decision. In Miranda, the Supreme Court, led by
Chief Justice Earl Warren, aimed to give “concrete constitutional guidelines for law
enforcement” and found that unwarned confessions were taken from individuals under
“unconstitutional standards.”

Dickerson v. United States also asked the Court to rule on the constitutionality of their original
ruling in Miranda v. Arizona. In the majority opinion, the Justices chose not to overrule Miranda
for a few reasons. First, the court applied stare decisis (a Latin term meaning "to stand by things
decided”), which asks the court to refer to past rulings in order to rule on a current case. Under
stare decisis, overturning past decisions requires special justification. In this instance, the Court
could not find special justification to overturn the Miranda v. Arizona, which by 2000 had
become an important part of police practice and the wider national culture. Unlike some
constitutional rules, the Court argued, the core of Miranda rights had been able to withstand
challenges and exceptions. The majority explained:

“If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate
law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not
be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.”

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. According to Scalia, the
majority opinion was an act of “judicial arrogance.” Miranda v. Arizona only served to protect
individuals from “foolish (rather than compelled) confessions.” In the dissent, Justice Scalia
noted that he was “not persuaded” by the majority’s claim that Miranda was better than
Congress’ alternative, and suggested that the majority’s attempt to ground its decision in stare
decisis was useless. Justice Scalia wrote:
“[…] what today’s decision will stand for, whether the Justices can bring themselves to say it or
not, is the power of the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution,
binding on Congress and the States.”

The Impact

In Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court asserted its authority over constitutional
questions, reaffirming the role of Miranda v. Arizona in police practice. Through Dickerson, the
Supreme Court emphasized the role of Miranda warnings in proactively protecting rights. The
Court maintained that the "totality of the circumstances" approach, which Congress sought to
implement, risked individual protections.

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO REYES G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009 581 SCRA 691 Rights of an
Accused, Evidence, Extra-judicial Confessions

OCTOBER 16, 2017

FACTS: On July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, accused-appellant,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together
with Juanito Pataray Cayaban, Federico Pataray Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes Acejo, who are
still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and
intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong
Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang
Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of
extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the detention
of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully
strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their
heirs.

Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at
Camp Crame. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a
written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo
identified appellants Reyes and Flores. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty.
Rous, executed a written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellants of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family
₱150,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings.

ISSUES:

1. Were th eextra-judicial confessions (Pasubali) of the accused admissible in evidence?

2. Was he afforded the right to counsel of his own choice?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Pasubali of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial confessions clearly
shows that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had
informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the
kidnapping of the Yao family.

Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions
of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional
guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to
a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. Consequently, the burden of proving that
undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and
Flores.

We have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following

requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

Yes. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of
a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsel’s
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to
the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not
object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during
their custodial investigation. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the
services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
People v. Chavez

735 SCRA 728

Facts:

Mark Jason Chavez (Chavez) was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.That on or
about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila,the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and intimidation
upon the person of Elmer Duque by then and there, with intent to kill, stabbing the latter
repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the said occasion or by reason
thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following:1 Unit Nokia Cellphone, 1Unit
Motorola Cellphone, 6 pcs. Ladies Ring, 2pcs. Necklace, 1 pc. Bracelet. The trial court acquitted
Chavez. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue : Whether or not Chaves is entitled to the right to be heard and to counsel even if he
voluntarily surrender.

Held:

Yes, even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez
is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure,
he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police
station. The Supreme Court finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.