Republic of the Philippines pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her

SUPREME COURT aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
Manila marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and
EN BANC her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than
two years later, she again became pregnant. On February
G.R. No. L-16439             July 20, 1961
21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,  defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in
vs. Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
A.P. Salvador for respondents. campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did
not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could Geluz we granted certiorari.
recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial
Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria
fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida
special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado",
three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
opinion.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows: or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if
no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if
In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
because that same article expressly limits such provisional attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be record, was clearly exaggerated.
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked
dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's that:
womb.
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the concern would be to see to it that the medical profession
editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639). was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his
wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases
damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of
upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his
of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the wife, would be the beneficiaries.
parents can not expect either help, support or services from an
unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion
the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a
was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely
its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record,
before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not have no factual or legal basis.
found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because
the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was dismissed. Without costs.
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the
Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice
the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise and the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the
he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the facts may warrant.
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee
does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
 FIRST DIVISION Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the
expense of the petitioner.
G.R. No. 153883             January 13, 2004
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and
vs. the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon
CHULE Y. LIM, respondent. Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.

DECISION SO ORDERED.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: During the hearing, respondent testified thus:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as
Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and
108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the in her marriage certificate.2 She presented a clearance from
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)3 to further show
Proc. No. 4933. the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".

In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record
1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have
Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
entries, and prays that they be corrected. been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got
married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
The trial court then issued an Order,1 which reads: Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the
fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance, let the hearing of this case be set on Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she
December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice, was a legitimate child when she should have been described as
Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 o’clock in the illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
afternoon at which date, place and time any interested
person may appear and show cause why the petition should Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino
not be granted. citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added
that she and her daughter’s father were never married because the
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
circulation in the City of Iligan and the Province of Lanao del
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT
Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO "FILIPINO" DESPITE
Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present. THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER
DEMONSTRATED ANY COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
present any evidence although it actively participated in the
proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent II
and her witnesses.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s petition RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHER’S
and rendered judgment as follows: SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.6
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set
the records of the petitioner straight and in their proper To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error
perspective, the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of respondent’s recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect
Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries
birth records of the petitioner, to wit: in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU"; civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made
in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)"
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to
be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v.
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by Valencia7 where we held that even substantial errors in a civil
changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule
"LEGITIMATE?"; and, 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino". or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
SO ORDERED.4 developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of been thoroughly weighed and considered.8
Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision.5
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors: Republic’s failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this
case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
I
considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
adversarial. 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of which he is rightfully entitled.13
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It
cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected
that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine old.14 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
citizenship.9 Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of citizenship.15
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and Appeals’ decision in allowing respondent to use her father’s surname
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." 10 The Republic’s submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did
not allow respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has
electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimatechildren. These do been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent
not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino surname.
mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply
with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. this time from using her father’s surname which she has
used for four decades without any known objection from
anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, 11 citing In re reasons allowed for changing one’s name or surname is to
Florencio Mallare,12 we held: avoid confusion.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges a name "by which he has been known since childhood."
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same
issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,16 we held:
 Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates SO ORDERED.
the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name "by which
he has been known since childhood" (Lim Hok Albano v.
Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil.
679; Republic v. Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children
cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from
using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil.
222).17

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or

surname,18 there is no such requirement for the continued use of a
surname which a person has already been using since childhood. 19

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general.20 In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably
be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondent’s
case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40
years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for

review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following
corrections in the birth record of respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:

1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";

2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU

DIOTO (CO TIAN)";

3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing

"YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?";
and,

4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".

 Republic of the Philippines July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
SUPREME COURT Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
Manila
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
EN BANC
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and
G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013 defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,  authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize
vs. and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents. upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.6
DECISION
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
SERENO, CJ.:
citizenship, which states:
THE CASE
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and
perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of
65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) United States of America.
of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being
assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct
the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is
to the best of my knowledge and belief.7
being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
passport. Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among
others, the following statements:
FACTS
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will
obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
constituted authorities.
PASSPORT : 05778270012
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8 On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.
local and national elections.9
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship,
Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been answer, submitting the following documents as evidence: 14
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the
April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno,
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all
Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
with the following pertinent travel records: Kauswagan;

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010 3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that
Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
PASSPORT : 057782700
 4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US
Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to for US nationals.19
15 April 1986; and
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of
Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered First Division reads:
voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of
First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was take effect.20
dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence
to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not The Motion for Reconsideration and
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency the Motion for Intervention
requirement under the Local Government Code."17
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient
disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. 18 to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied
with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently 1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported
using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has
substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
xxxx 9225;

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that 2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his
Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to
he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform
office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and Philippines;
his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the
Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity
 3. He used his US passport only because he was not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the
informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that case.
he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held
treatment of the petition as one for disqualification that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
jurisdiction;23 protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose
qualifications for office is questioned."
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his
winning the elections; As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been
COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second
placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First
petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the
within ten days from his proclamation. Local Government Code to take effect.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First
for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, 24 having
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the
together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for date of proclamation.
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling
44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s Reconsideration, on the following premises:
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful First:
votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never
Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3,
motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-
placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63
status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The "The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of
First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle,
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this
his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a
choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly,
citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship." 26
but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working
abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented,
progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his thus:
renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the
case at bar.
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The
xxxx latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the
privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he
his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s
passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the
notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already National and Local Elections.
used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven
by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing
passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to
following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at
January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election
shows that the use of the US passport was because to his to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements
respondent used whatever is within his control during that time. 25 regarding his citizenship.

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the
Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the renunciation earlier made.
highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the
lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it one’s qualifications to run for public office.
is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it
when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the
representatives who enacted the law.27 Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT OUR RULING

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of Intervention of a rival candidate in a
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his disqualification case is proper when
continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be there has not yet been any
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, proclamation of the winner.
Lanao del Norte.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed
is qualified to run for public office. against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified,
the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling
also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the
Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the
case the respondent is disqualified is in order." COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court
which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of
on the result of the first. R.A. No. 6646:

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
disqualification case. been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such Arnado will attain finality.
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
Mercado v. Manzano28 citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
case, the Court said: Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the 2003 provides:
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the and the following conditions:
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or xxxx
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the (2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is qualification for holding such public office as required by the
strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
been no final judgment rendered.29 any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The
fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling x x x31
has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and
therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a
not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his
Court. foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and
eligible to run for public office. privileges granted by the United States of America.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted
Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time,
however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court
therefore become a dual citizen. declared:

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
the laws of the foreign country.32 citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone
is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation
foreign citizenship.33 of his Philippine citizenship.

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run
at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him for a local elective position.
eligible to run for public office.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself challenged. x x x.41
as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of
an American citizen by using his US passport. the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively
negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for he in fact did.
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of It was after complying with the requirements that he performed
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not Government Code of 1991.
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also
to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual
candidate for public office. citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted
if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign
2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of citizen, to hold any public office.
Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by
the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
position. passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later. 43
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for
a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the
which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen
American citizenship. and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does
This Court has previously ruled that: not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the
Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad." 44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is The Facts of the case are as follows:
September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon
as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
passport on 24 November 2009. Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and
not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that
and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four
not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened. 46
Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the year interruption.
state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
those who seek election or appointment to public office are required other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to
the Republic and to no other.
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum.
The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code hold such an office."
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the
public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections. The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
We now resolve the next issue.
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the
office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers
again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the
court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it
cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad
ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court
returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before therein ruled:
the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the
election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order
and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and
in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5
the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. days, without costs. So ordered.49
In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the
personal character and circumstances of a single On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied) does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another
and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the even illogical.
other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the
earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for Let us examine the statement:
supremacy."
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
"the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots." What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible
candidate to another candidate?
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that
since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus
at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have electorate alone.
been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
might not have been passed upon prior to election date. the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his
favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.
legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and
Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
The popular vote does not cure the victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
ineligibility of a candidate. requirements."53

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions
serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets COMELEC:
forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might
as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity
sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a
elective positions in our republic. blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading
COMELEC50 when we pronounced: may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public and fitness for office.
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and
made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal
qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of effect.
being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what
should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the
candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes
that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted) eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must
also be respected.
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a
seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be
election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates? in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC 56 that
law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates
end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to who placed second to ineligible ones.
set in.1âwphi1
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not
Maquiling is not a second-placer as a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The
he obtained the highest number of very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate
votes from among the qualified ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
candidates. disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
proclamation.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides: certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be the winner.
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be
not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended
under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate
2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
the winner. succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
elected, from holding the office. DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
in the 10 May 2010 elections.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As
earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American This Decision is immediately executory.
citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and
the Local Government Code. the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

 THIRD DIVISION the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag)
and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No.
02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said
SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY property measuring 49.5 sq m.6
ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On
July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new
DECISION
certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name
of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January
REYES, J.: 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m
portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on No. 183088 was an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005
October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It
with modification the Decision3 dated September 28, 2007 was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of
147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On
deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.10
Resolution4 dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for
reconsideration thereof. On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal
complaint for two counts of falsification of public documents
The Facts under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
against the petitioner.11 However, said criminal charges
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the were eventually dismissed.
subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz
(Silvestra). On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are
the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with
Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of
children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. Makati City.12
(Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz
(Fidela). In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the
petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they
meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have
Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of
the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18,
relatives of their father and mother. 2005 presented for the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was
a forgery considering that Silvestra, who purportedly
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002,
its Decision on September 28, 2007.14 The fallo of the RTC about three years before the execution of the said Deed of
decision reads: Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal capacity to sue,
the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as
follows: Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the
personality of the [respondents] to initiate this action as the
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between
executed by [Silvestra] in favor of [the [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the
petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The
of land covered by TCT No. 183088 of the name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and respondents'] respective birth certificates as the
Void; mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the same as
the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated
to cancel TCT No. 221466 issued in the name as the name of the father.17 (Emphasis ours)
of [the petitioner], the same having been
issued on the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Ruling of the CA
Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate TCT
No. 183088 issued in the name of [the Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA
petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens resting on the argument that the respondents are without
and encumbrances annotated thereon, legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation
including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and] of deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status
as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the heir of the deceased, Silvestra.18
[respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00 as
moral damages and another P100,000.00 as On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and by the RTC decision with modification as to the amount of
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:

[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
merit. hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Decision dated
September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch
SO ORDERED.15 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the award of moral and exemplary ground.
damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to
P50,000.00, respectively. x x x.

With costs against the [petitioner].  xxxx

SO ORDERED.19 Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing

matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
No. 183088 and the issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the
fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage
name of the petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to
is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
Silvestra and thus have the legal capacity to institute the
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look
action, the CA ruled in this wise:
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
court in sustaining the appellees' legitimate filiation to weight.
Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found
unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and
assail the validity of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by competent and substantial
[Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born
has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore
Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a presumed to be legitimate children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in
marriage license. the absence of any contradicting evidence.20 (Citations
omitted)
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a
marriage contract. A certificate of marriage issued by the The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was
Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as denied in the Resolution22 dated April 5, 2010.
well as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted
in evidence by the [respondents]. Hence, this petition.

xxxx Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed
the factual finding that forgery was indeed committed to
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
a marriage license number and in the absence of a consequent transfer of title of the property in her name.
certification from the local civil registrar that no such Verily, in this petition, the petitioner continues to assail the
marriage license was issued, the marriage between legal capacity of the respondents to institute the present
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be invalidated on that action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil
Code,23 the petitioner insists that the respondents have no
legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for being The petition is bereft of merit.
illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
the legal heir of Silvestra, she, however, claims that the party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this
respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the
Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to determine
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently proven. their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the
According to the petitioner, the marriage question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity
contract24 presented by the respondents is not admissible to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues
under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.
photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not
even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar. At first blush, the documents presented as proof of
In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or
document was ever received by said office. Further, while photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical
the respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical) certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to
Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is not the establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the
marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130,
Family Code;26 that said Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the
only proves that a marriage ceremony actually transpired subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no
between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.27cralawred evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of original document can still be admitted as secondary
live birth of the respondents do not conclusively prove that evidence subject to certain requirements specified by law.
they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:

In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance
and ruling of the CA that the petitioner's argument has no with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the
leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can only be original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
is related to the former either by consanguinity or affinity.29 and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
fundamental issue: whether or not the respondents are of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of
legal heirs of Silvestra. the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove
the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
Ruling of the Court existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court; and (3) the where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that
part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in
the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the Alang-alang, Leyte."39
basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x
x.32 (Citation omitted) The petitioner asserts that said documents do not
conclusively prove the respondents' legitimate filiation,
albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not
certificates of live birth contain no entry stating whether the
a public document. As early as in the case of United States
respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making
v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries
said documents unreliable and unworthy of weight and
of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
value in the determination of the issue at hand.
promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of
Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents'
by duly authorized public officials.34 They are private
certificates of live birth, only the signature of Fidela
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as
appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr.
are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
She argues that the birth certificate must be signed by the
evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that the
father in order to be competent evidence to establish
authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of
filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces
marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it
v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila 40 where it was held that a
cannot be admitted in evidence.
birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not
competent evidence of paternity.41
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be
offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
marriage.36 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
(Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a
between his parents.37
public officer (Civil Registrar)."42Thus, being public
documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of
respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live
the facts stated in them.43
Birth issued by the National Statistics Office38 where Fidela
signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and
sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents
were apparently born to the same parents — their father's the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group
or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense
name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's
and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof
sufficient."44
xxxx
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be
signed by the father in order to be a competent evidence of In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate
legitimate filiation does not find support in law and shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In
misplaced considering that what was sought to be proved is the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal
the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not in the document the name of the father who refuses to
legitimate filiation. acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration
of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates
sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, of live birth were duly executed consistent with the
and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of
does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because
mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child. Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the
respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The
intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of
birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither
which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio,
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
Jr. being born more than three years after their first child,
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the
declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp
validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13,
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife
(SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the occasion to state:
in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly
born child. Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what
other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall solemnized marriage, viz:
certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the that as proof of marriage may be presented: a)
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where
testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's
the infant was born; if) and such other data as may be public and open cohabitation as husband and wife
required in the regulations to be issued. after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal
certificate of children born during such union; and d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent Republic of the Philippines
documents.48 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) SUPREME COURT
Manila
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held
that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption SECOND DIVISION
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if  
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, 
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful vs.
contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG
matrimonio — Always presume marriage."50 and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of

Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption MENDOZA, J.:
accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the
validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus: This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog
children, the community of property during marriage, the are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother,
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
aggression.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog
brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 20, 2009 and
Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of
Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue
in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the
beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not
sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another
withdrew this allegation. certificate from the Office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no
record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the
mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was
that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of
Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo which were either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they
performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog
Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the testified 5 that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias.
wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated
Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed.
municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by
private respondents, who testified that private respondents are the Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there
children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of
Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6
Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their
wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and
and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war,
poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that although he did not know whether they were legally married. He
Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had
the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in married before the war, although he did not know the names of the
their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia
Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a
had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's
4
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.   She testimony.
testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt,"
presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered
burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering
in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its
and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents
crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay
lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they attorney's fees and costs.
separated.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
contending that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the except as they related to vested rights, 11 and the rules on evidence.
certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their married. 12 This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to
motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for the contrary. 13 In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification
new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the
parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by
marriage in that church. the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal
treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private
respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man respondents' parents.
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact
married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants,
happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic
habits of life. 9Hence, this petition. copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite
for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina
of marriage, 15 the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the
took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time the
marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial
alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages
evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they
celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the
subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children,
books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they
private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and
are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as
by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of
husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration
of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the
submitted in evidence. marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence
showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of
two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil
and wife. 17 An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been
Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended
made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding
by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
extension of that code to this
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to
country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force.
have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for
Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence
people not to notice its absence.
of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the
interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
v. Cheong Seng Gee: 18
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth,
The basis of human society throughout the civilized authentic document, final judgment or possession of
world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
institution in the maintenance of which the public is special laws.
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony testimonies as to the possession by private respondents of the status
are presumed, in the absence of any counter- of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in 1928-1929 is available.
fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as their children. The
be living in the constant violation of decency and of marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that
Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the
lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina
28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six.
presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and Generoso
[1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are
U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be
Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.) doubted.

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso
on testimonial evidence to support their claim that private Balogbog admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is
respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:
legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which
provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the
Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who
accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of
in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous the appellees. In an investigation before the Police
possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other means Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on
allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of
provides: inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a
patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso
testified that the complainant in that administrative x x x           x x x          x x x
case is his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of
the proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. "N", Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your
"N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read: nephew?

Atty. Kiamco — May it please this A. Because he is the son of my

investigative body. elder brother.

Q. Do you know the complainant in This admission of relationship is admissible against

this Administrative Case No. 1? Gaudioso although made in another case. It is
considered as a reliable declaration against interest
A. Yes I know. (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did
not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of
Q. Why do you know him? that declaration. He did not even testify during the
trial. Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is
indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being
A. I know because he is my
the son of Gavino.
nephew.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Q. Are you in good terms with your
nephew, the complainant?
SO ORDERED.
A. Yes.

Q. Do you mean to say that you are

close to him?

A. Yes. We are close.

Q. Why do you say you are close?

A. We are close because aside from

the fact that he is my nephew we
were also leaving (sic) in the same
house in Butuan City, and I even
barrow (sic) from him money in the
amount of P300.00, when I return to
Balamban, Cebu.
 Republic of the Philippines records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3 was issued by the
SUPREME COURT LCR.
Manila
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four
SECOND DIVISION (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943;
Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born
G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014 on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15
December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, 
informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
vs.
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
without any issue.
DECISION
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to
another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
PEREZ, J.: claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules properties acquired by Eustaquio.
of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving
Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City,
Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98. their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude
Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was
The Facts instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio.
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to
have been validly married to the same man, now deceased. Trial ensued.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting
November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of:
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground
that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio 1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco
Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II,
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he
Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio
the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5 and Tecla;14

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between
of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar Eustaquio and Peregrina.15
General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6 On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her
marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he
deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not
Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
started only in 1932;7 Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to
substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted wit:
to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO,
from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally 1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late
destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8 Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9 2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985

declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10 with the petitioner although he had a common law relation
with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children
namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
surnamed Avenido;18
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr.,
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002,
and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon,
addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P.
were destroyed by Second World War issued by the
Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria,
Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
Surigao del Norte.20
that they cannot furnish as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco
Avenido;13 In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the
case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties
she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her
entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal
petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion issues:
thereof reads:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA subsequent marriage;
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED. 2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered
and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby evidence, the original document;
DISMISSED.22
and
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial
court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her 3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the
marriage to Eustaquio. church has a probative value to prove the existence of a
valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by presented to the witness stand.26
declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing
on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to Our Ruling
be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of
the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified Tecla to Eustaquio.
that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older
brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages
and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards
sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila.
contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has The trial court observed:
disregarded.24
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General,
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage
to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage
during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly
presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this
office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
in Talibon, Bohol.27 the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary"
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified
credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it this misconception thus:
considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol
her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court
and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the
that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage. contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence
when the
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption
of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and,
presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction
testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, of secondary evidence of the contents.
created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation xxxx
of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,
necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from
Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that: its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most,
failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of the admissibility of such evidence.
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court
has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who xxxx
[knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1)
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified
by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
[been] lost." testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
In the present case, due execution was established by the mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution
testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and disregarded.31
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage.30
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 32 this Court has
elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was
completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the Republic of the Philippines
unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest SUPREME COURT
of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol. Manila

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of THIRD DIVISION
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The
marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the G.R. No. 135216           August 19, 1999
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No pronouncement as to costs.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner, 
SO ORDERED. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F.
TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence

other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes
its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly,
the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than
the marriage contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated
January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998,
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from it being more consistent with the facts and the
applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994
of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in
toto.2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows: During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-
rendered in favor of [herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his
against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows: share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and
as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of
the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed
father Alfredo.
marriage contract" excluded under the best evidence
rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious
and non-existent. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and
filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No.
T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and
Alfredo.
the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA
(Exh. 34) to be genuine.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the
provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-
appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally
adopted son of deceased Jacob.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage

The Facts
between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr.
Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus: 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera
surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
between herself and the deceased.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he Contract, to wit:
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting 1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus
Pedro Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt giving the implication that there was no copy of the
 marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as
civil registry of Manila; the legally adopted son of Alfredo.

2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of
Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said the signature of Judge Moya.
contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of
the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of
executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a Judge Moya's signature in the Order granting the petition for
day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived residence on 01 October 1990.
together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no
trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then
Jacob’s; presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was
suffering from "glaucoma".
3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit
stating the circumstances of the loss of the Marriage The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to
Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moya's
that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage signature.
Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration". And
as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera
(who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C.
the date of the marriage since he was then in Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used
Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and
Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin Molina" compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out
who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the
allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to questioned and the "standard" signature" and concluded that
Mr. Jose Centenera; the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L.
MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the
purported marriage entered in the book of records in On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge
San Agustin Church where the marriage was Moya's signature, appellee presented the comparative
allegedly solemnized. findings of the handwriting examination made by a former
NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who
examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by
18 July 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the
Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual
 pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics admissible other than the original document itself,
between the standard and the questioned signatures and except in the following cases:
concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the
Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
was indeed genuine. cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court
sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature xxx     xxx     xxx
of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and
authentic. Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable.
— When the original document has been lost or
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the legally offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a
and non-existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the recital of its contents in some authentic document, or
original) by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in
reality may be established by secondary evidence, it is
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled necessary that the due execution of the document and
in this wise: subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed document and subsequent loss that would constitute the
Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to
provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that prove the contents of such document.
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth
in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." of the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
an authentic copy of the marriage contract. contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed
to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in original document.
relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of
then Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine,
exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing
contents of a document, no evidence shall be proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge
 Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the
regular duties. resolution of this Court:

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa
challenged Order was subjected to a rigid examination of Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid;
two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of and
forgery of Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted
statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7
the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between The Court's Ruling
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would
ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but
credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the respondent’s adoption has not been sufficiently established.
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under First Issue:
investigation and the fitness of the particular witness. Except
in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on Validity of Marriage
account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court
in determining qualifications of this case. Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack,
while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent
when ably supported by substantial evidence on record are Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and
accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus, petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage
upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked license nor a marriage ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this
or ignored by the court below which if considered might vary contention.
the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that
would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was
findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and void because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is
respect on appeal especially when established by misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and
unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence.5 (citations petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five
omitted, emphasis in the original) years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and
petitioner.11Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
before this Court.6 Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned
marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of
The Issues the Family Code.
 When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed? itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede
cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary
a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by evidence of the contents.
recollection of witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was
duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the xxx     xxx     xxx
part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.14 Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last
analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when
when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not
and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized produce the document, when available, to establish its
the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented
Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties
to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its
Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even
Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book evidence."17
of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the
circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate. Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non  for the the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. 18 The
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept
this misconception thus: by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed
parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was [been] lost."19
barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may In the present case, due execution was established by the
not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the testimonial evidence in its place.25
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own
declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office
evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be admitted to (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited
prove the fact of marriage. three years before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he
proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
marriage contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to
fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead,
court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29
emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union
between Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Proof of Marriage Likewise, we have held:

As early as Pugeda v.  Trias,  21 we have held that marriage may be The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is .
proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we . . of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
said: contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.22 (emphasis supplied) fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held: themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
[A]lthough a marriage contract is
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
considered  primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 (emphasis
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis
supplied)
supplied, footnote ommitted)

This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
the  prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which,
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife, 34 we find
that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case. A: I said I do not remember.

Second Issue: Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the

judge's testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the
Validity of Adoption Order Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He
was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob
and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that
the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The Q. What else did she tell you[?]
appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s
handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the credibility of such A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the
expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . " 35 order.

We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are Q. What was your response sir[?]
accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. A. I said I do not remember.40
The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it
was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya
testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and
the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
"failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an Atty. Benito P. Fabie
exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be
reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37 Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will
you please recall whether you issued this Order and whether
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your
signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial signature.
court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for
petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order
mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of and the signature reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly
Judge Moya himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my
action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends signature.41
that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the
Order was his and cites the following portion as proof: 39
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as
name, he positively declared that it was not his. shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he
performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the
not discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the
still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued
he even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been
– and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
Deposition of Judge Moya. inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. 49

Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared: claiming such relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.
Atty. Paraiso

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision

Q   And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
in your examination of this document?
marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared
A   Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is
questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to
not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my costs.1âwphi1.nêt
findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the
writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of letters
SO ORDERED.
which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the
capital letter "J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services

having been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his
competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert
witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The

alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition,
however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in
adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were
criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover,
Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was
always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
 Republic of the Philippines attended to the processing of the documents required for the
SUPREME COURT celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
Manila marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
SECOND DIVISION contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

  The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was
only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation
lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
vs. Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before
respondent. leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio
E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage.
Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
PUNO, J.: marriage.

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the
respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin
F. Cardenas.1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage February 20, 1987
license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his This is to certify that the names EDWIN F.
answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
in his absence. allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June
21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage
The controlling facts are undisputed: license 
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without
the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
 (Sgd) CENONA
presumption
D. QUINTOS
that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
Senior Civil
regularly
Registry
performed
Officer his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she
sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued." We affirm the impugned Decision.

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970,
appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The
registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license. law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the subject marriage contract. Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
Hence this petition for review on certiorari. marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent
appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is
civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued.
Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self- Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written
serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro statement signed by an officer having custody of an
that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage official record or by his deputy, that after diligent
license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to found to exist in the records of his office,
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage. accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the contain no such record or entry.
parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his respondent and her husband Cardenas.
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the
relevant data. 6 solemnizing officer.

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any marriage license.
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
SO ORDERED.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition.
The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of
those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-
existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during
the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F.
Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a
copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the
same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default.
Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of
interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no
 Republic of the Philippines petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
SUPREME COURT registrar of Manila as respondent.
Manila
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila
FIRST DIVISION to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on
April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007 Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, 
vs. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
DECISION
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
CORONA, J.: "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala procedure.
and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh
North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named to "female."
the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were
does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil
scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a registrar of Manila.
person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing
in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
surgery? established. No opposition to the petition was made.

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru
petitioner. Its relevant portions read: the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or certificate by reason of sex alteration.
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in
compatible with his present sex. favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked
legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
the relief asked for. through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in
would be more in consonance with the principles of justice
his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil
and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who
Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune
to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and The petition lacks merit.
should not be in any way taken against him.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] Sex Reassignment
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to disagree.
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
"Male" to FEMALE. 5
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority. (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  – No entry in Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
and its implementing rules and regulations. changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and his true and official name.
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
name may be allowed: Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no
merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate of Court.
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
corrected without a judicial order.
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical  errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations;
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
civil register.23 adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
error" is: voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean: The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However,
xxx       xxx       xxx no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults
entry in the civil register that is harmless and or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
or obvious to the understanding, and can be entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
corrected or changed only by reference to other sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
(emphasis supplied) illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births.  – The
legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even parent of the newborn child.
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
his age, nationality and his family membership.27 parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother
alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant
The status of a person in law includes all his personal was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, regulations to be issued.
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
The comprehensive term status… include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29Thus, the sex of a
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
supplied) Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in
civil status shall be governed by special laws. the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary.
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the
distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs
to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male"
and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil
Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post- obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
"female." apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose
his body and appearance through the intervention of modern to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. claims asserted are statute-based.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
wrong. with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed
eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-
is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male equal branch of government, Congress.
and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post- argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Republic of the Philippines
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Costs against petitioner.
SECOND DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166676
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Present:
Petitioner,
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
- versus -
Carpio Morales,
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Tinga,
Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
 Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes
gender from "female" to "male." male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that
The facts are as follows. this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal January 12, 2005 which reads:
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has acknowledged and identified as a male.
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following
Jeff. corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan
upon payment of the prescribed fees:
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor CAGANDAHAN; and
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf. b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data. Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
SO ORDERED.[3] registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling. least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated
under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in
The issues raised by petitioner are: the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition
known as CAH does not make her a male.7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT: On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local
Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a
I. party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
AND, proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence
his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
II. sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4 Rule 103

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in CHANGE OF NAME
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province
name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile
Rules of Court. and Domestic Relations Court].

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party
in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under
changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the Rule 108
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing; CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
sought;
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any
(c) The name asked for. act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, corresponding civil registry is located.
and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon
some newspaper of general circulation published in the good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register
province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
notice. beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments
of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the minor; and (o) changes of name.
Government of the Republic.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
date fixed in the order that such order has been published as who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the shall be made parties to the proceeding.
court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition,
in accordance with the prayer of the petition. the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
 province. objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of registrar.
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such corrected without a judicial order.
proceedings.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall of such matters can now be made through administrative
be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
the same in his record. Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court the civil register.18
because respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry.
He is an indispensable party without whom no final The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition should ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.14Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
 (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) [23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
of a minor; and (16) changes of name. surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold
the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article male or female.
407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.20
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
early or "inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine
clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, rigid classification.
some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female,
in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry
for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the female, then a change in the
term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally
both male and female sexes." produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different of a male.
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
 biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
gender classification would be what the individual, like Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good and his personal judgment of being a male.
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself
as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity
male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
support for considering him as being male. Sexual development handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital
in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
persons, like respondent, is fixed. respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make
his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has
not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to
chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
characteristics. merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s male.
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not
to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The
to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent pronouncement as to costs.
to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this SO ORDERED.
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to
live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right
to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27]and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
 Republic of the Philippines Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
SUPREME COURT September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial
Manila and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
THIRD DIVISION existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
investigation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
vs.
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
DECISION
Ruling of the RTC
MENDOZA, J.:
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to
The facts avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were xxxx
married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate
SO ORDERED.6
of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
returned to the United States and never again communicated with
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he
never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
should not be recognized from its inception. parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly
and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion to the validity of marriage.
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
$2,000.00. otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
Ruling of the CA reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by
way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed
the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its
was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that
their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that Ruling of the Court
the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a
concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
consideration of $2,000.00. of lack of consent?

Hence, this petition. The Court resolves in the negative.

Assignment of Error Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR Marriage Fraud in Immigration
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This
OFCONSENT.8 has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of
availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where
a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will
to achieve immigration status.14 put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a others.18
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together
at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the (Italics supplied)
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v.
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage
the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
existence of a marriage.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has,
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that
sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
notable case of married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to
allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry The Court now turns to the case at hand.
but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The
Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert Respondent’s marriage not void
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not
a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when
a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound.
wife or build a family. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to
enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
render a marriage void ab initio. because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in
any way or for any purpose.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent
of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,
and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of
shall be declared valid.28 marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when
support a marriage. it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to
utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting. lack of merit.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of SO ORDERED.

fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy
by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease;
and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality.
No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for
the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under
any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3),
the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
 Republic of the Philippines her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
SUPREME COURT City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Manila Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered.
SECOND DIVISION
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice
G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013 and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired
the following real properties:
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, 
vs. (1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
DECISION
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered
in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
CARPIO, J.:

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT)

The Case
Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married
to Benjamin; and
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August
2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The Antecedent Facts
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left
for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-
Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and
Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired
with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37
was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally
of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the
Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his
Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive
present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under
September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were
2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to
trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
trial court to consider the case submitted for decision. purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner
of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as
The Decision of the Trial Court well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783.
However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and
the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor
Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT
ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21
Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed
part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without
during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to
prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the
Azucena in a separate proceeding.
purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of
subsisting marriage with Azucena. the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the
properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of
Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
ownership with Azucena.
was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not
rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and
because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is
Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not married to hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and NONEXISTENT.
Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven
(37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725,
126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, No other relief granted.
188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623,
194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial
194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in
194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners,
namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo SO ORDERED.6
B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the
exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion
Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles. for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, 7 the trial
court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision
before the Court of Appeals.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money
without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of The Decision of the Court of Appeals
the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted
is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err
these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned
control and possession of these properties including the documents to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
of title to the petitioner. deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally
still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them presence of her other witnesses.
equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED
in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed
share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of
Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior
two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage
of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003. was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second
marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and
to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10. void.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin
counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The
declaration of the status of the parties’ children. Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to
respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 her. The rest of the decision stands.
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and
his siblings. SO ORDERED.8

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’
Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively denied her motion.
because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him
solely. The Court of Hence, the petition before this Court.

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and The Issues
253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin
and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. (1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived
partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s her right to present evidence;
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing
proof of bad faith. (2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the and non-existent; and
part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads: error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision
regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 The Ruling of this Court
and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby The petition has no merit.
AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by
court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally
them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the
alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
marriage as an inviolable institution. recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not
be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was
were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In
hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in
case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that
submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children
the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on with Azucena.
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day.
Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was
priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for
decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros
2008. (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig
City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence
her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued
failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of
trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin
Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to
was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if
accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one license.12
of the parties.10
It was also established before the trial court that the purported
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court
Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled
Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage. On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the
concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not
Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face
Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void
in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other
Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that
reflected on the birth certificates. what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions
of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not
and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner
a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have
City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision
and wife without the benefit of marriage. of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of
Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the
which states:
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their 148 of the Family Code.30
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
money and evidences of credit.

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
her and in favor of Benjamin.
preceding Article.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
parties are in bad faith.
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or
Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37
properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late
are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he
father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and
acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for
their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25
his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14
March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. FIRST DIVISION
94226.
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006
SO ORDERED.
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, 
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the

Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20
December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25
January 2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before

the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations,
duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of
the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the
City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said
date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a
marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According
to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed
marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage
license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license
was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and

claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969, 4 and
in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered
with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the
after having been married to her for 25 years. United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation
of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
The trial court made the following findings:
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff,
May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry
Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was
Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was
defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh.
with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and
That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by
in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11,
applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church
dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of
Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted
office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly
this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on
Quezon City, where they executed another marriage May 19, 1969."
contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no.
2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994,
and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their
son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually,
their marital relationship turned bad because it became Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff
difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were
that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was
underwent family counseling before they eventually compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff,
she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was
in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally
plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage.
parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in
but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of 1991 in the United States.
everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant.
As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff;
more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after
before a minister and where she was made to sign they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and
documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under
each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs.
arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. "9" and "10").
Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations.
Defendant further stated that there was no sexual Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all
two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the
sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church
since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences
plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over between plaintiff and defendant.
her knees of which he would take endless pictures of.
Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between
the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce
sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it
has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in
Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her
like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony,
take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000
tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage
they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is
a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
would send some financial support on and off, while
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the
justifications: trial court and held:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9,
the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption
marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by  affirmative
certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no
Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. conclusive."
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on
May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the
fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to
the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
the Rules of Court, x x x. registered," for the reason that "the employee handling
is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore
xxxx just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to
between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not
solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but
Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage
marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e- license no. 2720792.
69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila
be cancelled. xxxx

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties'
civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that
the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded his union with defendant is defective with respect to an
the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that
information.7 ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record. 8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of
2005. a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime. of Cariño v. Cariño13:

He raises the following issues for Resolution. [A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as
celebration of the marriages in question;
in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the
relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, issuance of a marriage license.
particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in question
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage
which show on their face that a marriage license was
of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan,
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove
Metro Manila, and
that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the
the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
admitted "fact of marriage."9 pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage
that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage cannot stand.
contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage as null and void ab initio. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative. solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53, 10 5811 and 80.12
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where
Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception. it was held that:
 The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our
certify that despite diligent search, a particular full force locating the above problem.
document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a San Juan, Metro Manila
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of March 11, 1994
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)             Local Civil Registrar

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and
categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or
provides:
the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence
of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792
signed by an officer having the custody of an official record were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his find the said number.
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our
no such record or entry. full force locating the above problem.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the San Juan, Metro Manila
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage
License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and September 20, 1994
deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:             Local Civil Registrar

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License
Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the This is to certify that according to the records of this office,
said number. no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage
 License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to
issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. bring to this Court among other things the register of
CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA. application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the
Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of
This is to further certify that the said application and license Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring
do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, with you those records?
appear to be fictitious.
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the
interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve. Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the
request for subpoena?
San Juan, Metro Manila
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
July 25, 2000
Q Did you bring that with you?
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
A No, sir.
            Local Civil Registrar

Q Why not?
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope
and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of
its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
marriage applications that your office maintains as required
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not
such license was issued.
COURT
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita May I see that book and the portion marked by the
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the witness.
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in xxxx
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of
the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not COURT
be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook
or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted. Why don't you ask her direct question whether
marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
 their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-
the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the
issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
you could not find the record? But for the moment means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
you cannot locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not? Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir. 19 marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that is of great weight.24
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage
License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
the disputable presumptions. lived together for several years producing two offsprings, 26 now
adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
In one case, it was held: petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner
by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of
in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is
no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it
stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21 policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. 22
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 29
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
tenor of the first and second certifications.
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact Republic of the Philippines
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and SUPREME COURT
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, Manila
they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a THIRD DIVISION
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30 G.R. No. 183896               January 30, 2013

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, 
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as vs.
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31 GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with DECISION
his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-
Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, VELASCO, JR., J.:
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760,
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated
the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
petitioner. Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article
4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of
his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that

Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy
Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, counsel.8
located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-
law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared
stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and
until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had
never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11
a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification
reads as follows:
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
11 July 2003 May Ann Ceriola.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of
the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
19, 1993. witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary
Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993. further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage,
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7 it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
license with that office.17 presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21 Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on
June 15, 1993.29
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed
Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with
the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August
person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the the time were Chinese.31
marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified
that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the The Ruling of the RTC
Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for
Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.26 In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no
valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a
said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No.
and Atty. Sanchez. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As
the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
II
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS
A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
annulled; APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
2. Terminating the community of property relations between
OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF
the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of
the marriage of the parties.
III
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. COURT BELOW.35

SO ORDERED.34 The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her

appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005,
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
The Ruling of the CA compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed
errors: the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
I instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would
No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage as follows:
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted
on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs. Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

SO ORDERED.39 (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
July 24, 2008.41
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
Hence, this petition. appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each
Grounds in Support of Petition other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
I
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S voidable as provided in Article 45.
OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
II the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE xxxx
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42 (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
The Ruling of this Court
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
The petition is meritorious. Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid relevant data.44
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
was a valid marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance. marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his given probative value.
office contain no such record or entry.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court,
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license
the Court held: was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of apply.
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage
of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that
the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
a diligent search of the records of her office. simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the of the alleged marriage license.
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, CA:
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
license came from. The task of applying for the license was Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
value. members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony,
as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license
could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the xxxx
court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
Syed. has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on
15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of REINSTATED.
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note
that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after No costs.
an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was
filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage SO ORDERED
with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready
to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give
him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony

was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage
license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it

may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to
him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law
must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
 SECOND DIVISION petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.
G.R. No. 141528             October 31, 2006
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality,
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,  petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition 5 for declaration of
vs. nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent. that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact
that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part,
respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss 6 dated August
13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of res judicata  and forum shopping.

DECISION In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s

motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits,

the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
AZCUNA, J.: DISMISSED.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules SO ORDERED.8

of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment
denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of order9 dated January 21, 2000.
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
The facts are not disputed:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF
Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE
SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
"failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED
relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR
likewise dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.
 B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for
LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of
TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present
MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single
CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10
The contention is untenable.
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was
the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers
separate from the cause of action in the present case because the to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not former suit."11
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains
that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage, quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of
their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the the public tranquility and happiness.12
rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner
violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section
petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
4341-95.
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of
The petition lacks merit. a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the final order, may be as follows:
matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an
essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific
raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
Article 36 of the Family Code? respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
 judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or matter, and of causes of action.15
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites.
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard,
the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance
other matter that could have been raised in relation of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first
successors in interest by title subsequent to the case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions
in the same capacity; and, brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are
anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or purported absence of a marriage license.
which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the
judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is
as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the
pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy,
judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
same parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same
its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case. took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
Res judicata  in this sense requires the concurrence of the following marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
is a judgment or an order onthe merits; and (4) there is -- between presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties
are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been
and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 18 taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all
matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is
adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. 21
stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present
transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
actions are not necessarily for different causes of action marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997
simply because the theory of the second would not have of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP
been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot 4341-95.
preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of
the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. against petitioner.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for SO ORDERED.
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A
lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound
to set forth in his first action every ground for relief
which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or
injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable,

must present to the court, either by the pleadings or
proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his
demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only
a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is
sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a
second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to
litigation if such piecemeal presentation is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)
 Republic of the Philippines being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
SUPREME COURT least five years.
Manila
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or
THIRD DIVISION Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008 with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through
vs.
fraud.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
G.R. No. 179474 Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later,
Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,  ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
vs. from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
DECISION papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper,
and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R.
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the
Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-
table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he
Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose
Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986,
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not
National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
without emolument.7 wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
Complaint. It disposed: testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the
marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
with costs against [Jose].9 Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by
her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the
more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud. 10
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action
implausible, and rationalized that: had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
of the fraud. Thus:
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could
have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they
were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at
guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the
her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x. 12
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to
to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.] the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court
of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.
Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage
Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The
the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code
on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in
the following manner: Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion
for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
(5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of condition that the man and the woman must have been living
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as
the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and
he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman of Pasay City.19
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the
effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of
for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit
over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they
on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to
Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special I
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO
be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement FELISA.
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from II
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar. III

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between LICEN[S]E.24
Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
absence of a marriage license.21
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the
2007, denying Felisa’s motion. annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability. of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Philippines and Felisa. Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances a contract:
give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between
Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing are complied with:
this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used (2) Their consent, freely given;
in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that character. (Emphasis ours.)
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code,
Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code
and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
Felisa’s name as his wife. government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They
consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34 exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides: non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age
of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years
of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not
persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their
as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
status.36
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to impediment to the marriage.
marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is
thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of
and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
a marriage license.
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also
We answer in the affirmative. noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986
after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
to live in her house.45 lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.
falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a
ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose
that: to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every
the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license
evidence.48 is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
a marriage license, is beyond question.
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this
statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth
with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be in our laws.
denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic
and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited
license.
for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant.
The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license,
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at
holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without liability, if any. No costs.
force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
SO ORDERED.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because
he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities
are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is
without prejudice to their criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack
of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is

imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it
is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that
the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration
of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years
- and continuity that is unbroken.58
 Republic of the Philippines municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
SUPREME COURT kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Manila
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator,
SECOND DIVISION respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
  mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as
judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-
IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, is still pending.

vs. In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks

exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent. Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by
  the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost
ROMERO, J.:p seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that
in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he
did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent
applies to the case in question.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law. The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since
the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of
the case. 2
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite
the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony
thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
prove the latter's malfeasance.
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent
judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on
ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
not agree. submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from
the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under
Article 41."
A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse of the Family Code, thus:
present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years court's jurisdiction;
shall be sufficient.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
present must institute a summary proceeding as the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
provided in this Code for the declaration of church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
spouse. (Emphasis added.) marriages contracted on the point of death or in
 remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing official to administrative liability. 5
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities
in a sworn statement to that effect. of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil
As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside law.
of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances:
(1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario. 4 The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are
at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary  within the court's intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to persons.
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other
lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts FIRST DIVISION
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper A.M. No. 99-1211           January 28, 2000
understanding of the law. (Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, 

Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and vs.
given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
acts will be dealt with more severely. Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged

with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit
dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar alleging —

a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic)

BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our marriage was
solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence of
J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; . . .

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO

MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO

YMAN abandoned me without any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to

Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire
my Marriage Contract;
 e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of
Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage was not their marriage right then and there,  first, because
registered; . . . complainants said she must leave that same day to
be able to fly from Manila for abroad as
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to
Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire; another town for the marriage would be expensive
and would entail serious problems of finding a
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge
sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary
Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were
Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang
taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already
with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get
h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman; married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be
out of the country for a long period and their
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts marriage license would lapse and necessitate
prejudicial to my interest such as: another publication of notice;  fourth, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage,
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction; complainant feared it would complicate her
employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not as to date and venue of marriage were considered
registering our marriage before the office of the impracticable by the parties;
Local Civil Registrar.
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which
for comment. respondent found all in order.1âwphi1.nêt

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that: 1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino
overseas worker, who, respondent realized,
deserved more than ordinary official attention under
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and
present Government policy.
Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by respondent in
Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal
Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and 2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in
pressing circumstances: question, he believed in good faith that by so doing he was
leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be
not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically
married.
indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior
appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman 3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent of registration of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by missing documents in some amicable way during the
the following circumstances beyond the control of expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case
respondent: in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said
respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar
3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of General for possible registration of reconstituted
the marriage certificate, respondent left the three copies of said documents.
remaining copies on top of the desk in his private
office where the marriage ceremonies were held, The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge ". . . committed
copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office. non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out
respondent gathered all the papers relating to the that:
said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in
the premises and private files, all the three last As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-
copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly, Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is
respondent invited by subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction.
shed light on the missing documents and he said he Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
saw complainant Beso put the copies of the jurisdiction.
marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding
party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contract Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by
complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's claim. Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be
solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting other than his sala, to wit:
complainant now that she is out of the country, a
reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of (1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at
the established facts so far in this dispute. If we the point of death;
believe the claim of complainant that after August
28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, (2) when the residence of either party is located in a
abandoned her without any reason . . . but that said remote place;
husband admitted "he had another girl by the name
of LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear
who of the two marriage contracting parties probably (3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
certificate. solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect.
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has
no other recourse but to protect the public interest by The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant
trying all possible means to recover custody of the case.
 Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake its
neglected his duty when failed to register the marriage of foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."
complainant to Bernardito Yman.
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Code provides, among others, that —
Family Code which provides:
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
the original of the marriage certificate referred to in jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
after the marriage, to the local civil register of the
place where the marriage was solemnized. . . .
(emphasis ours) Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel
or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in
undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
basic social institution in our society whose nature, were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should (Emphasis ours)
have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same.
As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be
conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held
that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof. accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court
finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-taken. In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her
fiancé Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
Jimenez v.  Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his
social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on
which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more
is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas
question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
and complicated for citizens to get married." in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law officiating official to administrative liability.7
but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. 2 A judge is not only Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the
bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he
thorough in doing so.4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their Calbayog.8
duties.5
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the hierarchy of likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that —
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to
marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital Art. 23. — It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
unions. marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the
original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws — let alone that to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate
enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
institution as marriage — and the stability of judicial doctrines laid registrar of the place where the marriage was
down by superior authority should have given respondent judge solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the
and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in
is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
authority or jurisdiction of his court.6 Thus respondent Judge should original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the
be reminded that — affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization
of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area
of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA
court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court Republic of the Philippines
reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management SUPREME COURT
and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an SECOND DIVISION
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after
all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
functions.11 G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, 
Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a vs.
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1âwphi1.nêt
DECISION
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is
hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be
dealt with more severely. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
SO ORDERED. Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30
October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a

Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert,
and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the
care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A.,
back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons.
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely American husband was legal because now being an American
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present
had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was
Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also
herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00
Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and
Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00
danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their
the Philippines. evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; 8 and (3)
because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein
effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of Fely openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.9
their household. She could not have been extravagant since the
family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the
for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr.
and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders 12 and incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to
York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses plaintiff.
upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever
submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s
year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy,
submitted for decision. firmly.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings – such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.
These are her excessive disposition to material things over and
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the
practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
United States of America and married another man and has Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
another man in another country. declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit –
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
instance. seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly …

reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution
of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
36, 37 and 38. accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 18
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW." the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of
has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the marriages.
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino
citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
thus becomes herself an alien. laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her I
total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
the marriage of the parties.16
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
arguments/grounds –
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
determining its existence. and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
was defined, thus – our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of
state.
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has solidarity.
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
marriage is celebrated…21 decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by – and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
emerge only after the marriage; and nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 22 (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below – (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
profession or employment in a job… on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the trial.
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the Family Code of the Philippines.
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
in the text of the decision. the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which
Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts… convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24 under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital Philippines –
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28 shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
incapacitating nature be fully explained. Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to III
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. 32 The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
II marriages.

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
applicable to the case at bar. Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of
the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical
behalf of the State. Article 48 provides – that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials appear as counsel for the State:
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.34 shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id.,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and at 213]
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State… 37
Court or the Court of Appeals.35While it is the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to (3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
reproduced below –
…
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
…
…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of
the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the (2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
period. new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on
the adverse parties.
…
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
decision, with or without the memoranda. one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answer to every individual problem. 39
Sec. 19. Decision. –
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
… of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
and SET ASIDE.
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or
by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed
to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
published once in a newspaper of general circulation. remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one

party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to

make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails

the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of

Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
follows. applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam- Article II of the Constitution.7
an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
Orbecido. before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their provides:
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen. RULE 63

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
...
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4 persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code ripe for judicial determination.8
is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
determination.6 marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment? while residing in the U.S.A.

Brief Historical Background Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states: 1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. 2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
supplied.)
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

Legislative Intent
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
36, 37 and 38. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
married to the Filipino spouse.
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
(Emphasis supplied) case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but capacitating him or her to remarry.
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized latter to remarry.
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
under Philippine law and can thus remarry. between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible,
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the naturalized alien spouse.
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.12 However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence
duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the evidence.13
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically EN BANC
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another April 24, 2018
marriage.
G.R. No. 221029
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner 
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and vs
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that RESOLUTION
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is peralta, J.:
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
his favor. Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18,
2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and the Decision states:
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
No pronouncement as to costs. Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo)

filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by 5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in
virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court. Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be
initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing,
counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of 6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for 7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that
enforcement of a foreign judgment. were offered and admitted were:

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the 1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
alleged: 2. Affidavit of Publication;

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a 3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
Marriage Contract xxx;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in husband;
Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December
6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in 6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
Japanese former husband;
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5 Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
allegations of Manalo. or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for
a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are 2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine obtained abroad.13
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing who both aliens, may be recognized in the
marriages."6 Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.14
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article
26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable 4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et capacitating him or her to remarry.15
al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent
of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code,
Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter. originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As modified,
hence, this petition. Article 26 now states:

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the where country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
36, 37 and 38. American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce injustice. x x x
obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. 23 situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies
to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. to remarry.
Orbecido III:26
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the jurisdiction x x x.30
recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the
Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect.
the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen,
she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that
husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the
said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname. ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied
We rule in the affirmative. the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
and property relation,respectively. jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing
the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of
the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an
Philippines. Thus:
Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the
husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce local law and public policy.
the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may
decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign private respondent from the marriage from standards of American
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.  As stated by the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has
stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the
bond of the former marriage." There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
be served.31 between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33 for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a
family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and
bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled: it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence
to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v.
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the COMELEC et. al.:41
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond. The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers
of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same. alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in
the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
We beg to differ. Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to
marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a
in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the latter's national law.
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a
statute there should be departure."38 Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43 based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed law of the foreigner.55
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
interest.47 obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence,
right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some unjustly discriminate against the other.
individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary.
a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her
latter.52 alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be
same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that
he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien
The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is national. In one case, it was said:
not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties
before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple
of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit,
annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
of our kababayan. companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign support a marriage.63
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses. The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
The supposition is speculative and unfounded. protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a
general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G.
whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange
the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if reveal as follows:
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing Bernas be recognized.
acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It recognized.
is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral
conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or
losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of
intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But submitted by the House Committee on Population
now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is
to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer. And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March
19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law? absolute divorce are as follows:

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer. 1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code, modified or amended, as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute child of the petitioner;
divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner,
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such corruption or inducement;
as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable pardoned;
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the
Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force
and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic
1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil gambling of respondent;
Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here
or abroad, is no longer recognized.70 f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. abroad;
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
 h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
with another person other than one's spouse during the other husband and wife;
the marriage, except when upon the mutual
agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them d. consent of either party was obtained by force,
by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
bears a child after being a victim of rape; having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the
petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; e. Either party was physically incapable of
and consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year. f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually
transmissible infection found to be serious or
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more appears to be incurable.
thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at
separation. the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family 1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
Code restated as follows: years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the
reconciliation is highly improbable;
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or 2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article
over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at
solemnized without the consent of the parents the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
guradian or personl having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after 3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely surgery or transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is
cohabited with the other and both lived together as entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
husband and wife; transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such 4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest
the other as husband and wife; and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their 2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family
nature of permanence, as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose
sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81
can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and
establish a state religion.76 still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms"
under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital"
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate.
believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not
considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle
ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
interest to regulate. Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
formed according to indigenous customs.82
institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to time. With the advancement of communication and information
actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is
alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self
almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti- and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. rotten quality.
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San dispensed with justice.86
Luis85 quoted:
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated: and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. or intent.88
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce
motives of the legislature, is to render justice. the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
done even as the law is obeyed. divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.91
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an
import a policy that goes beyond them." official body or tribunal of foreign country.

xxxx Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
the seal of his office.92 capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on
persons and family relations are not among those matters that
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted: Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents law on divorce.
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing SO ORDERED
the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the

divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign
court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not
denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96
 Republic of the Philippines and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s
SUPREME COURT marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
Manila an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
THIRD DIVISION Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must
first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, 
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
vs.
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
GENERAL, Respondents.
trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
DECISION financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she
be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
BRION, J.: Gerbert’s.

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition.
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
petition). is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert 36, 37 and 38.
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5 alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after Code.
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages –
THE PETITION void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13 exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be 36, 37 and 38.
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Gerbert’s position. celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
divorce decree. 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
THE COURT’S RULING Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital
rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
in favor of the Filipino spouse reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.22 The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to this jurisdiction
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens –
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code judgments. This Section states:
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 thing; and
of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the between the parties and their successors in interest by a
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), subsequent title.
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem
it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to law.
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
national law.27 the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state,
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
defense. considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a Family Code provides.
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
the seal of his office. to what had been done.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, persons:
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35 (1) Birth and death register;

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status marriages.
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
registry: (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
(a) births; not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
(b) deaths; foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
(c) marriages; recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
(d) annulments of marriages;
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
(e) divorces;
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
(f) legitimations; requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
(g) adoptions; of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
(i) naturalization; and of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition
is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
(j) changes of name.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that
the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by
xxxx
itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
SO ORDERED.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be

construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and

REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
 FIRST DIVISION otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329            March 8, 2001 designed merely to harass him.
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,  Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty
vs. of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
Pangasinan, respondent. dealt with more severely.

RESOLUTION On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest

whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
affirmative.
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his
who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In
with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed
those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
We find merit in the complaint.
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and
not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
 under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the to before him.
marriage.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1)
the following requisites must concur: of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a
1. The man and woman must have been living together as case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
have lived together for at least five years [and are without who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground
legal impediment to marry each other]; and for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. 6 Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is
indicated that both were "separated." simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.10
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is
subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased
would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And to P20,000.
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and
Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise),
SUPREME COURT represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Manila Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No.
SECOND DIVISION M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,  Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
vs. among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the
ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent. same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In
DECISION order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation
of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
PEREZ, J.: father’s estate.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states: Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as
shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for
March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas,
City are AFFIRMED in toto.2 Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
The Facts
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the
of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to
by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac,
whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children,
as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let
letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo We find the petition bereft of merit.
Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9 of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the death:
28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent
Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009. other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
The Issues of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS; – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
– residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. 13Even where
the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases
DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but
LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12 abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
The Court’s Ruling proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19 Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals therein respondent after the death of their father, by
cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
estate may be laid in the said city. which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. 24
the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, the parties to the marriage.25
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to
of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising
supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the
be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21 absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of cause of action.
Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab
initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s
attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration
of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently apply for administration or to request that administration be
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage serve;
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve,
marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries it may be granted to such other person as the court may
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was select.
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record
of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at
the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition
therefore, void ab initio.27 for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’
contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for (a) The jurisdictional facts;
Letters of Administration.
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus: (c) The probable value and character of the property of the
estate;
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are (d) The name of the person for whom letters of
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies administration are prayed.
intestate, administration shall be granted:
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or of administration.
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
serve; against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings,
the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent distributees.28
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be
benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate
as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack

of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November
2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.