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G.R. No. 204735. February 19, 2018.*

 
SPOUSES CIPRIANO PAMPLONA and BIBIANA INTAC,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LILIA I. CUETO and VEDASTO
CUETO, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Supreme Court; Generally, the

Supreme Court (SC) cannot delve into questions of fact on appeal because it
is not a trier of facts; Exceptions.—Generally, the Court cannot delve into
questions of fact on appeal because it is not a trier of facts. Yet, this rule has
not been ironclad and rigid in view of several jurisprudentially recognized
instances wherein the Court has opted to settle factual disputes duly raised
by the parties. These instances include situations: (a) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (b) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (c) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (d) when the judgment of the CA is
based on misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case, and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclu-

_______________

*  THIRD DIVISION.

 
 

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sions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (j) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
absence of evidence but the premise is contradicted by the evidence on
record.
Civil Law; Sales; “Contract of Sale” and “Contract to Sell,”
Distinguished.—The admissions by Roilan and Vedasto of the petitioners’
ownership of the property could not be appreciated in favor of the
petitioners. That Bibiana and Lilia had entered into a contract to sell instead
of a contract of sale must be well-noted. The distinctions between these
kinds of contracts are settled. In Serrano v. Caguiat, 517 SCRA 57 (2007),
the Court has explained: A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale
where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer
title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that
if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if
the conditional obligation had never existed. The suspensive condition is
commonly full payment of the purchase price. The differences between a
contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-settled in jurisprudence. As
early as 1951, in Sing Yee v. Santos, we held that: x x x [a] distinction must
be made between a contract of sale in which title passes to the buyer upon
delivery of the thing sold and a contract to sell x x x where by agreement the
ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until the full payment,
of the purchase price is made. In the first case, nonpayment of the price is a
negative resolutory condition; in the second case, full payment is a positive
suspensive condition. Being contraries, their effect in law cannot be
identical. In the first case, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the
ownership of the land sold until and unless the contract of sale is itself
resolved and set aside. In the second case, however, the title remains in the
vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract. In other words, in a
contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass to the
buyer until full payment of the price. x x x x The distinctions delineate why
the admissions by Roilan and Vedasto were consistent with the existence of
the oral contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana. Under the oral contract
to sell, the ownership had yet to pass to Lilia, and Bibiana retained

 
 
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Pamplona vs. Cueto

ownership pending the full payment of the purchase price agreed upon.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Admission by Silence; The act or declaration
made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who
does or says nothing may be admitted as evidence against a party who fails
to refute or reject it.—The failure of Roilan to raise as a defense in the
unlawful detainer suit against him the existence of the contract to sell
between Bibiana and Lilia could not be properly construed as an admission
by silence on the part of Lilia. It is basic that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet. As an exception to the rule, the act or
declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a
party who does or says nothing may be admitted as evidence against a party
who fails to refute or reject it. This is known as admission by silence, and is
covered by Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 32. Admission by silence.—An act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be
given in evidence against him. For an act or declaration to be admissible
against a party as an admission by silence, the following requirements must
be present, namely: (a) the party must have heard or observed the act or
declaration of the other person; (b) he must have had the opportunity to
deny it; (c) he must have understood the act or declaration; (d) he must have
an interest to object as he would naturally have done if the act or declaration
was not true; (e) the facts are within his knowledge; and (f) the fact admitted
or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue.
Same; Same; Same; The rule on admission by silence applies to
adverse statements in writing only when the party to be thereby bound was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant.—The first two
requirements are lacking in the case of Lilia. She was not shown to have
heard or seen the admissions by Vedasto and Roilan that were in writing
because she was then abroad. Also, she was not shown to have had the
opportunity to deny their written admissions simply because she was not a
party to the written admissions. The rule on admission by silence applies to
adverse state-

 
 

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ments in writing only when the party to be thereby bound was carrying
on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. Without such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that although the party
would have immediately reacted had the statements been orally made in his
presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the party
still has to resort to a written reply.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Kathryn T. Elemen for petitioners.
   De Mesa & De Mesa Law Office for respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:
 
This case involves conflicting claims between the parties
involving their transaction over a parcel of land and its
improvements, with the respondents claiming, on the one hand, that
they had purchased the property on installment pursuant to an oral
contract to sell, and the petitioners insisting, on the other, that the
amounts paid by the respondents to them were in payment of the
latter’s indebtedness for a previous loan. The trial court sided with
the petitioners but the appellate court reversed the trial court and
ruled in favor of the respondents.
 
The Case
 
Under review is the decision promulgated on December 3, 2012,1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision issued on
June 21, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court

_______________

1   Rollo,  pp. 39-55; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, and

concurred by Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybañez and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang.

 
 

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(RTC), Branch 8, in Batangas City dismissing the respondents’

complaint in Civil Case No. 5120, and ordering the petitioners
instead to execute a deed of sale on the property in favor of the
respondents upon the release of the consigned amount.2

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The CA further ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas City

to cancel the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners, and to
issue a new one in favor of the respondents.
 
Antecedents
 
The CA rendered the following factual and procedural
antecedents:

An Amended Complaint dated 20 November 1998 was filed by

plaintiffs Sps. Lilia I. Cueto (“Lilia,” for brevity) and Vedasto Cueto
(“Vedasto,” for brevity) against defendants Sps. Cipriano Pamplona
and Bibiana Intac (“Bibiana,” for brevity) for specific performance,
conveyance, consignation and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City, docketed as Civil Case No. 5120.
It was alleged, inter alia, that: defendants are the registered
owners of Lot No. 1419-C (LRC) Psd-66901 of the Cad. Survey of
Batangas, Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC Cad. Record No. 1706, with
improvements thereon (subject property), situated in Batangas City,
containing an area of 476 sq. m., more or less, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-1504 (34558) of the land records of
Batangas City; on 10 January 1989, plaintiff Lilia and defendants
mutually agreed that the former would buy and the latter would sell
on installment, the aforementioned immovable including the house
standing thereon for the total sum of US$25,000.00 payable on a
monthly installment of US$300.00; the agreement was

_______________

2  Id., at pp. 240-249; penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto L. Marajas.

 
 
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verbal considering that Lilia and defendants are sisters and brother-
in-law, respectively, and completely trusted each other; however, a
notebook with the personal inscription of defendant Bibiana was sent
to Lilia at the latter’s address in Italy, affirming their oral agreement
and wherein the list of all the remittances would be entered; on even
date, defendants voluntarily transferred the peaceful possession of the
subject property to Lilia and from the date of the agreement, the latter
had remitted to the former her monthly instalments through
registered mail, with a total payment of US$14,000.00 to date,
leaving a balance of US$11,000.00; since January 1989, Lilia
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allowed her son Rolando (or Roilan) Cueto (“Rolando” or “Roilan,”

for brevity) to reside at the subject property as Lilia had to leave for
abroad due to her employment in Italy; since January 1989, Lilia
through her son, has religiously paid the annual realty taxes on the
premises, including electric and water bills; on 13 August 1997,
defendants filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Batangas
City, with malicious intent and to the prejudice of plaintiffs’ rights, a
case for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 3429 against
plaintiff’s son Rolando and his wife Liza Cueto (“Liza,” for brevity);
being indigent, spouses Rolando and Liza failed to defend
themselves resulting in a judgment by default and they were finally
evicted in January 1998; Lilia learned of the eviction case in June
1998 when she returned home from Italy; she executed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim dated 15 June 1998, and registered the same with
the land records of Batangas City; on 17 June 1998, through Lilia’s
lawyer, a written tender of payment of US$11,000.00 was sent to
defendants by registered mail and received by Bibiana on 30 June
1998; earnest efforts were resorted to compromise the present
controversy between members of the same family as shown by the
final demand letter dated 11 August 1998, sent by registered mail, to
defendants; as a consequence of the latter’s unreasonable refusal to
recognize plaintiffs’ just and valid demand, they were constrained to
consign the US$11,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency, as
final payment to defendants; after plaintiffs’ compliance with her
contrac-

 
 

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tual obligation, she demanded from defendants to immediately

execute the necessary deed of conveyance and delivery of the
owner’s copy of TCT No. T-34558; due to defendants’ act and
omission, Lilia suffered actual damages for the reimbursement of her
travelling expenses and loss of revenue due her from foreign job
abandonment during the length of the proceeding; and plaintiffs are
entitled to the payment of damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
In their Answer with Counterclaim dated 25 August 2000,
defendants alleged, inter alia, that: it was plaintiff Lilia who is
indebted to her sister defendant Bibiana, as it was the latter whom
she approached for money to be used in applying for a job in Italy; as
promised by Lilia, she would pay Bibiana and remit the amount in
instalment to the residence of defendants in the United States; but

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only few dollars were sent to them by Lilia, and as could be gleaned
from the self-serving notations thereon, there exists no agreement
duly signed by defendants, as in truth and in fact they never sold the
said property to the plaintiffs; Article 1405 of the New Civil Code
mandates that irrespective of who the parties are to agreement, if it
involves more than Php500.00, it should be reduced into writing,
mutually agreed upon by the parties thereto; plaintiff Vedasto, and
Rolando married to Liza, were allowed by defendants to stay in the
said house, by mere tolerance, subject to the condition that they
would pay their electric and water consumption bills thereon, but
realty tax payments were sent to them by defendants for payment to
the Batangas City government; Vedasto, husband of Lilia, as early as
24 October 1996, had recognized the defendants’ right of ownership
over the property in question, when he undertook to vacate the same;
they never sold the subject property to the plaintiffs’ if the plaintiffs
incurred expenses or suffer pecuniary damages including attorney’s
fees, they themselves are to be blamed and not defendants, for
instituting a baseless and unfounded complaint.
Defendants filed their Manifestation and Urgent Motion for
Inhibition dated 13 March 2001, to which

 
 

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plaintiffs filed their Counter-Manifestation dated 29 March 2001. On

05 April 2001, Judge Teodoro Tapia Riel inhibited himself. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 8.
Intervenor Redima Baytown Development Corporation
(“Redima,” for brevity) filed its Manifestation and simultaneous
filing of Answer-in-Intervention with attached Answer-in-
Intervention dated 24 June 2001, and Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention dated 25 July
2001. Plaintiffs filed their “Negation” dated 10 August 2001. On 31
March 2004, the trial court admitted the Answer-in-Intervention.
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 April 2004,
which was denied by the trial court on 30 July 2004.
In the meantime, petitioners therein (herein plaintiffs) filed a
Petition for Certiorari dated 20 September 2004 before this Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 86541. This Court (Seventeenth Division)
rendered a Decision dated 28 June 2005, granting the Petition for
Certiorari, reversing and setting aside the trial court’s Orders dated
31 March 2004 and 30 July 2004, and entering a new one denying
the Answer-in-Intervention. Private respondent Redima filed its

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Motion for Reconsideration, etc. dated 19 July 2005, which was

denied by this Court (Former Seventeenth Division) in its Resolution
dated 03 November 2005. Redima filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 December 2005, docketed
as G.R. No. 170315. In a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the
Supreme Court (First Division) denied the Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Redima filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated 24
February 2006, but the same was denied in the Supreme Court’s
Resolution dated 16 January 2006, which became final and executory
and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Pretrial was held and the trial court issued an Order dated 25 April
2005.
Trial on the merits ensued. Plaintiff Lilia, Roilan and Emma Intac
were presented as witnesses.

 
 

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Lilia Cueto testified, inter alia, that: she started working in Italy
in 1987 up to the present; Bibiana is her sister and Cipriano
Pamplona is her brother-in-law who have been residing in the U.S.A.
for 35 years; she bought the subject property in Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, covered by TCT No. RT-1504 from Sps. Pamplona on
10 January 1998; Bibiana called her by telephone and told her that
she (Lilia) would pay by installment every month for US$300.00; the
total amount of said subject property is $25,000.00; they agreed to
the proposal and Bibiana sent her a booklet wherein she could write
her payments and there was also a note above in the booklet before
Bibiana sent the same; her sister has inscriptions on the front cover of
Exhibit “B”; the figures 1-10-89 is the date of her first payment;
US$25,000.00 is the amount of the subject property she bought from
defendants; US$300.00 is her monthly payment; all in all, she sent
Bibiana US$14,000.00; her thirty-one (31) return cards show that she
sent money to Bibiana; usually she sent Bibiana cash in US dollars;
possession of the subject property was entrusted to her and her son
Roilan resided in the said property since 10 January 1989; she paid
realty taxes on the subject property as shown in the four (4) official
receipts dated 22 November 1996, for the years 1991 to 1996; Roilan
was ejected by Bibiana in November 1997 in relation to the
complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3429; when she
talked with Bibiana in the Philippines on 07 June 1998, she did not
have with her the full payment for the balance amounting to
US$11,000.00 because she lost her job at that time; after she and

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Bibiana talked on 07 June 1998, they agreed that she would come
back to the Philippines in order to pay the latter; she came back to the
Philippines on 27 September 1999 and she had the money with her,
but Bibiana already left for the USA; and Bibiana did not ac queue
 cept her tender of payment of US$11,000.00. On cross-examination,
she testified that she and Bibiana verbally agreed that she was going
to pay; Bibiana told her that after she has settled the payment, that
would be the time that they would execute a deed of sale; her hus-

 
 

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band knew that she bought said property; and the yellow paper shows
what was agreed upon by her and Bibiana.
Roilan Cueto testified, inter alia, that: his mother Lilia has been
working in Italy since 1987; Sps. Pamplona are his uncle and aunt;
Bibiana and Lilia are sisters; Lilia started paying defendants
US$300.00 a month since 10 January 1989; his parents authorized
him to reside on the said property; since 10 January 1989, he
occupied the house and paid the electric and water bills; he paid the
taxes of the subject property, but it was his mother who sent money
for the payment; he was ejected from the house because he was
charged with unlawful detainer by his aunt; after the promulgation of
the decision in the unlawful detainer case, he left the house; he did
not inform his mother, and just waited for her to come home, because
he did not want to give her a problem; and from the time he occupied
the subject property on 10 January 1989 and up to the time he was
ejected by the Court, he did not pay any rent. On cross-examination,
he testified that his father Vedasto is a co-plaintiff in this case; he
thinks that his father was forced to sign the undertaking “Pangako ng
Pag-alis” because his mother and father had a quarrel during that
time and they were made to understand that it was a form of
separation of property, which is why, they made that document; he
did not appeal the Decision of Judge Francisco D. Sulit (“Sulit,” for
brevity); and he just left because his mother was still abroad and they
did not have the financial capacity to hire the services of counsel. On
redirect examination, he testified, that he informed his mother who
was in Italy about the ejectment case filed against him by the Sps.
Pamplona during the time when they were made to vacate by Sps.
Pamplona.
Emma Intac testified, inter alia, that Lilia and Bibiana are her
sisters; and that Lilia is the mother of Rolando who is the owner of
the house.

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Plaintiffs filed their Formal Offer dated 02 February 2009, to

which defendants filed their “Legal & Factual Objections, etc.” dated
27 March 2009. On 20 April

 
 

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2009, the trial court admitted plaintiffs’ Exhibits “A” to “T” with
submarkings.
Wilfredo M. Panaligan and Atty. Dimayacyac testified for the
defense.
Wilfredo M. Panaligan, testified, inter alia, that: he was a
member of the Batangas City Police Station in 1997, and he was
assigned at the Intelligence Division, under Col. Pablo Panaligan; he
and PO2 Hoberto Bagsit (“Bagsit,” for brevity) were called by their
Chief of Police for police assistance to Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City; he was told to get in touch with Sps. Pamplona for
peace and order situation thereat; in his (Panaligan) presence, Roilan
signed his written undertaking in relation to their manifestation to
vacate the premises regarding the decision of Judge Sulit; Vedasto
signed the “Pangako ng Pag-alis”; and he and Bagsit were present
when Vedasto signed said specific undertaking; they were assisted by
the sheriff of the court; there were typographical errors in the
undertaking of Vedasto considering 24 October 1996 should be 1997,
and 21 October 1996 should be 21 October 1997; he read the
document marked at Exhibit “4-A” before affixing his signature
thereon; and he was not able to call the attention of the court
personnel or Vedasto regarding the discrepancy of the date stated on
the document, as he just signed as a witness.
Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac, Sr., defendants’ counsel, filed his
Judicial Affidavit dated 26 August 2010 (Exhibit “AA’’) and affirmed
the same. He testified, inter alia, that: when the property was offered
to him before and being well acquainted of the fact that as early as
1997, his assistance was solicited in conjunction with the assistance
provided by the Batangas City PNP for the enforcement of the
decision of Judge Sulit, ejecting Roilan or Rolando and Liza, the son
and daughter-in-law of the plaintiffs, he was already aware of the
legality of the ownership of Sps. Pamplona; he went to the trial court
and made researches on the pleadings pending as well as the record
of the proceedings, for that purpose he realized that the case
instituted by Sps. Cueto against Sps. Pamplona had no legal basis;
and he noticed with respect to

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the other arguments advanced by Atty. Eugenio Mendoza, counsel of

Sps. Pamplona therein, that the basis of the allegations in favor of
Lilia, which has been denied by Sps. Pamplona, was that there was
no document of sale which had been signed and they were not in
possession because they were ejected, aside from the fact no appeal
has been instituted by either Lilia or Vedasto; he was not the counsel
of the defendants in the ejectment case decided by Judge Sulit; he
examined the annotation on TCT No. RT-1504(34558) at the land
records of Batangas City; he is not aware of the lis pendens per entry
Entry No. 105392 that was annotated thereon in September 1998
because he never went to the Register of Deeds; he just depended on
his copy of a clean title; he and his family corporation have never
been disturbed in their possession; he is aware that when Redima
executed the Memorandum of Agreement and Contract to Sell on 15
March 2001, there is a pending litigation between plaintiffs and
defendants in this case; and Redima took possession of the property
in litigation immediately after the execution of the Memorandum of
Agreement and Contract to Sell; the permission of the trial court was
not needed when they took possession of the property; and he
participated by filing the necessary intervention.
Defendants filed their Motion to Admit attached Formal Offer of
Evidence dated 10 January 2011, to which plaintiffs filed an
Opposition dated 08 February 2011. On 28 March 2011, the trial
court admitted Exhibit “AA’’ which was remarked by defendants’
counsel as Exhibit “20.” Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum dated 19
April 2011, to which defendants filed their Counter-Argument, etc.
dated 27 April 2011 x x x.3

Judgment of the RTC

 
As stated, the RTC, holding that the respondents did not prove
the existence of the partially executed contract to sell involving the
property; that neither documentary nor object

_______________

3  Id., at pp. 40-47.

 
 

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evidence confirmed the supposed partially executed contract to sell;

and that the respondents accordingly failed to support their cause of
action by preponderance of evidence, disposed:

Wherefore, the complaint filed against Spouses Cipriano

Pamplona and Bibiana Intac for specific performance, reconveyance
consignation and damages is hereby dismissed for failure of the
Plaintiff to present preponderance of evidence to substantiate the
theory of the case. In like manner This Court will not award any
damages in favor of the Defendants; however the cost of the suit is
chargeable against the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.4

Decision of the CA
 
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC, and declared that the
respondents presented sufficient evidence to establish that petitioner
Bibiana and her sister, respondent Lilia, had entered into an oral
contract to sell; that their oral contract, being partially executed by
virtue of Lilia’s partial payments to Bibiana, removed the contract
from the application of the Statute of Frauds; that the transfer of the
property in favor of Redima, represented by the petitioners’ counsel,
Atty. Dimayacyac, by virtue of the deed of transfer of rights, was
null and void for being violative of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
The fallo of the decision of the CA reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.

The Decision dated 21 June 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 8, Batangas City in Civil Case No. 5120 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, plaintiff-appellant Lilia
I. Cueto is recognized to have the right of ownership over subject
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1504
(34558) of the Registry of Deeds for Batan-

_______________

4  Id., at p. 249.

 
 

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gas City registered in the names of defendant-appellees Spouses

Cipriano Pamplona and Babiana Intac. The Registrar of Deeds of
Batangas City is hereby ORDERED to cancel said TCT No. RT-
1504 (34558) and to issue a new one in the name of plaintiff-
appellant Lilia I. Cueto. The judicially consigned amount of
Php436,700.00 under Official Receipt No. 8789368 dated 24
November 1998, representing the full payment by plaintiff-appellant
Lilia I. Cueto of the remaining balance of the subject property’s
purchase price, is ORDERED release[d] to defendant-appellees.
Defendant-appellees are hereby ORDERED to immediately execute
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of
plaintiff-appellant Lilia I. Cueto. Costs against defendant-appellees.
SO ORDERED.5

Issues
 
The petitioners now assail the decision of the CA by stressing
that the admissions of Lilia’s son, Roilan, and of her husband,
petitioner Vedasto, to the effect that the petitioners were the true
owners of the property were contrary to the conclusions of the CA;
that the CA’s finding that there had been a partially executed
contract to sell was unwarranted because nothing in the records
established the same; that the decision of the MTCC of Batangas
City against Roilan in the unlawful detainer case indicated that they
were the true owners of the property; that the CA should not have
nullified the deed of transfer of rights between Redima and the
petitioners on the strength of Article 1491 of the Civil Code because
it was Redima, the corporation, that acquired the property instead of
Atty. Dimayacyac; and that there was no violation of Article 1491
because of the separate juridical personalities between the
corporation and its shareholders.

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5  Id., at p. 54.

 
 

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On their part, the respondents object to the authority of Atty.

Dimayacyac to sign the verification and certification against forum
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shopping for the petitioners, stating that the fact that the written
authority for that purpose had been notarized before a notary public
of the State of Washington did not convert the document into a
public document in the context of the Philippine law; that the factual
findings of the CA, being more consistent with the facts and the law
of the case, should be respected; that the CA correctly voided the
transfer of the property from the petitioners to Redima and Atty.
Dimayacyac for having been in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil
Code; and that although it may have appeared that it was Redima, it
was really Atty. Dimayacyac who had purchased the property after
piercing the corporate veil, which indicated that the transfer was
both legally and ethically abhorrent.
In their reply, petitioners counter that the general power of
authority was duly authenticated within the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, California, and was submitted to the
RTC as Exhibit 5-b; and that any objection to the validity of the
verification and certification against forum shopping would be
misplaced.
Based on the foregoing, the issues to be resolved are: (a) whether
or not there was sufficient evidence to show the existence of a
partially executed contract to sell; and (b) whether or not the deed of
transfer of rights from the respondents to Redima violated Article
1491 of the Civil Code.
 
Ruling of the Court
 
The appeal lacks merit.
Generally, the Court cannot delve into questions of fact on appeal
because it is not a trier of facts. Yet, this rule has not been ironclad
and rigid in view of several jurisprudentially recognized instances
wherein the Court has opted to settle factual disputes duly raised by
the parties. These instances
 
 

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include situations: (a) when the inference made is manifestly

mistaken, absurd or impossible; (b) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (c) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (d) when the judgment of the CA is based
on misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case, and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the CA are
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contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and (j) when the findings of fact of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence but the premise is
contradicted by the evidence on record.6
The conflict in the factual findings and conclusions drawn by the
RTC and the CA demands that the Court sift the records in order to
settle the dispute between the parties.
At the start, the Court reiterates the general proposition that is
true in all civil litigations that the burden of proof lies in the party
who asserts, not in the party who denies because the latter, by the
nature of things, cannot produce any proof of the assertion denied.7
Equally true is the dictum that mere allegations cannot take the place
of evidence.8 The party making an allegation in a civil case has the
burden of proving the allegation by preponderance of evidence.9 In
this connection, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of

_______________

6  Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. Nagrama, Jr., G.R. No, 164403, March 4, 2008,
547 SCRA 571, 585.
7  MOF Company, Inc., v. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, G.R. No. 172822,
December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 521, 533.
8  Guidangen v. Wooden,  G.R. No. 174445, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 119,
131.
9  Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013, 706 SCRA 252, 259.

 
 

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Pamplona vs. Cueto

the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be

synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater
weight of credible evidence.”10
A careful review of the records calls for us to affirm the CA. In
our view, the existence of the partially executed contract to sell
between Bibiana and Lilia was sufficiently established.
It is uncontested that Lilia sent money to Bibiana. The latter did
not deny her receipt of the money. Moreover, the records showed
that the parties further agreed for Vedasto and Roilan to occupy the
property during the period when Lilia was remitting money to

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Bibiana; and that Lilia immediately took steps to protect her

interests in the property once the petitioners started to deny the
existence of the oral contract to sell by annotating her adverse claim
on the petitioners’ title and instituting this action against the latter.
We concur with the CA’s holding that the respondents adduced
enough evidence to establish the existence of the partially executed
contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana.
The petitioners have contended that the sums of money received
from Lilia were payments of the latter’s obligations incurred in the
past; that the admission by Roilan and his wife that the petitioners
owned the property negated the absence of the contract to sell; and
that the admission by Vedasto that the petitioners owned the
property was an admission against interest that likewise belied the
contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana.
The contentions of the petitioners are factually and legally
unwarranted.
To start with, it was incumbent upon Bibiana to prove her
allegation in the answer that the money sent to her by Lilia was in
payment of past debts. This conforms to the principle

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10  Ogawa v. Menigishi, G.R. No. 193089, July 9, 2012, 676 SCRA 14, 22.

 
 

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that each party must prove her affirmative allegations.11 Yet, the
petitioners presented nothing to establish the allegation. They ought
to be reminded that allegations could not substitute for evidence.
Without proof of the allegation, therefore, the inference to be
properly drawn from Bibiana’s receipt of the sums of money was
that the sums of money were for the purchase of the property, as
claimed by the respondents.
Secondly, the admissions by Roilan and Vedasto of the
petitioners’ ownership of the property could not be appreciated in
favor of the petitioners. That Bibiana and Lilia had entered into a
contract to sell instead of a contract of sale must be well-noted. The
distinctions between these kinds of contracts are settled. In Serrano
v. Caguiat,12 the Court has explained:

A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy

or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that
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if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would
stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. The
suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase
price.
The differences between a contract to sell and a contract of sale
are well-settled in jurisprudence. As early as 1951, in Sing Yee v.
Santos, we held that:
x x x [a] distinction must be made between a contract of sale
in which title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing
sold and a contract to sell x  x  x where by agreement the
ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until the
full payment, of the purchase price is made. In the first case,
nonpayment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in
the second case, full payment is a positive

_______________

11  G& M (Phils.), Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 140495, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 215,
221.
12  G.R. No. 139173, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 57, 64-65.

 
 

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Pamplona vs. Cueto

suspensive condition. Being contraries, their effect in law

cannot be identical. In the first case, the vendor has lost and
cannot recover the ownership of the land sold until and unless
the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In the
second case, however, the title remains in the vendor if the
vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract.
   In other words, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the
seller and is not to pass to the buyer until full payment of the price.
x x x x

 
The distinctions delineate why the admissions by Roilan and
Vedasto were consistent with the existence of the oral contract to sell
between Lilia and Bibiana. Under the oral contract to sell, the
ownership had yet to pass to Lilia, and Bibiana retained ownership
pending the full payment of the purchase price agreed upon.
Thirdly, the failure of Roilan to raise as a defense in the unlawful
detainer suit against him the existence of the contract to sell between
Bibiana and Lilia could not be properly construed as an admission
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by silence on the part of Lilia. It is basic that the rights of a party

cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.13
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. As an exception to the
rule, the act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing may be
admitted as evidence against a party who fails to refute or reject it.
This is known as admission by silence, and is covered by Section 32,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 32. Admission by silence.—An act or declaration made

in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who
does or says nothing when the

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13  Section 28, Rule 130 of the RULES OF COURT.

 
 
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act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if

not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be
given in evidence against him.

 
For an act or declaration to be admissible against a party as an
admission by silence, the following requirements must be present,
namely: (a) the party must have heard or observed the act or
declaration of the other person; (b) he must have had the opportunity
to deny it; (c) he must have understood the act or declaration; (d) he
must have an interest to object as he would naturally have done if
the act or declaration was not true; (e) the facts are within his
knowledge; and (f) the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence is material to the issue.14
The first two requirements are lacking in the case of Lilia. She
was not shown to have heard or seen the admissions by Vedasto and
Roilan that were in writing because she was then abroad. Also, she
was not shown to have had the opportunity to deny their written
admissions simply because she was not a party to the written
admissions. The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse
statements in writing only when the party to be thereby bound was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. Without
such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that
although the party would have immediately reacted had the
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statements been orally made in his presence, such prompt response

can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a
written reply.15
In the context of the norms set by jurisprudence for the
application of the rule on admission by silence, Lilia could not be
properly held to have admitted by her silence her lack of interest in
the property. On the contrary, the records reveal

_______________

14  People v. Ciobal, G.R. No. 86220, April 20, 1990, 184 SCRA 464, 471.
15  Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 661, 672.

 
 

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otherwise. Upon her return to the country, she communicated with

Bibiana on the terms of payment, and immediately took steps to
preserve her interest in the property by annotating the adverse claim
in the land records, and by commencing this suit against the
petitioners. Such affirmative acts definitively belied any claim of her
being silent in the face of the assault to her interest.
The Court avoids discussing and resolving the issue regarding the
validity of the deed of transfer of interest between Redima and the
petitioners because this case would not be the proper occasion to do
so without violating the right to due process of Redima and Atty.
Dimayacyac. We note that Redima’s attempt to intervene herein in
order to protect its right was earlier denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 3,
2012; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonen, Martires and Gesmundo,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—An act or declaration made in the presence and within the

hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the
act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if
not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be
given in evidence against him. (People vs. Español, 579 SCRA 326
[2009])
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