GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs.
ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA
[G.R. No. 159240. February 4, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner Silot and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract
for the construction of a dormitory-apartment building. They
expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa
shall pay 33% of the total value of the materials purchased for the
project. Upon turnover of the completed structure, the total cost of
materials actually purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is
P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of
P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount due.
Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the
overpayment but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After
her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit
against Silot. Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient
payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive
P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving
a balance of P273,872.40.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed
with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa. Atty.
San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that
in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the
material supplies during the making of the additional works
mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was paid for all
works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that
the total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only
P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00;
hence, there was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and that de
la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted
by Silot regarding an alleged balance.
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and
ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner
Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondent's evidence.
HELD:
Yes.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by
the mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel. The only
exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its
decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is
deprived of his day in court.
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any
application in this case. As the records would plainly show, Silot
was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court
observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by
his counsel. Said the appellate court:
…As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not
deprived of his day in court. He was given every opportunity to be
heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also
presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio,
counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked
Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silot's counsel, if he would
admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to
dispense with his testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly
answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if
he will admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.
More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the
content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation
was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that
admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some
facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense
counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into
writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings
had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his
signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that:
"[…] an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of
a lawsuit […] has prima facie authority to make relevant
admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, […] which
unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics supplied.)
In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of
the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent
of his client. When such admissions are made […] for the purpose
of dispensing with proof of some fact, […] they bind the client,
whether made during, or even after, the trial.
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not
require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior
showing that the admissions had been made through palpable
mistake.
Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court
emphasized the consequence of admitting and dispensing with the
testimony of the proposed witness, thus:
The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be
examined any further since his testimony as summarized in the
offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing
counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said witness is
uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.…
JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX,
INC. and MATIAS B. AZNAR III
[G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a
cockpit. Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company
conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner
participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to
another bidder. Thereafter, petitioner formally demanded, through
several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the sum of
P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.
Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining
that respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of
the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer,
respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to
the leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of
materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.
The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted
that there is no inventory of damages. The respondents later
offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court. The
RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said
decision.
ISSUES:
Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a
party making the admission.
HELD:
Yes.
Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the
documentary evidence of an alleged property inventory conducted
on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount
of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the
possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioner's
deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by
respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the
respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2)
during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations,
or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of
facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The
veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be
controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were
made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made.
Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in
the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel,
neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable
mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and
may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the
proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in
the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and
worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the
scope of a "general or implied authority" is
regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in
estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation
is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their
counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an error
when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' evidence
contradictory to the judicial admission.
