ADMISSIONS

1. Oscar Constantino vs Heirs of Constantino; G.R. 181508, October 2, 2013

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties.

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party
making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions
explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the
contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and
limiting the issues to be tried. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.
However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party
making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the
admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was
in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before
and during the trial.

2. Conrado C. Doldol vs C.A.; GR 164481, September 20, 2005

As guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidenc, we hold that said payment,
particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant’s commitment to gradually pay the remainder
of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of
appellant’s guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.

As stated in facts, not too long after the shortages in the municipal funds were discovered,
Doldol made partial payment/settlement in the amount of P200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by O.R. No
436756. With respect to the balance of the missing funds. Doldol promised to pay the same in
installment basis. Doldol, though, failed to comply with his undertaking.

The said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant's commitment to
gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be
treated as an implied admission of appellant's guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds
to his personal use.

CONFESSIONS

1. Ladiana vs PP; G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002

" The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
 "SEC. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused
admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal
intent is an admission, not a confession.
Petitioner admits shooting the victim — which eventually led to the latter’s death — but
denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense.
Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence
against him as the voluntariness of the execution thereof was admitted by the defense.

2. People vs Ulit; G.R. 131779-801, February 23, 2004

Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the
barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him
because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement.
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities which will
include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants statement before the barangay
chairman is inadmissible.

3. People vs Sayaboc; GR 147201, January 15, 2004

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made during custodial investigation wherein
the rights of the accused were merely recited to him may be admissible in evidence against such
accused. (2) Whether a counsel who remain silent at the time the extrajudicial confession was made
qualifies as an independent counsel.

HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained
giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the
suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More
so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a
stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days
previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
(2) A counsel who remains silent all through-out the investigation shows that there is lacking of a
faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his
actions.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy
himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded. Counsel should be able, throughout the
investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the
investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under
custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any
time.

4. Tanenggee vs People; GR No. 179448, June 26, 2013

The answer is in the negative. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is
applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written
statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs
manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement.
No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving
due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.

5. Frontreras vs People; G.R. No. 190583, December 7, 2015

A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes

evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of
normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless
prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibihty and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its
voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case.
The petitioner's extrajudicial written confession coupled with the following circumstantial
evidence all point to her as the perpetrator of the unlawful taking.

CONDUCT AND CHARACTER

1. People vs Raul Santos; G.R. No. 100225-26, May 11, 1993

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the ground that the
accused was not provided with a counsel.
(2) Whether the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another criminal
case wherein the accused for both cases are one and the same.

HELD: (1) There is "no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police lineup. The
customary practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course
of a police line-up and who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not
questioned at all at that stage. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record of this case which
shows that in the course of the line-up, the police investigators sought to extract any admission or
confession from appellant Santos.
(2) Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
Trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited
purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that
the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle
and its passengers. As in fact, both in the instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s testimony
was originally presented, the scene of the crime is one and the same.

2. People vs Nardo; G.R. 133888, March 1, 2001

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies on a
number of occasion.
(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is contrary to
testimony made in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony.

HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that:
"Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did
nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." While
lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them
for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s
own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Furthermore, as a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be
disturbed, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly, jurisprudence
dictates that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more
so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

(2) An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason
or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses.
Recantations are frowned upon by the courts because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused
deserve only scant consideration.

3. Republic vs Heirs of Felipe Alejaga Sr.,; GR 146030, December 3, 2002

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission of a third person who
was not presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence for being a hearsay.

HELD: The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person
— the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may then be
regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged admission
may be considered as "independently relevant."
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio
may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to
a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for
in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted,
his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.