FIRST DIVISION

APRIL 16, 2018

G.R. No. 209031

ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN, Petitioner

vs
MARCO DAN, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012
Decision2 and August 29, 2013 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
Petition in CA-G.R. CV No.95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration,4 respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision5 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP07-0155.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian national - met
"in a chatroom [o]n the internet"6 sometime in May, 2005. They soon became
"chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them emotionally closer
to each other"7 even though petitioner was in the Philippines while respondent lived in
Italy.

In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew in

from Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January 23, 2006.

Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed thereafter, or
on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy.

On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition8 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las Piñas City,
Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the
Philippines opposed the petition.

On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the ground
that petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner stated that

sometime in May 2005, she chanced upon the respondent, an Italian, in
the internet xxx and they became regular chatmates. x x x In their
exchanges of chat messages and letters, she found respondent to be
sweet, kind and jolly. He made her feel that he really cared for her. He
was romantic. X X X [A]lthough at times, respondent was impatient and
easily got irritated, X X X.

xxxx

On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they

got married on 23 January 2006 X X X. During their honeymoon,
petitioner noticed that the respondent was not circumcised, x x x
[R]espondent (also) asked her where to find marijuana since he had to
sniff some. This made petitioner angry and she quarrelled with him.
Respondent apologized later.

On 29 January 2006, X X X respondent flew back to Italy and on 26

February 2006, xxx petitioner left to join respondent in Italy. Xxx After
a few days, respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude
different from that of Marco whom she had known thru the internet. He
was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He depended on
his mother to do or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who
decided where they lived and how the house should be arranged. When
they transferred to a separate house. it was respondent's mother who
managed the household.

Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days,

playing video games was always the first thing he does when he wakes
up and the last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would
play video games the whole day. There was never a quality time he
spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would spend
with his wife.

Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days,

playing video games was always the first thing he does when he wakes
up and the last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would
play video games the whole day. There was never a quality time he
spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would spend
with his wife.

Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all
the household chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom
takes a bath and brushes his teeth. For him to be able to take a bath,
petitioner would literally push him to the bathroom or hand him his
toothbrush with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant
on his underarms for he would not do it himself. He refused circumcision.

Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using
marijuana. When confronted, he get mad and pushed her [hard] and hit
her in the arm, [and told] her to go back to the Philippines. X X X

In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a

separate house from his mother did not improve their marital
relationship. His addiction to video games worsened. They seldom talk
to each other as he did not want to be disturbed while playing games.
His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often invite his
friends to their house for pot sessions, X X X to her extreme fright and
discomfort.

xxxx

On 18 April 2007. she flew back to the Philippines. XXX Since then,
there was no communication between them. XX x Petitioner took this as
lack of interest on his part to save their marriage, reason why she
decided to file this petition (TSN, August 11, 2008, pp. 6-10).

xxxx

She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her moncy for food.
He spent most of his income for video games. If they ran out of food, it
was her mother-in-law who supported them.

xxxx

Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified

x x x in her direct-examination that petitioner xxx was subjected to a
series of psychological tests, written and oral form. She likewise
subjected the mother of the petitioner to clarificatory analysis x x x.

In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological

incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a xxx
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his
parasitic attitude, allowing other people to be the handler of his own
personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow distorted the
notion on how to handle marital obligations in terms of mutual
understanding, communication and emotional intent. She was able to
arrive at these findings on respondent although he did not submit himself
for the same psychological tests, through the clinical assessments and
information supplied by the petitioner, and the description of the
petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the respondent.

On cross-examination, x x x she described respondent x x x as "Mama's

Boy", which attitude can be narcissistic because of his attachment to the
mother. He can do whatever he wants because the mother will always
be at his back. She likewise stated that the respondent is an unhygienic
person and the reason why he opted to lure herein petitioner to be his
wife was because he wanted her to be an extension of his maternal
needs to sustain his own desire.

On clarificatory questions of the Court x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she

was able to describe the respondent xxx because of the description
made by the petitioner and her mother. She however, admitted that as
disclosed to her by the petitioner, she (petitioner) was not able to have
a bonding or to know well the respondent because more often than not
the respondent was always in the company of the mother that a
pathological symbiotic relationship developed between the mother and
son.

Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of

herein petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was adopted as
her direct-testimony, which was entirely in corroboration of the testimony
of petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan.

On cross-examiration x x x. She testified that respondent had not

assumed his responsibilities as a married man, his dependency on drugs,
his dependency on his mother with regard to their finances were just toid
by her daughter, petitioner herein, during their conversations in the
internet and therefore she has no personal knowledge to what
happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.

xxxx

Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration

of marriage, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, (240 SCRA
20, 24) declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (6) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.

In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be

suffering from x x x Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying
Antisocial traits, x x x which x x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and
incurable by any treatment'. x x x

XXXX

The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from

her interviews of petitioner and her mother. However, from petitioner's
Judicial Affidavit xxx, it was gathered that respondent's failure to
establish a common life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity to
do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. How she arrived at the conclusion that
respondent was totally dependent (on] his mother, his propensity [with]
illegal substance, his instability to maintain even his personal hygiene,
and his neglect to assume his responsibilities as a husband, Nedy Tayag
failed to explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and respondent were
chatmates in 2005 and contracted marriage in 2006 when respondent
was already 35 years old, far removed from adolescent years.

Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a

chat room in the internet. Respondent was very sweet, kind and jolly. He
was romantic. He made her feel that he cared even if they were apart.
He remembered important occasions and he would always send her
sweet messages and funny jokes x x x which revealed the harmonious
relationship of the couple before their marriage. From this, it can be
inferred how responsible respondent was to faithfully comply with his
obligations as a boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was working
and giving her money though not enough as she said (TSN, August 11,
2008, p. 15). With this premise, it is therefore safe to conclude that no
matter how hard respondent would try to show his best, to show his
capability as husband to petitioner, she would always find reason to say
otherwise.

As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was

admitted by no less than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag that in a country
like Italy wherein the weather is different from the Philippines, the
people there do not bathe regularly x x x. With respect to circumcision,
we all know that circumcision is not common in European countries. You
cannot compel respondent to undergo circumcision since it is against their
culture. However, respondent expressed his willingness to be circumcised,
but later on, changed his mind.

As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner

never showed that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her
husband. Undeniably, drug addiction is curable and therefore it can
hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological
incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not

well established by the petitioner. X X X What is clear was that
respondent's mother was all out in helping them since the salary of the
respondent was not sufficient to sustain their needs.

All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of
respondent would render him unaware of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by him, At the most,
the psychological evaluation of the parties proved only incompatibility
and irreconcilable differences, considering also their culture differences,
which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Along this line,
the aforesaid psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is
unfortunately one sided (and) based only on the narrations made by
petitioner who had known respondent only for a short period of time
and too general to notice these specific facts thereby failing to serve its
purpose in aiding the Court in arriving at a just resolution of this case.

In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her

petition is miserably wanting in force to convince this Court that her
marriage with respondent comes and qualifies under the provision of
 Article 36 of the Family Code and hence unable to discharge
completely her burden of overcoming the legal presumption of validity
and the continuance of her marriage with respondent, declaration of
nullity of same marriage is not in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity

of marriage is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and accordingly, the
same petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.9

Petitioner moved to reconsider,10 but in an April 28, 2010 Order,11 the RTC held its
ground.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 95112. In its
assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however, the CA denied the appeal and
affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus:

x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage xxx null and void on

the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Thus, the court a quo correctly denied the petition for annulment
of marriage x x x.

XXXX

In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity

under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient
basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals

and Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
established in the Santos case, as follows:

xxxx

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these

basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the
continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. Insofar as the present factual
situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying
our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application
of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality
disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or
inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness
and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the
marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 xxx
does not really dissolve a marriage: it simply recognizes that there
never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction -
already then existing - was so grave and permanent as to deprive the
afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.

In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's

evidence insufficient to prove respondent-appellee was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's
depiction of respondent-appellee as irresponsible, childish, overly
dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs,
lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, are not enough. These traits do not
equate to an inability to perform marital obligations due to a
psychological illness present at the time the marriage was solemnized.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal,"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It is not
enough the respondent-appellee, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or
was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the
respordent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown.

Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital

obligations, or ill will on the part of the spouse, is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may
only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is essential that the spouse must be shown to
be incapable of performing marital obligations, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Respondent-appellee's condition or personality disorder has
not been shown to be a malady rooted on some incapacitating
psychological condition.

It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests
on respondent-appellee. The conclusion in the psychological report of
Ms. Tayag that respondent-appellee was suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder, with underlying Anti-Social traits, was based
merely on information supplied by petitioner-appellant and Violeta
(mother of the petitioner-appellant).

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as

purely advisory in character. The court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more
rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must
be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological
incapacity that is grave, severe, and incurable. Thus, We cannot credit
Ms. Tayag's findings as conclusive, as she did not conduct an actual
psychological examination on respondent-appellee. The information
relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of respondent-appellee's psychological condition.
The methodology employed (i.e., gathering information regarding
respondent-appellee from petitioner-appellant and Violeta, without
interviewing respondent-appelles himself), simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.

Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged

psychological incapacity, and to establish the requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. The psychological report, was
based entirely on petitioner-appellant's assumed knowledge of
respondent-appellee's family background and upbringing, Ms. Tayag
was not able to establish with certainty that respondert-appellee's
alleged psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
inability of the respondent-appellee to assume the essential obligations
of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.
Also, it did not fully explain the details of respondent-appellee's
alleged disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag came to the
conclusion that respondent-appeliee's condition was incurable; and how
it related to the essential marital obligations that respondent-appellee
failed to assume.

in this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that
respondent-appellee is psychologically incapacitated, is his allegedly
being irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted
to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 X X X contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.

This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by

petitioner-appellant failed to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband x x x. Therefore, there is no basis to declare
their marriage null and void x x x.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the

family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State,
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. "The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4 January 2010, in Civil
Case No. LP-07-0155, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013 Resolution, the
CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly contends that –

THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED THE
STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA AND
OTHER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT.13

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was
clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition, and proved by adequate
evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, and that the same is medically permanent,
incurable, and grave enough as to bring about the inability of respondent to assume his
obligations in marriage, and that as a consequence, respondent is incapable of fulfilling
his duties as a husband under the obligation to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to her.

Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are
specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, which
diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the evidence in the case;
that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert determination, which
sufficiently prove respondent's psychological incapacity; that Dr. Tayag has
adequately determined that respondent's condition is grave, incurable, and existed
prior to and at the time of his marriage to petitioner; that respondent has been
suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait which
deterred him from appropriately discharging his duties and responsibilities as a
married man; that despite considerable efforts exerted by petitioner, respondent
remained true to his propensities and even defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence;
that no amount of therapy - no matter how intensive - can possibly change respondent,
but rather he would always be in denial of his own condition and resist any form of
treatment; and that respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from his formative
years - a product of faulty child-rearing practices and unhealthy familial constellation
that altered his emotional and moral development.

Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of

respondent be conducted in order that he may be diagnosed or declared as
psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v. Marcos14 and Antonio v.
Reyes,15 as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo,16 in which latter case it was held that a
personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is not
necessarily mandatory, bụt merely desirable, as it may not be practical in all instances
given the oftentimes estranged relations between the partics. She suggests instead that
pursuant to the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,17 "each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts"18 and that courts "should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines x x x."19

The State's Arguments

In its Comment20 praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA dispositions,
arguing that no new issues that merit reversal have been raised in the Petition. It
contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even admitted that incipiently,
respondent was romantic, funny, responsible, working, and giving money to her; that
petitioner's allegations of video game and drug addiction are uncorroborated, and her
failure to seek medical treatment therefor in behalf of her husband must be considered
against her, that such addictions are curable and could not be the basis for a
declaration of psychological incapacity; that respondent's irresponsibility, immaturity,
and over-dependence on his mother do not automatically justify a conclusion of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law
is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders - existing at the time of the marriage -- clearly demonstrating an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and
depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond
one is about to assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent was based on
one-sided information supplied by petitioner and her mother - which renders the same
of doubtful credibility; and that while personal examination of respondent is indeed not
mandatory, there are instances where it is required - such as in this case, where the
information supplied to the psychologist unilaterally comes from the side of the
petitioner, which renders such information biased and partial as would materially affect
the psychologist's assessment.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the petition.

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155
on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time. They held that while
petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its existence, gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her testimony, which is
insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know
respondent very well enough - having been with him only for a short period of time; Dr.
Tayag's psychological report - which is practically onesided for the latter's failure to
include respondent in the study; and the account of petitioner's mother, which is deemed
biased and thus of doubtful credibility.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial
affidavits and testimonies of hermother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological
evaluation report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The
deterınination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on
petitioner's account and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy
and did not participate in the proceedings.

This is insufficient.

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their
marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was
romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent
enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was
psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate
courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable differences and
basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short
period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed
addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are correct in
their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that
she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render
support and aid to respondent.

"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition.21 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage"22 such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."23

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental --
not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 38 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.24

With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the
weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings.
However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted on
respondent himself - but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as
well.

x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should

evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions

about the respondent's psychological incapacity were
based on the information fed to her by only one side ---
 the petitioner -- whose bias in favor of her cause cannot
be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not
disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner
we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third
party account; she did not actually hear, see and
evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted
and responded to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the

petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized
the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and
unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves
around him'; and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic
for exploiting the confidence [petitioner) extended
towards him.'. . .

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently

in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion
that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented
the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root
cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder
and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr.
Tayag's conclusion in her Report -- i.e., that the
respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to
be grave and incurable’- is an unfounded statement, not
a necessary inference from her previous characterization
and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a
fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this
same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side
is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.25

Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most respects
-are entitled to respect and finality.1âwphi1 The same being correct, this Court finds no
need to disturb them.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given

case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in
 any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however,
is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-established
principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons x x x.26

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, "The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after marriage, and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved."27 Finally, the burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.

X X X Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of

evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner
to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 28

With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and August 29,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.95112 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice