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April 2018 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2018 > April 2018 Decisions > G.R. No.

209031, April 16, 2018 - ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner, v. MARCO DAN,
Respondent.:

G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018 - ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner, v. MARCO
DAN, Respondent.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018

ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner, v. MARCO DAN, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012
Decision2 and August 29, 2013 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
Petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration,4 respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision 5 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP- 07-0155.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian national - met
"in a chatroom [o]n the internet"6 sometime in May, 2005. They soon became
"chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them emotionally closer
to each other"7 even though petitioner was in the Philippines while respondent lived in
Italy.

In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew in from
Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January 23, 2006.

Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed thereafter, or
on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy.

On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition 8 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0155with the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch
254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines
opposed the petition.

On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the ground
mat petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity. It held, thus:

Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner stated that sometime in May 2005,
she chanced upon the respondent, an Italian, in the internet x x x and they became
regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat messages and letters, she found
respondent to be sweet, kind and jolly, He made her feel that he really cared for her.
He was romantic, x x x [A]lthough at times, respondent was impatient and easily got
irritated, x x x.

xxxx

On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they got married on
23 January 2006 x x x. During their honeymoon, petitioner noticed that the respondent
was not circumcised, x x x [Respondent [also] asked her where to find marijuana since
he had to sniff some. This made petitioner angry and she quarrelled with him.
Respondent apologized later.

On 29 January 2006, x x x respondent flew back to Italy and on 26 February 2006, x x

x petitioner left to join respondent in Italy, x x x After a few days, respondent started
displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco whom she had
known thru the internet. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He
depended on his mother to do or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who
decided where they lived and how the house should be arranged. When they
transferred to a separate house, it was respondent's mother who managed the
household.

Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video games
was always the first thing he does when he wakes up and the last thing he does before
retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the whole day. There was never a
quality times he spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would
spend with his wife.

Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the household
chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom takes a bath and brushes his
teeth. For him to be able to take, a bath, petitioner would literally push him to the
bathroom or hand him his toothbrush with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to
put deodorant on his underarms for he would not do it himself. He refused circumcision.

Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using marijuana. When
confronted, he got mad and pushed her [hard] and hit her in the arm, [and told] her to
go back to the Philippines. x x x

In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a separate house

from his mother did not improve their marital relationship. His addiction to video games
worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he did not want to be disturbed while
playing games. His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often invite his
friends to their house for pot sessions, x x x to her extreme fright and discomfort.

xxxx

On 18 April 2007, she flew back to the Philippines. x x x Since then, there was no
communication between them. x x x Petitioner took this as lack of interest on his part
to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file this petition (TSR August 11,
2008, pp. 6-10).

xxxx

She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her money for food. He spent most
of his income for video games. If they ran out of food, it was her mother-in-law who
supported them.
xxxx

Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified x x x in

her direct-examination  that petitioner x x x was subjected to a series of psychological
tests, written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of the petitioner to
clarificatory analysis x x x.

In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological incapacity of

the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a x x x Dependent Personality
Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude, allowing other
people to be the handler of his own personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which
somehow distorted the notion on how to handle marital obligations in terms of mutual
understanding, communication and emotional intent. She was able to arrive at these
findings on respondent although he did not submit himself for the same psychological
tests, through the clinical assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and
the description of the petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the respondent.

On cross-examination,  x xx [s]he described respondent x x x as "Mama's Boy", which

attitude can be narcissistic because of his attachment to the mother. He can do
whatever he wants because the mother will always be at his back. She likewise stated
that the respondent is an unhygienic person and the reason why he opted to lure herein
petitioner to be his wife was because he wanted her to be an extension of his maternal
needs to sustain his own desire.

On clarificatory questions of the Court  x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she was able to
describe the respondent x x x because of the description made by the petitioner and
her mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by the petitioner, she
(petitioner) was not able to have a bonding or to know well the respondent because
more often than not the respondent was always in the company of the mother that a
pathological symbiotic relationship developed between the mother and son.

Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of herein petitioner.
Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was adopted as her direct-testimony,  which was entirely in
corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan,
On cross-examination x x x. She testified that respondent had not assumed his
responsibilities as a married man, his dependency on drugs, his dependency on his
mother with regard to their finances were just told by her daughter, petitioner herein,
during their conversations in the internet and therefore she has no personal knowledge
to what happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.

xxxx

Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration of marriage,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,  (240 SCRA 20, 24)
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and. (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be suffering from x x
x Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-social traits,  x x x which
x x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment'. x x x

xxxx

The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from her interviews of
petitioner and her mother. However, from petitioner's Judicial Affidavit x x x, it was
gathered that respondent's failure to establish a common life with her stems from his
refusal, not incapacity to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. How she arrived at the conclusion that respondent was totally
dependent [on] his mother, his propensity [with] illegal substance, his instability to
maintain even his personal hygiene, and his neglect to assume his responsibilities as a
husband, Nedy Tayag failed to explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and respondent
were chatmates in 2005 and contracted marriage in 2006 when respondent was already
35 years old, far removed from adolescent years.

Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a chat room in the
internet. Respondent was very sweet, kind and jolly. He was romantic. He made her
feel that he cared even if they were apart. He remembered important occasions and he
would always send her sweet messages and funny jokes x x x which revealed the
harmonious relationship of the couple before their marriage. From this, it can be
inferred how responsible respondent was to faithfully comply with his obligations as a
boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was working and giving her money though not
enough as she said (TSN, August, 11, 2008, p. 15). With this premise, it is therefore
safe to conclude that no matter how hard respondent would try to show his best, to
show his capability as husband to petitioner, she would always find reason to say
otherwise.

As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was admitted by no less

than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag that in a country like Italy wherein the weather is
different from the Philippines, the people there do not bathe regularly x x x. With
respect to circumcision, we all know that circumcision is not common in European
countries. You cannot compel respondent to undergo circumcision since it is against
their culture. However, respondent expressed his willingness to be circumcised, but
later on, changed his mind.

As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner never showed,
that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband. Undeniably, drug
addiction is curable and therefore it can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the
kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not well established
by the petitioner, x x x What is clear was that respondent's mother was all out in
helping them since the salary of the respondent was not sufficient to sustain their
needs.

All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of respondent would render
him unaware of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by him. At the most, the psychological evaluation of the parties proved only
incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, considering also their culture differences,
which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Along this line, the aforesaid
psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is unfortunately one sided [and] based
only on the narrations made by petitioner who had known respondent only for a short
period of time and too general to notice these specific facts thereby failing to serve its
purpose in aiding the Court in arriving at a just resolution of this case.

In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her petition is

miserably wanting in force to convince this Court that her marriage with respondent
comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the Family Code and hence
unable to discharge completely her burden of overcoming the legal presumption of
validity and the continuance of her marriage with respondent, declaration of nullity of
same marriage is not in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is

hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and accordingly, the same petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las
Piñas City, for their information and guidance. 9

Petitioner moved to reconsider,10 but in an April 28, 2010 Order,11 the RTC held its
ground.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 95112. In its
assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed
the RTC Decision, declaring thus:

x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage x x x null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus, the court a
quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of marriage x x x.

xxxx

In Toring v. Toring,  the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina and

laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability established in the Santos  case, as follows:

xxxx

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to

varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity
of Santos. [Insofar] as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be
lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine
the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious eases of personality
disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the
afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.
Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from
the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article
36 x x x does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was
any marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.

In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence

insufficient to prove respondent-appellee was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of respondent-appellee as
irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games,
addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, are not enough. These traits do not equate to an
inability to perform marital obligations due to a psychological illness present at the time
the marriage was solemnized. Psychological incapacity must be more titan just a
"difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance, of some marital obligations. It is
not enough the respondent-appellee, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral
element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown. Mere difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of the
spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is essential that the
spouse must be shown to be incapable of performing marital obligations, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Respondent-appellee's condition or personality disorder has not been shown to be a
malady rooted on some incapacitating psychological condition.

It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests on respondent-
appellee. The conclusion in the psychological report of Ms. Tayag that respondent-
appellee was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, with underlying Anti-Social
traits, was based merely on information supplied by petitioner-appellant and Violeta
(mother of the petitioner-appellant).
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. The court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care
and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
above, i.e.,  that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that
is grave, severe, and incurable. Thus, We cannot credit Ms. Tayag's findings as
conclusive, as she did not conduct an actual psychological examination on respondent-
appellee. The information relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of respondent-appellee's psychological condition. The methodology employed
(i.e., gathering information regarding respondent-appellee from petitioner-appellant
and Violeta, without interviewing respondent-appellee himself), simply cannot satisfy
the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.

Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity,
and to establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The
psychological report, was based entirely on petitioner-appellant's assumed knowledge
of respondent-appellee's family background and upbringing, Ms. Tayag was not able to
establish with certainty that respondent-appellee's alleged psychological incapacity was
grave enough to bring about the inability of the respondent-appellee to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or
incurable. Also, it did not fully explain the details of respondent-appellee's alleged
disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag came to the conclusion that respondent-
appellee's condition was incurable; and how it related to the essential marital
obligations that respondent-appellee failed to assume.

In this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that respondent-appellee is
psychologically incapacitated, is his allegedly being irresponsible, childish, overly
dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor
hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 x x x contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.

This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellant failed to

establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband x x x. Therefore, there is
no basis to declare their marriage null and void x x x.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the
basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity,

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4 January 2010, in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013 Resolution, the
CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly contends that –

THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED THE STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA AND OTHER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE IN
POINT.13

Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was
clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition, and proved by adequate
evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, and that the same is medically permanent,
incurable, and grave enough as to bring about the inability of respondent to assume his
obligations in marriage; and that as a consequence, respondent is incapable of fulfilling
his duties as a husband under the obligation to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to her.

Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are
specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, which
diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the evidence in the
case; that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert determination, which
sufficiently prove respondent's psychological incapacity; that Dr. Tayag has adequately
determined that respondent's condition is grave, incurable, and existed prior to and at
the time of his marriage to petitioner; that respondent has been suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait which deterred him
from appropriately discharging his duties and responsibilities as a married man; that
despite considerable efforts exerted by petitioner, respondent remained true to his
propensities and even defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence; that no amount of
therapy - no matter how intensive can possibly change respondent, but rather he would
always be in denial of his own condition and resist any form of treatment; and that
respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from his formative years - a product of
faulty child-rearing practices and unhealthy familial constellation that altered his
emotional and moral development.

Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of

respondent be conducted in order that he may be diagnosed or declared as
psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v. Marcos14 and Antonio v.
Reyes,15 as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo,16 in which latter case it was held that a
personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is not
necessarily mandatory, but merely desirable, as it may not be practical in all instances
given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. She suggests instead that
pursuant to the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,17 "each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
its own facts"18 and that courts "should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines x x x."19

The State's Arguments

In its Comment20 praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA
dispositions, arguing that no new issues that merit reversal have been raised in the
Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even admitted that
incipiently, respondent was romantic, funny, responsible, working, and giving money to
her; that petitioner's allegations of video game and drug addiction are uncorroborated,
and her failure to seek medical treatment therefor in behalf of her husband must be
considered against her; that such addictions are curable and could not be the basis for
a declaration of psychological incapacity; that respondent's irresponsibility, immaturity,
and over-dependence on his mother do not automatically justify a conclusion of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law
is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and
depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond
one is about to assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent was based on
one-sided information supplied by petitioner and her mother – which renders the same
of doubtful credibility; and that while personal examination of respondent is indeed not
mandatory, there are instances where it is required - such as in this case, where the
information supplied to the psychologist unilaterally comes from the side of the
petitioner, which renders such information biased and partial as would materially affect
the psychologist's assessment.

Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155
on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time. They held that while
petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its existence, gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her testimony, which is
insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know
respondent very well enough - having been with, him only for a short period of time;
Dr. Tayag's psychological report - which is practically one-sided for the latter's failure to
include respondent in the study; and the account of petitioner's mother, which is
deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial
affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological,
evaluation report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The
determination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on
petitioner's account and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy
and did not participate in the proceedings.

This is insufficient.

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their
marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was
romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent
enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was
psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate
courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable differences and basic
incompatibility owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short period
that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed
addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are correct in
their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that
she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render
support and aid to respondent.

"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition."21 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage"22 such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 23

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.24

With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the
weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings.
However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted on
respondent himself - but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as
well.

x x x Rumbaua  provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz:

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side —
the petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed
the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see
and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this
basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful
person who 'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' . . . .

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive

to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to
identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was realty incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.
Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report
— i.e.,  that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave.and incurable' — is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal
of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on
the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 25

Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most respects
-are entitled to respect and finality. The same being correct, this Court finds no need to
disturb them.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review.
It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again fee evidence or
premises supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-established principle that
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x. 26

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. "The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved." 27 Finally, the burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the petitioner.

x x x Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented

during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence
of the psychological incapacity.28

With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and August

29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro,**  Bersamin,*** and Tijam, JJ., concur.

Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Endnotes:

**
 Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28,
2018.

***
 Designated as additional member per October 24, 2017 raffle vice J. Jardeleza who
recused due to prior action as Solicitor General.

1
 Rollo, pp. 9-26.

2
 Id. at 61-81; penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and concurred
in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias.

3
 Id. at 94-95.

4
 Id. at 82-92.

5
 Id. at 36-42; penned by Presiding Judge Gloria ButayAglugub.

6
 Id. at 28.

7
 Id.

8
 Id. at 28-34.

9
 Id. at 37-42.

10
 Id. at 43-56.

11
 Id. at 57.

12
 Id. at 69-80.
13
 Id. at 16.

14
 397 Phil. 840 (2000).

15
 519 Phil. 337 (2006).

16
 629 Phil. 157 (2010).

17
 598 Phil. 666 (2009).

18
 Id. at 699.

19
 Id.

20
Rollo, pp. 135-155.

21
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 14at 850.

22
Republic v. Galang, 665Phil. 658, 672 (2011).

23
Zamora v. Court of Appeals,  543 Phil. 701, 708 (2007).

24
Republic v. De Gratia,  726 Phil. 502, 509 (2014).

25
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, 751 Phil. 762, 775-776 (2015), citing Rumbaua v.
Rumbaua,  612 Phil, 1061 (2009).

26
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, 527 Phil. 722, 727 (2006).

27
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).

28
Republic v. Court of Appeals,  698 Phil. 257, 267 (2012).
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April-2018 Jurisprudence                 
 A.C. No. 9676, April 02, 2018 - IN RE: DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 IN
OMB-M-A-10-023-A, ETC. AGAINST ATTY. ROBELITO* B. DIUYAN
 G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018 - MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 A.M. No. MTJ-18-1911 (formerly A.M. No. 17-08-98-MTC), April 16, 2018 - OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. WALTER INOCENCIO V. ARREZA,
JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, PITOGO, QUEZON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 218703, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ANTONIO LLAMERA Y ATIENZA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018 - ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212866, April 23, 2018 - SPOUSES FREDESWINDA DRILON YBIOSA AND
ALFREDO YBIOSA, Petitioners, v. INOCENCIO DRILON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 215387, April 23, 2018 - NORTHERN MINDANAO INDUSTRIAL PORT AND
SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 218255, April 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. JERRY BUGNA Y BRITANICO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 203435, April 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MARDY AQUINO, MARIO AQUINO, RECTO AQUINO, INYONG NARVANTE, ROMY
FERNANDEZ, FELIX SAPLAN, BONIFACIO CAGUIOA AND JUANITO AQUINO, Accused.;
MARDY MARIO AQUINO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 219957, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ELEUTERIO URMAZA Y TORRES, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 213225, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 210446, April 18, 2018 - ANGELICA G. CRUZ, ANNA MARIE KUDO, ALBERT
G. CRUZ AND ARTURO G. CRUZ, Petitioners, v. MARYLOU TOLENTINO AND THE OFFICE
OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 200075, April 04, 2018 - SALIC MAPANDI Y DIMAAMPAO, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
  G.R. No. 216714, April 04, 2018 - SPOUSES GODFREY AND MA. TERESA TEVES,
Petitioners, v. INTEGRATED CREDIT & CORPORATE SERVICES, CO. (NOW CAROL
AQUI), Respondent.
 G.R. No. 217805, April 02, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ALSARIF BINTAIB Y FLORENCIO A.K.A. "LENG," Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 189590, April 23, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, ROMEO G. PANGANIBAN, FE L. PANGANIBAN, GERALDINE L.
PANGANIBAN, ELSA P. DE LUNA AND PURITA P. SARMIENTO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 219240, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. BRYAN GANABA Y NAM-AY, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018 - RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, AND
WILFREDO E. POLLARCO, Petitioners, v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO
DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR. CYNTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN, AND
THE COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY COUNCIL, Respondents.
 G.R. Nos. 192595-96, April 11, 2018 - NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION (NEA), Petitioner, v. MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE-PALMA AREA (MAGELCO-
PALMA), REPRESENTED BY ATTY. LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, ANTONIO U. ACUB,
EDGAR L. LA VEGA, RET. JUDGE TERESITA CARREON LLABAN, EMILY LLABAN,
ARMANDO C. LLABAN, AUDIE D. MACASARTE, WILFREDO Q. LLABAN, EVANGELINE A.
VARILLA, CORAZON TUMANG, AND PRESCILLA LANO, Respondents.; G.R. Nos. 192676-
77, April 11, 2018 - COTABATO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (COTELCO),
REPRESENTED BY ALEJANDRO Q. COLLADOS AS GENERAL MANAGER, Petitioner, v.
MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE-PALMA AREA (MAGELCO-PALMA),
REPRESENTED BY ATTY. LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, ANTONIO U. ACUB, EDGAR L. LA
VEGA, RET. JUDGE TERESITA CARREON LLABAN EVANGELINE A. VARILLA, AND
CORAZON TUMANG; AND MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DATU TUMAGANTANG ZAINAL, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 232892, April 04, 2018 - ALFREDO MALLARI MAGAT, Petitioner, v.
INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISE
LIBERIA FOR DROMON E.N.E. AND JASMIN P. ARBOLEDA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 208284, April 23, 2018 - THE IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM NUEVA
OF MANILA, PHILIPPINES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, FRANCISCO
GALVEZ, Petitioner, v. LOIDA DELA CRUZ USING THE NAME CHURCH OF JESUS
 CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 223321, April 02, 2018 - ROGELIO M. FLORETE, SR., THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE TERESITA F. MENCHAVEZ, REPRESENTED BY MARY ANN THERESE F.
MENCHAVEZ, ROSIE JILL F. MENCHAVEZ, MA. ROSARIO F. MENCHAVEZ, CRISTINE JOY
F. MENCHAVEZ, AND EPHRAIM MENCHAVEZ, AND DIANE GRACE F. MENCHAVEZ,
Petitioners, v. MARCELINO M. FLORETE, JR. AND MA. ELENA F. MUYCO, Respondents
 G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. PASTORLITO V. DELA VICTORIA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 218584, April 25, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. DENNIS MANALIGOD Y SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 234048, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. MALOU ALVARADO Y FLORES, ALVIN ALVAREZ Y LONQUIAS AND RAMIL DAL Y
MOLIANEDA, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ROLAND MIRAÑA Y ALCARAZ, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018 - PABLO C. HIDALGO, Petitioner, v. SONIA
VELASCO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199161, April 18, 2018 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. JAMES
T. CUA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 197645, April 18, 2018 - CARLOS JAY ADLAWAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 231053, April 04, 2018 - DESIDERIO DALISAY INVESTMENTS, INC.,
Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 192797, April 18, 2018 - EXCELLENT ESSENTIALS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EXTRA EXCEL INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. RODOLFO ADVINCULA Y MONDANO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 195814, April 04, 2018 - EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, REPRESENTED
BY DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR. (NOW DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF
SANITARIUM, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ANASTACIO AND PERLA BARBARONA,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 212785, April 04, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. GO
PEI HUNG, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199513, April 18, 2018 - TERESA GUTIERREZ YAMAUCHI, Petitioner, v.
ROMEO F. SUÑIGA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 226727, April 25, 2018 - UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST AND DR. ESTER
GARCIA, Petitioners, v. VERONICA M. MASANGKAY AND GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018 - ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner, v. MARCO
DAN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 214367, April 04, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
LAUREANA MALIJAN-JAVIER AND IDEN MALIJAN-JAVIER, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. GLEN ABINA Y LATORRE AND JESUS LATORRE Y DERAYA, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 202784, April 18, 2018 - JONNEL D. ESPALDON, Petitioner, v. RICHARD E.
BUBAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS GRAFT INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OFFICER II,
MEDWIN S. DIZON IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, PIAB-A, ALEU A. AMANTE IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN, PAMO I, AND CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN
HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETER L.
CALIMAG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, REVENUE AFFAIRS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS GROUP,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, RENATO M. GARBO III, MA. LETICIA MALMALATEO,
MARLON K. TAULI, FRAYN M. BANAWA, AND JOHNNY CAGUIAT, ALL NBI AGENTS,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ROGELIO M. SABADO, AND PRUDENCIO S.
DAR, JR., RAILWAY POLICE, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, IRENEO C. QUIZON, ARIEL SARMIENTO, DOMINGO BEGUERAS, JOHN
DOES/JANE DOES, NBI AND/OR PNR, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 216065, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. REYNANTE MANZANERO Y HABANA A.K.A. "NANTE," MARIO TANYAG Y MARASIGAN
A.K.A. "TAGA," ANGELITO EVANGELISTA Y AVELINO A.K.A. "LITO," ARTHUR FAJARDO Y
MAMALAYAN, MARIO EVANGELISTA A.K.A. "TIKYO," PATRICK ALEMANIA A.K.A. "BOBBY
PATRICK," TOYING PENALES A.K.A. "TOYING," A.K.A. "REY," AND A.K.A. "MARLON,"
ACCUSED, ARTHUR FAJARDO Y MAMALAYAN, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 11821 (formerly CBD Case No. 15-4477), April 02, 2018 - DARIO
TANGCAY, Complainant, v. HONESTO ANCHETA CABARROGUIS, Respondent.
  G.R. No. 193572, April 04, 2018 - TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC.,
Petitioner, v. MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199353, April 04, 2018 - LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner,
v. LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC., AND VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN AND PITONG MARCORDE,
RESPONDENTS. ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL BUILDING
OFFICIAL OF MAKATI, METRO MANILA AND HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THIRD PARTY,
Respondents.; G.R. NO. 199389, April 04, 2018 - LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC.,
Petitioner, v. LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL BLDG. OFFICIAL OF MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND HON.
JOSE P. DE JESUS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 185530, April 18, 2018 - MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018 - FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO
MAURICE GEORGE FUERTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES SILVINO S.ESTOMO AND
CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 213617, April 18, 2018 - ARCH. EUSEBIO B. BERNAL, DOING BUSINESS
UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE CONTEMPORARY BUILDERS, Petitioner, v. DR. VIVENCIO
VILLAFLOR AND DRA. GREGORIA VILLAFLOR, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018 - ALONA G. ROLDAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
CLARENCE I. BARRIOS AND ANNA LEE T. BARRIOS, ROMMEL MATORRES, AND HON.
JEMENA ABELLAR ARBIS, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AKLAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 228470, April 23, 2018 - LOADSTAR INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC.,
Petitioner, v. ERNESTO AWITEN YAMSON, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS GEORGIA M.
YAMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JENNIE ANN MEDINA YAMSON, KIMBERLY
SHEEN MEDINA YAMSON, JOSHUA MEDINA YAMSON AND ANGEL LOUISE MEDINA
YAMSON, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 201414, April 18, 2018 - PEDRO PEREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 198393, April 04, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, ROBERTO S.
CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, VICTOR AFRICA, MARIO K. ALFELOR, DON M. FERRY AND
OSCAR BELTRAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. BENITO MOLEJON, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 211232, April 11, 2018 - COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., Petitioner,
v. SPOUSES EFREN AND LOLITA SORIANO, Respondents.
 A.C. No. 9186, April 11, 2018 - ATTY. JUAN PAULO VILLONCO, Complainant, v.
ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018 - SHIRLEY T. LIM, MARY T. LIM LEON AND JIMMY T.
LIM, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 206529, April 23, 2018 - RENANTE B. REMOTICADO, Petitioner, v. TYPICAL
CONSTRUCTION TRADING CORP. AND ROMMEL M. ALIGNAY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 229047, April 16, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. RAMONCITO CORNEL Y ASUNCION, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 211187, April 16, 2018 - SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND
CROWN SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioners, v. CELESTINO M. HERNANDEZ, JR.,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018 - JAYLORD DIMAL AND ALLAN CASTILLO,
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018 - ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ATTY. JOHNIELLE KEITH P. NIETO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 196020, April 18, 2018 - MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, VICENTE
MONTERO, MR. BONDOC, AND MR. BAYONA, Petitioners, v. NORDEC PHILIPPINES
AND/OR MARVEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR.
POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Respondents.; G.R. No. 196116, April 18, 2018 - NORDEC
PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. POTENCIANO R. MALVAR,
Petitioner, v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, VICENTE MONTERO, MR. BONDOC, AND
MR. BAYONA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 191310, April 11, 2018 - PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC.,
AND/OR LUCHI SINGH MOLDES, Petitioners, v. DESIREE T. MASAGCA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018 - REY NATHANIEL C. IFURUNG, Petitioner, v. HON.
CONCHITA C. CARPIO MORALES IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, HON.
MELCHOR ARTHUR H. CARANDANG, HON. GERARD ABETO MOSQUERA, HON. PAUL
ELMER M. CLEMENTE, HON. RODOLFO M. ELMAN, HON. CYRIL ENGUERRA RAMOS IN
 THEIR CAPACITIES AS DEPUTIES OMBUDSMAN, AND THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 223660, April 02, 2018 - LOURDES VALDERAMA, Petitioner, v. SONIA
ARGUELLES AND LORNA ARGUELLES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ANGELITA REYES Y GINOVE AND JOSEPHINE SANTA MARIA Y SANCHEZ, Accused-
Appellants.
 G.R. Nos. 232197-98, April 16, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), ALEJANDRO E. GAMOS, AND
ROSALYN G. GILE, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 214759, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. DINA CALATES Y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 194765, April 23, 2018 - MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. RODIL
C. STA. RITA, Respondent.
 A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2224-MTJ), April 03, 2018 -
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, Complainant, v. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 2, ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL, Respondent.
 IPI No. 17-267-CA-J, April 24, 2018 - RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF FERNANDO
CASTILLO AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIFLOR PUNZALAN-CASTILLO, COURT OF
APPEALS, MANILA.
 G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER AND MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 201225-26 (From CTA-EB Nos. 649 & 651), April 18, 2018 - TEAM SUAL
CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORPORATION), Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.; G.R. No. 201132 (From CTA-EB
No. 651), April 18, 2018; COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. TEAM
SUAL CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORPORATION), Respondent.; G.R. No.
201133 (From CTA-EB No. 649), April 18, 2018; COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioner, v. TEAM SUAL CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL
CORPORATION), Respondent.
 G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018 - EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO AND
SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND RICARDO V. PARAS III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF
STATE COUNSEL, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. AND THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
Respondents.; G.R. No. 199034, April 17, 2018 - MA. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.; G.R. No. 199046, April 17, 2018 - JOSE MIGUEL T.
ARROYO, Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE AND RICARDO V. PARAS III, AS CHIEF STATE COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND RICARDO A. DAVID, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER, BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 210475, April 11, 2018 - RAMON K. ILUSORIO, MA. LOURDES C.
CRISTOBAL, ROMEO G. RODRIGUEZ, EDUARDO C. ROJAS, CESAR B. CRISOL, VIOLETA
J. JOSEF, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, AND CECILIA A. BISUÑA,
Petitioners, v. SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 232247, April 23, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. RONILLO LOPEZ, JR. Y MANTALABA @ "DODONG", Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 226481, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. JAYCENT MOLA Y SELBOSA A.K.A. "OTOK", Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018 - PO2 JESSIE FLORES Y DE LEON, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. BERNIE CONCEPCION, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 195320, April 23, 2018 - BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REPRESENTED
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. HON. ERNESTO D.
ACOSTA, ET AL. OF THE SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
AND CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.),
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 195962, April 18, 2018 - PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR.,
RECIO M. GARCIA, LEON O. TY, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, VICENTE
PATERNO, RUBEN ANCHETA, RAFAEL SISON, HILARION M. HENARES, JR., CARMELINO
G. ALVENDIA AND GENEROSO F. TENSECO, Respondents.
  G.R. No. 230473, April 23, 2018 - SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC.
AND/OR HERNING SHIPPING ASIA PTE. LTD., Petitioners, v. ALMA Q. RODEROS, AS
WIDOW AND LEGAL HEIR OF FRANCISCO RODEROS, Respondent.
 A.M. No. P-18-3833 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4370-P), April 16, 2018 - JULIUS E.
PADUGA, Complainant, v. ROBERTO "BOBBY" R. DIMSON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA CITY, BRANCH 171, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 226656, April 23, 2018 - ARNEL T. GERE, Petitioner, v. ANGLO-EASTERN
CREW MANAGEMENT PHILS., INC. AND/OR ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT
(ASIA), LTD., Respondents.; G.R. No. 226713, April 23, 2018 - ANGLO-EASTERN CREW
MANAGEMENT PHILS., INC. AND/OR ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA),
LTD., Petitioners, v. ARNEL T. GERE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018 - MARGIE SANTOS MITRA, Petitioner, v. PERPETUA
L. SABLAN-GUEVARRA, REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 200256, April 11, 2018 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
NORTHERN CEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 193499, April 23, 2018 - BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner, v. VTL
REALTY, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 222070, April 16, 2018 - EMMANUEL M. LU, ROMMEL M. LU, CARMELA M.
LU, KAREN GRACE P. LU AND JAMES MICHAEL LU, Petitioners, v. MARISSA LU CHIONG
AND CRISTINA LU NG, Respondents.
 A.M. No. 17-12-135-MeTC, April 16, 2018 - RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF
MR. ARNO D. DEL ROSARIO, COURT STENOGRAPHER II, BRANCH 41, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT (METC), QUEZON CITY.
 G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. BASHER TOMAWIS Y ALI, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 227982, April 23, 2018 - MARIO DIESTA BAJARO, Petitioner, v. METRO
STONERICH CORP., AND/OR IBRAHIM M. NUÑO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2018 - HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED,
PETITIONER, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention, v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA
LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, AND JULIO SUNIGA AND HIS SUPERVISORY
 GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. AND WINDSOR ANDAYA, Respondents.

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