G.R. No.
L-35701 September 19, 1973 The matter was elevated to the CA on the ground that there was a
ARTURO H. TROCIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. denial of procedural due process. As the question raised was purely
JORGE LABAYO, Undersecretary of Finance; SIXTO B. TADEO, Assistant legal, the case was elevated to this Court.
Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental; and ABELARDO SUBIDO,
Commissioner of Civil Service, respondents-appellees. ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not a party is denied his constitutional right to procedural due
On August 11, 1964, petitioner filed in the CFI of Misamis Oriental a process if in the notice of the hearing the suit filed by him, it was not specified
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction that the purpose thereof was for a pre-trial.
against respondents' to set aside decision of respondent Abelardo
Subido dismissing him from the position of Municipal Treasurer of RULING:
Camiguin.
No. No merit attaches to the contention of petitioner that the notice as to
An answer to such petition wherein it was stressed that petitioner the hearing scheduled for October 14 should specify that it was for a pre-trial.
had been granted six postponements of the hearing of the case to A hearing as known to the law is not confined to a trial but embraces the
afford him a chance to engage the services of counsel. several stages of litigation. It does not preclude pre-trial. A hearing "does
not necessarily mean presentation of evidence." It could cover the
On September 10, 1964, a notice to the parties that the case had determination of whether an accused is entitled to bail or the submission
been set for hearing on October 14 of that year, a copy thereof being for the court's determination of a motion to dismiss, or any motion for that
served on petitioner's counsel. Upon that case being called on that matter. It does not admit of doubt then, considering furthermore what did
date, there was a motion on the part of petitioner's counsel to set the transpire, that such a purely technical objection on the part of petitioner
case for pre-trial. raised at the last moment should not be taken too seriously. Much less does
it lay any basis for an asserted denial of procedural due process.
Counsel for petitioner was adamant, however, insisting that the
notice of hearing as such was null and void. As set forth in an opinion penned by Justice Castro, speaking for the Court, in
Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro: "One of the objectives of pre-
When the Court inquired as to where the petitioner was, counsel trial procedure is to take trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and
answered that he was in Cebu City, upon his own advice, on the maneuvering." Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues
assumption that a hearing on the merits could not be held. necessary to the disposition of a cause are properly raised. Thus, to obviate
the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pre-trial
From the standpoint of the court, this step taken by petitioner conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial,
smacked of a dilatory tactic, as evidenced by its being raised only on except such as may involve privilege or impeaching matter. The lower court
that morning, notwithstanding the fact that notice was sent as far therefore acted in accordance with law and sound reason when it noted that
back as September 10, 1964 and that at any rate, petitioner not being the facts being undisputed and the legal issue likewise being clear, pre-trial,
present, a pre-trial could not anyway be held. under the circumstances, would not be a necessity even on the assumption
that the belated insistence of its observance by petitioner was motivated in
Moreover, the notification as worded did not preclude a pre-trial, entire good faith.
which incidentally was not at all necessary as the question posed was
legal. Hence the order of dismissal, based on what for the lower The suspicion entertained by the lower court as to its being resorted to as a
court, was a lack of interest to prosecute the case. dilatory tactic by petitioner was not without basis. He had more than a
month, from September 9 to October 14, 1966, to seek clarification of the
nature of the scheduled hearing. What was even more revealing as to his lack
of good faith was his absence on the day of hearing. What was the lower court
to make of such tell-tale conduct? Did it not indicate lack of interest to
prosecute? There was nothing then, that did smack of arbitrariness in its
ruling as it did. There was no affront to the sense of justice and of fair play
which is essential for an assault on any actuation of governmental agency
predicated on a denial of due process succeed. Instead of this futile insistence
on a pre-trial, which would serve no useful purpose, petitioner could have
impressed on the court the legal support for his stand that the order of
dismissal by respondent Commissioner of Civil Service was devoid of legality.
He did nothing of the kind. Under the undeniable facts of record, the lower
court certainly could have decreed the dismissal without any legitimate fear
that its order suffers from the constitutional infirmity of failure to accord
respect to the due process safeguard.
