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e. Subject matter is a private land, in land case proceedings

f. Rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
g. There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention
h. Violation of due process
i. Respondent is a department secretary who acts as an alter ego of the President bearing the
implied and assumed approval of the latter
j. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
k. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
l. The claim is small
m. Strong public interest is involved
n. In quo warranto proceedings
o. No administrative review is provided by law
p. The rule of qualified political agency applies
q. Issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot

Pascual v. Provincial Board (1959)

Pascual was administratively charged for acts allegedly committed during his previous term as mayor. He
filed a motion to dismiss with the Provincial Board alleging that he cannot be punished for acts
committed during his previous term. The Board denied his motion. He filed a petition for prohibition with
the CFI, which dismissed his petition on the ground of being premature, as he had not appealed to the
Executive Secretary as provided in the Admin Code.
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While the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is followed in this jurisdiction, the said
principle has some exceptions. One exception, under which this present case falls, is where the question
involved is a purely legal question. With regard to the acts involved as a ground to discipline him, the SC
subscribes to the predominant view in US jurisprudence that a municipal officer cannot be removed for
acts committed during his previous term.

Alzate v. Aldana (1960)

Anacleto Alzate, Principal of the South Provincial High School, wrote to the Director of Public schools
claiming that considering his length of service and other qualifications he is entitled to automatic salary
increases of 5 salary rates as provided for by law. The Director replied telling him that he is only entitled
to an increase of 1 salary rate. Alzate requested for reconsideration of the ruling but after almost a
month, no action had been taken by the Director. Thus, he filed an action for mandamus to compel the
respondents Director of Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools to adjust his salary. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Alzate’s petition failed to state a cause of action
in view of the latter’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court granted this
motion.

The fact that the parties had to agree and the court had to approve the agreement that the Director shall
recommend to the proper official no later than 30 June 1958 and before the closing of office hours on the
same date the commitment of the sum claimed by Alzate to prevent its automatic reversion is a
recognition by the parties as well as the court of the validity and urgency of the action taken by the
petitioner. In view of the special circumstances of the case, Alzate’s resort to court action without
awaiting the Director’s action is not premature.
 102

Cipriano v. Marcelino (1972)

Leticia’s boss, the municipal treasurer of Calabanga, CamSur, refused to pay her salary and cash
equivalent of vacation and sick leaves after Leticia resigned. She went to court through an action for
mandamus but this was dismissed because she failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of the exception that there is no plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy. The SC granted Leticia’s petition and ordered Marcelino to pay up.

Corpus v. Cuaderno (1962)

Corpus was removed from his appointment as Special Assistant to the Governor in the Central Bank by
the Monetary Board after it found that it would prejudice the CB’s interest for him to remain in that
position. It also appointed a replacement. Corpus filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo
warranto in order to get his job back. The lower court dismissed his petition on the ground that he failed
to exhaust administrative remedies available to him.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. Corpus did not need to go to the
Office of the President because no law required it. He did not need to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission because the applicable law was the Central Bank charter, which gave the power to remove
employees to the Monetary Board, and not the more general Civil Service Law. At most, appeal to the CSC
was permissive or voluntary. The SC also took into consideration that the case is a quo warranto
proceeding. The Rules of Court emphasized “a need for speed” in resolving cases that involved occupation
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of public offices, because otherwise the government might have to pay two people for one job.

De Lara v. Cloribel (1965)

There was a pending conflict between De Lara and P&B with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. The Secretary issued an order prohibiting De Lara from operating and entering the contested
area until after the conflict was finally decided. De Lara defied this. P&B thus filed a complaint before the
CFI of Manila for injunction and damages against De Lara and the Bureau of Forestry. De Lara filed a
motion to dismiss, alleging that P&B failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking the issue
to court. This was denied.

As a rule a petition for certiorari interposed to dispute the validity of an order or decision rendered by an
administrative official in pursuance of the powers and duties with which he is invested cannot be
entertained if the party in interest fails to avail of the administrative remedies. Officials are the most
competent to pass upon matters that exclusively come within their jurisdiction. However, such rule may
be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be
prevented except by taking the opportune appropriate court action.

Paredes v. CA (1996)

Petitioners sought the nullification of 3 rules of A.O. Nos. 1 & 2 on rate increases before the CA which
dismissed their petition and MR on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. SC affirmed
the CA ruling that the petitioners should have first availed of the accessible remedy provided in the
enabling law (i.e., BP 325), which required Cabinet approval of such rate increases and charges, before
resorting to the judicial process.
 103

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies which mandates that relief should first be sought
from the highest or most superior administrative agency, the likes of the Cabinet, may prove that a resort
to the courts would be unnecessary thereby preventing the courts from being swamped by a resort to
them in the first instance. Also, courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to
its completion or finality, the reason being that in the absence of a final order or decision, the power of
the administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm.

Quasha v. SEC (1978)

Quasha challenged Manila Polo Club’s conversion to a proprietary club and asked for a TRO. SEC denied.
He went to the SC who granted such TRO.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. Appeal to the SEC would not be a plain,
speedy, adequate remedy. Considering that it was the holiday season and that he was trying to beat the
deadline, the petition direct to the SC was proper.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)

PCGG issued sequestration orders against Sipalay and Allied. They assailed such orders. It was only 7
years after that PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies.

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. There was no absolute necessity of
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appealing respondent PCGG’s resolution to the Office of the President. Official inaction or unreasonable
delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The other exception is “where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine,”
consisting in the PCGG’s being guilty of estoppel by laches.

Paat v. CA (1997)

The de Guzmans’ truck was confiscated by the DENR. After failing to provide an explanation, the order of
confiscation was affirmed by the DENR Regional Executive Director. They filed a letter of reconsideration,
which had a pronouncement that if it be denied, then the same letter must be considered an appeal to the
DENR secretary. True enough, the Regional Director forwarded the letter as an appeal. Pending
resolution however, the de Guzmans filed a replevin suit before the RTC Cagayan.

The statement in the reconsideration letter re: an appeal meant that the de Guzmans knew they had other
forums to go to for exhaustion of administrative remedies, before they could come to court. The RTC,
then, did not have jurisdiction to issue a replevin.

Lopez v. City of Manila (1999)

The City Council of Manila enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894, entitled “An Ordinance Prescribed as the
Revised Schedule of FMVs of Real Properties of the City of Manila”. With the implementation of the
ordinance, the tax on the land owned by Lopez was increased by 580%. Lopez filed a special proceeding
for the declaration of nullity of MO 7894. On the same date, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 amending
Ordinance 7894 took effect, reducing by 50% the assessment levels. The trial court dismissed the
petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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The case does not fall under the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. General
Rule: Where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon
the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may
amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Exceptions: With regard to questions on the
legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226,
and 252 of RA 7160. Also, the subsequent amendment of MO 7894 has rendered Lopez’ petition, moot
and academic, for his failure to amend his cause of action.

Garcia v. CA (2001)

An administrative complaint was filed against Garcia. While the case was pending, he filed for a TRO to
enjoin the proceedings of the administrative case. The trial court granted the TRO and subsequently a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Garcia’s petitions, while the administrative case was pending, were in violation of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. While there are exceptions to that general rule, the case does not
fall under the exceptions. The court also ruled that the trial court gravely abused its discretion by
granting Garcia’s motions.

DAR v. Apex Investment (2003)

Apex’s lands were subjected to CARL. But DAR Notices of the acquisition were not received by Apex
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because it changed its office when it became SM investments and the Notices were sent to the old office
address. Apex only learned of the acquisition in a newspaper. It filed a protest and a supplemental protest
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office. It was only more than a year after that PARO forwarded the
protest to DAR. DAR only made Apex submit documents which were already attached to its Protest.
Meanwhile, Apex’s TCT has been cancelled and transferred to an alleged farmer-beneficiary. Apex filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA.

The aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it
had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference
which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and
protect their interests.

Smart v. NTC (2003)

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, NTC promulgated rules and regulations on the billing
of telecommunications services. Petitioners-communications companies filed an action for declaration of
nullity of the billing circulars. The NTC moved to dismiss the case for failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.

The trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case. Judicial power includes the authority of
the courts to determine the validity of the acts of administrative agencies. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In like manner, the doctrine of
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primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function.

Estrada et al. v. CA (2004)

Estrada, Canilang, and Lim as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed before the Olongapo City RTC a
complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against
respondent Bacnotan Cement Corporation and 4 other parties. They alleged that BCC’s cement plant is a
nuisance as it will cause pollution, and prayed that BCC be restrained and prohibited from operating it.
BCC filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Estrada et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court, i.e. they should have gone to the DENR via the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) first,
which renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. RTC denied BCC’s
motion to dismiss and granted Estrada et al.’s prayer. CA set aside the RTC’s order, and lifted the writ of
injunction and dismissed the complaint insofar as BCC was concerned. Estrada et al. filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC.

Estrada et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court, which renders their
complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. The case is NOT one of those recognized
exceptional circumstances where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going
to court. There is NO basis to their claim that their immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified
because they were in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of BCC’s cement
plant, and the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief. The DENR, via the Pollution Adjudication
Board, has the power to grant Estrada et al. the proper relief.

Regino v. PCST (2004)

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Regino (student) filed a Complaint for damages against PCST and two of its teachers for having
disallowed her from taking final examinations allegedly due to her refusal to buy tickets for the school’s
fund raising campaign. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, Commission of Higher Education (CHED).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case since Regino is
not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Also, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable only when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of. In this case, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, Regino could
not have commenced her case before the Commission. Lastly, the exhaustion doctrine admits of
exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. Regino's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil
Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan (2005)

An administrative complaint was filed against Mayor Flores with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The
Sanggunian issued an Order recommending to the Governor the preventive suspension of Flores. Flores
wrote a letter to the Governor asking “to veto” the Order. Without filing for reconsideration of the Order,
or waiting for the Governor's action, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to nullify the Order. The
CA dismissed his petition for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.
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Flores still had remedies within the administrative machinery. He could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order. He could have also waited for the Governor to act on the matter,
considering that the Governor is the one empowered by the law to impose preventive suspension. Having
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, the intervention of the courts should not be
resorted to.

CSC v. DBM (2005)

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to
compel the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal
year 2002. DBM opposed arguing, among others, that CSC’s petition must be dismissed because the latter
failed to exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBM’s Secretary
regarding the extent of its fiscal autonomy before resorting to court action.

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision
requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As the CSC is not
mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and Management prior to filing
the present action, its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.

Obiasca v. Basallote (2010)

Jeane was appointed to Administrative Officer II and she immediately assumed the duties of her office.
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She later learned that her appointment was never transmitted to the CSC for approval because of a
requirement imposed by the Superintendent of Schools that she failed to submit. Rather than aid her in
the submission of this requirement, the principal of her school refused to affix her signature and the
Superintendent advised Jeane to just go back to being a teacher. Barely two months later, Arlin was
assigned to the position of Administrative Officer II. Jeane complained to the CSC, which eventually
recalled Arlin’s appointment and approved Jeane’s appointment. Arlin went up to the CA right away,
forgetting to file an appeal to the CSC resolution which then became final.

SC struck his petition down on this ground as well as on substantive grounds. One must exhaust
administrative remedies provided by law before resorting to the courts.

Factors affecting finality of administrative decisions

1. Failure to seasonably file a Motion for Reconsideration within the period provided for by law or by
the rules of procedure duly issued by administrative bodies. (Fortich v. Corona, (1998)).
Compliance with the period is not only a mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement.
(Antique Sawmill Inc. v. Zayco, (1960))
2. Decisions of administrative officials which are not clearly wrong will not be interfered with by
courts. (Sotto v. Ruiz ,(1921)) However, judicial review is available if the decision is rendered in
excess of authority. The availability of judicial review remains despite the absence of a statutory
provision to that effect. (Uy v. Palomar, (1969))
3. Decisions or orders issued by administrative agencies or officials in the exercise of administrative
functions are generally not interfered with by courts because such bodies are generally better
equipped technically to decide administrative questions and non-legal factors, such as
government policy on the matter. (Manuel v. Villena, (1971)). However, if the administrative
official has gone beyond his authority or the decision was vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake,
 107

judicial review is proper (Manuel v. Villena, (1971)). In addition, judicial review has also been held
to be proper in case the administrative official has exercised grave abuse of discretion or if an
error of law, fraud or collusion attended the decision (SMC v. Secretary of Labor, (1975)).
4. Findings of fact of administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal. (UCPB v. E. Guanzon, (2009)) Thus, if the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence, the court can make its own independent evaluation of
facts. (UCPB v. E. Guanzon, (2009))

Summary of grounds when judicial review is valid despite finality of administrative decisions:
• Decision is clearly wrong.
• Decision is manifestly arbitrary, capricious or unjust.
• Decision is not based upon any reasonable interpretation of law.
• Administrative body or officer has gone beyond statutory authority.
• Administrative agency exercised unconstitutional powers.
• Decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.
• Lack of jurisdiction.
• Grave abuse of discretion.
• Decision violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of law.

Fortich v. Corona (1998)

The Quisumbings’ 144 hectare- land was previously covered by the CARP, but an ordinance was passed
converting some areas, including their land, into an industrial zone. Several government sectors
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approved the application for conversion, including the Office of the President. DAR filed a motion for
reconsideration but did not make it within the reglementary period, so it filed a second MR. Pending
resolution of the second MR, the Sumilao farmers who were the supposed beneficiaries of the land under
the CARP staged a hunger strike in front of DAR, which led the Office of the President, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Corona, to issue a “Win-Win” Resolution modifying its earlier decision after it had
already been final and executory, and which reduced the land to be converted to 44 hectares.

Since no one had seasonably filed an MR of the first decision, it had already become final and executory.
Thus, the Office of the President had already lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case and to modify its
decision. It could also not have entertained the second MR because AO No. 18 and the Rules of Court
provide that only one MR is allowed. Even if the second MR was allowed under “exceptionally
meritorious cases”, it could not have been entertained because the first MR was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the first decision to lapse into finality.

Antique Sawmill Inc v. Zayco (1960)

Zayco appealed an order of the Secretary of Agriculture to the Office of the President 50 days from the
receipt of the order sought to be reconsidered, which was beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Zayco
contends that the period provided by the rules is a mere procedural technicality which, at least in
administrative proceedings, may be liberally construed.

Compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but
also a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to comply with the reglementary period has the effect of
rendering final the judgment of the court. That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law
and can no longer be questioned, because public interest requires that proceedings already terminated
should not be altered at every step.
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Sotto v. Ruiz (1921)

Ruiz, the Director of Posts, refused to forward as registered mail copies of “The Independent,” a weekly
periodical, because it allegedly contained libelous matters. The Director of Posts has the power to
determine whether certain mail matter is obscene, lewd or libelous. However, this authority is subject to
review by the court when there is clear error in his judgment. In this case, since there was no direct
attack on any person, the contents could not be deemed libelous.

Uy v. Palomar (1969)

Uy, a PCSO agent, devised a Grand Christmas Bonus Award plan in order to boost the sales of tickets for
the PCSO Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw. However, the Postmaster General found that his plan
amounted to “conducting a lottery or gift enterprise” in violation of the Postal Law and issued a Fraud
Order directing all postmasters to return all mail matter sent by Uy. Uy questioned this order.

The absence of statutory provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the
courts is barred; the courts will not interfere with the decisions of the Postmaster General unless it
clearly appears that the decision is wrong, notwithstanding the absence of statutory provision for judicial
review of his action. Indeed, the Postmaster General issued the fraud order in a mistaken view of the law,
as Uy’s plan is not lottery or gift enterprise for failing to satisfy the test laid down in jurisprudence. There
being no legal basis for the fraud order, there was also no adequate administrative remedy for Uy to avail
of. His action for injunction was proper and not premature for failure to exhaust all remedies.

Manuel v. Villena (1971)

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Manuel filed an application for a Tree Farm Permit on his land, but was denied by the Director of Forestry
because a certain Villena already filed for the same application on the same land. Manuel argued that he
was denied due process for not being afforded the services of counsel and that the investigation
concerning the application was not completed.

As a general rule, courts will refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or
officials in the exercise of administrative functions, because such bodies are generally better equipped
technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on
the matter, are usually involved in the decisions. However, if (1) the official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercising unconstitutional powers, or clearly acting arbitrarily and without regard to his duty
or with grave abuse of discretion; or (2) the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake, judicial
review is proper. In this case, Manuel was not only afforded an investigation, but also allowed to appeal
the Secretary’s decision. Thus, no denial of due process was shown.

San Miguel Co. v. Secretary of Labor (1975)

Yanglay was dismissed from his job as operator in the crown cork department of SMC after investigation
due to illegal trafficking in company medicines. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
After notifying both San Miguel and Yanglay, a mediator-fact finder conducted a preliminary hearing. The
NLRC adopted the mediator-fact finder’s report that Yanglay’s dismissal was unjustified but it also ruled
that San Miguel did not commit ULP. The NLRC ordered Yanglay’s reinstatement with backwages. San
Miguel filed an MR, claiming that the NLRC’s decision was premature, because the mediator-fact finder’s
report must be passed upon by an arbitrator.
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While the NLRC’s action was summary, it did not amount to a denial of due process. Both the mediator-
fact finder and the NLRC decided the case on the basis of the company’s investigation. It was evident from
the mediator-fact finder’s report that he had considered all the facts and evidence presented by both
parties, and, more importantly, that they no longer intended to present further evidence on the matter.
Because of this, it was proper for the NLRC to exercise its power of arbitration, and after assessing the
evidence before it, render a decision.

UCPB v. E. Guanzon (2009)

EGI filed with the BSP an administrative complaint against UCPB, et al. for the commission of
irregularities and conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner. The BSP Monetary Board, in a
letter-decision, dismissed the administrative complaint of EGI. On appeal, the CA set aside the BSP letter-
decision and remanded the case to the BSP Monetary Board for further proceedings. UCPB argued that CA
erred in disregarding the findings of fact of the BSP Monetary Board which should be accorded great
respect.

Although, as a general rule, findings of facts of an administrative agency, which has acquired expertise in
the particular field of its endeavor, are accorded great weight on appeal, such rule cannot be applied with
respect to the assailed findings of the BSP Monetary Board in this case. Rather, what applies is the
recognized exception that if such findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the Court can make
its own independent evaluation of the facts. Here, the factual findings of the BSP Monetary Board in its
letter-decision were not supported by substantial evidence.
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c. ELECTION LAW

A. Suffrage

Suffrage is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of
questions submitted to the people. It includes election, plebiscite, initiative, and referendum. (Nachura,
2009)

When the right of suffrage is exercised

1. Regular Election

Provided by law for the election of officers either nation-wide or in certain subdivisions thereof,
after the expiration of the full term of the former officers

ALU v. Letrondo-Montejo (G.R. No. 111988, 1994)

Employees of AMS Farming Corporation wanted to go on holiday on the date set out for the SK
elections, claiming that this was a regular election deemed holiday in their CBA. The Court agreed,
ruling that the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the
SK does not make it any less a regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for
the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others, women and youth.
Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their representatives.
Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its
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holding, a holiday.

2. Special Election

One held to fill a vacancy in office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent
was elected

3. Plebiscite

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Section 10 of the Local Government Code – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected.
Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within 120 days from the date
of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date.

Padilla v. Comelec (1992)

R.A. 7155 was enacted creating the municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Pursuant to the law and the
Constitution, a plebiscite was held. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
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disapproval of the creation of Tulay-na-Lupa. Governor Padilla filed a case to set aside the
plebiscite conducted and to have a new one conducted. He argued that the plebiscite conducted
was invalid because a plebiscite should be conducted only in the political units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising Tulay-na-Lupa, to the exclusion of the remaining portions of the mother
unit. The meaning of the phrase “political units directly affected” is not limited to the political
units being taken together to make a new LGU. It refers to the residents of the political entity who
would be “economically dislocated” by the separation of a portion thereof, i.e. the entire mother
unit.

Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)

In 1994, R.A. 7720 converting the Municipality of Santiago into an independent component city
was passed and later ratified in a plebiscite. A mere four years later, R.A. 8528, amending R.A.
7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago to a component city. Miranda et al. challenged
the constitutionality of the latter law, because it did not contain a provision which submitted the
law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. R.A. 8528 was declared
unconstitutional for failing to comply with the requirement of plebiscite. A plebiscite is still
necessary even if it involves just the reclassification from independent component city to
component city. A reading of the constitutional provisions shows that the acts of creating, dividing,
merging, abolishing, or substantially altering boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator:
material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected and their
inhabitants.

4. Initiative
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Section 3(a) of R.A. 6735 (“The Initiative and Referendum Act”)
The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose.

Three Kinds of Initiative:

a. Initiative on the Constitution

b. Initiative on national legislation (statutes)

c. Initiative on local legislation

Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 1997)

A lawyer filed a petition to amend the Constitution with the COMELEC. The Court explained that
the Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by a law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. R.A. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
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5. Referendum

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC (1996)

After the Garcia v. COMELEC case was decided by the SC, eventually, the COMELEC scheduled a
referendum for the electorate to vote on the petition of Garcia, Calimbas, et al. The SBMA filed suit
against the COMELEC, seeking to prevent the holding of a referendum. The SC ruled in favor of the
SBMA and held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. In its assailed resolution,
the COMELEC was preparing for a referendum when it was clear that the petition of Garcia,
Calimbas, et al. was one for initiative. The SC clarified that initiative is different from a
referendum. Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at polls independent of the legislative assembly. Referendum is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which, in most cases, would, without action on the part of electors, become a law.

B. Qualification and disqualification of voters

Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution

To exercise the right of suffrage, a person must be (1) a Filipino citizen; (2) at least 18 years of age; (3) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one year; (4) a resident of the place where he proposes to vote for
at least six months; and (5) not otherwise disqualified by law. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

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Section 9 of R.A. 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996)
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence
but who, on the day of the election, shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.

Pundaodaya v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 179313, 2009)

The petitioner filed a disqualification case against her opponent on the ground that the latter lacked
the residency qualification. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous
terms. Both impart not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent for business, pleasure, or like reasons, one intends to return. The
Court found that petitioner’s opponent had indeed no residency qualification since he had not
abandoned his domicile of origin for his present residence.

Marcos v. COMELEC (1995)

Imelda Marcos ran as a representative in Leyte. The Court ruled in her favor and explained that it is
not necessary that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a
municipality. It is enough that he should live there, provided that his stay is accompanied by his
intention to reside therein permanently.

Aquino v. COMELEC (1995)

Aquino’s domicile of origin was Tarlac, but he ran in Makati. The Court found him ineligible for the
elective position in Makati because of the residency requirement. There is nothing wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
that he has effected a change of residence for the period required by law. In this case, however,
Aquino was unable to sufficiently prove change of residence.
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Section 118 of B.P. 881 (Omnibus Election Code)

The following are disqualified to register as voters:
1. Those convicted by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year, unless pardoned
or granted amnesty, but their rights are reacquired upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence;
2. Those adjudged by final judgment as having committed any crime involving disloyalty to government
or any crime against national security, but their rights are reacquired upon expiration of five years after
service of sentence; and
3. Insane or incompetent persons, as declared by competent authority.

C. Registration of voters

Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189

Registration is the act of accomplishing and filing a sworn application for the registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in
the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board.

Section 8 of R.A. 8189

The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.

Section 18 of R.A. 8189

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The right to register may be challenged through the following process:
1. Any voter, candidate, or representative of a registered political party may challenge in writing any
application for registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge shall be under oath and be
attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of hearing to the challenger and the
applicant.
2. Oppositions to contest a registrant’s application for inclusion in the voter’s list must, in all cases, be
filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or
processed by the Election Registration Board.
3. The hearing on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and the decision shall be
rendered before the end of the month.

Section 27 of R.A. 8189

Deactivation of the registration of certain persons involves removal of their registration records from the
corresponding precinct book of voters and placing the same in the inactive file, properly marked
“deactivated” and dated in indelible ink. The registration of the following may be deactivated:

1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty;
2. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly-constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law;
3. Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification
has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer
insane or incompetent;
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4. Any person who did not vote in two successive preceding regular elections as shown by their voting
records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
5. Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
6. Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

Section 28 of R.A. 8189

Any voter whose registration has been deactivated may file with the Election Officer a sworn application
for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation
no longer exist any time but not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election. The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for
appropriate action.

Yra v. Abano (G.R. No. 30187, 1928)

Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote. After
completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office though his
cancellation of voter’s registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the mails
on time. In ruling in Abano’s favor, the Court explained that the registration of a voter does not
confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a
regulation, not a qualification.

D. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings

Section 34 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Inclusion)

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Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has
been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list
of voters in his precinct. The petition may be filed any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or
75 days prior to a special election. The petition must be accompanied by (1) a certificate of disapproval of
his application; and (2) proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be
decided within 15 days after its filing.

Section 35 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Exclusion)

Any registered voter, representative of a political party, or the Election Officer may file with the court a
sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address,
and precinct of the challenged voter. The petition may be filed at any time except 100 days prior to a
regular election or 65 days before a special election. The petition must be accompanied by proof of notice
to the Board and to the challenged voter. The petition shall be decided within 10 days from its filing.

Section 32 of R.A. 8189 (Common Procedure)

1. A petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours;
2. Notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of
the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition;
3. A petition shall refer to only one precinct and shall implead the Board as respondents;
4. No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court should find
that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it
shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses;
5. Any voter, candidate, or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and
present his evidence;
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6. The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of
facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for
hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious; and
7. The petition shall be heard and decided within ten days from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to the
RTC shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these
petitions not later than 15 days before the election and the decision shall become final and executory.

Section 33 of R.A. 8189

The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal
or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within
five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory.
The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the
decision shall immediately become final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.

Domino v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 134015, 1999)

Domino ran for Congress in Sarangani but his opponent filed a petition to cancel his certificate of
candidacy and claimed he had failed to meet the residency qualification. The COMELEC disqualified
Domino and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. Domino questioned the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
and offered up as proof of residency the MeTC of Quezon City’s factual findings that he was a resident
of Sarangani. The Court ruled that it is not within the competence of the trial court in exclusion
proceedings to declare the challenged voter as a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of
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the trial court is limited only to determining the right of the voter to remain on the list of voters or to
declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered,
specifying the ground for the voter’s disqualifications. The power to order the change or transfer of
registration from one place of residence to another rests with the Registration Board.

E. Political parties

Section 3(c) of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act)

A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

Section 3(d) of R.A. 7941

A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas works, and other similar sectors) whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.

Section 3(e) of R.A. 7941

A sectoral organization is a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests, or concerns.
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Section 3(f) of R.A. 7941

A coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766, 2013)

This case stemmed from 54 petitions for certiorari from Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties who
were disqualified by the COMELEC in May 2013 as party-list for not being qualified as representatives
for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. R.A. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The phrase
“marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to those sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

1. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties

Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution

The Commission on Elections shall register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions.

Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

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Any political party, organization, or coalition of political parties seeking registration pursuant to Section
2(5) of Article IX-C of the Constitution shall file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition
duly verified by the its President and Secretary-General, or any official duly authorized to do so under its
Constitution and By-laws.

2. Registration

Article IX-C, Section 7 of the Constitution

No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid except for those
registered under the party-list system.

Section 5 of R.A. 7941

Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization, or coalition for the purpose of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional, or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.

Section 60 of B.P. 881

To acquire juridical personality, quality it for subsequent accreditation, and to entitle it to the rights and
privileges herein granted to political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the
Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to obtain at least
ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and supported a candidate or
candidates in the election next following its registration shall, after notice and hearing be deemed to have
forfeited such status as a registered political party in such constituency.
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Section 6 of R.A. 7941

The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint and after due notice and hearing, cancel the
registration of a party, organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds:
1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization, or association, organized for religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, or
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one year; or
8. It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

F. Candidacy

1. Qualifications of candidates

For President and Vice President (Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born-citizen

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2. At least 40 years old on the day of the election

3. Able to read and write

4. Registered voter

5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the day of the election

For Senator (Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution)

1. Natural-born citizen

2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election

3. Able to read and write

4. Registered voter

5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election

For District Representatives (Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution)

1. Natural-born citizen

2. Registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected

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3. Resident of the same district for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election

4. Able to read and write

5. At least 25 years old on the day of the election

For Elective Local Officials (Section 39 of the Local Government Code)

1. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

2. Candidates for the position of governor, vice- governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or Mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

3. Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

4. Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must
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be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

5. Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be
at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

6. Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

2. Filing of certificates of candidacy

Sinaca v. Mula (G.R. No. 135691, 1999)

In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca was a substitute candidate for the mayoral
post of the LAKAS Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinaca, Jr., was disqualified
for being convicted of bigamy. In ruling that Emmanuel Sinaca was validly substituted for the original
candidate, the Court explained that a certificate of candidacy is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs if he belongs to any, and his
post-office address for all election purposes being well-stated.
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a) Effect of filing

Section 11 of R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369

Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-
owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.

Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678

Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678

If a person files two certificates of candidacy, each for a different office, the person shall not be eligible
for either office. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy,
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.

Quinto v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, 2010)

The petitioners were appointed officials who intended to run in the elections. Prior to the elections,
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COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678 pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 9369, which amended Section 11
of R.A. 8436. The third paragraph of Section 13 provided that all persons holding a public appointive
office would be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners argued that this provision violated equal protection. Although initially the Court
agreed with them, upon MR it ruled that the provision and the COMELEC Resolution were valid.

b) Substitution of candidates

Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678

If after the last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
political party dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate
belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any
independent candidate. No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as
substitute candidate for any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.

c) Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate

Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678

The receiving officer shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificates of candidacy or nomination by registered political parties or coalition of political parties on
or before the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy, provided said certificates are under oath
and contain all the required data and in the form prescribed by the Commission.
EXCEPTIONS: When the COMELEC may refuse or cancel a certificate of candidacy (as found in B.P. 881)
1. Section 68 (when candidates are disqualified)
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2. Section 69 (nuisance candidates)

3. Section 78 (upon petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy)

Luna v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 165983, 2007)

Joy Charisma Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger Luna. The COMELEC
invalidated her substitution because it found that while Hans Roger had withdrawn his candidacy,
when he first filed he was not of age and since no certificate of candidacy was validly filed, such could
not be the basis for a substitution. The Court disagreed with the COMELEC and reiterated that
COMELEC only has a ministerial duty to receive acknowledge receipt of a certificate of candidacy.

d) Nuisance candidates

Section 69 of B.P. 881

The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678

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The petition against a nuisance candidate must be filed within five days from the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy.

Bautista v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133840, 1998)

Efren Bautista ran as mayor in the 1998 elections alongside Edwin Bautista. The latter was declared a
nuisance candidate but the decision of the COMELEC, while made known to the public, did not become
final until after election. After election day, Cipriano “Efren” Bautista received 17,981 votes, Edwin
Bautista got 29 votes, and because of the confusion 21,016 “Bautista” votes were either tallied but not
credited to petitioner or simply not tallied at all. The Court explained that strictly speaking, a cancelled
certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Moreover, a stray vote is
invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. In this case, the Court
ruled in favor of Efren Bautista and counted the 21,000 votes in his favor. While Edwin’s
disqualification was not yet final, the public did know of it, hence any “Bautista” on the ballot was a
clear reference to Efren, who was already a well-known local politician before the election in point.

e) Petition to deny or cancel certificates of candidacy

Section 78 of B.P. 881

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.
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Salcedo II v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 135886, 1999)

The respondent Salcedo married a man who was already married and used his last name in her
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC Second Division found that this constituted material
misrepresentation that was a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy, but the
COMELEC en banc disagreed. The Court agreed with the COMELEC en banc and explained that for it to
be a ground to deny or cancel a certificate of candidacy, the false representation must (a) pertain to a
material matter affecting substantive rights of a candidate; and (b) consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

f) Effect of disqualification

Section 6 of R.A. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

g) Withdrawal of candidates

Section 73 of B.P. 881

No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
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within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No
person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who was filed
more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be
eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of
a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a
candidate may have incurred.

Monsale v. Nico (G.R. No. L-2539, 1949)

Monsale and Nico were opponents for the office of mayor. Monsale withdrew his certificate of
candidacy after the period for filing—and then he withdrew his withdrawal. In the election, Monsale got
more votes than Nico but ultimately Nico was proclaimed the winner. The withdrawal of the certificate
of candidacy shall effect the disqualification of the candidate to be elected for the position. The
withdrawal of the withdrawal, for the purpose of reviving the certificate of candidacy, must be made
within the period provided by law for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
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G. Campaign

Section 79 of B.P. 811

(a) The term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties;
(b) The term “election campaign” or “partisan political activity” refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election
of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall
not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or opinions or
discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or criticisms against probable
candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed
as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
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1. Premature campaigning

Section 80 of B.P. 881

It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during
the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign
period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.

Penera v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 131613, 2009)

Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before the
campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of
candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable
for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, when
partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the
same partisan political acts are lawful.
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2. Prohibited contributions

Section 94(a) of B.P. 881

The term “contribution” includes a gift, donation, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or
anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement to contribute, whether or not legally
enforceable, made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections but shall not include
services rendered without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time in
behalf of a candidate or political party. It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by
other persons, the money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.

Section 95 of B.P. 881

No contribution for purposes of partisan political activity shall be made directly or indirectly by any
of the following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall prevent the
making of any loan to a candidate or political party by any such public or private financial institutions
legally in the business of lending money, and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of business;
(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any
natural resources of the nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government or
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any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform
construction or other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives, exemptions,
allocations or similar privileges or concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(e) Natural and juridical persons who, within one year prior to the date of the election, have been
granted loans or other accommodations in excess of P100,000 by the government or any of its
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(f) Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to no less than
P100,000.00;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; and
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations.

It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution from any of the persons or
entities enumerated herein.
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3. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda

Section 82 of B.P. 881

Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more
than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area exceeding two feet by
three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the
holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be
allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the
meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may
authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were
given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be
published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within
one week after the authorization has been granted.

Section 85 of B.P. 881

It shall be unlawful:
(a) To print, publish, post or distribute any poster, pamphlet, circular, handbill, or printed matter
urging voters to vote for or against any candidate unless they bear the names and addresses of the
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printer and payor as required in Section 84 hereof;
(b) To erect, put up, make use of, attach, float or display any billboard, tinplate-poster, balloons and
the like, of whatever size, shape, form or kind, advertising for or against any candidate or political
party;
(c) To purchase, manufacture, request, distribute or accept electoral propaganda gadgets, such as
pens, lighters, fans of whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, shirts, hats,
bandanas, matches, cigarettes and the like, except that campaign supporters accompanying a
candidate shall be allowed to wear hats and/or shirts or T-shirts advertising a candidate;
(d) To show or display publicly any advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate by
means of cinematography, audio-visual units or other screen projections except telecasts which may
be allowed as hereinafter provided; and
(e) For any radio broadcasting or television station to sell or give free of charge air time for campaign
and other political purposes except as authorized in this Code under the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission pursuant thereto.

Any prohibited election propaganda gadget or advertisement shall be stopped, confiscated or torn
down by the representative of the Commission upon specific authority of the Commission.
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4. Limitations on expenses

Section 13 of R.A. 7166 (“An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms”)
The amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:
1. For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and for other candidates
Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
2. For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any contribution in cash or in kind to any
candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the
Commission shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.

5. Statement of contributions and expenses

Section 14 of R.A. 7166

Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within 30 days after the election, file in
duplicate with the offices of the Commission, the full, true, and itemized statement of all contributions
and expenditures in connection with the election. No person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he and the political party that nominated him has filed the statement
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of contributions and expenditures required by law. Except candidates for elective barangay office,
failure to file the statements or reports shall constitute an administrative offense. For a second or
subsequent offenses, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Pilar v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 115245, 1995)

Pilar ran for a position in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela but subsequently withdrew his
candidacy. The COMELEC fined him for his failure to file his statement of contributions and expenses.
The Court ruled in favor of the COMELEC and explained that candidates who withdrew after the filing
of their certificates of candidacy are still required to comply with the filing of statement of all
contributions and expenses.

H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers

1. Composition

Section 164 of B.P. 881

At least thirty days before the date when the voters list is to be prepare in accordance with this Code,
in the case of a regular election or fifteen days before a special election, the Commission shall, directly
or through its duly authorized representatives, constitute a board of election inspectors for each
precinct to be composed of a chairman and a poll clerk who must be public school teachers, priority to
be given to civil service eligibles, and two members, each representing the two accredited political
parties. The appointment shall state the precinct to which they are assigned and the date of the
appointment.
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Section 221 of B.P. 881

There shall be a board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality, and district of Metropolitan
Manila as follows:
(a) Provincial board of canvassers. - the provincial board of canvassers shall be composed of the
provincial election supervisor or a senior lawyer in the regional office of the Commission, as
chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the provincial superintendent of schools, and
one representative from each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party in the
constituency concerned entitled to be represented, as members.
(b) City board of canvassers. - the city board of canvassers shall be composed of the city election
registrar or a lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, the city fiscal and the city superintendent of
schools, and one representative from each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political
party entitled to be represented, as members.
(c) District board of canvassers of Metropolitan Manila - the district board of canvassers shall be
composed of a lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, and a ranking fiscal in the district and the most
senior district school supervisor in the district to be appointed upon consultation with the Ministry of
Justice and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, respectively, and one representative from
each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party in the constituency concerned, as
members.
(d) Municipal board of canvassers. - the municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the
election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, and
the district supervisor or in his absence any public school principal in the municipality and one
representative from each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party entitled to be
represented, as members.
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(e) Board of canvassers for newly created political subdivisions - the Commission shall constitute a
board of canvassers and appoint the members thereof for the first election in a newly created
province, city or municipality in case the officials who shall act as members thereof have not yet
assumed their duties and functions.

2. Powers

Section 168 of B.P. 881

The board of election inspectors shall have the following powers and functions:
a. Conduct the voting and counting of votes in their respective polling places;
b. Act as deputies of the Commission in the supervision and control of the election in the polling
places wherein they are assigned, to assure the holding of the same in a free, orderly and honest
manner; and
c. Perform such other functions prescribed by this Code or by the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission.

Abes v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-28348, 1967)

Abes et al. sought (among others) the nullification of elections in Quezon City for city officials. The
COMELEC denied their petition and ordered the board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass. The
Court denied the petition and reiterated that the board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is
enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it in due form. Its powers are
limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the
apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on
the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained.
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I. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law

1. Petition not to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy

Section 78 of B.P. 881

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

2. Petition for disqualification

Section 68 of B.P. 881

Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident
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of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Gonzales v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 192856, 2011)

Gonzales ran for Congress in Albay, but a petition for disqualification and cancellation of certificate of
candidacy was filed against him, alleging he was a Spanish national. He won the election but the
COMELEC invalidated his proclamation. In ruling for Gonzales, the Court had to distinguish between a
petition for disqualification and a petition for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (since the
petition against Gonzales seemed to be both at once): a petition to disqualify a candidate under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on prohibited acts committed by a candidate. In
contrast, the petition for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is based on material
misrepresentations in the certificate of candidacy. A petition to disqualify may be filed not later than
the date of proclamation under Section 68, while a petition for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be filed within 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
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3. Petition to declare failure of elections

Section 6 of B.P. 881

If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice
and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 4 of R.A. 7166

The COMELEC en banc has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
declaration of failure of election or for annulment of election results.

4. Pre-proclamation controversy

Section 1 of Rule 3, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of
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the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties, or by any accredited and participating party list group, before the board
or directly with the Commission.

Section 1 of Rule 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

There is illegal composition of the BOC when, among other similar circumstances, any of the members
do not possess legal qualifications and appointments. The information technology capable person
required to assist the BOC by Republic Act No. 9369 shall be included as among those whose lack of
qualifications may be questioned.

Section 2 of Rule 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

There is illegal proceedings of the BOC when the canvassing is a sham or mere ceremony, the results
of which are pre-determined and manipulated as when any of the following circumstances are
present:
a) precipitate canvassing;
b) terrorism;
c) lack of sufficient notice to the members of the BOC's;
d) Improper venue

Section 242 of B.P. 881

The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any proclamation,
if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.
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5. Election protest

Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

Section 1
The Commission on Elections, through any of its Divisions, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial, and city
officials.

Section 2
A petition contesting the elections or returns of an elective regional, provincial, or city official shall be
filed with the Commission by any candidate who was voted for in the same office and who received
the second of third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four
candidates following the last ranked winner duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the
election contained in the Statement of Votes. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.

Section 3
An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed directly with the Commission in ten (10)
legible copies plus such number of copies corresponding to the number of protestees, within a non-
extendible period of ten days following the date of proclamation. Each contest shall refer exclusively
to one office but contents for offices of the Sangguniang Pampook, Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod may be consolidated in one case.

Section 4
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Service and filing of pleadings, including the initiatory petition and other papers, shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the Commission, a resort to other modes of
service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule shall be a cause to consider the pleading or paper as not filed.

Section 5
An election protest shall be verified by an affidavit stating that the affiant has read the petition and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of affiant's own knowledge or based on authentic
records. A verification based on “information and belief” or upon the “knowledge, information and
belief” is not a sufficient verification. The protestant shall personally sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping which must be annexed to the election protest. An unverified petition or one with
insufficient verification or unaccompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping shall be dismissed
outright and shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to file an election protest.

Section 6
The pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy involving the validity of the proclamation as defined
by law shall suspend the running of the period to file an election protest.
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6. Quo warranto

Section 253 of B.P. 881

Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election. Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for
quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively,
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Section 7 of Rule 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall specifically state the following facts:
a) The position involved
b) That the protestant was a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office.
c) The date of proclamation; and
d) The number of votes credited to the parties per proclamation.
An election protest shall also state:
e) The total number of precincts of the region, province or city concerned;
f) The protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of
Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified an explanation why the votes are not
specified;
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g) A detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.

Villamor v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 169865, 2006)

Villamor won as mayor and his opponent filed a pre-proclamation protest. Not content, his opponent
also filed an election protest. The Court ruled in Villamor’s favor and explained that the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto generally has the effect of barring the subsequent filing
of a pre-proclamation controversy or petition to annul proclamation. It also amounts to the
abandonment of any pre-proclamation controversy or petition to annul proclamation filed earlier,
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. Once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction over an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case
itself and not in another proceeding.

Dumayas, Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 141952-53, 2001)

Dumayas and Bernal were rivals for a mayoralty post. After moving (in a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC) to declare Dumayas’ proclamation invalid, Bernal filed a case for quo warranto
against him. The Court dismissed Dumayas’ petition, which claimed that by filing the quo warranto
Bernal had abandoned his motion for reconsideration. In certain cases, a pre-proclamation
controversy may still proceed notwithstanding the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto, to wit:
1. What is filed in not really a quo warranto or election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation

2. Quo warranto is not the proper remedy

3. The BOC is improperly constituted

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4. The filing of a quo warranto or an election protest is expressly made without prejudice to pre-
proclamation contest, or is made ad cautelam

5. The proclamation is null and void

J. Prosecution of election offenses

 Section 261 of B.P. 881 enumerates and details 30 different election offenses. Please consult codal
for full list.

Article IX-C, Section 2(6) of the Constitution

The COMELEC has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases involving violations of election laws.

Section 43 of R.A. 9369

The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the
other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and prosecute the same.

People v. Judge Basilia (G.R. Nos. 83938-40, 1989)

The Provincial Prosecutor filed several cases for violations of the Omnibus Election Code, which the Judge
dismissed because COMELEC has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses. The
Court disagreed and ruled in favor of the People. The COMELEC may delegate its power to investigate and
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prosecute election offenses to the Provincial Prosecutor, as provided in the same Omnibus Election Code.

BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177508, 2009)

BANAT brought the petition to assail the constitutionality of several provisions in R.A. 9369. The Court
upheld the law’s validity, explaining that (in particular) Section 43 of R.A. 9369 does not violate Section
2(6) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but through B.P. 881, a legislative enactment
which is precisely amended by R.A. 9369. Section 43 grants COMELEC the power, concurrent with other
prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and
prosecute the same. It is a valid amendment of Section 265 of B.P. 881, pursuant to the plenary power of
the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Section 267 of B.P. 881

Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission. If the discovery of the
offense be made in an election contest proceedings, the period of prescription shall commence on the
date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final and executory.

Section 268 of B.P. 881

The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From
the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
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d. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1. CONCEPT
a) Distinguished from government-owned or controlled corporations

Province of Negros Occidental v. COA (2010)

Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA), in conformity with Republic Act 6758 (concerning the policy of
standardization of compensation), did not allow the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental to
implement its Resolution 720A which allocated the province’s retained earnings to the health care and
hospitalization of provincial officials and employees. COA says such allocation would require the
approval of the President.

Doctrine: Presidential approval is not required as it applies only to government offices/agencies,

government-owned and controlled corporations and their respective governing boards which are under
the control of the President. LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President,
and as such, the President's authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. The President cannot lay down the rules, nor can he modify or replace them.

2. CLASSIFICATIONS
a) Quasi-corporations
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MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association (2000)

Facts: The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) sent a letter to the Bel-Air Village
Association requesting the latter to open its private road (Neptune street) to the public and informing it
that its perimeter wall adjacent to Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Doctrine: The MMDA’s power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in
Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with legislative
power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can only lay down
policies and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector.

MMDA v. Dante Garin (2005)

Facts: Atty. Garin’s driver’s license was confiscated by the MMDA for illegal parking in Manila, pursuant
to Sec. 5(f) of Republic Act 7924 granting the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers’ licenses without need of any other legislative enactment.

Doctrine: The MMDA’s power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses is construed to mean
enforcing existing traffic rules and regulations and thus, it can only can only confiscate or suspend
drivers’ licenses pursuant to existing traffic laws and regulations enacted by Congress or, in this case, the
City of Manila and not “without need of any other legislative enactment.” The MMDA is not a political unit
of government and does not possess police power nor the power to legislate.
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MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co. (2007)

Facts: Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief when the MMDA was about to issue a circular ordering
the closure of bus terminals in Metro Manila in accordance with Executive Order 179 issued by the
President of the Philippines commanding the closing of bus terminals at Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue
(EDSA), to be replaced by four integrated terminals.

Doctrine:The MMDA is not the proper implementing agency for implementing Executive Order 179 as
the President’s authority to implement the project must be exercised through the Department of
Transportation and Communications. Republic Act 7924 does not grant the MMDA nor its Council the
power to enact ordinances and approve resolutions for the general welfare of Metro Manila’s inhabitants
and as such, because of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, it cannot order the removal
of the terminals involved in this case.

b) Municipal corporations

Villas v. City of Manila (1921)

Facts: Villas et al., creditors of the City of Manila under the Spanish regime, demanded payment from the
City of Manila after cession to the US.

Doctrine: A Municipal Corporation has two kinds of powers— public and private; the former is clothed
with sovereignty and is a legal individual while the latter enables it to act like a corporate legal
individual. Hence, the new City of Manila, despite the cession to the US, is still liable to the Villas as
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private property remains as it was prior to the cession and this includes any corporate liability incurred
by such city or municipality.

Republic v. City of Davao (2002)

Facts: The City of Davao claims that it is not required by law to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau to construct its Artica Sports Dome.

Doctrine: Davao is covered by the law which requires all persons to secure an ECC when they undertake
an environmentally-critical project. As the Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical and as
the state and its political subdivisions (i.e., local government units) are juridical persons, the City of
Davao, being a local government unit and thus a juridical person, is not excluded from the coverage of the
law requiring persons to secure an ECC.

B. Municipal corporations
1. Elements
2. Nature and functions

Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos v. E.M. Ramos and Sons (2011)

Facts: The corporation E.M. Ramos and Sons claims that the Department of Agrarian Reform cannot, in
implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), subject the unirrigated agricultural
land that the former acquired as the said land has been converted into a residential subdivision by virtue
of Ordinance 29-A.
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Doctrine: Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government unit of its police power and not the
power of eminent domain. Per Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code, the authority to reclassify land
primarily resides in the sanggunian of the city or municipality, and as the Ordinance has already
reclassified the land in this case to a residential area, it is no longer covered by CARP.

3. Requisites for creation, conversion, division, merger or dissolution

Population Requirement

Aldaba v. COMELEC (2010)

Facts: : Congress enacted Republic Act 9151 creating Malolos City using the projected population rate
instead of the current population rate to meet the population criteria in the Constitution.

Doctrine: Republic Act 9151 is unconstitutional because the Constitution requires an actual population
of 250,000 at the time of the city’s creation.

Territory Requirement

Navarro v. Ermita (2010)

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Facts: Navarro, et al. claim that Republic Act 9355, which creates the province of Dinagat Island, is
unconstitutional because it failed to comply with the land area requirement as the said province only has
a total land area of 802.12 sq. km.

Doctrine: Republic Act 9355 is unconstitutional because it failed to meet the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 sq. km. (the area need not be contiguous) as stipulated in the Local Government Code(LGC).
The Constitution mandates that the creation of Local Government Units must follow the criteria provided
in the LGC or else it will violate of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Navarro v. Ermita (2011)

Facts: Intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement

Doctrine: Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land area
requirement – when the Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or more islands – is
expressly stated in the Local Government Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites for the
creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local Government Code
Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR). The omission of the exemption in the case of provinces
was intended to be corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the true legislative intent. This will
also be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the contiguity and minimum land area requirements
for prospective local government units in order to achieve the desired results.
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Creation by Legislation

League of Cities v. COMELEC (2008)

Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 9009 which increased the annual requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million, but nevertheless approved 16
cityhood bills exempting them from the P100 million requirement.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for not complying with the P100 million income
requirement. Congress can only prescribe the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law (i.e. Cityhood laws). Since RA 9009 was enacted prior to the cityhood bills
then the cityhood bills should observe the same criteria.

League of Cities v. COMELEC (2009)

Facts: This involves a Motion for Reconsideration on the 2008 case.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional, for it is wrong to hold that the criteria for creation of
an LGU may not be provided for in any other law aside from the Local Government Code for this would
result in the conclusion that Republic Act 9009 which increased the income requirement is
unconstitutional. The only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause “in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code” is to lay stress that it is Congress alone -and
no other- which can impose the criteria.

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League of Cities v. COMELEC (2010)

Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the 2009 case.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for not complying with the P100 million income
requirement. The pendency or non-pendency of the cityhood bills is not a material difference so as to
distinguish one municipality from the other.

League of Cities v. COMELEC (Feb. 2011)

Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the 2010 case.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Congress intended that the 16 cities be exempted
from the requirement of Republic Act 9009 while the two bills (RA 9009 and 16 Cityhood Bills) were still
pending; Congress has the power to modify the Local Government Code and it did so for both RA 9009
and the Cityhood laws.

League of Cities v. COMELEC (Apr. 2011)

Facts: This involves a Motion for Reconsideration ad cautelam.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations showed
that Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate
during the 11th Congress, for Local Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of
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their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources).

Aquino and Robredo v. COMELEC (2010)

Facts: Aquino, et al. claim that the 1st district of Camarines Sur will no longer meet the minimum
population of 250,000 after Republic Act 9176 reapportions the 1st and 2nd legislative districts of
Camarines Sur.

Held: Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for a province. Records of
the Constitutional Commission show that the population was not the sole determinant of the creation of a
legislative district.

Sema v. COMELEC (2008)

Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 9054 by virtue of which Congress delegated to the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.

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Doctrine: Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be delegated
the power to create municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution but only
Congress may create provinces and cities.

Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (2011)

Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 10153 postponing the regional elections in the ARMM and
recognizing the President’s power to appoint Officers-In-Charge (OICs)to temporarily assume these
vacant positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

Doctrine: Synchronizing the ARMM elections to coincide with the country’s regular national and local
elections is not violative of the Constitution and of the autonomy of the ARMM. Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution gives the President the power to appoint “all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.” The grant of power to the President to appoint OICs is thus constitutional.

Composition

Ordillo v. COMELEC (1990)

Facts: In the plebiscite for the ratification of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) Organic Act, only
Ifugao province voted to be part of the CAR.

Doctrine: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear that the
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autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term “region” used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act of the
CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can constitute an autonomous region;
otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government
Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will be exercising executive and
legislative powers over the same area.

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (1990)

Facts: Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 220 creating the Cordillera Administrative
Region. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the EO claiming the creation of the Cordillera
Administrative Region by the President contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for
the provinces and the city which compose the CAR.

Doctrine: E.O. 220 is constitutional as it does not create an autonomous regional government but merely
created a region for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services. Furthermore, the bodies created by E.O. 220 do not supplant
the existing local governmental structure, nor do they serve as autonomous government agencies.

Plebiscite Requirement

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Bagabuyo v. COMELEC (2008)

Facts: Rogelio Bagabuyo argued that Republic Act 9371, which increased the legislative districts of
Cagayan de Oro from one to two, is not merely a legislative apportionment; hence, a plebiscite has to be
conducted per Sec. 8 of the Local Government Code.

Doctrine: A plebiscite is not required because what is involved is only a legislative apportionment. The
Constitution and LGC expressly require a plebiscite to effect any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a Local Government Unit (LGU) and since a legislative district is not a local
government unit or a political subdivision, no plebiscite is required for the creation, dissolution or other
similar actions on legislative districts.

Samson v. Aguirre (1999)

Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 8535 creating Novaliches City out of fifteen Quezon City
barangays. Moises Samson challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act 8535, alleging that a)
certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress during the
deliberations for the passage of RA 8535 b) that there was no certification attesting to the fact that the
mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of
Novaliches in terms of income, population and land area and that c) there was no seat of government
provided in the law for the proposed city of Novaliches.

Doctrine: RA 8535 is constitutional. The plebiscite requirement has been complied with, with all
constituents of Quezon City having been properly included and given the opportunity to raise issues on
the adverse effects on Quezon City by the creation of Novaliches City even before they voted on the
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principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches. Furthermore, the official statements of the
representatives from the Bureau of Local Government Finance and the NSO testifying that the combined
annual income and population of the fifteen barangays satisfied the requirements of the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations served the same purpose as the required
certifications. There was no need to consider the land area since the proposed city must comply with
requirements on income and population or land area. Though the law did not provide for a seat of
government, this is not fatal as under Sec. 12 of the Local Government Code, the City of Novaliches can
still establish a seat of government after its creation. Also, the chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor
Mathay, did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on the law in question, showing that
the creation of Novaliches City did not have any perceived adverse effect on Quezon City.

Tobias v. Abalos (1994)

Facts: Tobias questions the plebiscite held for Republic Act 7675, a law converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a highly-urbanized city, as it only included the people of Mandaluyong when,
according to Tobias, San Juan should have also been included as it once belonged to the same legislative
district as Mandaluyong.

Doctrine: The plebiscite is valid as the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly-urbanized city, and the matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of Mandaluyong.
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Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, et al. (1994)

Facts: President Garcia issued Executive Order (EO) 353 creating the Municipal District of San Andres,
which later became a municipality. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the EO because it
constitutes the usurpation of legislative power by the President. Respondents argued that the enactment
of the Local Government Code into law rendered the issue moot as the Municipality of San Andres has
turned into a de facto municipal corporation.

Doctrine: The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de facto
municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the existence of governmental
acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality) that point to the
state’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue
of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, which states that municipal districts “organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office” at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall be considered regular
municipalities, it has now attained the status of a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the
legality of EO 353 only thirty years after its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision should be timely raised.
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C. PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

Province of Batangas v. Romulo (2004)

Facts: Pres. Estrada created the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) which imposed a
set of criteria for release of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), which IRA should have been
automatically distributed to the LGUs.

Doctrine: The LGSEF is invalid as the President may not impose conditions on the release of the IRA
because such imposition of conditions is contrary to the principle of local autonomy. Also, the
Constitution and the Local Government Code mandate that Local Government Units (LGUs) are entitled to
a just share in the national taxes which share shall be determined by law and which must automatically
be released to the LGUs.

Sampiano v. Indar (2009)

Facts: After Sampiano filed a petition for annulment of proclamation against Ogka, the COMELEC issued
an order whereby Sampiano would discharge the functions as mayor so as to prevent paralysis to public
service pending determination and final resolution of the controversy. Ogka asked that the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the municipality be held and not released in the mean time.

Doctrine: The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under Sec. 286 is
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a mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget and Management to effect
automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government units, free from
any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government, but this automatic realease of the IRA from
the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending its release to
particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in court as to the rights of the parties to
receive the IRA.

National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes (2004)

Facts: The Liga ng mga Barangay claims that the appointment of DILG Sec. Barbers as Interim Caretaker
of the Liga until a new set of officers have been duly elected and assumed office (due to alleged election
irregularities) amounts to undue interference by the DILG.

Doctrine: The DILG’s acts are tantamount to exercise of control, and Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution
provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments,
which excludes the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s
authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor
does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.
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Disomangcop v. Datumanong (2004)

Facts: Republic Act 6074, the first Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Organic Act, as
implemented by Executive Order 426, devolved the functions of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) in ARMM to the regional government. The DPWH Secretary then issued Department
Order 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering office which shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of
Lanao del Sur (both of which are part of the ARMM). Republic Act 8999 was signed into law by Pres.
Estrada which established an engineering district in the 1st district of Lanao del Sur. Subsequently,
Republic Act 9054 was passed, transferring and devolving the administrative and fiscal management of
public works and funds for public works to the Autonomous Regional Government.

Doctrine: Because Republic Act 8999 sought to create an office the functions of which have been
previously devolved to the regional government, it in effect sought to amend RA 6074 and as such, RA
8999 never became operative as any law amending RA 6074 must first be approved by the people of
ARMM through a plebiscite.This holding is concommitant with the devolution of functions of the DPWH
to the regional government of ARMM. Devolution pertains to the transfer of powers, responsibilities and
resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government
units, thereby granting greater autonomy to local government units in recognition of their right to self-
government, to make them self-reliant and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities.
D.O. 119, as it runs counter to E.O. 426 and R.A. 9054, is also inoperative.

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Pimentel v. Executive Secretary (2012)

Facts: Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel claims that the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program involves
the recentralization of government funds as the Department of Social Welfare and Development has full
control over the identification of the beneficiaries and the manner of delivery of such services.

Doctrine: There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the National Government under the General Appropriations Act,
even if the said program is within the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services involved in the
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are funded by the National Government, which it may designate to
implementing agencies such as the DSWD. The concept of local autonomy does imply the establishment
of local government units into mini-states, as what is involved in local autonomy is decentralization of
administration and not of power.

Civil Service Commission v. Quida-Yu (2012)

Facts: The Department of Health (DOH) refused to recognize Dr. Yu, the Provincial Health Officer (PHO)
II appointed by the Basilan governor, as Chief of Hospital II after the Basilan General Hospital was re-
nationalized because DOH claims that the PHO position never devolved to Basilan.

Doctrine: The PHO position devolved to the LGU as devolution involves the absorption of personnel
from former national offices, including the Basilan General Hospital. As the PHO position occupied by Dr.
Yu was re-nationalized and as Dr. Yu was one of the personnel reverted to the DOH, she acquired a
vested right to the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II, and should not have been made to retain
her original item of PHO II.
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San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (1991)

Facts: The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) recommended the appointment of private
respondent Cecilia Almajose, disregarding the letter of the Rizal governor endorsing Dalisay Santos for
the position of Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal.

Doctrine: The recommendatory power of the Governor is not merely directory. As such, if the
recommended nominee failed to meet the requirements set by law, the DBM may choose not to appoint
him/her but the DBM may not appoint persons other than those recommended by the governor and
should instead ask the governor to submit a new list of nominees. When a law is capable of two
interpretations (one for centralized power and another, beneficial to local autonomy), the law must be
interpreted in favor of autonomy.

Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)

Facts: The President issued Administrative Order 372, pursuant to his general power of supervision over
local governments, commanding all local government units to identify and implement measures to
reduce their expenditures for the year by at least twenty-five percent, and withholding an amount
equivalent to 10% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from the local government units pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation.
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Doctrine: The withholding of the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, and encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concommittant with the local government units’ fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
of its IRA.

Tan v. COMELEC (1986)

Facts: Tan, et al. argued that Batas Pambansa (BP) 885, which provides for the creation of the province of
Negros del Norte, is unconstitutional as it mandated the conduct of a plebiscite only in the areas which
shall compose the new province of Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas
of the parent province Negros Occidental, which areas, Tan argued, will be similarly affected by the said
creation of a new province.

Doctrine: BP 885 is unconstitutional as it contravenes Sec. 3, Article XI of the then prevailing 1973
Constitution, which states that no province may be created or divided, or its boundary substantially
altered without the “approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.” All the
cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental compose the units affected, and not merely
those which shall compose the new province. Thus, the parent province of Negros Occidental should be
included in the plebiscite since the result of the creation of a new province will affect Negros Occidental’s
territory, population and economy.
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Tan v. Perena (2005)

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan in Cebu issued Municipal Ordinance 7 which provides
that a maximum of 3 cockpits shall be allowed in their municipality despite the fact that Presidential
Decree (PD) 449 (Cockfighting Law) states that only one cockpit is allowed in each city/municipality,
unless its population is over 100,000 people, in which case 2 cockpits shall be allowed.

Doctrine: Albeit the Sangguniang Bayan is granted the power to authorize and license the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits in line with the policy of local autonomy in the Constitution, its
discretion is limited as it cannot authorize acts which contravene the Constitution nor laws passed by
Congress. As such, Municipal Ordinance 7 is void for contravening PD 449.

Batangas CATV v. CA (2004)

Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City passed Resolution 210 allowing Batangas CATV to
operate in the area and charge its subscribers provided that the increase in rates charged must first be
approved by the Sanggunian. Batangas CATV did otherwise, and increased its rates without securing the
Sanggunian’s approval.

Doctrine: While a local government unit may prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of
the Local Government Code, it may only do so as regards the use of public properties or the “physical
realities” of a constructive CATV system, such as use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of
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structures and the parceling of large regions. As such, Resolution 210 is invalid as it is the National
Telecommunications Commission and not the Sangguniang Panglungsod that has the power to regulate
the industry by prescribing regulatory measures and approving the increase or decrease of rates.

Veloso v. COA (2011)

Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the disbursement of funds for exemplary public
service awards granted by Ordinance 8040 (of the City of Manila) to elective local officials of Manila who
have been elected for three consecutive terms because it argued that this would amount to double
compensation.

Doctrine: While the local government units have fiscal autonomy, their disbursements are still within
COA’s audit jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Local Government Code and the Constitution prohibits double
compensation, unless specifically authorized by Congress.

ACORD v. Executive Secretary Zamora (2005)

Facts: Under the General Appropriations Act of 2000, P10 billion classified as “Unprogrammed Fund”
was provided in addition to the original amount allotted to fund the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
but withheld until the revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress was met.

Doctrine: The withholding of the P10 billion is unconstitutional as it contravenes the constitutional
mandate providing for the automatic release of the IRA to local governments units as their just share in
the national taxes.
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D. POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs)

1. Police power (general welfare clause)

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (2005)

Facts: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary and the Department of Public
Works and Highways Secretary entered into a Memorandum of Agreement providing for the use of a
parcel of land in San Mateo as a sanitary landfill. The Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo in turn passed a
resolution banning the opening of dumpsites within its jurisdiction.
Doctrine: The Court held that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo has the right to pass a resolution
preventing the opening of a dumpsite within its territorial jurisdiction because of the detrimental effect
to the health and safety of San Mateo residents and its adverse effect on the environment and sources of
water. This is pursuant to its right to promote the general welfare of its inhabitants.

Rimando v. Naguilan Emission Testing Center (2012)

Facts: Naguilan Emission Testing Center applied for a business permit which Mayor Rimando refused to
grant. The former filed a mandamus case against Mayor Rimando to compel him to issue the business
permit.

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Doctrine: Mayor Rimando cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since its
issuance is a delegated police power and thus, discretionary and not merely ministerial. The power of the
municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to the general welfare clause in Section 16 the Local
Government Code. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.

Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City and the MMDA (2011)

Facts: Gancayco questioned the validity of Quezon City Ordinance 2904 which required commercial
buildings to provide arcades in front of their establishments for pedestrians.

Doctrine: Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of the
Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of buildings. Property
rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police power, but the
methods and means used in exercising such power to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The ordinance in question is valid as the city’s
primary goal in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the city since these arcardes were
intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for pedestrians.
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The Learning Center and Spouses Alfonso v. Ayala Alabang Homeowners Association (2010)

Facts: The Ayala-Alabang Homeowners Association sued the spouses Alfredo for breach of contract
because the spouses built a grade school on the property in addition to the preparatory school indicated
in the title. The spouses argued that the association had no basis to enforce the restriction in the title as
an ordinance had been passed reclassifying the land on which the grade school was built from residential
to institutional.

Doctrine: Although the land had validly been classified as institutional by the zoning ordinance, the
restriction must still be upheld because the land was situated within a residential area. The increased
traffic that would be brought about by the expansion of preparatory school (with the addition of the
grade school) would effectively prevent the adjacent property owners from enjoying their own
properties.

Ortigas and Co. v. Feati Bank (1996)

Facts: Ortigas sued Feati Bank for building a commercial building contrary to its contract. Feati Bank
argued that the land in question was reclassified into a commercial zone by virtue of a Mandaluyong
resolution.

Doctrine: The Mandaluyong resolution is a valid exercise of police power, and Ortigas cannot prevent
Feati Bank from building a commercial building on the land. While the non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute as it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
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of police power. The Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act 2264) grants municipal councils the power to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr. (2007)

Facts: The Social Justice Society, by way of mandamus, sought to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce
Ordinancy 8027 (which restricts the use of the properties of Caltex, Shell and Petron in the Pandacan
area from being used as oil terminals and reclassified the area of Pandacan from industrial to
commercial) and remove all the oil terminals.

Doctrine: The Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza the duty, as chief executive of the
city, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. The mandamus, having met
the criteria, is granted as it is Mayor Atienza’s ministerial duty to enforce the said ordinance and remove
the oil terminals.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. (2008)

Facts: Caltex, Shell, and Petron argued that Ordinance 8027 is an invalid exercise of police power
because it is unfair and oppressive as it prohibits the said corporations from doing business.

Doctrine: Ordinance 8027 was a valid exercise of police power as it was enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Manila which, as the City of Manila’s legislative body, is authorized to exercise police
power. Furthermore, the City of Manila properly exercised its police power because there was 1) a lawful
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subject (i.e., the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State), and there was used 2) a lawful method (since the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals). The Sanggunian was compelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan terminals. Lastly,
only the use of the properties as oil terminals was restricted, as the corporations may still use the said
properties for other purposes.

Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner (2005)

Facts: The City Council of Lucena passed Ordinances 1631 and 1778 which prohibited outside buses and
jeepneys from entering the city and a policy that they will load and unload passengers only in the
common terminal.

Doctrine: Both ordinances are an improper exercise of police power as they went beyond what was
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Per the requirements of the proper exercise of police
power (a lawful subject and lawful method), there was a lawful subject in the form of traffic congestion,
but the method employed was not lawful as allowing only one terminal to have full control of bus-
jeepney terminal activities would subject users to unduly oppressive fees, rentals and charges.

Parayno v. Jovellanos (2006)

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Facts: Parayno argued that Resolution 50, which recommended to the Mayor of Calasiao the transfer or
closure of the former’s gasoline station pursuant to an ordinance prohibiting the placement of gasoline
service stations within 100 meters away from any school, church, or hospital is an invalid exercise of
police power.

Doctrine: The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served as its
basis only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school, church or hospital, and
not gasoline filling stations. The ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline filling stations and
gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and not the former. Also, there was no due process as the
Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged nuisance (Parayno’s gasoline filling station) without
proper judicial proceedings.

City of Manila v. Laguio (2005)

Facts: The Malate Tourist Development Corporation assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance 7774
which prohibits hotels and motels in certain areas of Ermita-Malate.

Doctrine: Ordinance 7774 is an invalid exercise of police power as the closing down and transfer of
hotels, motels, and other businesses prohibited under it has no reasonable relation to the promotion and
protection of social and moral values of Manila. The prohibition of hotels and motels in the Ermita-Malate
area will not per se protect and promote the welfare of the community from prostitution, adultery,
fornication, or the spread of sexual disease.
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White Light Corp v. City of Manila (2009)

Facts: The City of Manila issued Ordinance 7744 prohibiting short-time admission rates (booking rooms
for less than 12 hours) in hotels, motels, and other similar establishments to lower the rate of illicit
activities. White Light Corp, owner of several hotels and motels in the area, assailed the ordinance for
being violative of the right to privacy and the freedom of movement.

Doctrine: The Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power and is unconstitutional. To be valid, an
ordinance must be within the local government unit’s corporate powers to enact and must a) not
contravene the Constitution or any statute, b) not be unfair or oppresive, c) not be partial or
discriminatory, d) not prohibit but may regulate trade, e) must be consistent with public policy and f)
must not be unreasonable. In this case, the goal (minimizing or eliminating the use of the establishments
covered by the ordinance for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and other illicit activities) is lawful, but the
means employed was an arbitrary intrusion into private rights since it also had the effect of prohibiting
the legitimate use of the said establishments. The means of enforcement must be reasonably necessary to
attain the purpose of the ordinance and there must be no other alternative action less intrusive of private
rights.

2. Eminent domain

Albon v. Fernando (2006)

Facts: Albon filed a taxpayer’s suit against the City of Marikina for using public funds to repair private
property via the issuance of Ordinance 59 which provides for public works to widen, clear and repair the
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sidewalk of Marikina Greenheights subdivision.

Doctrine: The Ordinance is valid but the case was remanded to determine whether it is the City or the
subdivision that owned the sidewalks. Such determination is important as Sec. 335 of the Local
Government Code provides that public money cannot be used for private purposes.

City of Manila v Chinese Community (1919)

Facts: The City of Manila wanted to expropriate land, used as a cemetery, for the extension of Rizal
Avenue. The Chinese Community claims that the expropriation was not necessary because there were
other lots which could be expropriated for the same purpose.

Doctrine: Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the right of
expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where the statute does not
designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a particular property
is a question for the courts to decide. In this case, the first condition on expropriation by the City of
Manila was met, as the land sought to be expropriated is private but the second condition (public
purpose) was not met as it was not shown that the extension of the street was necessary and its
extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as other lots have been offered to
the city free of charge.
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Figuracion v. Libi (2007)

Facts: Figuracion’s land was expropriated by the City of Cebu to extend N. Escario Street and as not all of
the land was used, the remainder was reconveyed to Figuracion. The Libis (who occupied the remainder
of the said land) opposed the reconveyance to Figuracion.

Doctrine: Reversion is a proceeding where the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain or the
improvements thereon through cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over it.
The Local Government Code grants local government units the power of reversion of public roads and the
Revised Charter of the City of Cebu states that property withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose, which includes reconveyance to the previous owner. As such, the City of Cebu
had every right to reconvey the remainder of the land to Figuracion.

Spouses Yusay v. CA (2011)

Facts: Spouses Yusay argued that Resolution 552, which authorized the expropriation of the land of the
spouses Yusay for the development of low-cost housing, is invalid as it does not satisfy the requirement
that an ordinance first be passed authorizing the mayor to exercise the power to expropriate.

Doctrine: The resolution is not a valid authorization for the mayor to exercise the power to expropriate
as he can only exercise the power of eminent domain through an ordinance, which is a law possessing a
general and permanent character, as opposed to a resolution which is merely a declaration of a sentiment
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or opinion of a law-making body on a specific matter and which is temporary in nature.

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA (1993)

Facts: The Solicitor General claims that before Camarines Sur can expropriate property (by virtue of
Resolution 129) for the purposes of putting up a farm and housing project for government employees,
the province must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

Doctrine: Expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is not subject to the prior
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary as Sec. 9 of the Local Government Code does
not require the approval of the DAR Secretary for converting agricultural land to non-agricultural land. It
is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether expropriation is for a
public purpose or for public use since expropriation is an expression of legislative policy.

Masikip v. Pasig City (2006)

Facts: Masikip assailed Ordinance 42 (which authorizes the Mayor of Pasig to expropriate Masikip’s lot
to build a sports and development and recreational activity center for Barangay Caniogan residents), and
argued that there is no genuine necessity for the expropriation because there exists an established sports
development and recreational activity center being used by residents of the said Barangay.

Doctrine: The Court cited the case of City of Manila v. Arellano Law College to emphasize that the
necessity for the expropriation must be reasonable or of practical necessity (not an absolute one), which
would “combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the
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condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. In this case, there was no
genuine necessity for the expropriation because the sports and recreation facility envisioned to be built
was not for a public purpose but merely for the exclusive use of the residents of the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association.

Barangay Sindalan v. CA (2007)

Facts: The spouses Magtoto argued that the plan to expropriate part of their property in order to make a
feeder road leading to the municipal road is actually for the private use of the homeowners of Davsan II
Subdivision.

Doctrine: There was no genuine necessity for the expropriation because only the subdivision residents
would benefit from the feeder road. Although the public nature of the prospective exercise of
expropriation cannot depend on the “numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness
of the community to be benefited”, the essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for
the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use.

JIL Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig (2005)

Facts: An ordinance was issued authorizing the Mayor to initiate expropriation of Cuangcos property to
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be converted into a road leading to a barangay which was a fire hazard. However, the Cuangcos told Pasig
City that they sold the land to JIL Christian School, and JIL claims that there was no valid and definite
offer made to them by Pasig City.

Doctrine: The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local
government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an ordinance enacted
by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; b) The
power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was no offer
because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to the engineer’s office only proved its
intent to acquire the property for a right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.

Antonio v. Geronimo (2005)

Facts: Antonio, against whom Catolos filed an unlawful detainer suit, moved to stay the demolition of his
property on Catolos’ land because he contends that the two resolutions passed by Pasig City authorizing
the expropriation of Catolos’ land (passed while the demolition was taking place) were supervening
events that rendered the demolition unjust and inequitable.

Doctrine: The resolutions for expropriation were not supervening events because the rule is that if
judgment is rendered against the defendant, it is immediately executory. Also, the Mayor cannot exercise
the power of eminent domain pursuant to two resolutions of the municipal council as he may only do so
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pursuant to an ordinance.

Ortega v. City of Cebu (2009)

Facts: Cebu contends that the price set by the Regional Trial Court on the expropriated property of the
Ortega’s land was beyond the reach of the intended beneficiaries of the socialized housing program.

Doctrine: The determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, and Cebu discontinued the
expropriation just because the compensation fixed is beyond its financial capacity. An order fixing just
compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation.

3. Taxing power

Ongsuco v. Malones (2009)

Facts: Petitioners, stall holders at the market, argued that a public hearing was required for the
imposition of the fees imposed by Ordinance 89-01, which raised the rental and goodwill fees for the
Maasin Public Market. Maasin countered that the ordinance is not a tax measure but involved the
operation and management of an economic enterprise of the municipality.

Doctrine: The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making the
municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing conducted as mandated
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by Sec. 186 of the Local Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances levying taxes, fees
or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing.

GSIS v. City Treasurer of Manila (2009)

Facts: The City Treasurer assessed real property taxes on the 2 properties owned by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), but GSIS argued that both its old charter and current charter exempt it
from all forms of taxes.

Doctrine: GSIS is exempt from real property tax because as an instrumentality of the national
government, the GSIS is outside the scope of local taxation. Although the Local Government Code (LGC)
stripped the GSIS of its tax exemption, Republic Act 8291 later restored the said exemption. However,
realty taxes may be assessed on the GSIS property being leased by Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), but
the said taxes shall be paid by the taxable entity (i.e., MHC) pursuant to the “beneficial use” principle
under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC which provides that the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is
chargeable against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it, regardless of
whether or not it is the owner.

Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications (2006)

Facts: Bayantel holds a legislative franchise whereby it was granted exemption from real estate taxes by
virtue of the term “exclusive of the franchise” qualifying the phrase “same taxes on its real estate,
building and personal property,” found in Sec. 14 of its franchise, Republic Act 3259. However, the Local
Government Code (LGC) withdrew exemptions from real estate taxes for properties of whatever kind
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located within Metro Manila. Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act 7633 which restored the realty
tax exemption granted by Bayantel’s original franchise. The Quezon City government enacted a local
Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties in its territorial jurisdiction and thus
expressly withdrew all tax exemption privileges in general.

Doctrine: Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously
withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative
bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and limitations as
Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of
the Local Government Code which provides that “a province or city or municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property…not hereinafter
specifically exempted,” the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the
taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase “exclusive of this franchise”
in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayante’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC,
shows the intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing power
all of the franchisee’s properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

MIAA v. CA (2006)

Facts: The Office of Government Corporate Counsel withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by the Manila
International Airport Authority (or the MIAA, whose charter exempts it from real estate tax) arguing that
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Sec. 193 of the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly withdraws the tax exemption privileges of
government-owned and controlled corporations.

Doctrine: MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate
tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality refers
to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states
that the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This
constitutes a limitation imposed by Congress on the local government’s exercise of the power to tax.
Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed
strictly against local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax.

Quezon City v. ABS-CBN (2008)

Facts: The Quezon City Revenue Code imposed a franchise tax on businesses within its jurisdiction.
Republic Act 7966 granted ABS-CBN a franchise which provided that it would pay franchise tax
equivalent to 3% of gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes. Quezon City argued that the “in lieu of other
taxes” clause could not have been intended to prevail over the constitutional mandate ensuring the
viability and self-sufficiency of local government units.

Doctrine: While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create