Case digest

Paat vs. CA GR # 111107

FACTS:
On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman, while on its way to Bulacan from
San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the DENR personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan, the CENRO in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation.

On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.
Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private
respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be
denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary."

Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private respondents against
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,
ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending that private respondents had no cause of action for
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question.

Hence, this present petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners. By
virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order
of petitioners was granted by this Court.

ISSUE:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin
prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding?

HELD:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought.

The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent
any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment
of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is
no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
 However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon
by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.

Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9)when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which
is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's
prerogative.

Full text

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director

(RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA
DE GUZMAN,respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled
The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de
Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15)
days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private
respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive
Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2Subsequently, the case
was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their
letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should
be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin,
docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan 4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the
return of the truck to private respondents. 6Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion
to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition
for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's
order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9 with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution
dated September 27, 1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was
granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant
to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to
avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine
upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and
(2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest
products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the
opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction
then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons,
for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility
is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there
is irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21 (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it
was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private
respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private
respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did
avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be
considered as an appeal to the
Secretary. 24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and
disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain
remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for
replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. 25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 26 which was reiterated in the
recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, 27 this Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore
stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions
of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because
they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to
stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. 28 One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. 29 In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, 31 as in the instant
case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a
letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of
Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco, 32 we ruled that :

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the
administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted
that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The
pertinent provision reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipments,implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only
because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the
subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents'
interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the
other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative
To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned,
and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter .
(Emphasis ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting
conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a
way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. 33 Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as
will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In this wise, the observation
of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present situations
and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country,"
that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative
remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is
intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most
revealing:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of

the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected

through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules
and regulations;
 WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical
difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts

more responsive to present situations and realities;"

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate,
not only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68 . If as
private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through
the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put,
Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO
277, supra. 35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted
in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not
used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of
private respondents, reads in part, viz.:

. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the
crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could
a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code. . . 36

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the
truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of
theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same
order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:

. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order
No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of
forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in
the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for
a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. . . 37

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other
than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents
could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then
necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We
disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the
provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis
ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
 Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall bepunished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1,
E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting,
gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense
independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty
to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the
language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined
and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and
explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 38

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners
for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to
Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of
the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of
action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents'
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant
wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that
are unlawfully detained. 39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody," 40 and it has been held
that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim
of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is
sufficient. 41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by
his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by
the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized
under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property. 42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject
truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was
transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68
of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the
confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention
of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the
said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts
may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision
shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved
party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No.
 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16,
1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order
promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to
resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.