General theoretical part:

Development (e.g. public services): discrepancies between origins and destinations have asked how
standard of living issues and developmental policies affect returnees
Economic consideration (e.g. availability of employment): reintegration through an economic lens
have looked into cross-country differences between origin and destination in terms of employment
and entrepreneurship opportunities, earning differentials, economic risk, availability of occupational
choices and divergencies in the premium on skills
Security: both of the above are conditioned on security; thus this is the most prominent variable
shaping return rates and experiences of post-conflict return and reintegration
Corruption: recently a study on Iraqi kurds argued, that returnees, who are more sensitive to
corruption as a result of spending time possibly in a more developed country. Moreover, struggling
with reintegration might result in attributing this to external problems, further increasing the
Time
Distance
Push and pull factors
KAGAN ARTICLE-LEGAL FRAMEWORK
REPATRIATION IS VOLUNTARY: only two exception if a refugee is expelled for nationatoal
security reasons and if the refugee status has ceased to exist as result of the circumstances of the exile
has ceased to exist.
The cautious plan that UNHCR laid out after the invasion does not reflect the way repatriation actually
occurred. Rather than refugees choosing their durable solution, it would be more accurate to say that
the international community strives to achieve a humane implementation of predetermined solutions.
But when free choice is actually required, the information, counseling, and monitoring provided for in
UNHCR’s existing standards are necessary but not sufficient. Refugees must have real alternatives.
This gap rendered UNHCR’s standards largely unworkable in the context of Iraq. Lacking other
alternatives, many refugees “chose” the politically preferred solution of return. UNHCR’s admirable
official hesitation about return was not reflected on the ground, and UNHCR felt pressure to provide
some order to returns that were happening anyway.
Iraq History and demographics
Most of the population being Arab (70%), followed by Kurds (25%). Shia Muslims make up 65-70%
and form the majority and the rest belong to other religious minorities..
Insurgency agaisnt foreign troops arised, Baathist leaders joined them. Reported acts of violence
conducted by an uneasy tapestry of insurgents steadily increased by the end of 2006.Al Qaeda in Iraq
continued to target Shia civilians, notably in the 23 February 2006 attack on the Al Askari Mosque in
Samarra, one of Shi'ite Islam's holiest sites. A cycle of violence thus ensued whereby Sunni
insurgent attacks were followed reprisals by Shiite militias, often in the form of Shi'ite death
squads that sought out and killed Sunnis. Following a surge in U.S. troops in 2007 and 2008,
violence in Iraq began to decrease.
Entire neighborhoods in Baghdad were ethnically cleansed by Shia and Sunni militias and sectarian
violence has broken out in every Iraqi city where there is a mixed population
As Fearon sumamrized: The civil war in Iraq began in 2004 as a primarily urban guerrilla struggle by
Sunni insurgent groups hoping to drive out the United States and to regain the power held by Sunnis
under Saddam Hussein. It escalated in 2006 with the proliferation and intensification of violence by
Shiite militias, who ostensibly seek to defend Shiites from the Sunni insurgents and who have
pursued this end with "ethnic cleansing" and a great deal of gang violence and thuggery
After 2003, refugees started going back on their own, without any reintegration plan (probably as a
cause of push factors from their exile e.g. Lebanon started organizing repatriation).
Return was spontaneous and out of desperation mainly.
Most importantly, it is impossible to know how much Iraqi refugees were “pulled” back by the fall of
the Ba’ath regime relative to how much they were “pushed” by poor conditions in their host countries.
None of the neighbouring states gave extensive rights to Iraqi refugees.

THE return of refugees and internally displaced persons: from coercion to sustainability
Dayton Agreement annex 7, provided a right to return to their domiciles. This was done through the
cooperation of local and international officials – through the use of bribes, threat and other leverage
available. International policy had worked on the assumption that the majority of refugees and IDPs
would want to return voluntarily to their pre-war homes. However, many refugees and IDPs did not
share this aspiration in the short- or in the medium-term, and many did not aspire to return at all.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees had been granted permanent status in their host countries. – the
return of refugees study. After 1997, most of potential returnees would have been in minority. This
was prioritized from 1997-2000).
„It is vital to note that by far the majority of minority returns were individual, voluntary and
spontaneous, which meant that they returned on their own initiative, without international assistance
or approval from the local authorities. High-profile organized repatriation by the international
community only made up for a minor proportion of return movements (see further, Roberto Belloni,
this volume).”
Voluntary return institutionalizes ethnic divisions.
Possible pitfalls: returning minority refugees established their parallel institutiosn Furthermore,
placing return so high up the agenda made the issue automatically politicized, and therefore
confrontational, instead of adopting a more consensus-based and less politicized approach.
UNHCR PLAN
Refugees
Policy promoting voluntary repatriation was the central aim of UNCHR/ Voluntary repatriation
became central to solve large-scale influxes of refugees. However, there’s an internal contradiction
here.
On the one hand, to prevent mass starvation, aid is obviously needed; yet to provide assistance risks
that yet more people will be attracted across borders. A delicate balance must be struck. Aid must be
evenly distributed on a per capita basis, and assistance should not be so generous to make the refugees
better off than their hosts. Too little assistance and the humanitarian community gets a bad name. And,
in fundamental contradiction with the emphasis upon integration as a permanent solution, too much
assistance and the refugees will be encouraged to settle down in the host country.
Most of the refugees are in Iran, Jordan (mostly Shia) Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden. A ginificant
percentage of them lived in exile for 10 or more years.
Physical safety of returnees must be assured by the authorities in Iraq and includes the end of violence
and insecurity and the establishment of operational law enforcement institutions;
Material safety includes access to means of survival and basic services in the early phases of return,
such as potable water, food and basic health services. This should be followed by measures to underpin
sustainable reintegration.
Legal Safety relates to redress for human rights violations, non-discrimination and unhindered access
to justice.
Only when these are sufficed, wanted the UNCHR begin facilitating return. The plan limited itself to
“minimal basic assistance”
In this context, and within its 4Rs programming concept (Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation
and
Reconstruction), it is essential for UNHCR to:
i) integrate its return and initial reinsertion plans with those of other actors;
ii) ensure that the needs of returnees are incorporated in the transition, recovery and development
plans;
iii) develop partnerships with relevant local institutions, UN agencies, NGOs and other bilateral and
multilateral bodies; and, most importantly
iv) encourage the local authorities to take ownership of the return, reintegration, rehabilitation and
reconstruction plans and activities.

„The orderly and humane return or voluntary relocation of those whose homes were occupied or
destroyed. This will be a major protection challenge, which concerns especially ethnic Kurds,
Turkmen, Assyrians and Shia Arabs in various parts of the country”
However, the 2003 was only a preliminary one, not anticipating the large influx of returnees.
Plus, there was a housing shortage, which was not adressed by the UNHCR, and domestic political
forces used it ultimately as described by Jenne, I.e. for the purposes of homogenizing their
consituencies.
Return was unguided.
According to interview, however, they only return to places where they are safe. Given that security is
organized locally. E.g.: large part of them return to Baghdad.
No substantial pull factors. Push factors were more prominent

GOING HOME: PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS

Return meant in BiH and Croatia a right to return to their homes of origin, which is a special case, as
usually the right to return only rffer to the right to return to a country. However,
Return =/= reintegration
UNHCR programs for delign with refugees in post-conflict situations: 4Rs: repatriation, reintegration,
rehabilitation, reconstruction
The question of sustainbility:
Iraqis interview, who returned to Denmark after repatriation noted several reasons behind coming back
to exile:
The homeland has changed;
2. The refugee has changed during time in exile;
3. A feeling of not belonging in the homeland;
4. Insufficient information about the country of origin;
5. The desire to leave the exile country as motive for repatriation;
6. The household is divided on the decision to repatriate;
7. Country of origin is a post-conflict society;
8. Particularly vulnerable as a returnee;
9. Difficulties finding work or starting a business;
10. Lack of public services in the country of origin.46
In Iraq, as was in BiH as well, property restitution is crucial in reconciliation. Failure to resolve
property disputes delay and prevent returns.

Reasons for return (as mapped by the UNHCR)

security had improved, and they want to be reunited with family and friends; unable to work and
lacking adequate assistance, they have exhausted their savings and feared the winter period when the
cost of living rises sharply; inability to access food rations and other government services; residency
pressures: their residence permit has expired and cannot be renewed; desire to collect income, pension
or rent, or check on (or sell) properties, following rumours that unclaimed properties would be
confiscated by the government – they then hope to return to Syria; a lack of assistance and/or timely
opportunity for resettlement; returning to Iraq for the start of the (delayed) school year.
Consistently there is, however, a real concern among the returnees.
Bosnian case:
In Bosnia, the restoriation of multi-ethnicity was the aim, to undo ethnic cleansing.

After the initial return movement from 1996 to 1997, the process seemed to be at an end. At the start
of 1998, most of the remaining refugees and IDPs, almost 1.5 million people, would have been in the
minority if they had returned to their original homes. In late 1997, there was a policy shift towards
much more direct international intervention in promoting the Dayton Annex 7 aim of a population
return to the status quo ante of 1991. The Bonn Peace Implementation Council called upon the High
Representative to use his ‘full authority to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding
decisions. . .[and to] take actions against persons holding public office or officials. . .found by the High
Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms
for its implementation’.14 With the coercive mechanisms in place, the international community now
decided that it was time to prioritize the thorny question of minority return.
As it was observed, voluntary return institutionalized ethnic divisions and strenghtened the hold of
nationalist elites. For example, a tactic employed was ’hostile relocation’ during which ethnic elites
placed groups of people in housing belonging to other ethnic groups. Thus, forcing the issue of minorit
return was seen as the solution.
However, the issue here is not straightforward. While this procedure is unjust, some argue that without
relocation the country would not normalize and began to develop. So in the cases in which individuals
don’t accept domicile return (for example because of present situations), normalization of the country
takes precedent over unmixing.
Given that minority return is already hard in itself to achieve, and even harder to sustain amidst security
issues and various kind of discriminations. Can in such circumstances social and economic relation be
reestablished or parallel institutions would emerge?
Similarly, in BiH, many of the displaced who received a compensation for their property did not return,
but used the money to live elsewhere.