 REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No.

115748, August 7, 1996) - Upon careful scrutiny of the

allegations in petitioner’s Second Amended Complaint, as well as the particulars sought by
private respondents in their motion for a bill of particulars, we find no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in granting private respondents’ motion.

Under paragraph 6-A of the Amended Complaint, the Companies alleged to be beneficially
owned or controlled by defendants Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the other
individual defendants were identified and enumerated, including herein corporate respondents.
17 But except for this bare allegation, the complaint provided no further information with
respect to the manner by which herein corporate respondents are beneficially owned or
controlled by the individual defendants. Clearly, the allegation is a conclusion of law that is
bereft of any factual basis.

In paragraph 14-C it is alleged that improper payments were given to Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos in the form of gifts, bribes, commissions and dividends in various sums in consideration
of the Marcoses’ continued support to defendant Lucio Tan’s diversified ventures and/or the
former’s ownership or interests in said business ventures. 18 But in like manner, no factual
allegation was made as to the form and extent of support given by the Marcos spouses to the
corporations alleged to be owned by Lucio Tan. Again the allegation is a mere conclusion with
no basis in fact.

Equally wanting in specificity is petitioner’s allegation that private respondents should be held
jointly and severally liable for actual damages respecting the pecuniary loss sustained by
petitioner as a result of private respondents’ unlawful acts. Without specifying the amount and
extent of damages suffered, private respondents cannot be expected to properly respond to this
allegation since there is no basis from which to determine whether petitioner’s claim for actual
damages is justified or not.

The aforementioned particulars sought by private respondents are material facts, which as
previously held, "should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may
be prepared to meet the issues at the trial." 19

There is no merit to the contention that the particulars sought by the private respondents in
their motion refer to mere details or evidentiary matters whose proper place is during the pre-
trial and trial proper. A party’s right to move for a bill of particulars in accordance with Section 1
of Rule 12 when the allegations of the complaint are vague and uncertain is intended to afford a
party not only a chance to properly prepare a responsive pleading but also an opportunity to
prepare an intelligent answer. This is to avert the danger where the opposition party will find
difficulty in squarely meeting the issues raised against him and plead the corresponding
defenses which is not timely raised in the answer will be deemed waived. Thus, it was
pronounced in Virata v. Sandiganbayan 20 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The proper preparation of an intelligent answer requires information as to the precise nature,
character, scope and extent of the cause of action in order that the pleader may be able to
squarely meet the issues raised, thereby circumscribing them within determined confines and
preventing surprises during the trial, and in order that he may set forth his defenses which may
not be so readily availed of if the allegations controverted are vague, indefinite, uncertain or are
mere general conclusions. The latter task assumes added significance because defenses not
pleaded (save those excepted in Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court and, whenever
appropriate, the defense of prescription) in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

With respect however to paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Amended Complaint, we do

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 not find it necessary for petitioner to specify whether any of the acts referred therein pertain to
herein corporate respondents on account of petitioner’s admission that by the very nature of
the causes of action, it is clear that the specified acts referred to in said paragraphs are imputed
to the individual defendants. 21

In the same vein, the particular acts alleged to have been committed singly or collectively with
the other defendants are already laid out in detail under petitioner’s Specific Averments of
Defendant’s Illegal Acts in the Amended Complaint, 22 hence, need no further clarification.

 LUCIO TAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 84195, December 11, 1989) We also sustain the
Sandiganbayan because the PCGG's complaint (as amended); from our vantage point, does set
out allegations, however confusingly put in print, which, interrelated to one another, are
enough to support a formal civil charge. If the petitioners are not aware of the PCGG's
asseverations, the remedy, so we hold, is to deny the same in their answer for lack of
"knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 20 the said averments.
They can not, however, demand for any more particulars without actually making the PCGG
expose its evidence unnecessarily before the trial stage.

 JOSE BARITUA, ET. AL. vs. NIMFA DIVINA MERCADER, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 136048, January 23, 2001)
- We are not impressed. It must be noted that petitioners' counsel manifested in open court his
desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985
within which to do so.14 He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven
days past the deadline set by the trial court.15 Moreover, such motion was already moot and
academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several other
pleadings to the amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:

 NATIONAL WATERWORKS, ET AL. vs. NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNION, ET AL. (G.R. No. L-27463, L-
27503 & L-27504, May 16, 1969) - It is of course true that under Rule 12 of the Rules of Court a
party against whom a complaint has been filed is entitled to compel the plaintiff to submit a bill
of particulars in relation to such allegations of the latter's pleading as appear to be indefinite
and uncertain, and that the filing of the motion for the purpose suspends the running of the
period for the filing of the corresponding responsive pleading. Even under this rule, however, it
is doubtful whether the filing of a motion for a bill of particulars would automatically suspend
the running of the period for the filing of the required responsive pleading if it appears, as it
does in the present case, that it was filed manifestly for delay and was entirely without merit. Be
that as it may, it is settled that the Rules of Court are not of strict application but merely
suppletory to the CIR's own Rules of Procedure, and when, as in the present case, by formal
order the CIR had clearly given the direction for the filing of objections to the report under
question within a definite period to prevent the parties from resorting to dilatory tactics, We do
not believe said court erred in disregarding a pleading violative of its order and clearly intended
to delay the proceedings in a case which had started almost eight years before. We, therefore,
find no merit in the first assignment of error.

 FILIPINAS FABRICATORS vs. MAGSINO (G.R. No. L-47574, January 29, 1988) - The petitioners also
argue that, in denying the motion for a bill of particulars in the omnibus order of August 10,

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 1977, upon the ground that "... the matters sought to be alleged in the complaint [were]
evidentiary in nature which may be presented at the trial", the respondent court had in effect
clearly entertained the defective motion. Therefore, when the respondent court subsequently
treated it as "a mere scrap of paper" in its subsequent order of October 14, 1977, it committed a
serious error.

The argument has no merit. As we earlier stated, a motion without notice of hearing is nothing
but a piece of paper filed in court, which should be disregarded and ignored. Even without the
respondent court stating in the questioned orders its other reasons for throwing out the
petitioners' defective motion, the default order would still be valid. The additional finding that
the matters which the petitioners wanted to be alleged in the complaint were merely
evidentiary shows that even equitable considerations are lacking in the instant petition.

 JOSE MARIA SALVADOR, ET. AL. vs. ROSENDO FRIO, ET. AL. (G.R. No. L-25352, May 29, 1970)- 1.
The lower court's ruling that the complaint did not state with particularity the circumstances
constituting the fraud is not borne out by the pleadings. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged collusion
between the defendants and fraud on the part of defendant Frio in securing title to the land of
which "he was never the owner and was never in possession." Assuming that these allegations
were not sufficiently particular to satisfy the lower court, its proper course was not to dismiss
the complaint but to treat the motion as one for a bill of particulars and require plaintiffs to
submit a more definite statement or bill of particulars in accordance with Rule 12, section 1 of
the Rules of Court.1

 2. The lower court's other ruling that plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a cause of action because
it failed to allege that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value mistakes defendant Verdad's defense of being such an innocent purchaser for failure to
state a cause of action. Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent collusion between the defendants and the
latter's violating their rights "under a false and malicious claim of ownership, "particularly, that
defendant Frio fraudulently and illegally secured title to their property and then executed an
alleged deed of sale in favor of defendant Verdad. While imprecisely and imperfectly worded, it
was sufficient to challenge Verdad's claim of being an innocent purchaser.

 FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 89114, December 2,
1991) - Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill
of particulars because the ultimate facts constituting the three (3) essential elements of a cause
of action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in the complaint, it
would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only question to be resolved is
whether or not the allegations of the complaint are averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable the movant properly to prepare his responsive pleading and to prepare
for trial. As already discussed, the allegations of the complaint pertaining to the herein
petitioner are deficient because the averments therein are mere conclusions of law or
presumptions, unsupported by factual premises.

 SANTOS vs. LIWAG (G.R. No. L-24238, November 28, 1980) - We find no merit in the appeal. The
allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound
judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of
the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of
discretion or a clearly erroneous order. In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt
imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant

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 properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an orderly
and expeditious disposition tion in the case.

 The present action is one for the annulment of documents which have been allegedly executed
by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other
fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats,
however, are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without a statement of the
facts to which such terms have reference are not sufficient The allegations must state the facts
and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant
merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use
of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent
means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or
misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant the
defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the
order, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint. 7

 ROSITA ZAFRA BANTILLO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (G.R. No. 75311, October 18,
1988) - There is of course no question that petitioner's Amended Complaint was filed out of
time. Nonetheless the Court believes that in the interest of substantial and expeditious
justice, 9 the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed and ordered stricken from
the record. In the first place, the amendment of the original complaint consisted simply of
deletion of any reference to "other heirs" of the Zafra spouses as co-plaintiffs in the action for
reconveyance; petitioner, in other words, clarified that she alone was plaintiff and heir and
therefore was no longer suing also in a representative capacity. This amendment, in the second
place, imposed no substantial prejudice upon respondent Sumcad and was thus formal in
character. 10 As a matter of fact, Sumcad had not yet filed any responsive pleading at all and had
not disclosed the nature and basis of her own claim of ownership of Lot No. 63. The issues had
not yet been joined. Thirdly, the Amended Complaint was already before the trial court and it
could have and should have proceeded with the case.

LIRAG ET AL. vs. RICARDO D. GALANO (G.R. No. L-46244, August 18, 1988)- Upon
the facts, it is clear that petitioner had failed, if not "refused,"
to comply with the Orders of respondent Judge to file a Bill of
Particulars or an Amended Complaint notwithstanding the
extensions of time granted him. Pursuant to Section l (c) of Rule
12, therefore, the Court could "make such other order as it
deems just." Respondent Court deemed it just to dismiss the
case for failure to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court.


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 After the Court had ordered the
BAUTISTA vs. TEODORO (101 Phil. 701) -

appellant either to amend her complaint or to file a bill of

particulars within ten days from receipt of notice, on 17
November 1955 she moved that she be granted two weeks
from that date to file a bill of particulars. This the Court
granted. But she failed to file the bill of particulars within
that period. If she thought that she could not file it on
time, she should have seasonably explained to the Court
the reason why she could not do so and prayed that she
be granted another extension of time within which to
comply with the order of the Court, as she previously had
done. Said this Court in Smith Bell & Co., Ltd. v. American
President Lines Ltd., (99 Phil., 879) —

. . . The dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rest

upon the sound discretion of the court and will not be
reversed on appeal in the absence of abuse. The burden of
showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant since
every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the
court’s action.

 PALM AVENUE HOLDING CO., INC. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 173082 & G.R. No. 195795,
August 6, 2014)