Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106527. April 6, 1993.

CESAR E.A. VIRATA, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; BILL OF PARTICULARS; PURPOSE. — As this

Court enunciated in Tan vs. Sandiganbayan: "It is the office or
function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to
amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a
claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give
information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and
the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the
cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the
opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the
proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order
that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be
avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated
that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define,
clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case,
to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or
purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in
the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a
bill. It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material
allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a
cause of action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause
of action or defense other than the one stated. Also it is not the office
or function, or a proper object, of a bill of particulars to set forth the
pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule of evidence on which
he intends to rely, or to furnish evidential information whether such
information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to
introduce or of facts which constitute a defense or offset for the other
party or which will enable the opposite party to establish an
affirmative defense not yet pleaded." The phrase "to enable him
properly to prepare his responsive pleading . . ." in Section 1 of Rule
12 implies not just the opportunity to properly prepare a responsive
pleading but also, and more importantly, to prepare an intelligent
answer. Thus, in Tan vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court also said: The
complaint for which a bill for a more definite statement is sought,
need only inform the defendant of the essential (or ultimate) facts to
enable him, the defendant to prepare an intelligent answer . . . ." The
proper preparation of an intelligent answer requires information as to
the precise nature, character, scope and extent of the cause of action
in order that the pleader may be able to squarely meet the issues
raised, thereby circumscribing them within determined confines and,
preventing surprises during the trial, and in order that he may set
forth his defenses which may not be so readily availed of if the
allegations controverted are vague, indefinite, uncertain or are mere
general conclusions. The latter task assumes added significance
because defenses not pleaded (save those excepted in Section 2,
Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court and, whenever appropriate, the
defense of prescription) 27 in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived.

2. ID.; PROPRIETY OF THE MOTION FOR A BILL OF

PARTICULARS UNDER SEC. 1, RULE 12 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT IS BEYOND DISPUTE IN CASE AT BAR;
REASON. — We have carefully, scrutinized the paragraphs of the
expanded Second Amended Complaint subject of the petitioner's
motion for a bill of particulars and find the same to be couched in
general terms and wanting in definiteness or particularity. It is
precisely for this reason that We indirectly suggested in the said
decision that the petitioner's remedy is to file a motion for a bill of
particulars and not a motion to dismiss. Thus, the basis of the
distinction made by the respondent Sandiganbayan between the
allegations in support of the first three (3) "actionable wrongs" and
those in support of the fourth is as imperceptible as it is insignificant
in the light of its admission that the ruling in Tantuico possesses "a
semblance of relevance to the factual setting of the instant incident."
As We see it, there exists not only a semblance but a striking
similarity in the crafting of the allegations between the causes of
action against Tantuico and those against the petitioner. And, as
already stated, such allegations are general and suffer from a lack of
definiteness and particularity. As a matter of fact, paragraphs 2, 7, 9
and 17 — four of the five paragraphs of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 0035 which was resolved in Tantuico — are likewise involved in
the instant case. Tantuico's applicability to the instant case is thus
ineluctable and the propriety of the motion for a bill of particulars
under Section 1, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court is beyond
dispute. We also find the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that "the
matters which defendant-movant seeks are evidentiary in nature and,
being within his intimate or personal knowledge, may be denied of
admitted by him or if deemed necessary, be the subject of other
forms of discovery," to be without basis as to the first aspect and
gratuitous as to the second. The above disquisition's indubitably
reveal that the matters sought to be averred with particularity are not
evidentiary in nature. Since the issues have not as yet been joined
and no evidence has so far been adduced by the parties the
Sandiganbayan was in no position to conclude that the matters which
the. petitioner seeks are "within his intimate or personal knowledge."

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

This petition is a sequel to Virata vs. Sandiganbayan 1 and Mapa vs.

Sandiganbayan 2 which were jointly decided by this Court on 15
October 1991. 3

Petitioner is among the forty-four (44) co-defendants of Benjamin

(Kokoy) Romualdez in a complaint filed by the Republic of the
Philippines with the respondent Sandiganbayan on 31 July 1987. 4
The complaint was amended thrice, the last amendment thereto is
denominated as the Second Amended Complaint, as expanded per
the Court-Approved Manifestation/Motion dated 8 December 1987. 5

Petitioner moved to dismiss the said case, insofar as he is

concerned, on various grounds including the failure of the expanded
Second Amended Complaint to state a cause of action. The motion
was denied and so was his bid to have such denial reconsidered. He
then came to this Court via a special civil action for certiorari imputing
upon the respondent Sandiganbayan the commission of grave abuse
'of discretion in, inter alia, finding that the complaint sufficiently states
a cause of action against him. In Our aforementioned Decision of 15
October 1991, We overruled the said contention and upheld the ruling
of the Sandiganbayan. However, We stated: 6

"No doubt is left in Our minds that the questioned expanded Second
Amended Complaint is crafted to conform to a well-planned outline
that forthwith focuses one's attention to the asserted right of the
State, expressly recognized and affirmed by the 1987 Constitution
(Section 15, Art XI), and its corresponding duty, (Bataan Shipyard &
Engineering Co., Inc. vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 207) to recover ill-
gotten wealth from the defendants named therein; the alleged
schemes and devises used and the manipulations made by them to
amass such ill-gotten wealth, which are averred first generally and
then specifically; and the extent of the reliefs demanded and prayed
for. However, as shown above, the maze of unnecessary literary
embellishments may indeed raise some doubts on the sufficiency of
the statement of material operative facts to flesh out the causes of
action. Be that as it may, We are, nevertheless, convinced that the
questioned pleading has sufficiently shown viable causes of action.

xxx xxx xxx

If petitioners perceive some ambiguity or vagueness therein, the

remedy is not a motion to dismiss. An action should not be dismissed
upon a mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are
not grounds for a motion to dismiss, but rather for a bill of particulars .
. . (Amaro vs. Sumanguit, 5 SCRA 707) . . ."

Petitioner was thus compelled to go back to the Sandiganbayan.

However, insisting that he "could not prepare an intelligent and
adequate pleading in view of the general and sweeping allegations
against him in the Second Amended Complaint as expanded," 7
while at the same time remaining "steadfast in his position
maintaining his posture of innocence," 8 petitioner filed on 30 January
1992 a Motion For a Bill of Particulars. 9 He alleges therein that on
the basis of the general and sweeping allegations in the Second
Amended Complaint, to wit:

"a. 'The wrongs committed by Defendants, acting singly or collectively

and in unlawful concert with one another, include the
misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust end brazen abuse of power, as
more fully described below, all at the expense and to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.' (par. 2, at p.
3).

b. 'The following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees or agents,

by allowing themselves to be (sic) incorporators, directors, board
members and/or stockholders of corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos

xxx xxx xxx'

CESAR E. A. VIRATA

xxx xxx xxx

(par 7, at pp. 5-7).

c. 'From the early years of his presidency, Defendant Ferdinand E.

Marcos took undue advantage of his powers as President. All
throughout the period from September 21, 1972 to February 26,
1986, he gravely abused his powers under martial law and ruled as
Dictator under the 1973 Marcos promulgated Constitution Defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting singly or
collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant
breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligation as public
officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines,
embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth:'
(par 9 (a) in the section of the Complaint styled 'General Averments
of Defendants' Illegal Acts.' at pp. 12-13).

d. 'Defendants, acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert

with one another, for the purpose of preventing disclosure and
avoiding discovery of their unmitigated plunder of the National
Treasury and of their other illegal acts, and employing the services of
prominent lawyers, accountants, financial experts, businessmen and
other persons, deposited, kept and invested funds, securities and
other assets estimated at billions of US dollars in various banks,
financial institutions, trust or investment companies and with persons
here and abroad.' (par. 12, in the same section 'General Averments
of Defendants' Illegal Acts' at p. 18)." 10

which were attempted to be "fully describe[d]" in that "section of the

complaint, styled 'Specific Averments of the Defendant's Illegal Acts,"
11 as follows:

"a. 'Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez

Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or unlawful (sic) concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with
the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
strategies to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people, among others: (par. 14, at p. 19).

xxx xxx xxx

(i) Gave MERALCO undue advantage . . . (ii) with the active

collaboration of Defendant Cesar E. A. Virata be (sic) reducing the
electric franchise tax from 5% to 2% of gross receipts and the tariff
duty on fuel oil imports by public utilities from 20% to 10%, resulting
in substantial savings for MERALCO but without any significant
benefit to the consumers of electric power and loss of million (sic) of
pesos in much needed revenues to the government;' (par 14(b), at pp
22 and 23)

(ii) 'Secured, in a veiled attempt to justify MERALCO's anomalous

acquisition of the electric cooperatives, with the active collaboration of
Defendants Cesar E. A. Virata, . . . and the rest of the Defendants,
the approval by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cabinet of
the so-called 'Three-Year Program for the Extension of MERALCO's
Services of Areas within the 60 kilometer Radius of Manila,' which
required government capital investment amounting to millions of
pesos; (par. 14(g), at p. 25)

(iii) 'Manipulated with the support, assistance and collaboration

Philguarantee officials led by Chairman Cesar E. A. Virata and the
senior managers of EMMC,/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S.
Sandejas, J. Jose M. Mantecon and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among
others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc., without infusing
additional capital solely for the purpose of making it assume the
obligation of Erectors, Inc. with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387.440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable
Erectors, Inc. to appear viable and to borrow more capitals (sic), so
much so that its obligation with Philguarantee has reached a total of
more than P Billion as of June 30, 1987. (par. 14(m) p. 29)

(iv) 'The following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees and/or

agents by allowing themselves (i) to be used as instruments in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be incorporators,
directors or members of corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in
order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained: . . .
Cesar E.A. Virata . . .' (par. 17, at pp. 36-37).

b. 'The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful

concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official and
fiduciary obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse
of right and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Republic the (sic) Philippines, to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the, Filipino people' (par. 18, at p.
40)." 12

the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, asserts four (4) alleged

"actionable wrongs" against the herein petitioner, to wit:

"a. His alleged 'active collaboration' in the reduction of the electric

franchise tax from 5% to 2% of gross receipts and the tariff duty of
fuel oil imports by all public utilities from 20% to 10%, which — as this
Honorable Court will take judicial notice of — was effected through
the enactment, of Presidential Decree 551.

b. His alleged 'active collaboration' in securing the approval by

defendant Marcos and his Cabinet of the 'Three-Year Program for the
Extension of MERALCO's Services to Areas Within the 60-Kilometer
Radius of Manila' which — as this Honorable Court will likewise take
judicial notice of — the present government continuously sanctions to
date.

c. His alleged 'support, assistance and collaboration' in the formation

of Erectors Holdings, Inc.

d. His alleged acting as 'dummy, nominee, and/or agent by allowing'

himself '(i) to be used as instrument(s) (sic) in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies
prejudicial to Plaintiff' or (ii) to be an incorporator, director, or member
of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants
Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette
Romualdez' in order 'to conceal and prevent recovery of assets
illegally obtained.'" 13

Petitioner claims, however, that insofar as he is concerned, the

"foregoing allegations . . . and the purported illegal acts imputed to
them as well as the alleged causes of actions are vague and
ambiguous. They are not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity as would enable defendant Virata to properly prepare his
answer or responsive pleading." 14 He therefore prays that "in
accordance with Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff be directed to
submit a more definite statement or a bill of particulars on the matters
mentioned above which are not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity." 15

In its Comment, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines opposed the

motion. Replying to the opposition, petitioner cited Tantuico vs.
Republic 16 which this Court decided on 2 December 1991.

In its Resolution promulgated on 4 August 1992, 17 the respondent

Sandiganbayan (Second Division) partially granted the Motion for a
Bill of Particulars. The dispositive portion thereof provides:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant 'Motion For Bill of

Particulars', dated January 30, 1992, is hereby partially granted.
Accordingly, plaintiff is hereby ordered to submit to the Court and
furnish defendant-movant with a bill of particulars of the facts prayed
for by the latter, pertaining to paragraph 17 (sic) and 18 of the
Expanded Complaint, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof.
Failure of plaintiff to do so would mean automatic deletion and/or
exclusion of defendant-movant's name from the said paragraphs of
the complaint, without prejudice to the standing valid effect of the
other specific allegations against him." 18

In granting the motion with respect to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the

expanded Second Amended Complaint — which it erroneously
referred to as the Expanded Complaint — the Sandiganbayan stated:
"In deference to the pronouncement made by the Highest Tribunal in
Tantuico. We rule and so hold that the foregoing allegations need
further amplifications and specifications insofar as defendant-movant
is concerned in order for him to be able to properly meet the issue
therein . . ." 19

However, in denying amplification as to the rest of the allegations, the

Sandiganbayan declared that:

"Albeit We are fully cognizant of the import and effect of the Supreme
Court ruling in Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic, et al., supra, however, We
are not prepared to rule that the said case applies squarely to the
case at bar to warrant an absolute ruling in defendant-movant's favor.
The thrust of the ruling in said case, although possessing a
semblance of relevance to the factual setting of the instant incident,
does not absolutely support defendant-movant's stance. As implicitly
admitted by defendant-movant, there are certain specific charges
against him in the Expanded Complaint which are conspicuously
absent in Tantuico, to wit: (i) his alleged 'active collaboration' in the
reduction of the electric franchise tax from 5% to 2% of gross receipts
and the tariff duty on fuel oil imports by all public utilities from 20% to
10%, which was effected through the enactment of Presidential
Decree 551; (ii) his 'alleged collaboration' in securing the approval by
defendant Marcos and his Cabinet of the 'Three-Year Program for the
Extension of Meralco's Services to Areas Within the 60-Kilometer
Radius of Manila'; and (iii) his alleged 'support, assistance and
collaboration' in the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. (EHI).

We are of the considered opinion that the foregoing charges in the

Expanded Complaint are clear, definite and specific enough to allow
defendant-movant to prepare an intelligent responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Considering the tenor of the Supreme Court ruling in
Tantuico, the nature and composition of the foregoing factual
allegations are, to Us, more than enough to meet the standards set
forth therein in determining the sufficiency or relevancy of a bill of
particulars. Alleging the specific nature, character, time and extent of
the phrase 'active collaboration' would be a mere surplus age and
would not serve any useful purpose, except to further delay the
proceedings in the case. Corollarily, any question as to the validity or
legality of the transactions involved in the charges against defendant-
movant is irrelevant and immaterial in the resolution of the instant
incident, inasmuch as the same is a matter of defense which shall
have its proper place during the trial on the merits, and on the
determination of the liability of defendant-movant after the trial proper.
Furthermore, the matters which defendant-movant seeks are
evidentiary in nature and, being within his intimate or personal
knowledge, may be denied or admitted by him or if deemed
necessary be the subject of other forms of discovery." 20
In short, of the four (4) actionable wrongs enumerated in the Motion
for a Bill of Particulars, the Sandiganbayan favorably acted only with
respect to the fourth. 21

Not satisfied with the partial grant of the motion, petitioner filed the
instant petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
contending that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not totally
granting his Motion for a Bill of Particulars.

After thorough deliberations on the issues raised, this Court finds the
petition to be impressed with merit. We therefore rule for the
petitioner.

The Sandiganbayan's favorable application of Tantuico vs. Republic

of the Philippines 22 with respect to the fourth "actionable wrong," or
more particularly to paragraphs 17 and 13 of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035, and its refusal to apply
the same to the first three (3) "actionable wrongs" simply because it is
"not prepared to rule that the said case (Tantuico) applies squarely to
the case at bar to warrant an absolute ruling in defendant-movant's
favor," is quite contrived; the ratiocination: offered in support of the
rejection defeats the very purpose of a bill of particulars.

It is to be observed that Tantuico vs. Republic of the Philippines also

originated from Civil Case No. 0035. Tantuico, herein petitioner's co-
defendant in the said civil case, filed a motion for a bill of particulars
to seek the amplification of the averments in paragraphs 2, 7, 9(a), 15
and 17 of the Second Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on the ground that the particulars sought are
evidentiary in nature. 23 This Court eventually overruled the
Sandiganbayan and forthwith directed the respondents therein to
prepare and file a Bill of Particulars embodying the facts prayed for by
Tantuico; this was based on Our finding that the questioned
allegations in the complaint pertaining to Tantuico "are deficient
because the averments therein are mere conclusions of law or
presumptions, unsupported by factual premises." 24

As in the earlier case of Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, We have

carefully, scrutinized the paragraphs of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint subject of the petitioner's motion for a bill of
particulars and find the same to be couched in general terms and
wanting in definiteness or particularity. It is precisely for this reason
that We indirectly suggested in the said decision that the petitioner's
remedy is to file a motion for a bill of particulars and not a motion to
dismiss. Thus, the basis of the distinction made by the respondent
Sandiganbayan between the allegations in support of the first three
(3) "actionable wrongs" and those in support of the fourth is as
imperceptible as it is insignificant in the light of its admission that the
ruling in Tantuico possesses "a semblance of relevance to the factual
setting of the instant incident." As We see it, there exists not only a
semblance but a striking similarity in the crafting of the allegations
between the causes of action against Tantuico and those against the
petitioner. And, as already stated, such allegations are general and
suffer from a lack of definiteness and particularity. As a matter of fact,
paragraphs 2, 7, 9 and 17 — four of the five paragraphs of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 which was resolved in Tantuico —
are likewise involved in the instant case. Tantuico's applicability to the
instant case is thus ineluctable and the propriety of the motion for a
bill of particulars under Section 1, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court is beyond dispute Said section reads:

"SEC. 1. Motion for bill of particulars. — Before responding to a

pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules,
within ten (10) days after service of the pleading upon him, a party
may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of
any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading
or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details, desired."

As this Court enunciated in Tan vs. Sandiganbayan: 25

"It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of

particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and
particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms,
give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party
and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of
the cause of action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise
the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that
the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in
order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be
avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated
that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define,
clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case,
to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or
purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in
the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a
bill.

It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations

necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of action
or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or
defense other than the one stated. Also it is not the office or function,
or a proper object, of a bill of particulars to set forth the pleader's
theory of his cause of action or a rule of evidence on which he
intends to rely, or to furnish evidential information whether such
information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to
introduce or of facts which constitute a defense or offset for the other
party or which will enable the opposite party to establish an
affirmative defense not yet pleaded."

The phrase "to enable him properly to prepare his responsive

pleading . . ." in Section 1 of Rule 12 implies not just the opportunity
to properly prepare a responsive pleading but also, and more
importantly, to prepare an intelligent answer. Thus, in Tan vs.
Sandiganbayan, this Court also said:

"The complaint for which a bill for a more definite statement is sought,
need only inform the defendant of the essential (or ultimate) facts to
enable him, the defendant to prepare an intelligent answer . . ." 26
(Emphasis supplied).

The proper preparation of an intelligent answer requires information

as to the precise nature, character, scope and extent of the cause of
action in order that the pleader may be able to squarely meet the
issues raised, thereby circumscribing them within determined
confines and, preventing surprises during the trial, and in order that
he may set forth his defenses which may not be so readily availed of
if the allegations controverted are vague, indefinite, uncertain or are
mere general conclusions. The latter task assumes added
significance because defenses not pleaded (save those excepted in
Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court and, whenever
appropriate, the defense of prescription) 27 in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived. It was, therefore, grave error for
the Sandiganbayan to state that "[a]lleging the specific nature,
character, time and extent of the phrase 'active collaboration' would
be a mere surplus age and would not serve any useful purpose" 28
for precisely, without any amplification or particularization thereof, the
petitioner would be hard put in meeting the charges squarely and in
pleading appropriate defenses. Nor can We accept the public
respondent's postulation that "any question as to the validity or
legality of the transactions involved in the charges against defendant-
movant is irrelevant and immaterial in the resolution of the instant
incident, inasmuch as the same is a matter of defense which shall
have its proper place during the trial on the merits, and on the
determination of the liability of defendant-movant after the trial
proper." 29 This is absurd, for how may the petitioner set up a
defense at the time of trial if in his own answer he was not able to
plead such a defense precisely because of the vagueness or
indefiniteness of the allegations in the complaint? Unless he pleads
the defense in his answer, he may be deprived of the right to present
the same during the trial because of his waiver thereof; of course, he
may still do so if the adverse party fails to object thereto or if he is
permitted to amend his answer pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules of Court, but that is another thing.

We also find the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that "the matters which

defendant-movant seeks are evidentiary in nature and, being within
his intimate or personal knowledge, may be denied of admitted by
him or if deemed necessary, be the subject of other forms of
discovery," 30 to be without basis as to the first aspect and gratuitous
as to the second. The above disquisition's indubitably reveal that the
matters sought to be averred with particularity are not evidentiary in
nature. Since the issues have not as yet been joined and no evidence
has so far been adduced by the parties the Sandiganbayan was in no
position to conclude that the matters which the. petitioner seeks are
"within his intimate or personal knowledge."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of

respondent Sandiganbayan of 4 August 1992, to the extent that it
denied the motion for a bill of particulars with respect to the so-called
first three (3) "actionable wrongs," is SET ASIDE but affirmed as to
the rest. Accordingly, in addition to the specific bill of particulars
therein granted, respondent Republic of the Philippines, as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, is hereby ordered to
submit to the defendant (herein petitioner) in the said case, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a bill of
particulars containing the facts prayed for by the latter insofar as the
first three (3) "actionable wrongs" are concerned.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,

Campos, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Narvasa, C .J ., and Romero J ., took no part.

Feliciano, J ., concurs in the result.

Footnotes

1. G.R. No. 86926.

2. G.R. No. 86949.

3. 202 SCRA 680 [1991].

4. Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 38-78. The complaint is for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and is denominated as one for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

5. Annex "D", Id.; Id., 127-174.

6. Pp. 693-695; entries within parentheses appear as footnotes in the

decision.

7. Rollo, 9.

8. Id.

9. Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 175-182.

10. Rollo, 175-177.

11. Rollo, 177.

12. Rollo, 177-180.

13. Rollo, 180-181.

14. Rollo, 181.

15. Id.

16. 204 SCRA 428 [1991].

17. Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, op. cit., 24-37.

18. Id., 36-37.

19. Rollo, 34-35.

20. Rollo, 32-34.

21. Id., 14.

22. Supra.

23. Supra., at page 435.

24. Supra., at page 448.

25. 180 SCRA 34, 42-43 [1989], quoting 71 C.J.S. 376, cited in
Tantuico vs. Republic, supra.

26. Supra., at page 43, omitting footnote.

27. Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, 27
SCRA 766 [1967]; Garcia vs. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250 [1980]; Gulang
vs. Nadayag, G.R. No. 82630, 30 September 1992.

28. Supra., footnote no. 20.

29. Id.

30. Supra., footnote no. 20.