SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 96405. June 26, 1996.]
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE; DOES NOT SPECIFY
THAT THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BE A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. — Clearly, the
rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. What is
required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on
"long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate
than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when
parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker
evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended
a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them"
[FRANCISCO, THE RULES OF COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. VII, Part I,
1990 ed., p. 179] Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract
need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general
rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be
varied or contracted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS; SOLIDARY OR JOINT AND SEVERAL
OBLIGATION, DEFINED. — A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in
which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled
to demand the whole obligation. [TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 217] Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of
the Civil Code states the law on joint and several obligations. Under Art. 1207
thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and the same obligation,
the presumption is that the obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is
liable only for the proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when
the nature of the obligation so requires. [Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 89252, May 24, 1993, 222 SCRA 466, 481.]
3. ID.; GUARANTY; GUARANTOR AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SOLIDARY
DEBTOR. — While a guarantor may bind himself solidarity with the principal
debtor, the liability of a guarantor is different from that of a solidary debtor.
Thus, Tolentino explains: "A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the
principal debtor under the provisions of the second paragraph does not become
a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference between a
solidary co-debtor, and a fiandor in solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the
liability he assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor
has been exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which
pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other
rights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of
the Civil Code." [[TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V, 1992
ed., p. 502]
ROMERO, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18,1 which disposed of Civil Case No. 10507 for collection of a sum of money and damages, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, defendant BALDOMERO L. INCIONG, JR. is adjudged
solidarily liable and ordered to pay to the plaintiff Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City, the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), with interest thereon from May 5, 1983 at 16% per
annum until fully paid; and 6% per annum on the total amount due, as
liquidated damages or penalty from May 5, 1983 until fully paid; plus 10% of
the total amount due for expenses of litigation and attorney's fees; and to
pay the costs.
The counterclaim, as well as the cross claim, are dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he
signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding
themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissory note was due on May 5,
1983.
Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their obligation. Consequently,
on November 14, 1983 and on June 8, 1984, private respondent sent petitioner telegrams
demanding payment thereof.2 On December 11, 1984 private respondent also sent by
registered mail a final letter of demand to Rene C. Naybe. Since both obligors did not
respond to the demands made, private respondent filed on January 24, 1986 a complaint
for collection of the sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors.
On November 25, 1986, the complaint was dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
the case. However, on January 9, 1987, the lower court reconsidered the dismissal order
and required the sheriff to serve the summonses. On January 27, 1987, the lower court
dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas as prayed for by the private respondent
herein. Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to petitioner was served as the sheriff
learned that defendant Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia.
In his answer, petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1983, he was approached by his
friend, Rudy Campos, who told him that he was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of
private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos
also intimated to him that Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would
contribute a chainsaw to the venture. He added that, although Naybe had no money to buy
the equipment, Pio Tio had assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make with
private respondent. Campos then persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker" in the said
loan. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understanding that he would only be a co-
maker for the loan of P50,000.00.
Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him
by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that
he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and
misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00.
In the aforementioned decision of the lower court, it noted that the typewritten figure "--
50,000 --" clearly appears directly below the admitted signature of the petitioner in the
promissory note. 3 Hence, the latter's uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability
cannot prevail over the presumed regularity and fairness of the transaction, under Sec. 5
(q) of Rule 131. The lower court added that it was "rather odd" for petitioner to have
indicated in a copy and not in the original, of the promissory note, his supposed obligation
in the amount of P5,000.00 only. Finally, the lower court held that, even granting that said
limited amount had actually been agreed upon, the same would have been merely
collateral between him and Naybe and, therefore, not binding upon the private respondent
as creditor-bank.
The lower court also noted that petitioner was a holder of a Bachelor of Laws degree and a
labor consultant who was supposed to take due care of his concerns, and that, on the
witness stand, Pio Tio denied having participated in the alleged business venture although
he knew for a fact that the falcata logs operation was encouraged by the bank for its export
potential.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision of
August 31, 1990, affirmed that of the lower court. His motion for reconsideration of the said
decision having been denied, he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On February 6, 1991, the Court denied the petition for failure of petitioner to comply with
the Rules of Court and paragraph 2 of Circular
No. 1-88, and to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error
in its questioned decision.4 His motion for the reconsideration of the denial of his petition
was likewise denied with finality in the Resolution of April 24, 1991.5 Thereafter, petitioner
filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration which, in the Resolution
of May 27, 1991, the Court denied. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the entry of
judgment in this case.6
Unfazed, petitioner filed a notion for leave to file a motion for clarification. In the latter
motion, he asserted that he had attached Registry Receipt No. 3268 to page 14 of the
petition in compliance with Circular No. 1-88. Thus, on August 7, 1991, the Court granted
his prayer that his petition be given due course and reinstated the same.7
Nonetheless, we find the petition unmeritorious.
Annexed to the petition is a copy of an affidavit executed on May 3, 1988, or after the
rendition of the decision of the lower court, by Gregorio Pantanosas, Jr., an MTCC judge
and petitioner's co-maker in the promissory note. It supports petitioner's allegation that they
were induced to sign the promissory note on the belief that it was only for P5,000.00,
adding that it was Campos who caused the amount of the loan to be increased to
P50,000.00.
The affidavit is clearly intended to buttress petitioner's contention in the instant petition that
the Court of Appeals should have declared the promissory note null and void on the
following grounds: (a) the promissory note was signed in the office of Judge Pantanosas,
outside the premises of the bank; (b) the loan was incurred for the purpose of buying a
second-hand chainsaw which cost only P5,000.00; (c) even a new chainsaw would cost
only P27,500.00; (d) the loan was not approved by the board or credit committee which
was the practice, as it exceeded P5,000.00; (e) the loan had no collateral; (f) petitioner and
Judge Pantanosas were not present at the time the loan was released in contravention of
the bank practice, and (g) notices of default are sent simultaneously and separately but no
notice was validly sent to him.8 Finally, petitioner contends that in signing the promissory
note, his consent was vitiated by fraud as, contrary to their agreement that the loan was
only for the amount of P5,000.00, the promissory note stated the amount of P50,000.00.
The above-stated points are clearly factual. Petitioner is to be reminded of the basic rule
that this Court is not a trier of facts. Having lost the chance to fully ventilate his factual
claims below, petitioner may no longer be accorded the same opportunity in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court below. Had he presented Judge
Pantanosas affidavit before the lower court, it would have strengthened his claim that the
promissory note did not reflect the correct amount of the loan.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the promissory note "is not a public
deed with the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a mere commercial paper which does
not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the
contents of the promissory note.9 The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule 10 states:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.
What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which
rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the
terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger
and to show that the
parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by
them." 11 Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties. 12 As a general rule, bills, notes and other
instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or
extrinsic evidence. 13
By alleging fraud in his answer, 14 petitioner was actually in the right direction towards
proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that,
where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the
written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence. 15 However, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being
adequate. 16 Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only
by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Petitioner also argues that the dismissal of the complaint against Naybe, the principal
debtor, and against Pantanosas, his co-maker, constituted a release of his obligation,
especially because the dismissal of the case against Pantanosas was upon the motion of
private respondent itself. He cites as basis for his argument, Article 2080 of the Civil Code
which provides that:
The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their
obligation whenever by some act of the creditor, they cannot be subrogated
to the rights, mortgages, and preferences of the latter.
It is to be noted, however, that petitioner signed the promissory note as a solidary co-maker
and not as a guarantor. This is patent even from the first sentence of the promissory note
which states as follows:
Ninety one (91) days after date, for value received, I/we, JOINTLY and
SEVERALLY promise to pay to the PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS at its office in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, together with interest . . . at the rate of SIXTEEN (16) per
cent per annum until fully paid.
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. 17 on the other
hand, Article 2047 of the Civil Code states:
By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to
fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do
so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions
of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such a
case the contract is called a suretyship. (Emphasis supplied.)
While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the liability of
a guarantor is different from that of a solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains:
A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor under the
provisions of the second paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor
to all intents and purposes. There is a difference between a solidary co-
debtor and a fiador in solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the liability he
assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has
been exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which
pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no
other rights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I,
Book IV of the Civil Code. 18
Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code states the law on joint and several
obligations. Under Art. 1207 thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and the
same obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is
liable only for a proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the
obligation so requires. 19
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three
signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be
proceeded against for the entire obligation. 20 The choice is left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection. 21 Consequently, the dismissal of the
case against Judge Pontanosas may not be deemed as having discharged petitioner from
liability as well. As regards Naybe, suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction
over him. Petitioner, therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as provided
by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
